It all came down to a call from Pakistan.
Had Osama Bin Laden not received that message 11 years ago today, dozens of U.S. Navy cruise missiles might have found their primary target and America arguably would not have been attacked on Sept. 11, 2001. Afghanistan probably would have remained a blighted backwater run by the Taliban, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein might even still be in power.
More importantly, if Al Qaeda’s leader had been killed on Aug. 20, 1998 by the missiles aimed at his Al Farouk terror training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan, 2,973 innocent Americans might not have been slaughtered in Al Qaeda’s assault on New York City, Washington and Pennsylvania. And 5,439 families in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, Italy and scores of other coalition countries probably never would have been informed that a loved one in the military had made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq, Afghanistan or the far reaches of the war on Bin Laden’s Islamic terror network.
How did the U.S. miss him? A lingering 9/11 mystery may finally have been explained.
A St. Martin’s Press book set for fall release by Bin Laden’s son Omar and first wife Najwa, “Growing Up Bin Laden,” appears to credibly answer the question of how the Saudi terror kingpin narrowly dodged - by two hours - the Clinton administration’s biggest attempt to assassinate him. It came days after the East Africa U.S. embassy bombings that killed 224 and wounded more than 5,000 on Aug. 7, 1998.
It was America’s biggest missed opportunity to alter the course of history - but the evidence increasingly points a damning finger at a current U.S. ally Washington relies so heavily on to help prevent the next attack on the homeland.
Omar Bin Laden reveals in the new memoir, as we reported in the New York Daily News last month, that his father moved from his compound in Kandahar following the embassy attacks (which Al Qaeda implausibly denied perpetrating), traveling northeast to Khowst on the Pakistan border in late August 1998.
After a few days at Al Farouk, Osama Bin Laden “received a highly secretive communication” on Aug. 20, Omar writes. The family immediately left Khowst for Kabul - only two hours before the camp was obliterated by 75 cruise missiles. (Clinton was immediately accused of a “Wag the Dog” strike intended to distract the country from his Aug. 17 admission of a sex affair with Monica Lewinsky.)
Richard Clarke, then Clinton’s counterterror czar, recently told me that Omar’s account is important because it “squares with what we had.”
It also settles a question the 9/11 commission couldn't definitively answer. “Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or Bin Laden,” the panel’s 2004 final report stated, citing only its 2003 interview of Clarke and reaching no conclusion.
The U.S. later learned that Pakistani officials had spotted Navy warships off their coast, “deduced there would be a missile attack,” and tipped off Al Qaeda, Clarke reasons.
Bin Laden expert Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation agrees that Omar’s tale rings true, but says the terror leader’s precautions could also be explained by merely “being cognizant” of a likely U.S. reprisal.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Hardware Hackers Create a Modular Motherboard by Priya Ganapati
An ambitious group of hardware hackers have taken the fundamental building blocks of computing and turned them inside out in an attempt to make PCs significantly more efficient.
The group has created a motherboard prototype that uses separate modules, each of which has its own processor, memory and storage. Each square cell in this design serves as a mini-motherboard and network node; the cells can allocate power and decide to accept or reject incoming transmissions and programs independently. Together, they form a networked cluster with significantly greater power than the individual modules.
The design, called the Illuminato X Machina, is vastly different from the separate processor,memory and storage components that govern computers today.
“We are taking everything that goes into motherboard now and chopping it up,” says David Ackley, associate professor of computer science at the University of New Mexico and one of the contributors to the project. “We have a CPU, RAM, data storage and serial ports for connectivity on every two square inches.”
A modular architecture designed for parallel and distributed processing could help take computing to the next level, say its designers. Instead of having an entire system crash if a component experiences a fatal error, failure of a single cell can still leave the rest of the system operational. It also has the potential to change computing by ushering in machines that draw very little power.
“We are at a point where each computer processor maxes out at 3Ghz (clock speed) so you have to add more cores, but you are still sharing the resource within the system,” says Justin Huynh, one of the key members of the project. “Adding cores the way we are doing now will last about a decade.”
Huynh and his team are no strangers to experimenting with new ideas. Earlier this year, Huynh and his partner Matt Stack created the Open Source Hardware Bank, a peer-to-peer borrowing and lending club that funds open source hardware projects. Stack first started working on the X Machina idea about 10 months ago.
Computing today is based on the von Neumann architecture: a central processor, and separate memory and data storage. But that design poses a significant problem known as the von Neumann bottleneck. Though processors can get faster, the connection between the memory and the processor can get overloaded.That limits the speed of the computer to the pace at which it can transfer data between the two.
