Those who carried out the 11 September 2001 attacks, were they extremist Serbian nationalists, no it was the Israeli Mossad, no, pardon me, it was a US group of Seventh Day Adventists! Not at all, the one who carried out the terrible attacks was the US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]!
The suggestions and imaginary illusions continue to pour in the direction of evading the real consequences of the reality, which is that those who carried out the 11 September attacks were Muslim youths who believe in a hard-line interpretation of Islam, who are led by Osama Bin Laden, and who are encouraged and were then encouraged by millions of Muslims.
The idea that the Serbs were the ones who carried out the 11 September attacks to take revenge for US interference in the Serbs' war against Bosnia and the Croats was pronounced by Hasanayn Haykal, symbol of Arab political journalists who follow the pan-Arab direction. He said it days after the explosions took place (Lebanese Al-Safir newspaper 1 October 2001).
The idea that the attacks were carried out by the Israeli Mossad (the source of all evils and mysterious events that some people do not have the stamina to investigate and scrutinize) was suggested by the Islamist writer Fahmi Huwaydi, who believed that Al-Qaeda could not carry out such an operation, but the Mossad could (Kuwaiti Al-Watan newspaper 25 September 2001).
As for the idea that the explosions were carried out by a US group called the Seventh Day Adventists, it was pronounced by the presenter of the Science and Belief program, Mustafa Mahmud (Al-Ahram 22 September 2001.)
All these suggestions and scenarios indicate the extent of the control of wishful thinking over us. This is because the common factor among all these ideas is to put the responsibility on the shoulders of a party other than the Arab and Muslim party, i.e. a party that is not us. I remember that there were some who spoke of the involvement of the Colombian drug cartels in these attacks. What is important is that the involved side is someone other than us, even if this one is a blue jinn. The owners of these suggestions do not burden themselves with thinking of the events and analyzing them in order to reach the closest possible point to the truth, as the researcher Saqr Abu-Fakhr says in his book, "Religion and the Mob."
From this we can understand the enthusiastic celebrations with which our Arab media, and our semi- and even quarter-intellectuals met the delusions of the French journalist Thierry Missan that what took place on 11 September was merely a "terrifying deception" carried out by the United States itself, and hence it killed 5,000 people, and bombed the Defense Department building and the World Trade Center twin towers!
The main purpose of all these contorted ideas is to kill the questions, and to exonerate the cultural self from responsibility. If the ones who carried out these explosions were Serbs, Mossad, Seventh Day Adventists, Colombian gangs, or the CIA, it would be meaningless to question us about extremism, the culture of fanaticism and religious excess, the need to revise the concepts that establish religious violence, and all this continuous headache of questions that keep hammering on the mind of the society. The matter is easy with these conspiratorial illusions, and presenting critical questions becomes meaningless "intellectual luxury" and verbosity.
With these images, the entire issue is reduced to saying that there are conspiracies that no one knows about except those in the know, but we are a perfect nation with a healthy society, culture, and civilization (where are all these now?!). However, we are targeted and warred upon. We are the main preoccupation of the world. The world wants to oppress us, prevent us from rising, and rob our wealth.
Conspiracy is neither an illusion nor an abstract idea; it is part of the world of politics, and it has happened, and still is happening. The aim is not to deny its existence or to ridicule that it has taken place at certain periods and in specific cases, and that it will take place again, because conspiracy is a part of the practice of political wars. Many people in the world are obsessed by the conspiracy theories, and there are films and novels about this group of people, who do not see anything in front of them other than a conspiracy or a potential conspiracy.
However, in the societies that are free from injured pride, historic-role complex, and regrets of being backward in civilization, they do not allow such group of people to undertake the decision making in important and sensitive issues; in these societies such issues are studied with complete, or as close as possible to complete, objectivity in order to protect the state and the decision making from the impact of fleeting emotional feelings. Even if some hysterical people, such as the journalist Thierry Missan, were to emerge at certain times, as a fleeting fit of hysteria, they soon would fade away in the sea of the ruling rationalism.
However, our situation is the opposite of their situation. We continuously enable these people, listen to them, and rely on anything that anyone says that would tickle our sentiments, and inflame our imagination with sensational conspiracies. The defeat of 1967 was a foreign conspiracy, so were the 1956 aggression and the 1948 catastrophe. The appointment of Anwar al-Sadat as president of Egypt was a conspiracy. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was a conspiracy, and the west deliberately enticed Saddam into it. Osama Bin Laden is a conspiracy. All the religious fanaticism, and the dozens, even hundreds of suicide bombers, who flood our land with blood and torn bodies, are nothing but tools of a conspiracy that is managed from abroad (the nature and type of this abroad vary according to the prevailing circumstances and enemies.)
This type of thinking reflects a deep-rooted perplexity, and a continuous fear of facing up to the naked truth. It is true that facing up to the truth is bitter and painful, but this is temporary bitterness and pain that soon will go away, and putting up with this is better and more beneficial than resorting to intellectual drugs and evasion tricks.
Does this mean self-hatred and shedding one's identity and culture? This question is meaningless, because man cannot shed his skin; if he did he would turn into an appalling freak, or perhaps he would die completely, because the skin is what protects the body, and hence the soul that uses the parts of the body.
Therefore, this question, which is presented always whenever the idea of self-criticism is put forward, is meaningless. If our problem with our prevailing way of thinking were restricted to the 11 September explosions, the situation would be easy, and we would believe the conspiracy theories, be they the Serbian scenario, the Mossad scenario, the Colombian scenario, or even the blue jinn scenario. However, our problem has not been restricted to the story of 11 September. Before and after the 11 September events we have gone through dozens of crises that have led us to this reality, which I do not think pleases any rational Muslim or Arab.
In a nutshell: The solution before we go through any talk or sidelines is that if we do not change our way of thinking we will continue to repeat these saddening distractions in an absurd and tragic way. We repeat the same words at every problem. It is said that you will not get a different result if you are using the same method!
I say these words as in a few days we will commemorate the eighth anniversary of 11 September 2001. We will remember that many of us celebrated it and its deeds, while at the same time the ideas of the conspiracy and the foreign side became widespread. I do not know how we can take pride in a deed, and at the same time we are pleased that someone tells us that there are foreign sides that did that deed, and it was not us!
Abu-al-Ala al-Maarri [famous Arab poet 973-1057 AD] was right when he said: In every generation there are falsehoods to condemn it, has any generation ever been uniquely well-guided?
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
Iran Banks Move Into Ecuador to Avoid UN Sanctions by Douglas Farah
In its latest bid to avoid international banking sanctions, Iran has reached an agreement with the Central Bank of Ecuador to allow the Export Development Bank of Iran to operate in this Andean nation.
The move came even though Ecuador is fully aware that EDBI is under U.S. Treasury Department sanction for illicitly providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
According to the Treasury Department’s designation statement:
“In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions.” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. “Today’s action exposes EDBI’s role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves.”
Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran’s import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law.
However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran’s WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities.
At the same it designated EDBI, Treasury also designated the “Venezuelan” Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank that was constituted in 2007.
Its founding documents show the BID (not to be confused with the multi-national lending agency, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, also known as BID) is wholly owned (all 40,000 shares) by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and UN sanction. The BID (Venezuela) was also granted an operating license, along with EDBI, in Ecuador.
According to the U.S. Treasury designation:
Bank Saderat has been a significant facilitator of Hizballah’s financial activities and has served as a conduit between the Government of Iran and Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
District Attorney in Manhattan, Robert Morgenthau, in a speech yesterday at the Brookings Institution warned that the proliferation of Iranian banks through Venezuelan auspices was a danger to the region.
“Generally speaking, nobody is focused sufficiently on the threat of the Iran-Venezuela connection,” said Morgenthau, whose New York jurisdiction includes the offices of numerous U.S. financial institutions.
Venezuela is not under U.S. or international economic sanctions. That means U.S. banks processing wire transfers from Venezuelan banks rely on their Venezuelan counterparts to ensure the exchanges are for legitimate purposes, Morgenthau said.
“I have little faith that this is being effectively done, and the Iranians, aware of this vulnerability, appear to be taking advantage of it,” he said.
Now, with an Ecuadoran branch set to open, the vulnerabilities have grown and diversified.
