This week saw two terror attacks that apparently came close to high-level officials: the Taliban suicide bombing at Bagram Air Force Base while Vice President Cheney was staying there, and the Tamil Tiger (LTTE) mortar attack on an aircraft carrying U.S. Ambassador Robert Blake, along with the Italian and German Ambassadors. In Afghanistan, the Taliban insist that they were targeting Cheney, while U.S. officials claim that the Taliban do not have the capability. In contrast, the LTTE insists that it was not targeting the international diplomats, but the Sri Lankan government claims that they were. It is unlikely that either attack expressly targeted the officials. But the difference in the claims about the attack illustrates the differences between the two conflicts and between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 terror.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban apparently claimed that Cheney was the target of the attack on Bagram. However, the Taliban had little notice of Cheney’s movements and suicide bombings take some time to prepare. Besides the logistics the bomber has to be completely prepared psychologically – at the same time, an indoctrinated bomber cannot be kept waiting, otherwise the bomber may have second thoughts. It is conceivable that the Taliban had a suicide bombing in the works and shifted it to Bagram when they learned that Cheney was there. But changing plans quickly increases the likelihood of being intercepted if the new plan takes the bombers to an area that has not been carefully reconnoitered. Also, the bomber made no effort (and really had no chance) of penetrating deeply into Bagram.
That the Taliban readily claimed that they were targeting Cheney shows how presenting the image of strength and the ability to hit the United States is essential to the Taliban and the broader Islamist cause.
In Sri Lanka the Sri Lankan government and two former Tamil Tigers who are now allied with the Sri Lankan government have insisted that the Tigers – who have a well-developed intelligence infrastructure and have carried out innumerable, high-level attacks – must have known about the movements of the international diplomats and intentionally targeted them. The Tigers formally claim that the government should have informed the Tigers about the movements of the diplomats.
The LTTE is a truly vicious terrorist group that has pioneered suicide bombings and fanatically prevented any reasonable settlement of Sri Lanka’s ongoing civil war. But they have also calibrated their violence when necessary. Despite long-standing U.S. support for the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE has specifically avoided targeting Americans (including not targeting U.S. military trainers in Sri Lanka.) Also, the LTTE’s one foray into international terrorism, the 1991 assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was a major strategic blunder turning India, the regional heavyweight, into an enemy. The LTTE’s strategic depth ought to be the Indian province of Tamil Nadu, home to over 50 million ethnic Tamils. While the LTTE has received support from sympathetic Indian Tamils in the past, India’s overall posture has made that more difficult.
This analysis, from a retired Indian army officer at the South Asia Analysis Group explains how the attack was in fact part the LTTE overall operational strategy and ceased the LTTE was contacted by a third party. In short, directly attacking U.S. officials would be a major departure from long-standing LTTE policy.
The Taliban are part of a global movement that is seeking to challenge the international order, whereas the Tigers seek portray themselves as an oppressed minority seeking their due. Interestingly, the targets responses are also opposite. The United States has played down Taliban capabilities. The Sri Lankan government, in turn, is portraying itself as the victim of a super-powerful terrorist organization and is seeking to enlist international aid against its enemy.
The LTTE is the old terrorism, where the violence, while terrible, was part of a political strategy and could be limited when it suited the terrorist’s purposes. The LTTE is also a hierarchical organization in which, ultimately, LTTE founder and leader Prabhakaran make the big decisions. That is, the LTTE’s terror is first limited by their desires – not their capabilities. With an international fundraising and propaganda network the LTTE unquestionably has the operatives, intelligence, and resources to undertake international terror attacks – they have chosen not to do so. In the case of the Taliban and other Islamist groups, the limitations are in the capabilities – not their desires. There is no question that the Taliban would have murdered Cheney had they been able to do so. For that matter, if they were able to, they would almost certainly use WMD against the United States. Thankfully their capacity to launch long distance attacks against far targets appears limited – for now.
The recent attacks by the Tigers and the Taliban – and the aftermath of these attacks, illustrate the opposite poles in terrorist strategies. No counter-terror strategy or accompanying information war strategy should ignore that paradigm.
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