“A von Neumann machine is like the centrally planned economy, whereas the modular, bottom up, interconnected approach would be more capitalist,” says Ackley.”There are advantages to a centrally planned structure but eventually it will run into great inefficiencies.”
By creating modules, Huynh and his group hope to bring a more parallel and distributed architecture. Cluster-based systems aren’t new. They have been used in high end computing extensively. But with the Illuminato X Machina they hope to extend the idea to a larger community of general PC users.
“The way to think of this is that it is a system with a series of bacteria working together instead of a complex single cell amoeba,” says JP Norair, architect of Dash 7, a new wireless and data standard. An electrical and computer engineering graduate from Princeton University, Norair has studied modular architecture extensively.
Each X Machina module has a 72 MHz processor (currently an ARM chip), a solid state drive of 16KB and 128KB of storage in an EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read-0nly memory) chip. There’s also an LED for display output and a button for user interaction.
Every module has four edges, and each edge can connect to its neighbors. It doesn’t have sockets, standardized interconnects or a proprietary bus. Instead, the system uses a reversible connector. It’s smart enough to know if it is plugged into a neighbor and can establish the correct power and signal wires to exchange power and information, says Mike Gionfriddo, one of the designers on the project.
The X Machina has software-controlled switches to gate the power moving through the system on the fly and a ‘jumping gene’ ability, which means executable code can flow directly from one module to another without always involving a PC-based program downloader.
Each Illuminato X Machina node also has a custom boot loader software that allows it to be programmed and reprogrammed by its neighbors, even as the overall system continues to run, explains Huynh. The X Machina creators hope to tie into the ardent Arduino community. Many simple Arduino sketches will run on the X Machina with no source code changes, they say.
Still there are many details that need to be worked out. Huynh and his group haven’t yet benchmarked the system against traditional PCs to establish exactly how the two compare in terms of power consumption and speeds. The lack of benchmarking also means that they have no data yet on how the computing power of an X Machina array compares to a PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo chip.
Programs and applications have also yet to be written for the X Machina to show whether it can be an effective computing system for the kind of tasks most users perform. To answer some of these questions, Ackley plans to introduce the Illuminato X Machina to his class at the University of New Mexico later this month. Ackley hopes students of computer science will help understand how traditional computer programming concepts can be adapted to this new structure.
So far, just the first few steps towards this idea have been taken, says Huynh.
Norair agrees. “If they can successfully get half the power of an Intel chip with a cluster of microcontrollers, it will be a great success,” he says, “because the power consumption can be so low on these clusters and they have a level of robustness we haven’t seen yet.”
New Army Camera Promises Super-Wide Surveillance by David Hambling
The ability to provide real-time surveillance of large areas may be getting closer, as the Army launches a quest for a 2.3 gigapixel camera that could be packaged aboard a drone or a manned aircraft. The new device would be smaller and lighter than previous systems – and it would work in the infrared range too.
Airborne surveillance is moving fast. We’ve seen the 66-megapixel Angel Fire and 39-megapixel BuckEye sensors being used in operations, while the even more powerful Gorgon Stare is being flight tested next year. In February we reported on DARPA’s Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance - Imaging System (ARGUS-IS ), a 1.8 gigapixel flying eye which will be mounted in a 500-pound pod carried by a Predator or A160 Hummingbird robocopter. The ARGUS-IS makes for an impressive camera, with the resolution and processing power to track a large number of separate items including “dismounts” — people on foot — over a wide area, as well as “a real-time moving target indicator for vehicles throughout the entire field of view in real-time.”
But ARGUS-IS is already looking old. Now the Army is asking for something even more powerful. In a new request for solicitations, it outlined the concept for a novel visible/infrared sensor that will cover a much larger area on the ground — with much higher resolution.
The sensor is required to be lightweight with low power consumption and to have significantly lower operating costs compared to existing systems, and must be able to operate from small aircraft, either manned or unmanned. In terms of specifics, the Army is looking for 2.3 gigapixels running at two frames per second. By my reckoning, this suggests continuous coverage of area of around sixty-two square miles at 0.3m resolution with a single sensor. That’s quite a step up from Angel Fire, which covers a tenth of the area at much lower resolution. And the new camera will work in the near-infrared range as well. This is useful for analysis, as sometimes things that are invisible in the normal range can be picked out easily in infrared; it also means that people can be illuminated without being aware of it.
At this point, the Army is still looking for proposals, and actual working hardware is some years down the line. However, the technology is moving fast and there is little doubt that the following generation will be much smaller than the 500-pound ARGUS. The PANOPTES being developed by Marc Christensen at Southern Methodist University with DARPA funding could potentially cut camera weight by a factor of ten by using a large array of small imaging elements.
