The top U.S. communications regulator plans to unveil proposals Monday for ensuring Web traffic is not slowed or blocked based on its content, sources familiar with the contents of the speech said on Friday.
Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski will announce plans to ask his fellow commissioners to adopt as a rule net neutrality and four existing principles on Internet access issued by the agency in 2005, one of the sources said.
Net neutrality pits open Internet companies like Google Inc against broadband service providers like AT&T Inc, Verizon Communications Inc and Comcast Corp, which oppose new rules governing network management.
Advocates of net neutrality say Internet service providers must be barred from blocking or slowing traffic based on its content.
But service providers say the increasing volume of bandwidth-hogging services, like video sharing, requires active management of their networks and some argue that net neutrality could stifle innovation.
"He is going to announce rulemaking," said one source familiar with the speech due to be delivered at the Brookings Institution, a public policy think tank.
The rule proposal will also try to seek greater clarity into what constitutes "reasonable" network management by Internet providers.
The FCC could formally propose the rule aimed at both wireless and landline Internet platforms at an open meeting in October.
Because of the implications for applications such as Internet phone calling services, like those provided by eBay Inc's Skype and Google, agency staff are expected to propose setting a lengthy public comment period before any final action.
The Monday speech coincides with a deadline for the FCC to file a court brief in a case against Comcast, which is challenging whether the agency has the authority to regulate actions involving the Internet.
The FCC is expected to defend its position by arguing that the agency has broad authority under the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
Public interest groups praised Genachowski for moving forward with a rule that would protect speech and commerce, predicting the policy move would be a big win for consumers.
"It will be a big win for consumers if the FCC delivers strong net neutrality rules that apply across all technologies," Ben Scott, policy director at Free Press, said in a statement.
Friday, September 18, 2009
Exhausting the Term "Sectarian" by Mshari Al-Zaydi
What exactly do we mean when we say there is a "sectarian" problem in the Middle East?
This statement is both confusing and misleading, both in letter and spirit, as it seems to indicate the existence of [many] sects and trends in conflict with each other whereas in reality there is tension and conflict between only two sects; the Shiites and the Sunnis. This conflict is taking place in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan and the Gulf and the reverberations of this can be felt throughout Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This impact can be seen in the talk of a campaign to Shiaficate the four countries mentioned above, even though these countries do not have Shiite communities, or have an almost negligible Shiite population.
So it is meaningless to talk about a variety of different sects, when it is only two sects who are monopolizing the conflict, although other smaller sects or trends may become involved in this conflict, as was the case with General Aoun's [Free Patriotic] movement or Walid Jumblatt's party [PSP] in Lebanon.
This [differentiation] is not pedantry, but is instead a description of the woeful state of the Middle East which is increasingly losing its diversity. The Christians have lost their presence and influence in the East. Ignore the noise that is being made by the Christians in Lebanon, and the roar of the Copts in Egypt; however it must be said that the Egyptians Copts do carry considerable weight in comparison to the rest of the Christians in the [Middle] East.
As for the confusion and obscurity in the definition of the term "sectarian conflict" this [is because] it refers to different verbal, theological, and historical divisions. However the problem of sectarianism is far more complicated, and cannot be confined to just cultural, theological, juristic, and historical dimensions. These dimensions form the overt shape of this current conflict of interests and counter-interests; this is a conflict that wears the cloak of sectarianism as part of a strategy to unite and rally the crowd behind a banner. However in the end this banner is just a banner; it does not represent the picture as a whole, but is instead its main feature.
Just look around you in our tense region and you will find a systematic and active endeavor to divide the Arab public until they can only define themselves in a sectarian manner. For example, the Future Movement today is not the same as the Future Movement under the leadership of Rafik al-Hariri. The Future Movement under the leadership of Rafik al-Hariri was more relaxed towards others, particularly the Shiites in Lebanon. However the Future Movement under Saad al-Hariri has become strained and less relaxed [with regards to its relationship] towards others.
It would be easy to say that this Sunni sectarian animosity – which [Saad] al-Hariri was the catalyst for – is nothing more than a reaction to the overt sectarianism of the Khomeinist Hezbollah and the affiliated Amal Movement. The Hariris – at least with regards to their rhetoric and election – did not spring from sectarian sensitivities. It was the non-stop and systematic disruptions caused by Hezbollah, its protests, its invasion of Beirut, its monopolization of [the concept of] purity and honor, and its stigmatization of the Hariris in particularly, and the Sunnis in general, accusing them of being agents of the US and Israel, which cornered the supporters of the Future Movement and caused the party's leadership to lose control of its ability to control sectarian passions.
But is this viewpoint enough to understand the sectarian frenzy that has taken place this year, not just in Lebanon, but also in Iraq. According to Iraqi journalist Hassan al-Alawi, Iraq is being governed by a "Shiite government" but not by the Shiites of Iraq. Iraq is full to the brim with shocking sectarianism, and this is now spilling over into the entire region. The Emir of Kuwait expressed a great deal of anger at the emergence of sectarianism in his country during his most recent address, and this is a clear sign of the increasing and negative impact of this [sectarianism spilling over].
There is no alternative but to admit that the political tension in the region is primarily a sectarian scene where the players are dressed in sectarian costumes and are playing out this [sectarian] conflict. However underneath the costume there is a conflict of interest and the desire to correct the mistakes of history that are currently being played out here and there.
If we delve a little deeper, the picture is not as simple as it seems at first glance. If we look into the situation in Syria, and the accusations of Alawite sectarianism made by Sunni Islamists against the ruling regime, then things are even more complicated than we imagined.
In an essay published in the excellent [Arabic] anthology put together by [Lebanese journalist] Hazim Saghieh entitled "Nawasib wa Rawafid" the Syrian writer Yassin Haj Saleh tells us that during the Muslim Brotherhood's struggle against late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, the movement's major problem can be seen in their inability to transform the Sunnis in Syria – who represented around 70 percent of the population – into "sectarians." And so the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria remained sectarians without a sect. The ironic thing about the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is that even though they were less than a sect, they dreamt of becoming an entire nation.
Haj Saleh also talks about the Hama Massacre, which took place in 1982 when the Muslim Brotherhood clashed with the Syrian regime. Saleh describes what happened in a manner that divests it of the sectarian unity that the Muslim Brotherhood aspires to, saying "During the bloody confrontation that was taking place at the time, Hama and Aleppo were fiercely opposed to the regime, while Damascus was relaxed, Hims was restless, and Ar-Raqqah and Hauran were unaware what was happening…the Shawaya and the Beduoins (in addition to the Kurds) were siding with the regime."
Therefore this limitless Sunni ocean, in the same manner that it gives a feeling of comfort to those who want to benefit from, also contains internal contradictions. Let us look at another example, such as why didn't the Iraqi Kurds – who are Sunni – join with the Arab Sunni of Iraq against the Shiites in order to form an anti-Shiite Sunni bloc?
The answer is simple, because things aren't as united as those who embrace sectarian or religiously divisive ideology believe them to be.
A government, any government, has its own way of approaching religious issues and sectarian sensitivities. We are now witnessing an abundance of social activity on the part of Islamic currents and groups in Syria, which is ruled by a Secular Arabist Baathist regime. This is the declared side of the Syrian regime's identity, but what about the undeclared side? According to the accusations leveled at the Syrian regime by its enemies, the regime also incorporates a well-hidden Alawite sectarianism. The goal of the Sunnis in the "Levant" has remained the same, and the Sunni hegemony with regards to the definition of Islam still exists. Haj Saleh also revealed that there is an undeclared "gentleman's" agreement [in Syria] whereby those in power have control over politics, and the Islamic religious authority has control of society. If we add a newly formed economy built upon the ruins of a socialist one, then it is understandable how everything has become wrapped in the heavy cloak of Arabism, Patriotism, and the Resistance. This is a cloak that is worn by all, and has become something of a uniform that outwardly gives an appearance of unity [while hiding the disorder mentioned above].