The move came even though Ecuador is fully aware that EDBI is under U.S. Treasury Department sanction for illicitly providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
According to the Treasury Department’s designation statement:
“In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions.” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. “Today’s action exposes EDBI’s role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves.”
Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran’s import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law.
However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran’s WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities.
At the same it designated EDBI, Treasury also designated the “Venezuelan” Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank that was constituted in 2007.
Its founding documents show the BID (not to be confused with the multi-national lending agency, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, also known as BID) is wholly owned (all 40,000 shares) by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and UN sanction. The BID (Venezuela) was also granted an operating license, along with EDBI, in Ecuador.
According to the U.S. Treasury designation:
Bank Saderat has been a significant facilitator of Hizballah’s financial activities and has served as a conduit between the Government of Iran and Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
District Attorney in Manhattan, Robert Morgenthau, in a speech yesterday at the Brookings Institution warned that the proliferation of Iranian banks through Venezuelan auspices was a danger to the region.
“Generally speaking, nobody is focused sufficiently on the threat of the Iran-Venezuela connection,” said Morgenthau, whose New York jurisdiction includes the offices of numerous U.S. financial institutions.
Venezuela is not under U.S. or international economic sanctions. That means U.S. banks processing wire transfers from Venezuelan banks rely on their Venezuelan counterparts to ensure the exchanges are for legitimate purposes, Morgenthau said.
“I have little faith that this is being effectively done, and the Iranians, aware of this vulnerability, appear to be taking advantage of it,” he said.
Now, with an Ecuadoran branch set to open, the vulnerabilities have grown and diversified.
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
The Middle East Security Agenda: An Israeli Assessment by General Herzog
In keynote remarks made at The Washington Institute's 2009 Soref Symposium, Michael Herzog discussed the Israeli perspective on growing security challenges in the Middle East, with particular focus on the Iranian threat. Michael Herzog, a brigadier general in the Israel Defense Forces, currently serves as chief of staff to the Israeli minister of defense. A former visiting fellow at The Washington Institute, he is the author of the Washington Institute Policy Focus Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the International Community (2006).
The following is a rapporteur's summary of General Herzog's remarks. Download a transcript of General Herzog's remarks in their entirety (PDF).
The Middle East is in a transitional period. There are new governments in Israel and the United States. Lebanon is about to hold elections, and the Palestinians may do the same by 2010. More broadly, the region has felt the effects of the global economic situation. And many are concerned about both the Iranian nuclear threat and the potential consequences of the Taliban gaining control over Pakistani nuclear facilities. The sand dunes are shifting, and it is important to determine sooner rather than later where the Middle East is headed.
The primary concern for Arab countries is Iran. Many are skeptical of the notion that Tehran's nuclear program can be stopped -- they worry that the United States will not be assertive enough, and that the Arab states will be sold out. As a result, the divide between radicals and moderates is sharpening, with regional actors judging both the Iranian issue and other events along these axes. This could be seen in the reactions to the 2006 Lebanon war and, even more clearly, the war in Gaza. Today, fault lines are deepening between Palestinian and Lebanese factions. Saudi Arabia is pouring huge sums into the Lebanese elections. Morocco has cut off official ties with Iran. Bahrain is becoming increasingly concerned about Tehran's claims of sovereignty over the island nation, while Qatar has decided to align with Iran due to their close proximity. And Syria is keeping its options open by engaging in peace efforts, and by building ties with Iraq and Turkey rather than with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
To address the region's growing divisions, we must clearly identify their source. The radical contingent has its head in Tehran, its body in Damascus, and its arms in Lebanon and Gaza. Although each of these players presents different challenges, the main problem is Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Some argue that Iran wants civilian nuclear power, not weapons, but there is clear evidence to the contrary.
In order to fulfill its nuclear ambitions, Tehran needs three elements: fissile material, delivery systems, and weaponization. Israel and the United States disagree on whether or not Iran truly halted its weaponization program in 2003. Yet, regardless of who is correct, weaponization is not a significant obstacle -- the nuclear program's success is much more dependent on acquiring delivery systems and enriching uranium
Iran already has the required delivery systems -- missiles -- and is working to extend their range to 2,000 kilometers by purchasing and developing new systems. Uranium enrichment is therefore the key issue. According to the latest intelligence and International Atomic Energy Agency reports, Iran already has more than a ton of low-enriched uranium. At this pace, it will have enough to produce a bomb as soon as the end of 2010 or early 2011.
Tehran will have four main options once it reaches breakout capacity. First, it could announce to the world that it is a nuclear power. This is probably not Iran's first choice, since it would draw international condemnation. Based on North Korea's experience, however, Iranian leaders may decide that announcing they have gone nuclear will shield them from repercussions. Therefore, this possibility cannot be ruled out.
Second, the Iranians could continue stockpiling low-enriched uranium without refining it into the high-enriched material needed for a bomb. In that case, they could bide their time, waiting until they feel that international resolve is weakened or pressure on them has lessened before moving forward with the program. A third possibility would be to halt enrichment while still increasing their stockpile by stealing or diverting additional low-enriched uranium. And a fourth option is to establish an entirely clandestine program parallel to their known, inspected program -- in fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that they have already done so.
Regardless of which scenario comes to pass, we will be in a danger zone once Iran reaches the breakout point. There is time for engagement, but not much. Although engagement is a sensible option, Israel has several questions for the United States about what such a strategy means.
First, what is the goal of engagement? How do you define it and measure it in clear, concrete terms? Second, what is your timeframe for this approach? Third, what benchmarks will you set in determining whether engagement is working? This is important because the Iranians will continue to enrich uranium as Washington and Europe attempt to engage them. Fourth, what will you do if engagement does not achieve its desired goal?
If engagement fails, the international community may choose to exploit Iran's acute vulnerability to sanctions. For example, the country's oil infrastructure has deteriorated to the point where Iranians have to import 40 percent of their refined petroleum needs. In light of this dependency, Europe could deny credit to companies that do business with Iran. These and other sanctions would place a great deal of pressure on the regime given the low price of oil and the global economic situation. As far as Israel's stance on Iranian nuclearization is concerned, I would just make the following points: when we say that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, we mean it. And when we say that all options are still on the table, we mean it.
Regarding the other key players in the region's growing radical contingent, Hamas remains a major Israeli concern. Israeli leaders are often asked -- even by many Arabs -- why they did not crush Hamas during the recent fighting in Gaza. The reason is primarily tactical. To borrow from Tom Friedman, the choice was whether to eradicate Hamas or educate it. Eradicating the group would have required a massive military deployment and a return to Israeli control over Gaza, with no exit in sight. The Palestinian Authority would not want to resume control amid Israeli bayonets, and no international actor would be willing to take Israel's place following such a campaign. Although Hamas is a concern, it is not Israel's top priority at the moment, and so the choice was made to "educate" the group instead.
Another common question is why, if the goal was to halt rocket attacks from Gaza, did Israel not reoccupy the Philadelphia Corridor on the Egyptian border? First, this would not have been sufficient to stop the smuggling of rockets -- Israel would also have had to control Rafah, where the smuggling tunnels end. Second, Egypt has recently become much more effective at preventing smuggling. We know this because the price of weapons in Gaza has increased dramatically. In retrospect, Hamas was badly beaten, and today it is trying to maintain quiet by forcing other groups to respect the ceasefire. Israel hopes that this ceasefire will last long enough for it to finish developing antirocket systems, whose necessity became clear after the 2006 war in Lebanon.
Hamas control of Gaza will continue to complicate the peace process with the Palestinians, of course. It is unclear how Israel can negotiate with Abu Mazen when some 40 percent of the Palestinian population is not under his control. Furthermore, if Hamas does not allow elections to be carried out in Gaza, even the Palestinians are unsure of what the potential consequences might be. In any case, the new Israeli government is still conducting its policy review on the peace process, so it is premature to say what Prime Minister Netanyahu will do.
In the meantime, both top-down and bottom-up state-building efforts should continue in order to lay the foundation of a Palestinian state. In particular, Gen. Keith Dayton should be permitted to continue his mission. Israel is very impressed with the professionalism and commitment he has shown in training Palestinian security officials and ensuring their cooperation with Israel. Although it is not yet possible to turn over complete security control to the Palestinians, the level of professional pride among the battalions trained in Jordan is unprecedented. In addition, we should continue with economic and infrastructure projects; such initiatives led to Palestinian economic growth rates of up to 4 percent in 2008 alone.