Once the technology is developed, anticipated civilian spin-offs will include “improved border and maritime management/patrol, critical infrastructure protection, transportation security, search & rescue, crime prevention, land & sea traffic monitoring, pipeline/powerline monitoring, private infrastructure surveillance/security.”
Meanwhile DARPA is also working on something a bit more advanced. This is ARGUS-IR, a version of ARGUS that works in the medium and long infra-red. This is the “emissive” end of the infra-red scale, where warm objects are visible by the infra-red light they emit. ARGUS-IR will only have a trifling 200 megapixels, later to be upgraded to 400. But the ability to see warm objects such as people in pitch darkness through some types of cover will add a new dimension.
The old adage “you can run, but you can’t hide” is becoming more true than ever, and real-time surveillance of huge swathes of territory using small drones will become a practical proposition. Airborne cameras providing a persistent view were a key factor in Task Force ODIN’s success in Iraq; given the new technology, their successors could have even more impact. And those cameras might have some effect on the home front too.
Cracking Down on Iran's Illicit Trade by Michael Jacobson
On August 13, President Barack Obama announced that his administration was reviewing the U.S. export control system to determine what reforms were needed to bring the regime up to date. Although the United States has stepped up its enforcement efforts in this area over the past several years -- particularly in terms of illegal exports of goods and services to Iran -- the system remains in need of further improvement. Strengthening the export control regime to prevent Iran from easily circumventing U.S. and international sanctions should be a key part of this important review.
Stepped Up Efforts
The United States began increasing its enforcement efforts in the export control arena in 2007, with the launch of the National Export Enforcement Initiative -- a joint effort of the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), State, Treasury, and the FBI. As a first step, the Justice Department created a national export control coordinator position in Washington to help manage nationwide efforts, and formed approximately fifteen counterproliferation task forces at the local offices of U.S. attorneys around the country to improve information sharing with participating investigative agencies.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released new enforcement guidelines, clarifying how it will determine penalties for violations of U.S. sanctions. In addition to the guideline changes, OFAC has also become more aggressive on the investigative front since the hiring of former prosecutors and investigators to lead the office's enforcement efforts. Now, instead of relying primarily on voluntary disclosures from companies that believe they have violated U.S. sanctions laws, OFAC is conducting more proactive, formal investigations.
These bureaucratic changes were complemented by an expansion in the U.S. government's legal authority, courtesy of the October 2007 International Economic Powers Enhancement Act, which dramatically increased the potential penalties for sanctions violations.
U.S. Efforts Paying Off
According to the Justice Department, in fiscal year 2008, the number of criminal export control cases rose to 145 -- with Iran clearly the top enforcement priority, accounting for more than 20 cases -- up from 110 the year before. Companies and individuals were prosecuted for sending a wide range of sensitive technology to Iran, including missile guidance systems, military aircraft parts, and components for improvised explosive devices.
This enforcement trend has continued into 2009. Shipping giant DHL, after acknowledging the illegal transfer of goods to Iran, Syria, and Sudan, paid a $9.4 million fine earlier this month to the U.S. government. This development was particularly significant since it signals not only that Treasury is broadening its focus beyond financial institutions, but also that Commerce -- which has a major role in oversight of freight forwarders such as DHL -- is becoming more engaged.
On the banking front, beginning in November 2009, a technical change will require banks to disclose more information about the underlying parties in cover-payment transactions to other banks, making it harder to hide who is involved in specific transactions. This follows a series of regulatory amendments that have made it increasingly difficult for Iranian entities to gain access to U.S. dollars and the U.S. financial system. The $350 million fine against Lloyds TSB bank in January -- for stripping Iran-related information from transactions going through the U.S. system -- has also put banks on edge about any Iran-related business. In fact, companies at this point are already having problems finding banks to finance even licensed, legitimate Iran business, such as agricultural trade permitted under the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enforcement Act.
Increased cooperation from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has long served as a major reexport hub for products ultimately destined for Iran, has also helped U.S. efforts to crack down on illegal trade to Iran. Since the UAE passed its first national security export control law in 2007 with considerable U.S. support, Iranian businessmen are finding it harder to get visas and licenses to operate in Dubai, and more difficult to find banks to handle their transactions. The UAE is also providing assistance to the United States, such as allowing U.S. officials to conduct interviews in the UAE, in criminal investigations of export control violations. Furthermore, the UAE has announced plans to more closely regulate Dubai Creek, a main thoroughfare for goods sent to Iran.