As for Iran, even in the pre-Khomeini era, it would look at the question of sectarianism in terms of how it could best serve the country's political interests. Iran worked upon the issue of sectarianism, not out of enthusiasm for Shiite fanaticism, but rather in order to reap the fruit of sectarian intolerance. We have seen these fruit fall like ripe dates into the basket of Tehran's mullahs, by way of the fields of Lebanon whose Shiite community has been monopolized by the Khomeinist Hezbollah long after this seed was first sown by Musa al-Sadr.
In his own research published in Hazim Saghieih's "Nawasib wa Rawafid" Lebanese sociologist and writer Ahmed Beydoun writes about how ostentatious Safavid rituals found their way to the Lebanese Shiites, and how in the past the Lebanese Shiites were not overt or dramatic [with regards to their religious practices], but only became so after they were affected by Iran's influence. This was initially confined to the town of Nabateya, but this was later extended over the entire Shiite community by the influence of Hezbollah and Khomeini's ideologies. This strained the mood of the Lebanese Shiite community. This was not just a result of abstract sectarian zeal, but was a political tool to incubate and insulate the masses and incite them to rally around this political project.
There is a flagrant example in Yemen. The Zaidiyyah of Yemen, who are [ideologically] closer to the Sunnis (The people of the Hadtih) than they are to the Twelver Shiite, have become a Khomeinist enclave as a result of internal and external political pressure, rather than as a result of intellectual justifications. In this case, it is politics that has led to the creation of this ideology and sect.
To sum up, the recreation of Sunni – Shiite sectarianism is nothing more than a tool in the hands of certain politicians here and there. The majority of sects are being controlled and provoked by this [tool] which is being used by certain political elements. Even the most isolated and solitary sects, such as the Islamic Batiniyyah sect, abandon their practices for the logic and protection of the government. This also previously happened during the Fatimid era in Egypt, and is currently taking place once more.
Civilization and the logic of the modern State are the greatest losers as a result of this sectarian commotion, along with the idea of an Arab deriving his identity from civilization rather than sectarianism.
If this conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis results in the end of sectarian ideology in the region, then this would be a great victory and a magnificent breakthrough. However I wonder what price we would have to pay for such a victory. And more importantly, is there a guarantee that we will pass through the tunnel of sectarianism into the bright pastures of civilization?
This statement is both confusing and misleading, both in letter and spirit, as it seems to indicate the existence of [many] sects and trends in conflict with each other whereas in reality there is tension and conflict between only two sects; the Shiites and the Sunnis. This conflict is taking place in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan and the Gulf and the reverberations of this can be felt throughout Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This impact can be seen in the talk of a campaign to Shiaficate the four countries mentioned above, even though these countries do not have Shiite communities, or have an almost negligible Shiite population.
So it is meaningless to talk about a variety of different sects, when it is only two sects who are monopolizing the conflict, although other smaller sects or trends may become involved in this conflict, as was the case with General Aoun's [Free Patriotic] movement or Walid Jumblatt's party [PSP] in Lebanon.
This [differentiation] is not pedantry, but is instead a description of the woeful state of the Middle East which is increasingly losing its diversity. The Christians have lost their presence and influence in the East. Ignore the noise that is being made by the Christians in Lebanon, and the roar of the Copts in Egypt; however it must be said that the Egyptians Copts do carry considerable weight in comparison to the rest of the Christians in the [Middle] East.
As for the confusion and obscurity in the definition of the term "sectarian conflict" this [is because] it refers to different verbal, theological, and historical divisions. However the problem of sectarianism is far more complicated, and cannot be confined to just cultural, theological, juristic, and historical dimensions. These dimensions form the overt shape of this current conflict of interests and counter-interests; this is a conflict that wears the cloak of sectarianism as part of a strategy to unite and rally the crowd behind a banner. However in the end this banner is just a banner; it does not represent the picture as a whole, but is instead its main feature.
Just look around you in our tense region and you will find a systematic and active endeavor to divide the Arab public until they can only define themselves in a sectarian manner. For example, the Future Movement today is not the same as the Future Movement under the leadership of Rafik al-Hariri. The Future Movement under the leadership of Rafik al-Hariri was more relaxed towards others, particularly the Shiites in Lebanon. However the Future Movement under Saad al-Hariri has become strained and less relaxed [with regards to its relationship] towards others.
It would be easy to say that this Sunni sectarian animosity – which [Saad] al-Hariri was the catalyst for – is nothing more than a reaction to the overt sectarianism of the Khomeinist Hezbollah and the affiliated Amal Movement. The Hariris – at least with regards to their rhetoric and election – did not spring from sectarian sensitivities. It was the non-stop and systematic disruptions caused by Hezbollah, its protests, its invasion of Beirut, its monopolization of [the concept of] purity and honor, and its stigmatization of the Hariris in particularly, and the Sunnis in general, accusing them of being agents of the US and Israel, which cornered the supporters of the Future Movement and caused the party's leadership to lose control of its ability to control sectarian passions.
But is this viewpoint enough to understand the sectarian frenzy that has taken place this year, not just in Lebanon, but also in Iraq. According to Iraqi journalist Hassan al-Alawi, Iraq is being governed by a "Shiite government" but not by the Shiites of Iraq. Iraq is full to the brim with shocking sectarianism, and this is now spilling over into the entire region. The Emir of Kuwait expressed a great deal of anger at the emergence of sectarianism in his country during his most recent address, and this is a clear sign of the increasing and negative impact of this [sectarianism spilling over].
There is no alternative but to admit that the political tension in the region is primarily a sectarian scene where the players are dressed in sectarian costumes and are playing out this [sectarian] conflict. However underneath the costume there is a conflict of interest and the desire to correct the mistakes of history that are currently being played out here and there.
If we delve a little deeper, the picture is not as simple as it seems at first glance. If we look into the situation in Syria, and the accusations of Alawite sectarianism made by Sunni Islamists against the ruling regime, then things are even more complicated than we imagined.
In an essay published in the excellent [Arabic] anthology put together by [Lebanese journalist] Hazim Saghieh entitled "Nawasib wa Rawafid" the Syrian writer Yassin Haj Saleh tells us that during the Muslim Brotherhood's struggle against late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, the movement's major problem can be seen in their inability to transform the Sunnis in Syria – who represented around 70 percent of the population – into "sectarians." And so the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria remained sectarians without a sect. The ironic thing about the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is that even though they were less than a sect, they dreamt of becoming an entire nation.
Haj Saleh also talks about the Hama Massacre, which took place in 1982 when the Muslim Brotherhood clashed with the Syrian regime. Saleh describes what happened in a manner that divests it of the sectarian unity that the Muslim Brotherhood aspires to, saying "During the bloody confrontation that was taking place at the time, Hama and Aleppo were fiercely opposed to the regime, while Damascus was relaxed, Hims was restless, and Ar-Raqqah and Hauran were unaware what was happening…the Shawaya and the Beduoins (in addition to the Kurds) were siding with the regime."
Therefore this limitless Sunni ocean, in the same manner that it gives a feeling of comfort to those who want to benefit from, also contains internal contradictions. Let us look at another example, such as why didn't the Iraqi Kurds – who are Sunni – join with the Arab Sunni of Iraq against the Shiites in order to form an anti-Shiite Sunni bloc?
The answer is simple, because things aren't as united as those who embrace sectarian or religiously divisive ideology believe them to be.
A government, any government, has its own way of approaching religious issues and sectarian sensitivities. We are now witnessing an abundance of social activity on the part of Islamic currents and groups in Syria, which is ruled by a Secular Arabist Baathist regime. This is the declared side of the Syrian regime's identity, but what about the undeclared side? According to the accusations leveled at the Syrian regime by its enemies, the regime also incorporates a well-hidden Alawite sectarianism. The goal of the Sunnis in the "Levant" has remained the same, and the Sunni hegemony with regards to the definition of Islam still exists. Haj Saleh also revealed that there is an undeclared "gentleman's" agreement [in Syria] whereby those in power have control over politics, and the Islamic religious authority has control of society. If we add a newly formed economy built upon the ruins of a socialist one, then it is understandable how everything has become wrapped in the heavy cloak of Arabism, Patriotism, and the Resistance. This is a cloak that is worn by all, and has become something of a uniform that outwardly gives an appearance of unity [while hiding the disorder mentioned above].