To the north, the Lebanese situation remains a concern as well. Although Israel has been successful during the past decade in preventing conflicts on that front from spreading elsewhere, Lebanon is still a sticking point in Israeli-Syrian negotiations. In the past, it was assumed that Lebanon would follow Syria's lead. Yet, recent political developments -- particularly the growing strength of Hizballah -- have changed the situation. Hizballah could conceivably win the upcoming Lebanese elections. A further difficulty is that Syria refuses to even negotiate until it knows what territory it will gain from Israel. For its part, Israel refuses to cede the Golan Heights until it knows that Syria will stop aiding Hizballah and Hamas.
Despite these bleak pictures, there are many opportunities for constructive action in the region. Such action will require cooperative effort, and Israel's neighbors are willing to take part as long as they believe that will not be left stranded, and that events are moving in the right direction.
Download a transcript of General Herzog's remarks in their entirety (PDF).
The following is a rapporteur's summary of General Herzog's remarks. Download a transcript of General Herzog's remarks in their entirety (PDF).
The Middle East is in a transitional period. There are new governments in Israel and the United States. Lebanon is about to hold elections, and the Palestinians may do the same by 2010. More broadly, the region has felt the effects of the global economic situation. And many are concerned about both the Iranian nuclear threat and the potential consequences of the Taliban gaining control over Pakistani nuclear facilities. The sand dunes are shifting, and it is important to determine sooner rather than later where the Middle East is headed.
The primary concern for Arab countries is Iran. Many are skeptical of the notion that Tehran's nuclear program can be stopped -- they worry that the United States will not be assertive enough, and that the Arab states will be sold out. As a result, the divide between radicals and moderates is sharpening, with regional actors judging both the Iranian issue and other events along these axes. This could be seen in the reactions to the 2006 Lebanon war and, even more clearly, the war in Gaza. Today, fault lines are deepening between Palestinian and Lebanese factions. Saudi Arabia is pouring huge sums into the Lebanese elections. Morocco has cut off official ties with Iran. Bahrain is becoming increasingly concerned about Tehran's claims of sovereignty over the island nation, while Qatar has decided to align with Iran due to their close proximity. And Syria is keeping its options open by engaging in peace efforts, and by building ties with Iraq and Turkey rather than with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
To address the region's growing divisions, we must clearly identify their source. The radical contingent has its head in Tehran, its body in Damascus, and its arms in Lebanon and Gaza. Although each of these players presents different challenges, the main problem is Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Some argue that Iran wants civilian nuclear power, not weapons, but there is clear evidence to the contrary.
In order to fulfill its nuclear ambitions, Tehran needs three elements: fissile material, delivery systems, and weaponization. Israel and the United States disagree on whether or not Iran truly halted its weaponization program in 2003. Yet, regardless of who is correct, weaponization is not a significant obstacle -- the nuclear program's success is much more dependent on acquiring delivery systems and enriching uranium
Iran already has the required delivery systems -- missiles -- and is working to extend their range to 2,000 kilometers by purchasing and developing new systems. Uranium enrichment is therefore the key issue. According to the latest intelligence and International Atomic Energy Agency reports, Iran already has more than a ton of low-enriched uranium. At this pace, it will have enough to produce a bomb as soon as the end of 2010 or early 2011.
Tehran will have four main options once it reaches breakout capacity. First, it could announce to the world that it is a nuclear power. This is probably not Iran's first choice, since it would draw international condemnation. Based on North Korea's experience, however, Iranian leaders may decide that announcing they have gone nuclear will shield them from repercussions. Therefore, this possibility cannot be ruled out.
Second, the Iranians could continue stockpiling low-enriched uranium without refining it into the high-enriched material needed for a bomb. In that case, they could bide their time, waiting until they feel that international resolve is weakened or pressure on them has lessened before moving forward with the program. A third possibility would be to halt enrichment while still increasing their stockpile by stealing or diverting additional low-enriched uranium. And a fourth option is to establish an entirely clandestine program parallel to their known, inspected program -- in fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that they have already done so.
Regardless of which scenario comes to pass, we will be in a danger zone once Iran reaches the breakout point. There is time for engagement, but not much. Although engagement is a sensible option, Israel has several questions for the United States about what such a strategy means.
First, what is the goal of engagement? How do you define it and measure it in clear, concrete terms? Second, what is your timeframe for this approach? Third, what benchmarks will you set in determining whether engagement is working? This is important because the Iranians will continue to enrich uranium as Washington and Europe attempt to engage them. Fourth, what will you do if engagement does not achieve its desired goal?
If engagement fails, the international community may choose to exploit Iran's acute vulnerability to sanctions. For example, the country's oil infrastructure has deteriorated to the point where Iranians have to import 40 percent of their refined petroleum needs. In light of this dependency, Europe could deny credit to companies that do business with Iran. These and other sanctions would place a great deal of pressure on the regime given the low price of oil and the global economic situation. As far as Israel's stance on Iranian nuclearization is concerned, I would just make the following points: when we say that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, we mean it. And when we say that all options are still on the table, we mean it.
Regarding the other key players in the region's growing radical contingent, Hamas remains a major Israeli concern. Israeli leaders are often asked -- even by many Arabs -- why they did not crush Hamas during the recent fighting in Gaza. The reason is primarily tactical. To borrow from Tom Friedman, the choice was whether to eradicate Hamas or educate it. Eradicating the group would have required a massive military deployment and a return to Israeli control over Gaza, with no exit in sight. The Palestinian Authority would not want to resume control amid Israeli bayonets, and no international actor would be willing to take Israel's place following such a campaign. Although Hamas is a concern, it is not Israel's top priority at the moment, and so the choice was made to "educate" the group instead.
Another common question is why, if the goal was to halt rocket attacks from Gaza, did Israel not reoccupy the Philadelphia Corridor on the Egyptian border? First, this would not have been sufficient to stop the smuggling of rockets -- Israel would also have had to control Rafah, where the smuggling tunnels end. Second, Egypt has recently become much more effective at preventing smuggling. We know this because the price of weapons in Gaza has increased dramatically. In retrospect, Hamas was badly beaten, and today it is trying to maintain quiet by forcing other groups to respect the ceasefire. Israel hopes that this ceasefire will last long enough for it to finish developing antirocket systems, whose necessity became clear after the 2006 war in Lebanon.
Hamas control of Gaza will continue to complicate the peace process with the Palestinians, of course. It is unclear how Israel can negotiate with Abu Mazen when some 40 percent of the Palestinian population is not under his control. Furthermore, if Hamas does not allow elections to be carried out in Gaza, even the Palestinians are unsure of what the potential consequences might be. In any case, the new Israeli government is still conducting its policy review on the peace process, so it is premature to say what Prime Minister Netanyahu will do.
In the meantime, both top-down and bottom-up state-building efforts should continue in order to lay the foundation of a Palestinian state. In particular, Gen. Keith Dayton should be permitted to continue his mission. Israel is very impressed with the professionalism and commitment he has shown in training Palestinian security officials and ensuring their cooperation with Israel. Although it is not yet possible to turn over complete security control to the Palestinians, the level of professional pride among the battalions trained in Jordan is unprecedented. In addition, we should continue with economic and infrastructure projects; such initiatives led to Palestinian economic growth rates of up to 4 percent in 2008 alone.
To the north, the Lebanese situation remains a concern as well. Although Israel has been successful during the past decade in preventing conflicts on that front from spreading elsewhere, Lebanon is still a sticking point in Israeli-Syrian negotiations. In the past, it was assumed that Lebanon would follow Syria's lead. Yet, recent political developments -- particularly the growing strength of Hizballah -- have changed the situation. Hizballah could conceivably win the upcoming Lebanese elections. A further difficulty is that Syria refuses to even negotiate until it knows what territory it will gain from Israel. For its part, Israel refuses to cede the Golan Heights until it knows that Syria will stop aiding Hizballah and Hamas.
Despite these bleak pictures, there are many opportunities for constructive action in the region. Such action will require cooperative effort, and Israel's neighbors are willing to take part as long as they believe that will not be left stranded, and that events are moving in the right direction.