Where It Is Falling Short
Despite these improvements, the U.S. and international export control regime remains limited in its effectiveness. One of the major problems is that few other countries take this issue as seriously as the United States. Most countries, including some of Iran's major trading partners, do not devote significant resources to investigating or prosecuting export control violations. In Germany, for example, a public prosecutor has stated that his country has only uncovered "the tip of the iceberg" of the black market activity involving Iran's nuclear program. In fact, media reports suggest that certain goods leaving Germany are bound for Iran's defense industrial complex, with little inspection at the border. In addition, many of the designated Iranian shipping vessels are owned by German front companies. Other examples abound: Italy and the United Kingdom have only small investigative staffs handling export control issues, while Canada has prosecuted only a handful of export control cases. And unfortunately, the European Union is not in a position to oversee the shortcomings of its member states in this area.
Iran also has been able to circumvent the various sanctions regimes by using third-party countries as reexport hubs. Since the UAE has started to crack down on this type of trade, new countries have emerged as safe havens, with Malaysia at the top of the list. Malaysia and Iran have taken steps recently to build closer ties on many fronts including trade, and in December 2008, Malaysian prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi traveled to Tehran, culminating in agreements to further cooperation in technology and automotive manufacturing. While in Iran, Badawi called on the Malaysia-Iran Joint Trade Committee to bolster both the volume and breadth of trade between the two countries.
Hong Kong is also becoming more of a problem in this area, with Iranian front companies and procurement agents setting up shop there. Hong Kong is an attractive reexport location for Iran in part because of the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, which dictates that Hong Kong be treated differently than the rest of China when it comes to export control issues. As a result, most items that can be shipped to the UK can also be sent to Hong Kong, despite the fact that many of these goods could not be shipped to mainland China. The Chinese government has also been stepping in to protect Iranians targeted by U.S. enforcement efforts. Hong Kong, for example, arrested Iranian procurement agent Yousef Boushvark in 2007 at America's request for attempting to acquire F-14 fighter plane parts, but Chinese authorities denied a subsequent U.S. extradition request, and Boushvark was then released from custody.
Although the main challenge for U.S. export control efforts is on the international front, problems closer to home exist as well:
* Despite the presence of a national export control coordinator, no agency is officially in charge of U.S. government export control efforts, with responsibility spread between State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and DHS;
* The main statute governing this issue -- the Export Administration Act (EAA) -- has expired, forcing the United States to temporarily operate under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which does not allow for the full set of tools that the EAA provided;
* Sentences in export control cases are often light, in part because judges do not always view them as serious national security issues. Adding to this prevalent perception is the fact that export control offenses are not in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, where the vast majority of crimes are found.
Conclusion
Iran's aggressive search for U.S. technology, particularly for its military programs, is quite evident from the number of U.S. export control prosecutions over the past several years. Stopping Iran's illicit activity is a significantly different challenge from the one the United States faced with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Iran is often not in need of the most modern, cutting-edge technology -- which is often the focus of the export control regimes -- but frequently seeks dated technology that is easier to procure. Success in the arena depends on better understanding how Iran is procuring illegal goods -- with its various front companies and agents around the world -- and mobilizing other countries to move forward on this front. As the Obama administration begins a review of the U.S. export control system, determining how to more effectively crack down on Iran's illicit trade should be a top priority.
Stepped Up Efforts
The United States began increasing its enforcement efforts in the export control arena in 2007, with the launch of the National Export Enforcement Initiative -- a joint effort of the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), State, Treasury, and the FBI. As a first step, the Justice Department created a national export control coordinator position in Washington to help manage nationwide efforts, and formed approximately fifteen counterproliferation task forces at the local offices of U.S. attorneys around the country to improve information sharing with participating investigative agencies.
In September 2008, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released new enforcement guidelines, clarifying how it will determine penalties for violations of U.S. sanctions. In addition to the guideline changes, OFAC has also become more aggressive on the investigative front since the hiring of former prosecutors and investigators to lead the office's enforcement efforts. Now, instead of relying primarily on voluntary disclosures from companies that believe they have violated U.S. sanctions laws, OFAC is conducting more proactive, formal investigations.
These bureaucratic changes were complemented by an expansion in the U.S. government's legal authority, courtesy of the October 2007 International Economic Powers Enhancement Act, which dramatically increased the potential penalties for sanctions violations.
U.S. Efforts Paying Off
According to the Justice Department, in fiscal year 2008, the number of criminal export control cases rose to 145 -- with Iran clearly the top enforcement priority, accounting for more than 20 cases -- up from 110 the year before. Companies and individuals were prosecuted for sending a wide range of sensitive technology to Iran, including missile guidance systems, military aircraft parts, and components for improvised explosive devices.