As for Iran, even in the pre-Khomeini era, it would look at the question of sectarianism in terms of how it could best serve the country's political interests. Iran worked upon the issue of sectarianism, not out of enthusiasm for Shiite fanaticism, but rather in order to reap the fruit of sectarian intolerance. We have seen these fruit fall like ripe dates into the basket of Tehran's mullahs, by way of the fields of Lebanon whose Shiite community has been monopolized by the Khomeinist Hezbollah long after this seed was first sown by Musa al-Sadr.
In his own research published in Hazim Saghieih's "Nawasib wa Rawafid" Lebanese sociologist and writer Ahmed Beydoun writes about how ostentatious Safavid rituals found their way to the Lebanese Shiites, and how in the past the Lebanese Shiites were not overt or dramatic [with regards to their religious practices], but only became so after they were affected by Iran's influence. This was initially confined to the town of Nabateya, but this was later extended over the entire Shiite community by the influence of Hezbollah and Khomeini's ideologies. This strained the mood of the Lebanese Shiite community. This was not just a result of abstract sectarian zeal, but was a political tool to incubate and insulate the masses and incite them to rally around this political project.
There is a flagrant example in Yemen. The Zaidiyyah of Yemen, who are [ideologically] closer to the Sunnis (The people of the Hadtih) than they are to the Twelver Shiite, have become a Khomeinist enclave as a result of internal and external political pressure, rather than as a result of intellectual justifications. In this case, it is politics that has led to the creation of this ideology and sect.
To sum up, the recreation of Sunni – Shiite sectarianism is nothing more than a tool in the hands of certain politicians here and there. The majority of sects are being controlled and provoked by this [tool] which is being used by certain political elements. Even the most isolated and solitary sects, such as the Islamic Batiniyyah sect, abandon their practices for the logic and protection of the government. This also previously happened during the Fatimid era in Egypt, and is currently taking place once more.
Civilization and the logic of the modern State are the greatest losers as a result of this sectarian commotion, along with the idea of an Arab deriving his identity from civilization rather than sectarianism.
If this conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis results in the end of sectarian ideology in the region, then this would be a great victory and a magnificent breakthrough. However I wonder what price we would have to pay for such a victory. And more importantly, is there a guarantee that we will pass through the tunnel of sectarianism into the bright pastures of civilization?
Applied Materials CEO's Best Advice: The Buck Stops Here by Scott Cendrowski
Mike Splinter, CEO of the Santa Clara, Calif.-based Applied Materials, recalls the best advice he ever got.
Before I joined Applied Materials (AMAT), I worked at Intel (INTC) for two decades. I recall a session with Andy Grove. It was 1984, and Grove was talking about Intel culture to a group of new employees who were coming in at a senior level. I was running Fab 1, a Santa Clara factory that made chips.
In his talk Grove advised us to always assume it's your responsibility. By that he meant to take on a job, even if it wasn't yours. That's a general thought, but it creates specific action and works across almost any situation, from picking up garbage on the floor to a new product idea.
If you automatically assume it's your responsibility and do something about it, that makes the company better. Those who can recognize that are the ones who end up being more successful.
Mike's greatest tips:
Engage your audience. When talking to a group, give the audience a challenge or an objective. It makes the presentation much more memorable.
Stay connected. I read every one of my e-mails. There are a lot of mechanisms to isolate you as CEO. You have to ensure you're finding out what's really going on with employees.
Get others involved early. People are a lot more motivated to execute the things they have to do if they're part of the planning and strategy. Execution is often grinding and hard, so make employees part of the process.
Recognize good work. If I think someone has really done a good job, I'll send a personal note to say it's appreciated. It doesn't matter to me what layer in the company they are.
Know why you're meeting. You need everyone to understand what they're trying to accomplish in a meeting. Is the meeting a communication meeting, or a decision-making meeting? Those things ought to be clear upfront.
Streamline your schedule. Prioritize every day. I focus on three things: financial goals, new-product goals, and people goals.
Balance your risk. You want to encourage people to be willing to take risks. Since I consider myself a risk taker, I like to have a CFO who's much more conservative than I am. We have a good balance.
Before I joined Applied Materials (AMAT), I worked at Intel (INTC) for two decades. I recall a session with Andy Grove. It was 1984, and Grove was talking about Intel culture to a group of new employees who were coming in at a senior level. I was running Fab 1, a Santa Clara factory that made chips.
In his talk Grove advised us to always assume it's your responsibility. By that he meant to take on a job, even if it wasn't yours. That's a general thought, but it creates specific action and works across almost any situation, from picking up garbage on the floor to a new product idea.
If you automatically assume it's your responsibility and do something about it, that makes the company better. Those who can recognize that are the ones who end up being more successful.
Mike's greatest tips:
Engage your audience. When talking to a group, give the audience a challenge or an objective. It makes the presentation much more memorable.
Stay connected. I read every one of my e-mails. There are a lot of mechanisms to isolate you as CEO. You have to ensure you're finding out what's really going on with employees.
Get others involved early. People are a lot more motivated to execute the things they have to do if they're part of the planning and strategy. Execution is often grinding and hard, so make employees part of the process.
Recognize good work. If I think someone has really done a good job, I'll send a personal note to say it's appreciated. It doesn't matter to me what layer in the company they are.
Know why you're meeting. You need everyone to understand what they're trying to accomplish in a meeting. Is the meeting a communication meeting, or a decision-making meeting? Those things ought to be clear upfront.
Streamline your schedule. Prioritize every day. I focus on three things: financial goals, new-product goals, and people goals.
Balance your risk. You want to encourage people to be willing to take risks. Since I consider myself a risk taker, I like to have a CFO who's much more conservative than I am. We have a good balance.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
I + Seattle + DIA (September 2009)
....... My objectives
"Working toward hopes, futures, and accomplishments that ensure those content with today, apathetic toward common problems and their fellow man, timid and fearful of new ideas and bold projects do not control ideals of American Society. The futures and hopes will belong to those that can blend vision, reason, and courage to the ideals of American Society."....... My reasons
"When you get invloved, you feel hope and accomplishment. When you sit on the sideline and do nothing, you feel overwhelmed and powerless."
....... In good faith
"God willing, let my accomplishments and hopes be my measure vs certain crazy people driven by and use of office politics, white lies, rumors, slander, and libel to measure people by."
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Physical Safe Havens for Terrorists by Douglas Farah
Paul Pillar, former deputy CIA counter-terrorism chief, has an interesting op-ed in today’s Washington Post posing an important question regarding the Afghanistan conflict:
Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.
Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does.
Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust.
This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience.
People are seldom motivated to act based on the Internet alone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Ramsey Yousef, the 1998 Embassy bombers, Bali bombers and the current group of foreign recruits in Somalia all share a tie that could never be forged outside of being in a battlefield and fighting the infidel.
Those who undergo the same experiences (training, combat, deprivation, communal living etc.), even if they do not do it together, share a bond that cyperspace simply cannot bridge. It is the building of community that is vital in moving someone from interest in jihad to actual involvement.
It is also worth remembering the cross-training and learning experiences that safe havens provide. Hezbollah and al Qaeda exchanged “lessons learned” and technology when bin Laden was in Sudan.
Sudan itself was the great mixing bowl for all radical Islamist groups, under the guidance of al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing Hamas and Hezbollah, PIJ and al Qaeda a safe meeting ground that enhanced the operational capacities of each and forged the bonds that still are relevant today.
I think the analysis also overlooks the importance, in jihadist theology, of a physical caliphate or space that is considered a true Muslim nation or divine kingdom on earth. Hence the fight in Somalia, Afghanistan etc. It is not so much about conquering space to create safe havens as it is to establish the rule of Allah on earth, and eventually, spreading that rule over the entire earth.