Download a transcript of General Herzog's remarks in their entirety (PDF).
How effective are terrorist rehabilitation programs? by David Montero
Recent attacks in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have left some wondering whether attempts to turn militants away from terrorism have failed.
Police in Indonesia were once lauded for their track record of rehabilitating hardened terrorists, turning them into informants and aides. But then a graduate of one of those programs turned back to terrorism and died in a spectacular shoot-out with police in August.
Saudi Arabia was also considered a good model of rehabilitating terrorists. But two weeks ago a graduate of a rehabilitation program detonated a suicide bomb in an attack on a Saudi prince, nine months after the kingdom disclosed that 11 graduates of the program had been rearrested for joining militant groups.
Many countries around the world – including Pakistan, Yemen, and the United States – are struggling with the issue of what to do with terrorism suspects in their custody. With Indonesia and Saudi Arabia's models seemingly compromised, rehabilitation has become both a pressing and confounding issue.
Recent attacks in Indonesia have generated much criticism of that country's rehabilitation efforts. But it doesn't mean the entire system needs to be thrown out, International Crisis Group's senior advisor for Asia Sidney Jones recently told The Jakarta Post.
"[It is] … simplistic and naïve to say that the program is a failure because there was a bombing. It's much more complicated than that," [said Ms. Jones].
... Jones believes the country needs to further integrate cooperation between state institutions including the ministries and the police.
"If we look at the program in Saudi Arabia, it is very integrated, with many different parts of the government involved," she said.
But Saudi Arabia's system is also in need of a major overhaul, argues Tawfik Hamid, in a blog for conservative US news outlet Newsmax.
[I]t is vital in such programs to have proper peer review for the study. Political statements of the program's success are not sufficient to consider it effective. Detailed statistical analyses and comparison to a control group in other Middle Eastern countries that do not use this approach are needed for further evaluation of the Saudi program. It may turn out that using other tactics is more effective or, that putting the terrorists in prison or under surveillance indefinitely may yield a better outcome. Releasing the terrorists may actually facilitate further spread of the radical ideology.
The Christian Science Monitor reported last month that Human Rights Watch criticized Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program for violating international law by detaining people indefinitely without bringing charges against them or convicting them of a crime. The program also doesn't have a perfect track record. Two former Guantánamo Bay detainees and graduates of Saudi Arabia's program have joined Yemen's Al Qaeda branch, the Monitor reported earlier this year.
It's not just an issue the Saudis and Indonesians will have to grapple with, as this report in Pakistan's Daily Times newspaper reveals:
According to military officials, the 'Sabawoon' (morning light) Rehabilitation Centre will look after the young men brainwashed and indoctrinated by Taliban for suicide attacks on security forces and other targets in Swat. Many such youths were arrested by troops or found in camps raided by security forces during search and clearance operations in the valley.
Yemen has also created its own rehabilitation program, similar to Saudi Arabia's, in an attempt to convince the US to repatriate Yemeni Guantánamo detainees. Human rights groups are skeptical of Yemen's program, warning that "the programs ... don't always translate into practical transformation," the Monitor reported in June.
It is also an important issue for the US, since many of the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay could be released into countries where rehabilitation will be difficult, argued a recent opinion piece in the Monitor:
The detainees who remain at Guantánamo have had years to reevaluate and perhaps upgrade their ideological convictions as well as develop new personal networks. Those who are ultimately released are likely to be welcomed home as heroes by Al Qaeda followers, their status enhanced by the legend of their Guantánamo experience.
Police in Indonesia were once lauded for their track record of rehabilitating hardened terrorists, turning them into informants and aides. But then a graduate of one of those programs turned back to terrorism and died in a spectacular shoot-out with police in August.
Saudi Arabia was also considered a good model of rehabilitating terrorists. But two weeks ago a graduate of a rehabilitation program detonated a suicide bomb in an attack on a Saudi prince, nine months after the kingdom disclosed that 11 graduates of the program had been rearrested for joining militant groups.
Many countries around the world – including Pakistan, Yemen, and the United States – are struggling with the issue of what to do with terrorism suspects in their custody. With Indonesia and Saudi Arabia's models seemingly compromised, rehabilitation has become both a pressing and confounding issue.
Recent attacks in Indonesia have generated much criticism of that country's rehabilitation efforts. But it doesn't mean the entire system needs to be thrown out, International Crisis Group's senior advisor for Asia Sidney Jones recently told The Jakarta Post.
"[It is] … simplistic and naïve to say that the program is a failure because there was a bombing. It's much more complicated than that," [said Ms. Jones].
... Jones believes the country needs to further integrate cooperation between state institutions including the ministries and the police.
"If we look at the program in Saudi Arabia, it is very integrated, with many different parts of the government involved," she said.
But Saudi Arabia's system is also in need of a major overhaul, argues Tawfik Hamid, in a blog for conservative US news outlet Newsmax.
[I]t is vital in such programs to have proper peer review for the study. Political statements of the program's success are not sufficient to consider it effective. Detailed statistical analyses and comparison to a control group in other Middle Eastern countries that do not use this approach are needed for further evaluation of the Saudi program. It may turn out that using other tactics is more effective or, that putting the terrorists in prison or under surveillance indefinitely may yield a better outcome. Releasing the terrorists may actually facilitate further spread of the radical ideology.
The Christian Science Monitor reported last month that Human Rights Watch criticized Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program for violating international law by detaining people indefinitely without bringing charges against them or convicting them of a crime. The program also doesn't have a perfect track record. Two former Guantánamo Bay detainees and graduates of Saudi Arabia's program have joined Yemen's Al Qaeda branch, the Monitor reported earlier this year.
It's not just an issue the Saudis and Indonesians will have to grapple with, as this report in Pakistan's Daily Times newspaper reveals:
According to military officials, the 'Sabawoon' (morning light) Rehabilitation Centre will look after the young men brainwashed and indoctrinated by Taliban for suicide attacks on security forces and other targets in Swat. Many such youths were arrested by troops or found in camps raided by security forces during search and clearance operations in the valley.
Yemen has also created its own rehabilitation program, similar to Saudi Arabia's, in an attempt to convince the US to repatriate Yemeni Guantánamo detainees. Human rights groups are skeptical of Yemen's program, warning that "the programs ... don't always translate into practical transformation," the Monitor reported in June.
It is also an important issue for the US, since many of the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay could be released into countries where rehabilitation will be difficult, argued a recent opinion piece in the Monitor:
The detainees who remain at Guantánamo have had years to reevaluate and perhaps upgrade their ideological convictions as well as develop new personal networks. Those who are ultimately released are likely to be welcomed home as heroes by Al Qaeda followers, their status enhanced by the legend of their Guantánamo experience.
Beslan: Jihadism against Children Must Trigger Global Response by Walid Phares
Five years after the massacre of Russian children in Beslan at the hands of "Caucuses Jihadists" (Jihadiyu al Qafqaz), this attack is still catalogued as the lowest form of Salafi Jihadi Terror on civilian population. In the following piece I argue that the intention by the perpetrators to inflict pain on children and parents alike has reached the bottom of human rights abuse. Thus I argue that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all targeted by Salafi Takfiri Terror, must initiate a UN sponsored declaration against the ideology legitimizing this type of violence.
Wars have always had inhuman results, no matter what is the scale. Since the early 20th century, terrorism has perpetrated mass killing of innocents, condemned by all moral values. Salafi jihadism in particular has produced extreme scales of bloodshed against civilians, comparing with the monstrosity of totalitarian regimes under Hitler or Pol Pot, among others.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s, Salafi terror groups operating from the Philippines to Algeria have butchered families, students, journalists, elderly, and the weakest elements of civil society.
Children, too, have been murdered during these ghazwas (jihadi raids). In the post 9/11 era, al-Qaida, the Taliban, Indonesia’ Jemaa, the Janjaweed in Darfur, and the Shabab of Somalia, among others, have bombed and slaughtered kids. The al-Muhayya bombing in Saudi Arabia, the Amman bloody wedding, and the Baghdad’s surreal infanticides are only examples as to how Salafi jihadists and Khomeinist operatives have gone in their devastation of children’s lives.