This enforcement trend has continued into 2009. Shipping giant DHL, after acknowledging the illegal transfer of goods to Iran, Syria, and Sudan, paid a $9.4 million fine earlier this month to the U.S. government. This development was particularly significant since it signals not only that Treasury is broadening its focus beyond financial institutions, but also that Commerce -- which has a major role in oversight of freight forwarders such as DHL -- is becoming more engaged.
On the banking front, beginning in November 2009, a technical change will require banks to disclose more information about the underlying parties in cover-payment transactions to other banks, making it harder to hide who is involved in specific transactions. This follows a series of regulatory amendments that have made it increasingly difficult for Iranian entities to gain access to U.S. dollars and the U.S. financial system. The $350 million fine against Lloyds TSB bank in January -- for stripping Iran-related information from transactions going through the U.S. system -- has also put banks on edge about any Iran-related business. In fact, companies at this point are already having problems finding banks to finance even licensed, legitimate Iran business, such as agricultural trade permitted under the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enforcement Act.
Increased cooperation from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has long served as a major reexport hub for products ultimately destined for Iran, has also helped U.S. efforts to crack down on illegal trade to Iran. Since the UAE passed its first national security export control law in 2007 with considerable U.S. support, Iranian businessmen are finding it harder to get visas and licenses to operate in Dubai, and more difficult to find banks to handle their transactions. The UAE is also providing assistance to the United States, such as allowing U.S. officials to conduct interviews in the UAE, in criminal investigations of export control violations. Furthermore, the UAE has announced plans to more closely regulate Dubai Creek, a main thoroughfare for goods sent to Iran.
Where It Is Falling Short
Despite these improvements, the U.S. and international export control regime remains limited in its effectiveness. One of the major problems is that few other countries take this issue as seriously as the United States. Most countries, including some of Iran's major trading partners, do not devote significant resources to investigating or prosecuting export control violations. In Germany, for example, a public prosecutor has stated that his country has only uncovered "the tip of the iceberg" of the black market activity involving Iran's nuclear program. In fact, media reports suggest that certain goods leaving Germany are bound for Iran's defense industrial complex, with little inspection at the border. In addition, many of the designated Iranian shipping vessels are owned by German front companies. Other examples abound: Italy and the United Kingdom have only small investigative staffs handling export control issues, while Canada has prosecuted only a handful of export control cases. And unfortunately, the European Union is not in a position to oversee the shortcomings of its member states in this area.
Iran also has been able to circumvent the various sanctions regimes by using third-party countries as reexport hubs. Since the UAE has started to crack down on this type of trade, new countries have emerged as safe havens, with Malaysia at the top of the list. Malaysia and Iran have taken steps recently to build closer ties on many fronts including trade, and in December 2008, Malaysian prime minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi traveled to Tehran, culminating in agreements to further cooperation in technology and automotive manufacturing. While in Iran, Badawi called on the Malaysia-Iran Joint Trade Committee to bolster both the volume and breadth of trade between the two countries.
Hong Kong is also becoming more of a problem in this area, with Iranian front companies and procurement agents setting up shop there. Hong Kong is an attractive reexport location for Iran in part because of the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, which dictates that Hong Kong be treated differently than the rest of China when it comes to export control issues. As a result, most items that can be shipped to the UK can also be sent to Hong Kong, despite the fact that many of these goods could not be shipped to mainland China. The Chinese government has also been stepping in to protect Iranians targeted by U.S. enforcement efforts. Hong Kong, for example, arrested Iranian procurement agent Yousef Boushvark in 2007 at America's request for attempting to acquire F-14 fighter plane parts, but Chinese authorities denied a subsequent U.S. extradition request, and Boushvark was then released from custody.
Although the main challenge for U.S. export control efforts is on the international front, problems closer to home exist as well:
* Despite the presence of a national export control coordinator, no agency is officially in charge of U.S. government export control efforts, with responsibility spread between State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and DHS;
* The main statute governing this issue -- the Export Administration Act (EAA) -- has expired, forcing the United States to temporarily operate under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which does not allow for the full set of tools that the EAA provided;
* Sentences in export control cases are often light, in part because judges do not always view them as serious national security issues. Adding to this prevalent perception is the fact that export control offenses are not in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, where the vast majority of crimes are found.
Conclusion
Iran's aggressive search for U.S. technology, particularly for its military programs, is quite evident from the number of U.S. export control prosecutions over the past several years. Stopping Iran's illicit activity is a significantly different challenge from the one the United States faced with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Iran is often not in need of the most modern, cutting-edge technology -- which is often the focus of the export control regimes -- but frequently seeks dated technology that is easier to procure. Success in the arena depends on better understanding how Iran is procuring illegal goods -- with its various front companies and agents around the world -- and mobilizing other countries to move forward on this front. As the Obama administration begins a review of the U.S. export control system, determining how to more effectively crack down on Iran's illicit trade should be a top priority.