Safe havens make jihadists stronger. The cost of denying them is high, and Pillar is right that the case has not yet been publicly made for that in Afghanistan. It is time to seriously consider whether it can be made.
Whether preventing a safe haven in Afghanistan would reduce the terrorist threat to the United States enough from what it otherwise would be to offset the required expenditure of blood and treasure and the barriers to success in Afghanistan, including an ineffective regime and sagging support from the population. Thwarting the creation of a physical haven also would have to offset any boost to anti-U.S. terrorism stemming from perceptions that the United States had become an occupier rather than a defender of Afghanistan.
Clearly Pillar is arguing that the answer is Afghanistan is not worth the price, given those terms of debate. One of his main points is that The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
Here is where I disagree. Clearly training camps are not of paramount importance to terrorist groups, and the Internet provides a fluid and almost risk free way to communicate both ideologically and personally, and physical safe havens are not as vital to many aspects of the terrorist threat as they were before 9/11. But it misses a key point to dismiss their importance to the degree Pillar does.
Almost all the personal ties and connections that were formed among those who have carried out different terrorist attacks took place because the actors had a place where they meet each other, understand they were not alone in their vision of jihad, and build relationships of trust.
This is fundamental to any cadre, and something that virtual exchanges simply cannot replace. The meetings in the hotel rooms and apartments were possible because of the bond of trust forged in a broader common experience.
People are seldom motivated to act based on the Internet alone. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), Ramsey Yousef, the 1998 Embassy bombers, Bali bombers and the current group of foreign recruits in Somalia all share a tie that could never be forged outside of being in a battlefield and fighting the infidel.
Those who undergo the same experiences (training, combat, deprivation, communal living etc.), even if they do not do it together, share a bond that cyperspace simply cannot bridge. It is the building of community that is vital in moving someone from interest in jihad to actual involvement.
It is also worth remembering the cross-training and learning experiences that safe havens provide. Hezbollah and al Qaeda exchanged “lessons learned” and technology when bin Laden was in Sudan.
Sudan itself was the great mixing bowl for all radical Islamist groups, under the guidance of al Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing Hamas and Hezbollah, PIJ and al Qaeda a safe meeting ground that enhanced the operational capacities of each and forged the bonds that still are relevant today.
I think the analysis also overlooks the importance, in jihadist theology, of a physical caliphate or space that is considered a true Muslim nation or divine kingdom on earth. Hence the fight in Somalia, Afghanistan etc. It is not so much about conquering space to create safe havens as it is to establish the rule of Allah on earth, and eventually, spreading that rule over the entire earth.
Safe havens make jihadists stronger. The cost of denying them is high, and Pillar is right that the case has not yet been publicly made for that in Afghanistan. It is time to seriously consider whether it can be made.
Monday, September 14, 2009
Is "Real-Time" taking the place of "Web 2.0" on the Hypechart? by Nik Fletcher
Is just me, or is "real-time" the replacement term for "Web 2.0": you know, hideously over-used, over-hyped and prime for a square on the Internet Bullsh*t Bingo card? I mean, word has it that every man, dog and Venture Capitalist is on the real-time train now that mere mortals like parents are embracing Twitter. Continuing the real-time push is Pubsubhubbub - the real-time blog notification technology with a name that 95% of the Internet struggle to pronounce on first reading - and today it received another boost from Typepad who've enabled the technology on all their hosted blogs.
If you're wondering "what does this mean for me?", it's worth noting that Pubshubhubbub isn't something that consumers in general would see - it's designed to speed up the propagation of news to RSS services and the like - though if you're looking forward to the even-quicker delivery of illiterately-captioned cat photos to Google Reader, this is the magic sauce that may well power it.
It's not that I'm opposed to real-time notifications in general [I mean, I'm dying for Twitter to flick the switch and stream updates from my friends doing their laundry to my iPhone] but in an age where we're seemingly drawn to 'first' instead of 'better' with the news, I can't help but feel we ought to looking at relevancy, not real-time.
Norway's Leftist Gov't Poised to Stay in Power by Karl Ritter
Norway's left-leaning government appeared to have narrowly won re-election Monday after using oil money to shield the Nordic welfare state from the global recession, near-complete results showed. If the results are confirmed, it would be the first time a government in Norway has survived an election in 16 years.
An official projection with 99 percent of votes counted showed Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's Labor-led coalition winning 86 seats to keep a slim majority in the 169-seat Parliament. Final results were expected Tuesday. "All the votes have not been counted and it is close, but the way in seems now, it looks like we can continue" in power, Stoltenberg, 50, said in a televised debate.
The results indicated Norway would continue to buck a trend that has seen center-right blocs take power in its Nordic neighbors Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Leaders of the fragmented opposition all but conceded defeat. "Everything suggests that ... Jens Stoltenberg and Labor have won the election," said Siv Jensen, who heads the right-wing populist Progress Party. Poor results by two small center-right parties canceled out gains by the Conservatives and the Progress Party.
Norway has escaped the financial crisis largely unscathed, partly by tapping into its oil- and gas-fueled sovereign wealth fund — currently valued at more than 2.4 trillion kroner ($400 billion). Unemployment stands at 3 percent — among the lowest in Europe.
Oil and gas pumped from North Sea platforms have made the fjord-fringed country of 4.8 million people one of the world's richest nations. But that wealth also presents a challenge for sitting governments, who must balance the risk of overheating the domestic economy with Norwegians' high demands on the cradle-to-grave welfare system.
The last prime minister to win re-election in Norway was Labor's Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1993.
After casting her vote outside Oslo, Jensen blamed Stoltenberg's government for bad roads, crowded asylum centers and long waiting lists for non-emergency treatment at public hospitals. "He has not been able to solve the welfare issues he promised to solve four years ago," the 40-year-old candidate stated. Oeystein Nordjordet, a construction worker in Oslo, said Labor's policies were the best for Norway. "Because they are the safest. It's Barack Obama politics, it's exactly the same," he said. Stoltenberg's camp also played on the U.S. president's "Yes we can" campaign slogan, with buttons and posters saying "Jens we can" in Norwegian.
Labor remained Norway's biggest party, winning 64 seats with 35 percent of the vote, the results showed. Its junior partners, the Socialist Left and the Center Party, each won 11 seats. The Progress Party led the opposition parties with 23 percent of votes and 40 seats — its best election result ever.
Divisions within the opposition had raised Stoltenberg's hopes of re-election. Two center-right parties — the Christian Democrats and the Liberals — had ruled out forming a coalition with the Progress Party, mainly because they disliked its immigration policies.
Jensen's party wants stronger demands on immigrants to integrate into Norwegian society and has proposed building Norwegian asylum centers in Africa.
Immigration has skyrocketed by a factor of five since the early 1970s — more than 10 percent of Norway's population is of foreign origin. In recent years the biggest groups of asylum seekers have come from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Eritrea.
There was virtually no talk about joining the European Union, which Norwegian voters have rejected twice, and whose members on average have been more severely hit by the recession.
Illiteracy undermines Afghan army by Fisnik Abrashi
Afghan army recruit Shahidullah Ahmadi can't read — and neither can nine out of 10 soldiers in the Afghan National Army.
The lack of education points to a basic challenge for the United States, as it tries to expand the Afghan army in the hopes that U.S. and allied forces can one day withdraw. Just as in Iraq — and perhaps even more so — the U.S. is finding it no small task to recruit, train and equip a force that is large and competent enough to operate successfully on its own.
"I face difficulties. If someone calls me and tells me to go somewhere, I can't read the street signs," Ahmadi, 27, a member of a logistics battalion, said while walking through downtown Kabul. "In our basic training, we learned a lot. Some of my colleagues who can read and write can take notes, but I've forgotten a lot of things, the types of things that might be able to save my life."
Interviewed recruits and visited a training center to gain a better understanding of the obstacles toward eventually handing over responsibility of security to the Afghan army so that international troops can go home.