Obviously, the young souls lost in New York, Madrid, and London testifies to the universality of jihadi terror. The latter’s ideologues do not exclude children from their operations, regardless of any consideration: The “caliphate” can be built on the skulls of all enemies, Muslims and non Muslim alike. But five years ago in Beslan, the zombies of jihadism took the Caucuses’ population to an unreached low. Not only did the so-called “separatists” target specifically a school in the Russian town of Beslan, but they built their tactical goals on causing pain to the kids and their parents. We now know the details of the operation and have seen the atrocious pictures of boys and girls laying dead or being whisked out from the premises covered in blood.
However, even if massacres can’t be compared when collective punishments are exerted on the little ones, Beslan’s killings have something peculiar in its horror: a calculated will to display the scenery of captured children via media all over the world: The Jihadi Kamikazes were proud of doing it. For whatever the “Chechen cause” is, and regardless of the political debate surrounding it, Beslan’s savage “intention” shattered any demands the armed terrorists were allegedly advancing.
Fighting face to face or even as a guerilla is one thing; targeting children specifically is a very different matter. The real message from that tragic episode, at least the one that has registered in Russia and around the world, is that jihadi terrorism has no moral bounders. Or at least the Takfiri Salafi strain, which nevertheless is an emanation from Wahhabism. Neither the international community, nor the Muslim societies subscribing to universal human rights can accept the premise of such inhuman violence when it openly, unashamedly, and ideologically, legitimizes infanticide. There are simply no merciful spaces in any set of legal traditions, from Scotland to Jordan that can incorporate a legitimization of Beslan’s motives.
But regardless of legal and doctrinal debates, Beslan sent irreversible chills throughout the globe. Notwithstanding academic discussion of Chechen and Russian politics, the raw scenes affected moms and dads around the world. Mumbai’s urban jihad alerted citizens across the planet that it can happen in any city. But Beslan’s butchery awoke basic instincts of parents: it can happen in any neighborhood, any school. Even if top government advisers in Brussels and Washington are claiming jihadism is just a “spiritual experience,” this ideology has committed unforgivable sins. Its doctrinaires have often repeated (and were heard on satellite TV and in chat rooms) that punishment of the enemy can require millions of children dead.
Beslan’s long-term effect is going to harden democratic societies and crumble the argument that engagement with totalitarians can mitigate their actions. Only political development within civil societies where the jihadists are produced can isolate the radicals and reverse their advances. Ironically, women and children are the real hope against the terror ideology; and it is precisely these two weak segments of society that the terrorists have been targeting. The questions after Beslan and all similar horrors are simple: who is providing the “fatwas,” who is sending the petrodollars and what is the doctrine behind the violence. Everything else can be figured out when these answers will be provided.
Beslan is perhaps a unifying platform which must be seized promptly by the main players in international security.
The United States, Britain, France, Russia, and even China have all been targeted by Salafi Takfiris. The jihadists are aiming at the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as well as India and major Muslim countries. There cannot be a wider consensus at this stage of global politics than waging a U.N. campaign against global jihadism.
Way beyond al-Qaida as an organization, the Security Council must render its ideology illegal. Let there be discussion of the issue and let clarity win the day: There should not be room to any violence promising the rise of empires and totalitarianism, and grounded with ideological legitimacy. The fascist genocides of the 20th century were enough reasons not to allow this to happen again.
Wars have always had inhuman results, no matter what is the scale. Since the early 20th century, terrorism has perpetrated mass killing of innocents, condemned by all moral values. Salafi jihadism in particular has produced extreme scales of bloodshed against civilians, comparing with the monstrosity of totalitarian regimes under Hitler or Pol Pot, among others.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s, Salafi terror groups operating from the Philippines to Algeria have butchered families, students, journalists, elderly, and the weakest elements of civil society.
Children, too, have been murdered during these ghazwas (jihadi raids). In the post 9/11 era, al-Qaida, the Taliban, Indonesia’ Jemaa, the Janjaweed in Darfur, and the Shabab of Somalia, among others, have bombed and slaughtered kids. The al-Muhayya bombing in Saudi Arabia, the Amman bloody wedding, and the Baghdad’s surreal infanticides are only examples as to how Salafi jihadists and Khomeinist operatives have gone in their devastation of children’s lives.
Obviously, the young souls lost in New York, Madrid, and London testifies to the universality of jihadi terror. The latter’s ideologues do not exclude children from their operations, regardless of any consideration: The “caliphate” can be built on the skulls of all enemies, Muslims and non Muslim alike. But five years ago in Beslan, the zombies of jihadism took the Caucuses’ population to an unreached low. Not only did the so-called “separatists” target specifically a school in the Russian town of Beslan, but they built their tactical goals on causing pain to the kids and their parents. We now know the details of the operation and have seen the atrocious pictures of boys and girls laying dead or being whisked out from the premises covered in blood.
However, even if massacres can’t be compared when collective punishments are exerted on the little ones, Beslan’s killings have something peculiar in its horror: a calculated will to display the scenery of captured children via media all over the world: The Jihadi Kamikazes were proud of doing it. For whatever the “Chechen cause” is, and regardless of the political debate surrounding it, Beslan’s savage “intention” shattered any demands the armed terrorists were allegedly advancing.
Fighting face to face or even as a guerilla is one thing; targeting children specifically is a very different matter. The real message from that tragic episode, at least the one that has registered in Russia and around the world, is that jihadi terrorism has no moral bounders. Or at least the Takfiri Salafi strain, which nevertheless is an emanation from Wahhabism. Neither the international community, nor the Muslim societies subscribing to universal human rights can accept the premise of such inhuman violence when it openly, unashamedly, and ideologically, legitimizes infanticide. There are simply no merciful spaces in any set of legal traditions, from Scotland to Jordan that can incorporate a legitimization of Beslan’s motives.
But regardless of legal and doctrinal debates, Beslan sent irreversible chills throughout the globe. Notwithstanding academic discussion of Chechen and Russian politics, the raw scenes affected moms and dads around the world. Mumbai’s urban jihad alerted citizens across the planet that it can happen in any city. But Beslan’s butchery awoke basic instincts of parents: it can happen in any neighborhood, any school. Even if top government advisers in Brussels and Washington are claiming jihadism is just a “spiritual experience,” this ideology has committed unforgivable sins. Its doctrinaires have often repeated (and were heard on satellite TV and in chat rooms) that punishment of the enemy can require millions of children dead.
Beslan’s long-term effect is going to harden democratic societies and crumble the argument that engagement with totalitarians can mitigate their actions. Only political development within civil societies where the jihadists are produced can isolate the radicals and reverse their advances. Ironically, women and children are the real hope against the terror ideology; and it is precisely these two weak segments of society that the terrorists have been targeting. The questions after Beslan and all similar horrors are simple: who is providing the “fatwas,” who is sending the petrodollars and what is the doctrine behind the violence. Everything else can be figured out when these answers will be provided.
Beslan is perhaps a unifying platform which must be seized promptly by the main players in international security.
The United States, Britain, France, Russia, and even China have all been targeted by Salafi Takfiris. The jihadists are aiming at the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as well as India and major Muslim countries. There cannot be a wider consensus at this stage of global politics than waging a U.N. campaign against global jihadism.
Way beyond al-Qaida as an organization, the Security Council must render its ideology illegal. Let there be discussion of the issue and let clarity win the day: There should not be room to any violence promising the rise of empires and totalitarianism, and grounded with ideological legitimacy. The fascist genocides of the 20th century were enough reasons not to allow this to happen again.
Monday, September 07, 2009
China alarmed by US money printing by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
The US Federal Reserve's policy of printing money to buy Treasury debt threatens to set off a serious decline of the dollar and compel China to redesign its foreign reserve policy, according to a top member of the Communist hierarchy.
Cheng Siwei, former vice-chairman of the Standing Committee and now head of China's green energy drive, said Beijing was dismayed by the Fed's recourse to "credit easing".
"We hope there will be a change in monetary policy as soon as they have positive growth again," he said at the Ambrosetti Workshop, a policy gathering on Lake Como.
"If they keep printing money to buy bonds it will lead to inflation, and after a year or two the dollar will fall hard. Most of our foreign reserves are in US bonds and this is very difficult to change, so we will diversify incremental reserves into euros, yen, and other currencies," he said.