Rebalancing Relations With China by Henry A. Kissinger
For several decades, the global economic system was sustained by acceptance of American predominance. A vast tide of liquidity coupled with America's appetite for consumer goods had sent enormous amounts of dollars to China, which, in turn, China lent back to us for still more buying. Before the crisis, China sent scores of experts to the United States and invested in major American financial institutions to learn the secrets of the system that seemed to produce permanent global growth at little risk.
The economic crisis has shaken that confidence. Chinese economic leaders have seen the American financial system subject a decade of their savings to potentially catastrophic fluctuations. To protect the value of its Treasury investment and to sustain its own export-driven economy, China finds itself obliged to largely retain its Treasury holdings of nearly $1 trillion.
Ambivalence in both China and the United States is the inevitable consequence. On the one hand, the two economies have grown increasingly dependent on each other. China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America's largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides.
A number of Chinese moves reflect this tendency. Chinese officials feel freer than they did previously to offer public and private advice to the United States. China has begun to trade with India, Russia and Brazil in their own currencies. The proposal of the governor of China's central bank to gradually create an alternate reserve currency is another case in point. Many American economists make light of this idea. But it surfaces in so many forums, and China has such a consistent record of pursuing its projects with great patience, that it should be taken seriously. To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced.
According to conventional wisdom, the world economy will regain its vitality once China consumes more and America consumes less. But as both countries apply that prescription, it will inevitably alter the political framework. As Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increased infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China's political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns.
A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership.
To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future.
At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective.
America's great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order.
The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.
The economic crisis has shaken that confidence. Chinese economic leaders have seen the American financial system subject a decade of their savings to potentially catastrophic fluctuations. To protect the value of its Treasury investment and to sustain its own export-driven economy, China finds itself obliged to largely retain its Treasury holdings of nearly $1 trillion.
Ambivalence in both China and the United States is the inevitable consequence. On the one hand, the two economies have grown increasingly dependent on each other. China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America's largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides.
A number of Chinese moves reflect this tendency. Chinese officials feel freer than they did previously to offer public and private advice to the United States. China has begun to trade with India, Russia and Brazil in their own currencies. The proposal of the governor of China's central bank to gradually create an alternate reserve currency is another case in point. Many American economists make light of this idea. But it surfaces in so many forums, and China has such a consistent record of pursuing its projects with great patience, that it should be taken seriously. To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced.
According to conventional wisdom, the world economy will regain its vitality once China consumes more and America consumes less. But as both countries apply that prescription, it will inevitably alter the political framework. As Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increased infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China's political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns.
A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership.
To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future.
At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective.
America's great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order.
The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Iraq May Hold Vote On U.S. Withdrawal by Ernesto Londono
U.S. troops could be forced by Iraqi voters to withdraw a year ahead of schedule under a referendum the Iraqi government backed Monday, creating a potential complication for American commanders concerned about rising violence in the country's north.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's move appeared to disregard the wishes of the U.S. government, which has quietly lobbied against the plebiscite. American officials fear it could lead to the annulment of an agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay until the end of 2011, and instead force them out by the start of that year.
The Maliki government's announcement came on the day that the top U.S. general in Iraq proposed a plan to deploy troops to disputed areas in the restive north, a clear indication that the military sees a continuing need for U.S. forces even if Iraqis no longer want them here.
Gen. Ray Odierno said American troops would partner with contingents of the Iraqi army and the Kurdish regional government's paramilitary force, marking the first organized effort to pair U.S. forces with the militia, known as the pesh merga. Iraqi army and Kurdish forces nearly came to blows recently, and there is deep-seated animosity between them, owing to a decades-long fight over ancestry, land and oil.
If Iraqi lawmakers sign off on Maliki's initiative to hold a referendum in January on the withdrawal timeline, a majority of voters could annul a standing U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, forcing the military to pull out completely by January 2011 under the terms of a previous law.
It is unclear whether parliament, which is in recess until next month, would approve the referendum. Lawmakers have yet to pass a measure laying the basic ground rules for the Jan. 16 national election, their top legislative priority for the remainder of 2009.
Before signing off on the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement last year, Iraqi lawmakers demanded that voters get to weigh in on the pact in a referendum that was to take place no later than last month. Because it did not happen, American officials assumed the plebiscite was a dead issue.
U.S. officials say they have no way to know how the referendum would turn out, but they worry that many Iraqis are likely to vote against the pact. Maliki billed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from urban areas at the end of June as a "great victory" for Iraqis, and his government has since markedly curbed the authority and mobility of U.S. forces.