The speed with which NATO trains and equips more Afghan security forces has become an issue in the United States, Europe, and Canada as governments decide whether to commit more deeply to a war that is losing public support. Carl Levin, the leading Senate Democrat on military issues, said Friday that he wants heightened training of Afghan armed forces before sending more American combat troops. Levin urged the Obama administration to expand Afghan forces to 240,000 troops and Afghan police to 160,000 officers by 2013. Current plans call for boosting the army from 92,000 soldiers to 134,000 by late 2011. U.S. officials say the combined army and police forces need to increase to about 400,000 by 2014.
"It's absolutely essential that over time Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security, and combat troops draw down," said Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy for the region. "The current force levels of police and army are clearly going to have to be increased." Violence in Afghanistan has already soared to record levels, requiring more troops to secure wide stretches of countryside. U.S. and NATO troops can clear areas of Taliban fighters, but they need Afghan soldiers to make sure the militants don't return.
The rapid expansion of the army, however, has already raised questions about whether Afghanistan, one of the world's poorest countries, can sustain a force of that size, as well as maintain discipline and ethnic balance in the ranks. It is likely that the cost of training, equipping and sustaining Afghan forces at a level big enough to maintain security will primarily fall on U.S. taxpayers for years to come.
In Iraq, the U.S. disbanded Saddam Hussein's army in 2003, but six years later has still not managed to create a force capable of operating without American logistical, technical, intelligence and other support. And in Iraq, the U.S. was able to tap resources unavailable in Afghanistan, including a pool of retired military officers and one of the Arab world's most literate populations.
Polls show that the army is the most trusted Afghan institution, a testament to the relative success it has had, especially compared with the police, who are widely derided as corrupt. But about 90 percent of those deciding to join the army are illiterate, according to U.S. military officers involved in the training. That's higher than the 75 percent national illiteracy rate, because military recruits come from lower classes where few know how to read.
The lack of basic reading skills slows down progress in an already short 10-week training course. It means soldiers cannot use maps properly or understand the army's code of conduct. It also increases the difficulty of building a solid core of noncommissioned officers — sergeants who are the backbone of every successful army, responsible for conveying a commander's written orders to the troops.
U.S. Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, who is in charge of training both soldiers and police, says the high illiteracy rate is not a "show-stopper." However, he added that illiteracy "particularly becomes a challenge for those recruits that we want to advance to become noncommissioned officers, because the higher you get in rank and responsibility, the more expectation there is that you can read and write at some basic level."
Most Taliban guerrillas also can't read and write, but they don't need to as much. Understanding maps and signs is important for the Afghan army, which is supposed to deploy anywhere government control is challenged.
The Taliban, however, strike on their own timetable — usually wherever government and NATO forces are weakest. They move among friendly, generally ethnic Pashtun communities and rely on local guides. Many Taliban fighters operate in areas of the country where they grew up, making maps and compasses unnecessary. The Taliban also generally operate in small units. They use hit-and-run insurgency tactics or lay bombs along roads, highly effective techniques that don't require the same level of sophistication and attention to detail as conventional military tactics, which often use helicopters, artillery, armored vehicles and large numbers of troops.
To overcome the problem for the Afghan army, a private company, Pulau Electronics of Orlando, Fla., has been hired to run a program that aims to make 50 percent of the troops "functionally literate," within the first year of the program. "The target is for them to be able to write their name and their weapon's serial number," said Joe Meglan, 39, of Savannah, Ga., who works for Pulau.
The main training effort takes place at the Kabul Military Training Center. The road to the training camp is littered with the rusting hulks of tanks destroyed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, a reminder of the last superpower's failure to tame this war-torn land. Afghan trainers lead the effort with coalition teams mentoring them. After 10 weeks of training, regular soldiers are put into units before being sent to the battlefield.
There are 5,000 coalition trainers who work with both army and police. Some 256 teams work with the army and 85 with the police, according to Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan.
President Barack Obama has ordered 4,000 additional U.S. military trainers as part of his surge of 21,000 new U.S. troops into the country. The training for recruits also has about half the number of mentors it needs from the coalition, said Lt. Col. Daniel Harmuth, 43, from Bakersfield, Ca., who runs the basic warrior training.
President Barack Obama has ordered 4,000 additional U.S. military trainers as part of his surge of 21,000 new U.S. troops into the country. The training for recruits also has about half the number of mentors it needs from the coalition, said Lt. Col. Daniel Harmuth, 43, from Bakersfield, Ca., who runs the basic warrior training.
In the meantime, illiterate soldiers in the army are scraping by. "Unfortunately all my friends and I cannot read," said soldier Rosey Khan, 19. "It is very bad, particularly during the fighting. They taught me a lot of things, but I've forgotten most of them. ... Even the officers cannot read."
Afghan troops' training hampered by shortage of instructors by Julian E. Barnes
The Afghan soldiers on the training ground quickly took up the proper defensive positions when the fake roadside bomb blew up -- but then, despite the insistent cajoling of a group of British and U.S. trainers, they just lay there in the dirt peering over their guns.
"These guys won't listen," said British army Capt. Clive Magill, an instructor at the Consolidated Fielding Center here.
It was a poor showing, but the Afghan soldiers weren't the only ones to blame. Because of U.S. troop rotations and shortages of instructors, their training team had been changed three times, forcing the entire battalion to be held back for an extra six weeks of work.
The problems with the unit that day highlight a broader issue across Afghanistan: Critical manpower shortages in Afghan combat units and of international combat trainers are hampering efforts to turn this country's security forces into an effective army, military officials say.
Increasing the size of Afghan forces is a central part of the stepped-up U.S. war effort and a key element of the Obama administration's exit strategy.
Despite years of training, however, Afghan forces' abilities lag behind those of their Iraqi counterparts, military officials say, in part because the U.S. training effort in Afghanistan has long suffered from a lack of resources.
Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the new top commander in Afghanistan, has not said publicly how large he wants the Afghan force to be but has said it needs to expand beyond its current goal. Other military officials are recommending that the force nearly double from the current goal of about 225,000 to about 400,000.
The U.S. is about to double the number of trainers it has in the field, from one brigade to two. But top officers plan to use the additional force to expand police training, so the extra instructors will not solve the shortfall in military trainers.
The fielding center, for example, has been allotted 40 military personnel and trainers, but only 22 of the slots are filled.
"This is the unloved part of" the training effort, said British army Col. Ian Smailes, deputy commander of the Combined Training Advisory Group. "There is a scarcity of resources."
And then there's the issue of shortages on the Afghan side. The initial Afghan unit training lasts about 10 weeks at the fielding center, east of Kabul, and trainers struggle to keep the Afghan units above 80% strength.
Many Afghan soldiers go AWOL because of problems getting their pay to their families in remote areas. But more problematic, many new soldiers desert when they learn they are going to be assigned to the south, where the fighting is most intense.
"As soon as they find out we are sending them to the south, we start losing them," said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Daniel J. Walczyk, the center's executive officer.
To stop the desertions, one American soldier said, trainers have begun lying to the Afghans, telling them at the beginning of training that they will be headed to more peaceful areas and withholding their real assignment.
U.S. commanders hope they can enhance the security forces' initial training by using international troops to train units in the field.
Marine Corps Lt. Col. Eleazar Omar Sanchez III, who oversees the training of field units in part of eastern Afghanistan, said he has about 16 U.S. trainers for every 500-man Afghan battalion. With battalions dividing up and deploying at multiple small combat outposts, there are not enough trainers to go around, Sanchez said.
"Sixteen definitely doesn't cut it if we want to hold several combat outposts," Sanchez said.
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams provided by European nations are much larger, with up to 50 people. U.S. officials say the European teams also tend to have more soldiers who have worked together. Many of the U.S. teams have been thrown together either right before they went to Afghanistan or once they arrived, decreasing their effectiveness, military officers say.
Army Maj. Gen. Richard P. Formica, head of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, said the military was working to overcome the problems. "We are managing shortfalls," he said.