China's reserves are more than – $2 trillion, the world's largest.
"Gold is definitely an alternative, but when we buy, the price goes up. We have to do it carefully so as not to stimulate the markets," he added.
The comments suggest that China has become the driving force in the gold market and can be counted on to buy whenever there is a price dip, putting a floor under any correction. Mr Cheng said the Fed's loose monetary policy was stoking an unstable asset boom in China. "If we raise interest rates, we will be flooded with hot money. We have to wait for them. If they raise, we raise. "Credit in China is too loose. We have a bubble in the housing market and in stocks so we have to be very careful, because this could fall down." Mr Cheng said China had learned from the West that it is a mistake for central banks to target retail price inflation and take their eye off assets. "This is where Greenspan went wrong from 2000 to 2004," he said. "He thought everything was alright because inflation was low, but assets absorbed the liquidity." Mr Cheng said China had lost 20m jobs as a result of the crisis and advised the West not to over-estimate the role that his country can play in global recovery. China's task is to switch from export dependency to internal consumption, but that requires a "change in the ideology of the Chinese people" to discourage excess saving. "This is very difficult".
Mr Cheng said the root cause of global imbalances is spending patterns in US (and UK) and China.
"The US spends tomorrow's money today," he said. "We Chinese spend today's money tomorrow. That's why we have this financial crisis." Yet the consequences are not symmetric. "He who goes borrowing, goes sorrowing," said Mr Cheng. It was a quote from US founding father Benjamin Franklin.
Cheng Siwei, former vice-chairman of the Standing Committee and now head of China's green energy drive, said Beijing was dismayed by the Fed's recourse to "credit easing".
"We hope there will be a change in monetary policy as soon as they have positive growth again," he said at the Ambrosetti Workshop, a policy gathering on Lake Como.
"If they keep printing money to buy bonds it will lead to inflation, and after a year or two the dollar will fall hard. Most of our foreign reserves are in US bonds and this is very difficult to change, so we will diversify incremental reserves into euros, yen, and other currencies," he said.
China's reserves are more than – $2 trillion, the world's largest.
"Gold is definitely an alternative, but when we buy, the price goes up. We have to do it carefully so as not to stimulate the markets," he added.
The comments suggest that China has become the driving force in the gold market and can be counted on to buy whenever there is a price dip, putting a floor under any correction. Mr Cheng said the Fed's loose monetary policy was stoking an unstable asset boom in China. "If we raise interest rates, we will be flooded with hot money. We have to wait for them. If they raise, we raise. "Credit in China is too loose. We have a bubble in the housing market and in stocks so we have to be very careful, because this could fall down." Mr Cheng said China had learned from the West that it is a mistake for central banks to target retail price inflation and take their eye off assets. "This is where Greenspan went wrong from 2000 to 2004," he said. "He thought everything was alright because inflation was low, but assets absorbed the liquidity." Mr Cheng said China had lost 20m jobs as a result of the crisis and advised the West not to over-estimate the role that his country can play in global recovery. China's task is to switch from export dependency to internal consumption, but that requires a "change in the ideology of the Chinese people" to discourage excess saving. "This is very difficult".
Mr Cheng said the root cause of global imbalances is spending patterns in US (and UK) and China.
"The US spends tomorrow's money today," he said. "We Chinese spend today's money tomorrow. That's why we have this financial crisis." Yet the consequences are not symmetric. "He who goes borrowing, goes sorrowing," said Mr Cheng. It was a quote from US founding father Benjamin Franklin.
Intel Under Threat From New Solar CPU? by J Mark Lytle
Intel might own 80 per cent of the world market for CPUs used in personal computers, but that doesn't mean it's invulnerable, especially not after news of a new threat from the Far East.
The upstart is set to come in the form of a new venture from seven Japanese companies keen to work together on a new breed of chips that use far less power than normal processors.
Solar Power
NEC, Toshiba, Panasonic, Fujitsu, Canon, Hitachi and Renesas (which is owned by Hitachi and Mitsubishi) are working on a chip that will run on solar power and that will also throttle its consumption according to how much work needs to be done.
Ambitiously, the group also wants the final product to be able to somehow store power so that it can keep running even when the mains electricity is cut off.
Coming Soon
So far, current prototypes store and save 30 percent of the power of standard CPUs, but the companies promise they'll reach their goal and have something ready by 2012. Watch out, Intel.
The upstart is set to come in the form of a new venture from seven Japanese companies keen to work together on a new breed of chips that use far less power than normal processors.
Solar Power
NEC, Toshiba, Panasonic, Fujitsu, Canon, Hitachi and Renesas (which is owned by Hitachi and Mitsubishi) are working on a chip that will run on solar power and that will also throttle its consumption according to how much work needs to be done.
Ambitiously, the group also wants the final product to be able to somehow store power so that it can keep running even when the mains electricity is cut off.
Coming Soon
So far, current prototypes store and save 30 percent of the power of standard CPUs, but the companies promise they'll reach their goal and have something ready by 2012. Watch out, Intel.
How Team of Geeks Cracked Spy Trade by Siobhan Gorman
From a Silicon Valley office strewn with bean-bag chairs, a group of twenty-something software engineers is building an unlikely following of terrorist hunters at U.S. spy agencies.
One of the latest entrants into the government spy-services marketplace, Palantir Technologies has designed what many intelligence analysts say is the most effective tool to date to investigate terrorist networks. The software's main advance is a user-friendly search tool that can scan multiple data sources at once, something previous search tools couldn't do. That means an analyst who is following a tip about a planned terror attack, for example, can more quickly and easily unearth connections among suspects, money transfers, phone calls and previous attacks around the globe.
Employee Nick Miyate demonstrated the red light and bubble machine that turns on whenever an engineer fixes a software error, or "build break."
Palantir's software has helped root out terrorist financing networks, revealed new trends in roadside bomb attacks, and uncovered details of Syrian suicide bombing networks in Iraq, according to current and former U.S. officials familiar with the events. It has also foiled a Pakistani suicide bombing plot on Western targets and discovered a spy infiltration of an allied government. It is now being used by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Yet Palantir -- which takes its name from the "seeing stones" in the "Lord of the Rings" series -- remains an outlier among government security contractors. It rejected advice to hire retired generals to curry favor with the agencies and hired young government analysts frustrated by working with slow-footed technology. The company's founders knew little about intelligence gathering when they started out. Instead, they went on a fact-finding mission, working with analysts to build the product from scratch.
"We were very naive. We just thought this was a cool idea," says Palantir's 41-year-old chief executive Alexander Karp, whose usual dress is a track-suit jacket, blue jeans, and red leather sneakers. "I underestimated how difficult it would be."
Technology like Palantir's is increasingly important to spies confronting an information explosion, where terrorists can hide communications in vast data streams on the Internet. Intelligence agencies are struggling to identify and monitor such information -- and quickly send relevant data to the analysts who need it. U.S. officials say the software is also crucial as the country steps up its offensive in difficult theaters like Afghanistan. There, Palantir's software is now being used to analyze constantly shifting tribal dynamics and distinguish potential allies from enemies, according to current and former counterterrorism officials familiar with the work.
"It's a new way of war fighting," says former Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long. While there are many good systems, Ms. Long says, with Palantir's software "you can actually point to examples where it was pretty clear that lives were saved."
Palantir's chief rivals are I2 Inc., a 20-year-old software company with offices in McLean, Va., and a handful of defense contractors who have been building software for intelligence agencies for years. I2's general manager, Todd Drake, dismisses his upstart competitor as "the new sexy thing," saying that Palantir won't be able to make lasting inroads in a government market that prizes the stability of established companies. Palantir CEO Mr. Karp says such criticism doesn't trouble him. He says the company is already expanding rapidly.
Palantir's roots date back to 2000, when Mr. Karp returned to the U.S. after living for years in Frankfurt, where he earned his doctorate in German social philosophy and discovered a talent for investing. He reconnected with a buddy from Stanford Law School, Peter Thiel, the billionaire founder of online payment company PayPal.
Palantir may look like a typical Silicon Valley start-up, with free food and the usual comforts to make work more like home. But with clients like the FBI and CIA, it's far from the usual software company.