Senior Pentagon officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity said that Odierno probably will make an announcement later this week or early next week the accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which now stand at 130,000, by one or two brigades between now and the end of the year. Each brigade consists of about 5,000 troops. Odierno said Monday that he has not decided whether to speed up the plan, which he said remains on schedule.
The acceleration would still be much slower than if the referendum nullified the agreement.
Still, senior Pentagon officials played down Maliki's announcement, saying it was an expected part of Iraq's political process. Senior Iraqi officials did not raise the possibility of the referendum with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates when he visited the country earlier this month, Pentagon officials said.
Bahaa Hassan, who owns a mobile phone store in Najaf, south of Baghdad, said he would vote for a speedier withdrawal.
"We want to get rid of the American influence in Iraq, because we suffer from it politically and economically," he said. "We will vote against it so Iraq will be in the hands of Iraqis again."
But many Iraqis, particularly Sunnis and Kurds, consider the presence of the U.S. military a key deterrent to abuses of power by the Shiite-led government.
"After six years of Shiite rule and struggle, we still have no electricity, so what will happen if Americans leave?" said Dhirgham Talib, a government employee in Najaf. "The field will be left to the Shiite parties to do whatever they want with no fear from anybody."
A poll commissioned by the U.S. military earlier this year found that Iraqis expressed far less confidence in American troops than in the Iraqi government or any of its security forces. Twenty-seven percent of Iraqis polled said they had confidence in U.S. forces, according to a Pentagon report presented to Congress last month. By contrast, 72 percent expressed confidence in the national government.
Zainab Karim, a Shiite lawmaker from the Sadrist movement, the most ardently anti-American faction, said she was pleasantly surprised that the government is backing the referendum.
"I consider this a good thing," she said. "But we have to wait and see whether the government is honest about this or whether it is electoral propaganda."
As the Iraqi government took steps to force U.S. troops out earlier than planned, Odierno said Monday that he would like to deploy American forces to villages along disputed areas in northern Iraq to defuse tension between Kurdish troops and forces controlled by the Shiite Arab-led government in Baghdad.
"We're working very hard to come up with a security architecture in the disputed territories that would reduce tension," Odierno told reporters. "They just all feel more comfortable if we're there."
Scores of Iraqis have been killed in recent weeks in villages along the 300-mile frontier south of the Kurdish region. U.S. military officials say the attacks bear the hallmarks of Sunni extremists, but local leaders have traded accusations to bolster their positions on whether specific areas should be under the control of Baghdad or the autonomous government of Kurdistan.
The pesh merga currently controls some villages that are nominally outside the three-province Kurdish region. The expansion of Kurdish influence in northern Iraq has prompted Maliki to deploy more troops loyal to Baghdad to northern provinces south of Kurdistan. The new provincial leadership in Nineveh province, the most restive among them, has made curbing Kurdish expansion its top priority and has called for the expulsion of pesh merga forces.
The tension, Odierno said, has created a security vacuum that has emboldened al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group that he said was almost certainly responsible for recent sensational bombings in the province. The number of civilian casualties in Iraq has increased since the urban pullout, Odierno said, largely as a result of attacks in the disputed territories.
"What we have is al-Qaeda exploiting this fissure between the Arabs and the Kurds," he said. "What we're trying to do is close that fissure."
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's move appeared to disregard the wishes of the U.S. government, which has quietly lobbied against the plebiscite. American officials fear it could lead to the annulment of an agreement allowing U.S. troops to stay until the end of 2011, and instead force them out by the start of that year.
The Maliki government's announcement came on the day that the top U.S. general in Iraq proposed a plan to deploy troops to disputed areas in the restive north, a clear indication that the military sees a continuing need for U.S. forces even if Iraqis no longer want them here.
Gen. Ray Odierno said American troops would partner with contingents of the Iraqi army and the Kurdish regional government's paramilitary force, marking the first organized effort to pair U.S. forces with the militia, known as the pesh merga. Iraqi army and Kurdish forces nearly came to blows recently, and there is deep-seated animosity between them, owing to a decades-long fight over ancestry, land and oil.
If Iraqi lawmakers sign off on Maliki's initiative to hold a referendum in January on the withdrawal timeline, a majority of voters could annul a standing U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, forcing the military to pull out completely by January 2011 under the terms of a previous law.
It is unclear whether parliament, which is in recess until next month, would approve the referendum. Lawmakers have yet to pass a measure laying the basic ground rules for the Jan. 16 national election, their top legislative priority for the remainder of 2009.
Before signing off on the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement last year, Iraqi lawmakers demanded that voters get to weigh in on the pact in a referendum that was to take place no later than last month. Because it did not happen, American officials assumed the plebiscite was a dead issue.
