Eli Lake, of the The New York Sun, reports that documents captured from Iranian operatives in Iraq indicate that Iran has been supporting Sunni jihadists in Iraq. There have been other hints of this support. Reports on the IEDs have noted obliquely that the highest quality explosives come from Iran, and Hezbollah has been deploying IEDs against Israel since the 1990s.
Considering the well-known Iranian support for the Shiite militias (including Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, Abd al-Aziz Hakim’s SCIRI, and al-Dawa) and the bloody sectarian fighting between Shia and Sunnis, Iranian support for Sunni jihadis seems counter-intuitive. While the veracity of the report is not yet certain, seen in the context for Iranian support for terrorism elsewhere, a Iranian link to the Sunni insurgency has precedent. Not only, has Iran been willing to support Sunnis, Iran has frequently taken complex, multi-pronged approaches in their support for terrorism. This is approach particularly evident in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where it has been highly effective in expanding Iranian influence.
First, since the 1979 revolution the Iranian regime reached out to Sunni radicals worldwide with open hands. In places with only small Shia populations, Sunni antipathy tends to be muted and often these Sunni radicals were open to Iranian aid. Hezbollah, Iran’s leading terror proxy, provided training for radicals of all stripes at Sudanese training camps in the early 1990s. Egyptian and Algerian radicals received Iranian support. Also, Hezbollah’s top killer, Imad Mughniyah met with Bin Laden in Khartoum and forged an alliance. Later al-Qaeda operations, particularly the 1998 Embassy Bombings bore all the hallmarks of a Hezbollah operation (particularly the meticulous planning and the multiple simultaneous truck bombs).
Second, the Iranians have employed sophisticated strategies in supporting terrorist organizations in areas of priority. In Lebanon in 1982, Iran’s Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohatashemi, brought several radical Lebanese Shia factions together to form Hezbollah. Now the “Father of Hezbollah” is coordinating Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist groups. But here he is taking an opposite strategy, fostering competition between different groups to keep the pot boiling.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is Iran’s closest ally and was almost completely dependent on Iranian funding. The funding came via Hezbollah, but in June 2002 – as a reward for their many successful operations – PIJ was given an independent funding stream. The Iranians can be sure that even if Hamas and Fatah sign on to a hudna, PIJ will break it. But Iran has been generous to all factions (even minor secular ones like the PFLP) with money and arms. Iran is carefully infiltrating both Hamas and Fatah. Top leaders of both organizations, particularly Hamas’ Damascus leadership, are tightly linked to Iran. At the same time, lower level operatives from Hamas and Fatah are given training and medical treatment in Iran and some start Hezbollah cells in the West Bank and Gaza on their return. The first Hezbollah cells in the West Bank and Gaza were started by members of Force 17, the Palestinian Presidential Guard (which the U.S. is now arming to counter Hamas.)*
On the micro-level, having cells beholden to Tehran gives the Iranians direct levers to continue the violence. On the macro-Palestinian political level, the essential dynamic is that attacking Israel builds a group’s credibility. If Hamas or Fatah leaders decide to reach an understanding with Israel, then other groups have an increased incentive to launch attacks and build their own credibility.
This dynamic is essential to the third point about understanding Iranian support for terrorism. Iranian politics is a complex “black box” with numerous players. There are the formal ministries and intelligence agencies. But there is also the parallel government of the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards, who are charged with protecting the Islamic revolution and have played a key role in sponsoring international terrorist groups. There are also non-governmental radical institutions in Iran such as the bonyads (cleric controlled cartels that funnel some of their profits to radical causes world-wide) and internal vigilante groups that crack down on dissidents and reformers. Finally, Syria and Hezbollah, while closely allied with Iran, also pursue their own priorities via their own channels. These multiple semi-independent factions can create complicated situations in which different factions will compete to support extremist activity, build alliances with proxies, and generally not be left out of developments.
In short, Iran and its allies represent an alloyed network in which many of the network elements have formidable capabilities and can operate with tremendous cunning. At the same time the dynamics between the elements of the network can further foster chaotic situations that broadly serve Iranian interests and where Iran can fill the vacuum.
During the Cold War, the Soviets were often considered master chess players. But chess was invented in ancient Iran.
*Force 17 and Hezbollah have a long history of interaction. Hezbollah’s top killer, Imad Mughniyah – mastermind of Hezbollah’s deadliest attacks, including the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing – was a Force 17 alumnus. Also worth noting, Force 17 (which was supposed named due to its address at 17 Faqahani St. in Beirut) started as a protection unit for PLO officials. Naturally these skills were dual use and Force 17 became an integral part of PLO terror operations. When the PA was established, Force 17 became the Presidential Security Unit. Interestingly, under the PA, the unit’s uniforms had the number 17 on the arm.
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