In 2003, Mr. Thiel pitched an idea to Mr. Karp: Could they build software that would uncover terror networks using the approach PayPal had devised to fight Russian cybercriminals?
PayPal's software could make connections between fraudulent payments that on the surface seemed unrelated. By following such leads, PayPal was able to identify suspect customers and uncover cybercrime networks. The company saw a tenfold decrease in fraud losses after it launched the software, while many competitors struggled to beat back cheaters.
Mr. Thiel wanted to design software to tackle terrorism because at the time, he says, the government's response to issues like airport security was increasingly "nightmarish." The two launched Palantir in 2004 with three other investors, but they attracted little interest from venture-capital firms. The company's $30 million start-up costs were largely bankrolled by Mr. Thiel and his own venture-capital fund.
They modeled Palantir's culture on Google's, with catered meals of ahi tuna and a free-form 24-hour workplace wired so 16 people can play the Halo video game. The kitchen is stocked by request with such items as Pepto Bismol and glass bottles of Mexican Coca Cola sweetened with sugar not corn syrup. The company recently hosted its own battle of the bands.
One of the venture firms that rejected Palantir's overtures steered the company to In-Q-Tel, a nonprofit venture-capital firm established by the CIA a decade ago to tap innovation that could be used for intelligence work. As Silicon Valley's venture funding dries up, In-Q-Tel says it has seen a surge of requests from start-ups in the last year or so, many of which now see the government as an alternate money stream.
In-Q-Tel invested about $2 million in Palantir and provided a critical entreé to the CIA and other agencies. For his first spy meeting in 2005, Mr. Karp shed his track suit for a sports coat. He arrived at an agency -- he won't say which one -- and was immediately "freaked out" by security officers guarding the building with guns. In a windowless, code-locked room, he introduced himself to the first official he met: "Hi, I'm Alex Karp," Mr. Karp said, offering his hand. No response. "I didn't know you really don't ask their names," he says now.
Mr. Karp showed the group a prototype. The software was similar to PayPal's fraud-detection system. But instead of identifying and connecting cyber criminals, it focused on two hypothetical terror suspects and followed their activities, including travel and money transfers.
After the demo, he was peppered with skeptical questions: Is anyone at your company cleared to work with classified information? Have you ever worked with intelligence agencies? Do you have senior advisers who have worked with intelligence agencies? Do you have a sales force that is cleared to work with classified information? The answer every time: no.
But the group was sufficiently intrigued by the demo, and In-Q-Tel arranged for Palantir engineers to meet directly with intelligence analysts, to help build a comprehensive search tool from scratch.
Every other week for about two years, the engineers returned to Washington with a revised product, based on analysts' requests. The approach won over a number of tech-savvy younger analysts who asked their bosses to adopt the software.
Spy agencies like the CIA and military intelligence organizations have hundreds of databases each, most of which aren't linked up. A single database might contain reports from field agents or lists of known terrorists or companies thought to be financing terrorism. To conduct an investigation, analysts have to query individual databases separately, then try to make sense of the data -- frequently with pen and paper.
With many of the existing search tools, analysts also can't access some files on terrorist suspects or other threats because a bit of data in the file is classified at a level higher than they are allowed to see. That is a problem, because making connections among new clues and existing data is a key to foiling terrorist plots. Among the missed opportunities cited by post-9/11 investigations were the failure to see that five of the 19 hijackers used the same phone number as ringleader Mohammad Atta to book their airline tickets, two used the same frequent-flier number, and five used two common addresses to make their reservations.
Palantir's software plugs these gaps by using a "tagging" technique similar to that used by the search functions on most Web sites. Palantir tags, or categorizes, every bit of data separately, whether it be a first name, a last name or a phone number. That means if only one piece of data in a file is classified top-secret, an analyst with a lower level clearance can still see the rest of the data. It also allows analysts to quickly tag information themselves as it arrives in the form of field reports from spies overseas, and to see who else in the agency is doing similar research so they can share their findings.
By connecting different databases, analysts can start making new links. Someone could see, for example, that one terrorist suspect flagged in one database has been living at the same address as the cousin of another suspect whose information is in another database, and that the two men flew to the same city after money was transferred to a particular bank account.
Some analysts say Palantir's strength is helping analysts draw inferences when confronted with an enormous amount of disparate data. Palantir's tool is getting a thumbs-up from officers using it. "It is much simpler to understand the results of inquiries, and provides more in-depth database links then the current programs in use by the Army today," says Captain James King, an Army intelligence officer.
A handful of agencies have adopted Palantir's software for specific projects. The Pentagon recently used it to track patterns in roadside bomb deployment. Officials say analysts were able to connect two reports and conclude that garage-door openers were being used as remote detonators and soldiers on the ground had a new device to look for.
Analysts at West Point recently used Palantir's software to map evidence of Syrian suicide-bombing networks buried within nearly 700 al Qaeda documents, including hundreds of personnel records that the military recovered in Iraq. The analysts did an initial sweep of the data without the Palantir tool and assembled a report on foreign fighters in Iraq who were paying Syrian middlemen to send over suicide bombers.
A second analysis with Palantir uncovered more details of the Syrian networks, including profiles of their top coordinators, which led analysts to conclude there wasn't one Syrian network, but many. Analysts identified key facilitators, how much they charged people who wanted to become suicide bombers, and where many of the fighters came from. Fighters from Saudi Arabia, for example, paid the most -- $1,088 -- for the opportunity to become suicide bombers.
Such details helped local law enforcement break up some of the rings, said one U.S. official familiar with the work. It also revealed the extent to which al Qaeda was relying on mercenary smuggling networks, rather than true believers, to get suicide bombers into Iraq.
In the past two years, Palantir's work in Washington has expanded from eight pilot programs to more than 50 projects, executives say. The Australian government is now a client, and the NSA is eyeing Palantir, as is the U.K., current and former government officials say.
The company expects to turn a profit on its government work this year -- it recently started working with financial companies, but says it is too early to see any profits from that yet -- and for revenues to reach $100 million within the next two years. Palantir also maintains a pro-bono roster. It examined the cyber attacks on the central Asian country of Georgia last year, and earlier this year helped Canadian researchers uncover a cyberspying operation on the Dalai Lama. The company is now working with a nonprofit investigative group in Washington to resolve open questions in the 2002 murder of The Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
In 2007, Mr. Karp hired his first intelligence-agency alum, David Worn, to open a Washington office. Mr. Worn says he was among the younger agency analysts who felt trapped in an outdated system.
As he builds up the East Coast office, which now employs 20 people, Mr. Worn says that the company is still figuring out "how to live in those two worlds" of Silicon Valley and Washington. One thing that does seem to help: He and his colleagues make frequent trips to Palo Alto to make sure they don't lose "the vibe of the Shire," the home of the hobbits from Lord of the Rings.
One of the latest entrants into the government spy-services marketplace, Palantir Technologies has designed what many intelligence analysts say is the most effective tool to date to investigate terrorist networks. The software's main advance is a user-friendly search tool that can scan multiple data sources at once, something previous search tools couldn't do. That means an analyst who is following a tip about a planned terror attack, for example, can more quickly and easily unearth connections among suspects, money transfers, phone calls and previous attacks around the globe.
Employee Nick Miyate demonstrated the red light and bubble machine that turns on whenever an engineer fixes a software error, or "build break."
Palantir's software has helped root out terrorist financing networks, revealed new trends in roadside bomb attacks, and uncovered details of Syrian suicide bombing networks in Iraq, according to current and former U.S. officials familiar with the events. It has also foiled a Pakistani suicide bombing plot on Western targets and discovered a spy infiltration of an allied government. It is now being used by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Yet Palantir -- which takes its name from the "seeing stones" in the "Lord of the Rings" series -- remains an outlier among government security contractors. It rejected advice to hire retired generals to curry favor with the agencies and hired young government analysts frustrated by working with slow-footed technology. The company's founders knew little about intelligence gathering when they started out. Instead, they went on a fact-finding mission, working with analysts to build the product from scratch.
"We were very naive. We just thought this was a cool idea," says Palantir's 41-year-old chief executive Alexander Karp, whose usual dress is a track-suit jacket, blue jeans, and red leather sneakers. "I underestimated how difficult it would be."