McChrystal and other top military officials have concluded that one way to ease the shortfall of mentors is to partner international combat units and Afghan security forces.
The units would be paired with Afghan units of similar size. The idea is that by working side by side with troops, the Afghans would continue their combat education, making up for the shortage of mentors.
In an interview in Washington, Michele A. Flournoy, the undersecretary of Defense for policy, said that though there were examples of places where partnering was working, it was uneven and that there were "plenty of gaps to be filled in."
"A much more systematic and enhanced approach is needed," she said.
Preview of WebKit’s WebGL / Canvas 3D by Jeff
Yesterday, I was updating my local checkout of WebKit and I noticed a few tests for “WebGL” scroll by (view commit). Apparently, a big WebGL patch has quietly landed. With a name like “WebGL”, I couldn’t help but investigate.
What is WebGL?
WebGL is basically an initiative to bring 3D graphics into web browsers natively, without having to download any plugins. This is achieved by adding a few things to HTML5, namely, defining a JavaScript binding to OpenGL ES 2.0 and letting you draw things into a 3D context of the canvas element.
What does that mean exactly? Here’s a video of the initial WebGL layout tests included in WebKit r48331. Be sure to watch them in HD!
These demos are very simple, but they’re a great start. I’m sure we’ll see some complicated OpenGL scenes pop up soon, and I’m curious to see how complex they can get before FPS becomes a factor. Maybe I’ll make a WebGL mini-game in some spare time!
Why is this cool?
This has a million applications - I’m obviously biased towards gaming though. Basically, imagine playing Lugaru or Black Shades instantly in your browser, on any platform, without having to install anything. In the same way Gmail is killing desktop mail applications, full-fledged 3d video games could start migrating to the web.
Flash gaming would have a serious run for its money as more advanced, standards-based, hardware-accelerated games started popping up. This would have huge implications for the entire PC gaming market, which I might explore in a separate blog post.
Of course, this utopia of browser-based OpenGL gaming will require the cooperation of all major browser vendors. When will we start to see WebGL outside of isolated, developer previews?
When can we actually use it?
This is a brand new web technology, we won’t be seeing this for another 10 years right? Well, this actually has the potential to show up in browsers in the not-so-distant future. As you’ve seen above, this is already significantly developed in WebKit. It will take a little while before it’s enabled by default in the nightly WebKit builds and longer still for Safari to adopt it, but that could theoretically be as soon as six months from now.
The same goes for Google, FireFox, and Opera, who are part of the WebGL working group. Google Chrome, of course, is based on WebKit and has pledged to support this (in addition to its own O3D, which hopefully will be standard soon as well). FireFox has an extension which enables an implementation of Canvas 3D, and Opera has supported its own (albeit different style) canvas 3D for a while.
What about Internet Explorer, which hardly supports existing standards, let alone up and coming ones? Given Microsoft’s history, I wouldn’t hold my breath, but there will undoubtedly be some kind of extension that simulates WebGL, like there is for the canvas element. Until then, it will be yet another awesome WebKit feature for people who are developing specifically on the WebKit platform to brag about.
It will be pretty cool when Awesomium updates to the latest WebKit and we can render 3D scenes inside of our own 3D scene!
Sunday, September 13, 2009
DSEi: Throwbots, Folding Spyplanes And Monster Guns by David Hambling
The Defence Systems & Equipment International Exhibition in London included all the defense behemoths, and firms like Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems all turned out in force. But some of the more interesting gadgets came from smaller outfits.
This is Lance Bombardier Dave McLaughlin holding a handy new drone called Maveric. Just throw it into the air and you have an instant aerial reconnaissance capability. Made by Prioria Robotics, it weighs two pounds but has a respectable 45-minute flight time and can beam back video images from six miles away. Maveric has two cameras, one in the nose and one on a gimbal mount under the chin, so it can orbit over and area of interest and maintain continuous coverage. Control can be by joystick or autonomous, aided by on-board GPS.
This is all fairly standard, but the really clever feature is the carbon-fiber wing. To pack away the Maveric, you just roll it up and put it in a six-inch diameter tube, a process that takes seconds. Drones don’t get much more portable than that.
For close-in tactical reconnaissance you might want something like the Recon Scout XT. Michael Sarazine of Recon Robotics gave me a demo. The robot weighs just over a pound and had a throwing handle so it can be easily lobbed — through a doorway, perhaps, or over a wall. The big flexible wheels allow it to trundle over small obstacles, with a battery life of around an hour. The Recon Scout’s special feature is an infra-red camera and illuminator which automatically cuts in when it gets dark. This allows the Scout to see in zero light conditions without being seen. It’s also useful for other hard-to-reach locations, like checking underneath vehicles.
Recon Scout robots are already used by over a hundred police and security agencies, and in May the US Army ordered 150 of them for $1.35 million. The price is a major asset – at less than $10,000 a pop, it’s an affordable unit which can be issued in large numbers.
Tom Jonassen of armor makers NFM Group showed off the company’s new HEXA plate, a body armor insert giving a larger area of coverage than traditional rectangular-style inserts. Jonassen tells me that the larger plate is popular with special operations units who have tested it recently.
The effective area is further increased by the FREC technology, a thermoplastic process which ensures that the edges and corners of the plate are as effective as the center. This, the company claims, can improve effective coverage by as much as 60 percent. The level of protection given to HEXA by the National Institute of Justice is Level IV, which means it will stop pretty much anything out there — including armor-piercing bullets. NFM also design the plate to be capable of withstanding multiple hits – ceramic armor may crack after the first shot.
Craig Magill of Neopup showed me the company’s highly innovative “Personal Area Weapon” which falls somewhere between a grenade launcher and a rifle. This South African invention fires fires a novel 20mm high-explosive round weighing a hefty hundred and ten grams. The Neopup features a unique recoil mitigation system which allows the shooter to cope what would otherwise be a shoulder-dislocating level of recoil. It is accurate enough to hit point targets at six hundred metres, making it superior to 40mm grenade launchers which have a much lower muzzle velocity. At closer range the sheer size of the projectile gives it some significant advantages — it can punch through 8mm steel plates at a hundred meters making it highly effective against vehicles.
It may also become the weapon for choice for tackling alien invaders – the Neopup can be glimpsed in the movie District 9.
Being located on the Thames River, DSEi has a maritime element as well. There were a few Royal Navy warships, and some smaller craft, like this XSR, described as “a luxury power boat with super car style” for navies that want to make a splash. It would have been perfect for a replay of The World Is Not Enough: In the distance, you could spot the dome of O2, formerly the infamous Millennium Dome.
This is Lance Bombardier Dave McLaughlin holding a handy new drone called Maveric. Just throw it into the air and you have an instant aerial reconnaissance capability. Made by Prioria Robotics, it weighs two pounds but has a respectable 45-minute flight time and can beam back video images from six miles away. Maveric has two cameras, one in the nose and one on a gimbal mount under the chin, so it can orbit over and area of interest and maintain continuous coverage. Control can be by joystick or autonomous, aided by on-board GPS.
This is all fairly standard, but the really clever feature is the carbon-fiber wing. To pack away the Maveric, you just roll it up and put it in a six-inch diameter tube, a process that takes seconds. Drones don’t get much more portable than that.
For close-in tactical reconnaissance you might want something like the Recon Scout XT. Michael Sarazine of Recon Robotics gave me a demo. The robot weighs just over a pound and had a throwing handle so it can be easily lobbed — through a doorway, perhaps, or over a wall. The big flexible wheels allow it to trundle over small obstacles, with a battery life of around an hour. The Recon Scout’s special feature is an infra-red camera and illuminator which automatically cuts in when it gets dark. This allows the Scout to see in zero light conditions without being seen. It’s also useful for other hard-to-reach locations, like checking underneath vehicles.
Recon Scout robots are already used by over a hundred police and security agencies, and in May the US Army ordered 150 of them for $1.35 million. The price is a major asset – at less than $10,000 a pop, it’s an affordable unit which can be issued in large numbers.
