Hamas in the Palestinian Authority Seeks and Receives Assistance from Tehran and Damascus by David Schenker

Earlier this week, Israeli Defense Forces intelligence directorate chief BG Yossi Baidatz said that since the September 2005 Israeli withdrawal, Hamas had smuggled in millions of dollars worth of advanced weaponry to Gaza. Baidatz briefed the Israeli cabinet that anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons had entered Gaza, placing IDF helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at risk. Other Israeli sources suggest these weapons include the Russian-made Kornet anti-tank rocket employed so effectively by Hizballah against Israeli armor in August, as well as Soviet-era SAM-7s. Still other reports suggest that Hamas had managed to import over 20 tons of military explosives into Gaza.

No doubt these assessments inspired the current Israeli operation in Gaza, in which Israeli forces have returned to the Philadephia Corridor—the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—once occupied by the IDF to interdict weapons and personnel smuggling.

For Israel, the challenges posed by an increasingly well equipped Hamas go well beyond armaments. Hamas is also focused on improving the capabilities of its' personnel.

Indeed, two weeks ago, the Hamas PA Minister of the Interior, Said Siyam, traveled to Tehran and Damascus in search of technical assistance for his forces. Siyam’s meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene'i, President Ahmedinejad, and senior security officials—including reportedly with the Revolutionary Guard officials—were said to have gone quite well. So did Siyam’s meetings with the Syrian Interior Minister. News reports emerging from the trip suggest that Siyam received commitments from Tehran and Damascus to train (and fund) Palestinian (i.e., Hamas) police and intelligence cadres.

These developments are cause for concern for Israel. But they should also be of concern to Washington. Like Hizballah—which has long targeted the US—Hamas too has long espoused a virulently anti-US ideology. A marked improvement of technical capabilities could help Hamas to more effectively target US assets and personnel, should it find it in its interests to do so. Just recall the roadside bomb attack that killed 4 US diplomatic personnel in Gaza three years ago, on October 15, 2003. The investigation remains open, but it’s not difficult to imagine a Hamas role—either independently or via the Popular Resistance Committees—in the attack.