Technology like Palantir's is increasingly important to spies confronting an information explosion, where terrorists can hide communications in vast data streams on the Internet. Intelligence agencies are struggling to identify and monitor such information -- and quickly send relevant data to the analysts who need it. U.S. officials say the software is also crucial as the country steps up its offensive in difficult theaters like Afghanistan. There, Palantir's software is now being used to analyze constantly shifting tribal dynamics and distinguish potential allies from enemies, according to current and former counterterrorism officials familiar with the work.
"It's a new way of war fighting," says former Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long. While there are many good systems, Ms. Long says, with Palantir's software "you can actually point to examples where it was pretty clear that lives were saved."
Palantir's chief rivals are I2 Inc., a 20-year-old software company with offices in McLean, Va., and a handful of defense contractors who have been building software for intelligence agencies for years. I2's general manager, Todd Drake, dismisses his upstart competitor as "the new sexy thing," saying that Palantir won't be able to make lasting inroads in a government market that prizes the stability of established companies. Palantir CEO Mr. Karp says such criticism doesn't trouble him. He says the company is already expanding rapidly.
Palantir's roots date back to 2000, when Mr. Karp returned to the U.S. after living for years in Frankfurt, where he earned his doctorate in German social philosophy and discovered a talent for investing. He reconnected with a buddy from Stanford Law School, Peter Thiel, the billionaire founder of online payment company PayPal.
Palantir may look like a typical Silicon Valley start-up, with free food and the usual comforts to make work more like home. But with clients like the FBI and CIA, it's far from the usual software company.
In 2003, Mr. Thiel pitched an idea to Mr. Karp: Could they build software that would uncover terror networks using the approach PayPal had devised to fight Russian cybercriminals?
PayPal's software could make connections between fraudulent payments that on the surface seemed unrelated. By following such leads, PayPal was able to identify suspect customers and uncover cybercrime networks. The company saw a tenfold decrease in fraud losses after it launched the software, while many competitors struggled to beat back cheaters.
Mr. Thiel wanted to design software to tackle terrorism because at the time, he says, the government's response to issues like airport security was increasingly "nightmarish." The two launched Palantir in 2004 with three other investors, but they attracted little interest from venture-capital firms. The company's $30 million start-up costs were largely bankrolled by Mr. Thiel and his own venture-capital fund.
They modeled Palantir's culture on Google's, with catered meals of ahi tuna and a free-form 24-hour workplace wired so 16 people can play the Halo video game. The kitchen is stocked by request with such items as Pepto Bismol and glass bottles of Mexican Coca Cola sweetened with sugar not corn syrup. The company recently hosted its own battle of the bands.
One of the venture firms that rejected Palantir's overtures steered the company to In-Q-Tel, a nonprofit venture-capital firm established by the CIA a decade ago to tap innovation that could be used for intelligence work. As Silicon Valley's venture funding dries up, In-Q-Tel says it has seen a surge of requests from start-ups in the last year or so, many of which now see the government as an alternate money stream.
In-Q-Tel invested about $2 million in Palantir and provided a critical entreé to the CIA and other agencies. For his first spy meeting in 2005, Mr. Karp shed his track suit for a sports coat. He arrived at an agency -- he won't say which one -- and was immediately "freaked out" by security officers guarding the building with guns. In a windowless, code-locked room, he introduced himself to the first official he met: "Hi, I'm Alex Karp," Mr. Karp said, offering his hand. No response. "I didn't know you really don't ask their names," he says now.
Mr. Karp showed the group a prototype. The software was similar to PayPal's fraud-detection system. But instead of identifying and connecting cyber criminals, it focused on two hypothetical terror suspects and followed their activities, including travel and money transfers.
After the demo, he was peppered with skeptical questions: Is anyone at your company cleared to work with classified information? Have you ever worked with intelligence agencies? Do you have senior advisers who have worked with intelligence agencies? Do you have a sales force that is cleared to work with classified information? The answer every time: no.
But the group was sufficiently intrigued by the demo, and In-Q-Tel arranged for Palantir engineers to meet directly with intelligence analysts, to help build a comprehensive search tool from scratch.
Every other week for about two years, the engineers returned to Washington with a revised product, based on analysts' requests. The approach won over a number of tech-savvy younger analysts who asked their bosses to adopt the software.
Spy agencies like the CIA and military intelligence organizations have hundreds of databases each, most of which aren't linked up. A single database might contain reports from field agents or lists of known terrorists or companies thought to be financing terrorism. To conduct an investigation, analysts have to query individual databases separately, then try to make sense of the data -- frequently with pen and paper.
With many of the existing search tools, analysts also can't access some files on terrorist suspects or other threats because a bit of data in the file is classified at a level higher than they are allowed to see. That is a problem, because making connections among new clues and existing data is a key to foiling terrorist plots. Among the missed opportunities cited by post-9/11 investigations were the failure to see that five of the 19 hijackers used the same phone number as ringleader Mohammad Atta to book their airline tickets, two used the same frequent-flier number, and five used two common addresses to make their reservations.
Palantir's software plugs these gaps by using a "tagging" technique similar to that used by the search functions on most Web sites. Palantir tags, or categorizes, every bit of data separately, whether it be a first name, a last name or a phone number. That means if only one piece of data in a file is classified top-secret, an analyst with a lower level clearance can still see the rest of the data. It also allows analysts to quickly tag information themselves as it arrives in the form of field reports from spies overseas, and to see who else in the agency is doing similar research so they can share their findings.
By connecting different databases, analysts can start making new links. Someone could see, for example, that one terrorist suspect flagged in one database has been living at the same address as the cousin of another suspect whose information is in another database, and that the two men flew to the same city after money was transferred to a particular bank account.
Some analysts say Palantir's strength is helping analysts draw inferences when confronted with an enormous amount of disparate data. Palantir's tool is getting a thumbs-up from officers using it. "It is much simpler to understand the results of inquiries, and provides more in-depth database links then the current programs in use by the Army today," says Captain James King, an Army intelligence officer.
A handful of agencies have adopted Palantir's software for specific projects. The Pentagon recently used it to track patterns in roadside bomb deployment. Officials say analysts were able to connect two reports and conclude that garage-door openers were being used as remote detonators and soldiers on the ground had a new device to look for.
Analysts at West Point recently used Palantir's software to map evidence of Syrian suicide-bombing networks buried within nearly 700 al Qaeda documents, including hundreds of personnel records that the military recovered in Iraq. The analysts did an initial sweep of the data without the Palantir tool and assembled a report on foreign fighters in Iraq who were paying Syrian middlemen to send over suicide bombers.
A second analysis with Palantir uncovered more details of the Syrian networks, including profiles of their top coordinators, which led analysts to conclude there wasn't one Syrian network, but many. Analysts identified key facilitators, how much they charged people who wanted to become suicide bombers, and where many of the fighters came from. Fighters from Saudi Arabia, for example, paid the most -- $1,088 -- for the opportunity to become suicide bombers.
Such details helped local law enforcement break up some of the rings, said one U.S. official familiar with the work. It also revealed the extent to which al Qaeda was relying on mercenary smuggling networks, rather than true believers, to get suicide bombers into Iraq.
In the past two years, Palantir's work in Washington has expanded from eight pilot programs to more than 50 projects, executives say. The Australian government is now a client, and the NSA is eyeing Palantir, as is the U.K., current and former government officials say.
The company expects to turn a profit on its government work this year -- it recently started working with financial companies, but says it is too early to see any profits from that yet -- and for revenues to reach $100 million within the next two years. Palantir also maintains a pro-bono roster. It examined the cyber attacks on the central Asian country of Georgia last year, and earlier this year helped Canadian researchers uncover a cyberspying operation on the Dalai Lama. The company is now working with a nonprofit investigative group in Washington to resolve open questions in the 2002 murder of The Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
In 2007, Mr. Karp hired his first intelligence-agency alum, David Worn, to open a Washington office. Mr. Worn says he was among the younger agency analysts who felt trapped in an outdated system.
As he builds up the East Coast office, which now employs 20 people, Mr. Worn says that the company is still figuring out "how to live in those two worlds" of Silicon Valley and Washington. One thing that does seem to help: He and his colleagues make frequent trips to Palo Alto to make sure they don't lose "the vibe of the Shire," the home of the hobbits from Lord of the Rings.
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