Tom Jonassen of armor makers NFM Group showed off the company’s new HEXA plate, a body armor insert giving a larger area of coverage than traditional rectangular-style inserts. Jonassen tells me that the larger plate is popular with special operations units who have tested it recently.
The effective area is further increased by the FREC technology, a thermoplastic process which ensures that the edges and corners of the plate are as effective as the center. This, the company claims, can improve effective coverage by as much as 60 percent. The level of protection given to HEXA by the National Institute of Justice is Level IV, which means it will stop pretty much anything out there — including armor-piercing bullets. NFM also design the plate to be capable of withstanding multiple hits – ceramic armor may crack after the first shot.
Craig Magill of Neopup showed me the company’s highly innovative “Personal Area Weapon” which falls somewhere between a grenade launcher and a rifle. This South African invention fires fires a novel 20mm high-explosive round weighing a hefty hundred and ten grams. The Neopup features a unique recoil mitigation system which allows the shooter to cope what would otherwise be a shoulder-dislocating level of recoil. It is accurate enough to hit point targets at six hundred metres, making it superior to 40mm grenade launchers which have a much lower muzzle velocity. At closer range the sheer size of the projectile gives it some significant advantages — it can punch through 8mm steel plates at a hundred meters making it highly effective against vehicles.
It may also become the weapon for choice for tackling alien invaders – the Neopup can be glimpsed in the movie District 9.
Being located on the Thames River, DSEi has a maritime element as well. There were a few Royal Navy warships, and some smaller craft, like this XSR, described as “a luxury power boat with super car style” for navies that want to make a splash. It would have been perfect for a replay of The World Is Not Enough: In the distance, you could spot the dome of O2, formerly the infamous Millennium Dome.
Countering Today's Enduring and Adaptive Terrorist Threats
On 10 September 2009, the Washington Institute hosted Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as part of a lecture series we've been running since December 2007, with senior US counterterrorism officials. General Burgess was the third military official to participate in the series. Given the key role that the military has played in the counterterrorism arena over the past eight years, and the critical role it continues to play in the Obama administration, we believed it was essential to have a number of the top military officials speak as part of this series.
Here is an excerpt of his remarks:
So, where are we in our fight against al-Qaida? The record is mixed. On the one hand:
• We see continued terrorist attacks by supporters of an uncompromising ideology.
• Terrorists have learned to increase their lethality AND their political impact; and
• They are drawn to unstable and/or ungoverned territories where they fight, form bonds, draw recruits and further develop their trade.
On the other hand, there are reasons for optimism:
• U.S. and allied governments have impacted many of al-Qaida’s most lethal capabilities. The group is forced to perpetually rebuild. I’m proud to say DIA was instrumental in many of these successes.
• The ideology driving al-Qaida is showing signs of wear and its popularity appears to be waning and more Muslim voices publicly challenge its tenets.
To read the entire prepared statement, click here.
Evolution of US Global Confrontation with the Jihadists since 9/11 by Walid Phares
Every commemoration of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 reveals further confusion in reading the global map of confrontation with the Terror forces, particularly the Jihadist streams. Eight years after 9-11, decision-makers and commentators are still asking too many questions, and in those questions are embedded the reasons the war has gone on so long. Who is this enemy and why do they want to harm us, many ask. Unlike in previous global confrontations, from WWI, WWII and the Cold War, the inability to determine the foe has created an inability to produce the appropriate strategies to defeat the threat. If you can’t define the enemy, you cannot defeat him.
Where is the US this year in the confrontation with the forces that caused harm on 9/11 and wants openly to defeat democracies? Are the West and particularly the United States making progress in the war against the “terror forces;” are they far from victory; in popular terms how much more sacrifice will it cost us to get to the other side?
Rarely over the past eight years has the public received good clear answers. The national security debate was hopelessly disabled by large segments of our own academic establishment, which advocated exaggerated apology; in addition public perception was outmaneuvered by the Jihadist propaganda worldwide as I argued in my book The War of Ideas. For years any clear identification of the enemy, its ideology, its strategies and how to counter them has been lacking within a central well defined national security doctrine. And when attempts were made to advance it, it was rapidly derailed.
In no conflict throughout history were people still confused about the threat eight years after hostilities began. For America, neither WWI nor WWII had lasted half that long. And in those wars not only the US and its allies achieved victory in that time, but both Government and public knew long before that – with crystalline precision – who the foes were and what was to be done to defeat them.
Unfortunately, in the years after the 9/11 war began most academic and some media elite and, most recently and stunningly, top advisors on national security continued to affirm that Jihad is just some equivalent of yoga. Despite the counter Jihadist focus offered by Presidential speeches of earlier years in this conflict (although lacking extensive clarifications), the bureaucratic machine didn’t fight this war; in fact it pushed it to fail and eventually crumble.
And with the change of administrations, though policy and execution levels are at last united, their goal seems to be to "end" the war not achieve the strategic goals of defeating Jihadism.
If we analyze how the United States responded to the attacks of 2001, evolved in its campaigns overseas, debated its own perceptions of the conflict domestically and managed its own homeland security over the last eight years, we are forced to conclude that what has taken place in the very big picture was this: Since 9/11, the US dislodged two tyrannies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Historians will judge the validity of toppling Saddam’s regime at that time, or also the strategy of not resuming the pressure against Assad and the Ayatollahs all the way once we began the Iraq campaign. This was the history of the two first years of the “war.”
Since then, American efforts entered the stage of stalemate: fighting al Qaeda in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle and the Taliban in the peripheries of Afghanistan; gaming Iran and Syria’s regimes in Iraq and Lebanon; widening the hunt for Jihadists in several countries; chasing after “homegrown” cells inside the homeland; and Presidential escalation of the rhetoric against "Islamist" ideologies.
Between 2003 and 2008, the War on Terror was more of an “in-the-trenches” conflict: pushes here and there, from one side and the other. Lebanon was freed from Syrian forces in 2005 without bullets or dollars, but Hizballah counter attacked with both and took back most of its lost terrain by 2008. Somalia’s successive Jihadists uprisings split the country and now no one is winning. In the vast African Sahel, al Qaeda’s clones seized positions, retreated and came back: the jury is still out. In Sudan, US efforts identified Darfur as genocide -- a humanitarian victory of sorts -- but Khartoum is solidly backed by influential petrodollars regimes: no salvation was accomplished.
In Iraq, the successful surge weakened al Qaeda, but since 2007 Iran’s role wasn’t contained any more by Washington. In Pakistan, the Taliban went on the offensive and, as of last year, the new government went on the counter offensive: neither side is winning. The risks though are near catastrophic: A Jihadist victory in Islamabad would create the first al Qaeda nuclear state. In Afghanistan, a similar scenario is pinning NATO down, but not offering strategic victories to the Taliban.
In the homeland, unprecedented spending aimed at securing the infrastructure but cells continued to mushroom, the age of homegrown Jihadists falling to younger and younger generations dramatically. Luckily the country was not hit for eight years, but mutant Jihad is spreading.
So, under the Bush Administration we had two years of US thrusts overseas and five years of trenches warfare on a global scale. Was it a success? Bringing down the Taliban was a move of necessity; removing Saddam was militarily successful but its regional follow ups regarding the Baath and the Khomeinists failed.
The dichotomy within the US government regarding the so-called War on Terror had caused strategic shortcomings. Later, we understood that the American offensive was slowed and halted by the combined forces of appeasers and oil lobbies and by the sheer fear of wider war.
In short, winning an ideological war over the Jihadists was the only clear path to reach success anywhere worldwide, including in Afghanistan and Iraq and also at home. But that is precisely where the Bush Administration failed to fight and was thus paralyzed, causing a five years long “trenches war” where we spent endlessly and got nowhere beyond the targets reached by 2003.
Historians will most likely discover that the regional forces fearing the expansion of democracy in their midst, were pushing back against US efforts perhaps more so than the fighting Jihadists on the battlefields. We were defeated in a war of ideas they have launched and were crumbled from the inside by the interests groups feeding from Petro Jihadism. It would be useful to analyze the pitfalls of the Bush led War before beginning to address the Obama led disengagement.
After less than a year, the Obama Administration is sounding what seems to be a general retreat from "world confrontation" with the a "global foe." Pragmatically it would translate as follow:
In Iraq, the US will withdraw regardless of Iran and Syria’s counter moves, or at least that is the plan.
There will be no “meddling” in Iran’s democracy struggle and Washington will "hope" the Ayatollahs won’t set off the nuclear mushroom: Less likely other plans are envisaged.
In Lebanon, bureaucrats will eventually talk with Hizballah. In Gaza, the US will sometimes engage Hamas.
There will be no robust strategic Darfur campaign pushing back against the Bashir regime.
The US will seek the Taliban, while it will call them “the good ones,” for a dialogue in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
In short the so-called US War on Terror is over, but the Jihadists war on democracies will go on.
Inside this country, official narrative will be increasingly calling Jihad, “Yoga” and there will be more and more “Yogists” rising among us.
Evidently, these projections could be reversed if game changer events would occur.
This is no prediction of doom, but a rational, mathematically grounded projection of where we will be going from where we are now. I am not prescribing how the changing directions from offensive, stalemate and retreat will affect the nation’s future. That is a matter American citizens will have to decide on in the next benchmarks of choices they will have to make.
On this 9/11, it is important for the public to realize where history stands, from a very high altitude. More important is transparency. The American people, and certainly the international public opinion, needs to be informed accurately as to what are the options if it wants to pursue the struggle or if it wants to ignore it at their peril. The rest is details.
Assessing Counter-Terror Since 9/11 by Aaron Mannes
Among analysts, wonks, policy-makers, and pundits the question on the eighth anniversary on 9/11 is “Where are we?”
To some extent, one’s answer to that question (like much else) is shaped by where one sits – politically, geographically, and occupationally. This analysis attempts to look across the globe soberly and assess where things stand for Islamist terrorists and their targets.
Modes of Counter-Terror Success
It is impossible to ignore the relative dearth of successful Islamist terror attacks on Western targets. The last major attacks in the West were the London subway bombings in July 2005. This has not been for lack of trying. Western intelligence agencies deserve full credit for building the capabilities to monitor, infiltrate, and disrupt major plots.
A fascinating article from National Journal’s James Kitfield about a disrupted plot in Spain in 2008 gives tremendous insight into the difficulties faced by Islamist terrorists seeking to attack the West. The attack was modeled on the Madrid 2004 bombings. There were many operational differences, but the strategy was the same. Just as the March 11 bombings contributed to Spain’s leaving Iraq, this plot hoped to pressure Spain out of Afghanistan. However, European and US intelligence services were on top of the plot and successfully infiltrated the cell.
Counter-terrorism is the practical application of Murphy’s Law. Murphy states that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. Counter-terrorism is making sure things go wrong. Successful terror attacks require real skills at surveillance, security, and usually explosives manufacture. None of these skills are easy to acquire. Most successful attacks have involved someone with real training, usually acquired in Pakistan. By monitoring movements to and from Pakistan (and other areas that could be training centers) and extensive sharing between national intelligence agencies suspect activity can be identified and monitored. A replay of 9/11 in which nearly 19 people were moved around the world is almost inconceivable without attracting enormous attention from the intelligence community.
It is easier to move a specialist or so to a situation and then recruit muscle locally: easier, but not easy. At the same time, local recruits can be problematic. They are often less diligent about operational security and have connections in local communities that can be exploited by security services.
The other option is the local self-starter cell. These cells have had a notoriously bad record of achievement. In the United States self-starter cells have been rolled up by informants in New York, LA, Miami, and New Jersey. In Europe, at least a few have attempted to launch operations but (like the German suitcase bombs of 2006) were stymied by technical difficulties.
Finally there are the “lone wolves,” self-starters operating on their own or in very small groups – perhaps spontaneously so that security agencies have no opportunity to get a read on them. First, there have been relatively few of these plots. The most deadly was the DC sniper. The fascinating question on this operation is that if it was successful at spreading terror and easy to carryout: why hasn’t it been imitated?
The short hypothesis is that without either indoctrination or mental illness it may not be so easy for individuals to kill people. The more spontaneous “lone wolves” on the other hand, while difficult to detect and prevent, are also very limited as national security threats. When visiting the National Counterterrorism Center, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius wrote "My doomsday scenario, aside from weapons of mass destruction, is personalized jihad," explained one analyst. "Everyone gets to do it on their own. Anyone can take a knife and stab someone in the back."
This concern must be kept in perspective. The United States suffers approximately 14,000 homicides per year. Each one is a tragedy, but that does not mean that each rises to the level of national security concern. Insurgency experts note that when local police can address the problem, an insurgency is at least contained and usually defeated.
The Easy Part & Some Caveats
Preventing deadly terror attacks in the West is, in effect, the easy part of the equation. Two important caveats to this statement are necessary. First, comparatively easy is the operative term. Our safety relies on the tremendous efforts of intelligence and security professionals. We should be profoundly grateful for their efforts. They are fighting an adaptive, cynical adversary where even small mistakes in judgment can lead to tragedy. MI-5 had the 7/7 bombers under surveillance but elected not to monitor them. Resources are not infinite. This leads to the second caveat. Murphy’s Law applies both ways. At some point, terrorists will evade detection or develop an easier means of mass murder. This may be due to their adaptability – it could also be an accident. For whatever reason, a plot in formation fails to trip the appropriate alarms or a minor attack (such as a relatively small bomb) inadvertently triggers cascading reactions that lead to a major tragedy. A final caveat is that the focus is on Islamist terror. Other major terrorist groups, such as radical leftists in Europe and eco-terrorists and domestic rightwing terrorists in the US are also under surveillance. But there is always the possibility of “X-factor” terrorism motivated by rationales so arcane that they are simply not on the radar screen beforehand. Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and the anthrax attacks in the US were in that mold.
The Hard Part
Having written that preventing terror attacks on Western soil is the easy part of the equation, and then qualified this by expressing how difficult that task is raises the question: what then is the “hard part.”
Geopolitics. Islamist terrorists may not be able to pull off another 9/11 or 7/7 – but they can really mess up Pakistan – which could have international cascading effects that could effect – at a minimum - tens of millions. Pakistan may be at the top of the list but there are many lawless regions in which Islamist can fill the void and use their haven to destabilize neighboring areas or attempt to launch further attacks on the West. Somalia and substantial parts of Yemen are obvious examples. There are also many teetering states where Islamists could tip the balance – Egypt, Nigeria, and Bangladesh come to mind.
Sending troops to all of these hotspots is both unfeasible and would probably only make things worse. Developing the levers to maintain stability and ameliorate some of the underlying conditions that create the instability is a tall order. That is the hard part.
IEEE Ratifies 802.11n Wi-Fi Standard After 7 Years
The IEEE standards group today officially ratified 802.11n, the most recent standard for Wi-Fi. The move officially takes the wireless spec out of the draft status it has been in since 2006 and lets companies develop 11n hardware knowing that it will work properly with any device that supports the technology. Officials plan to publish the final standard in mid-October.
The extended delay in approving the standard, which was first developed in 2002, stemmed primarily from competing "pre-N" technology from Atheros and Broadcom and their resistance to finding a common ground for the standard. While this was eventually settled, the competition led to the IEEE agreeing to certify so-called Draft 2.0 802.11n devices in March 2007 with the promise that these would eventually be upgradable to the final standard. The group went so far as to promise no major changes in 802.11n or its certification process.
The standard is already found in most modern computers and a small number of handheld devices and theoretically connects at 300Mbps, or about six times the peak speed of the more ubiquitous 802.11g format. Some of this speed comes from Multiple In, Multiple Out (MIMO) antenna arrays that piece together an incoming signal as it's bounced around an environment, improving not only the maximum speed but also the usable range.
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