U.S. officials say they have no way to know how the referendum would turn out, but they worry that many Iraqis are likely to vote against the pact. Maliki billed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from urban areas at the end of June as a "great victory" for Iraqis, and his government has since markedly curbed the authority and mobility of U.S. forces.
Senior Pentagon officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity said that Odierno probably will make an announcement later this week or early next week the accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which now stand at 130,000, by one or two brigades between now and the end of the year. Each brigade consists of about 5,000 troops. Odierno said Monday that he has not decided whether to speed up the plan, which he said remains on schedule.
The acceleration would still be much slower than if the referendum nullified the agreement.
Still, senior Pentagon officials played down Maliki's announcement, saying it was an expected part of Iraq's political process. Senior Iraqi officials did not raise the possibility of the referendum with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates when he visited the country earlier this month, Pentagon officials said.
Bahaa Hassan, who owns a mobile phone store in Najaf, south of Baghdad, said he would vote for a speedier withdrawal.
"We want to get rid of the American influence in Iraq, because we suffer from it politically and economically," he said. "We will vote against it so Iraq will be in the hands of Iraqis again."
But many Iraqis, particularly Sunnis and Kurds, consider the presence of the U.S. military a key deterrent to abuses of power by the Shiite-led government.
"After six years of Shiite rule and struggle, we still have no electricity, so what will happen if Americans leave?" said Dhirgham Talib, a government employee in Najaf. "The field will be left to the Shiite parties to do whatever they want with no fear from anybody."
A poll commissioned by the U.S. military earlier this year found that Iraqis expressed far less confidence in American troops than in the Iraqi government or any of its security forces. Twenty-seven percent of Iraqis polled said they had confidence in U.S. forces, according to a Pentagon report presented to Congress last month. By contrast, 72 percent expressed confidence in the national government.
Zainab Karim, a Shiite lawmaker from the Sadrist movement, the most ardently anti-American faction, said she was pleasantly surprised that the government is backing the referendum.
"I consider this a good thing," she said. "But we have to wait and see whether the government is honest about this or whether it is electoral propaganda."
As the Iraqi government took steps to force U.S. troops out earlier than planned, Odierno said Monday that he would like to deploy American forces to villages along disputed areas in northern Iraq to defuse tension between Kurdish troops and forces controlled by the Shiite Arab-led government in Baghdad.
"We're working very hard to come up with a security architecture in the disputed territories that would reduce tension," Odierno told reporters. "They just all feel more comfortable if we're there."
Scores of Iraqis have been killed in recent weeks in villages along the 300-mile frontier south of the Kurdish region. U.S. military officials say the attacks bear the hallmarks of Sunni extremists, but local leaders have traded accusations to bolster their positions on whether specific areas should be under the control of Baghdad or the autonomous government of Kurdistan.
The pesh merga currently controls some villages that are nominally outside the three-province Kurdish region. The expansion of Kurdish influence in northern Iraq has prompted Maliki to deploy more troops loyal to Baghdad to northern provinces south of Kurdistan. The new provincial leadership in Nineveh province, the most restive among them, has made curbing Kurdish expansion its top priority and has called for the expulsion of pesh merga forces.
The tension, Odierno said, has created a security vacuum that has emboldened al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group that he said was almost certainly responsible for recent sensational bombings in the province. The number of civilian casualties in Iraq has increased since the urban pullout, Odierno said, largely as a result of attacks in the disputed territories.
"What we have is al-Qaeda exploiting this fissure between the Arabs and the Kurds," he said. "What we're trying to do is close that fissure."
U.S. Intelligence and Afghan Narcotics by Walter Pincus
The Afghanistan Intelligence Fusion Center, begun in 2004 and run by an American contractor under U.S. Air Force direction, is based at the offices of the Afghan counternarcotics police in Kabul. It produces "time-sensitive, counter-narco terrorism intelligence" that is critical for "compilation of actionable target packages" for U.S. and coalition forces, according to a recent Air Force notice on expanding the operation.
The Aug. 6 announcement said that the Air Force's 350th Electronic Systems Group, based at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts, will award a six-month "bridge" contract to Virginia-based Cambridge Communications Systems this Friday to allow that company to continue operating and maintaining the fusion center through Feb. 22, 2010. Meanwhile, a broader new long-term contract will be opened for bidding.
As U.S., Afghan and coalition forces increase their focus on breaking up Afghan drug rings that help finance the insurgents, more support is being given to gathering and processing intelligence on drug operations. Years ago, the Air Force was designated as the lead service for drug detection and monitoring under the deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics. That's why an Air Force unit is in charge of the contract.
It was five years ago that the U.S. Central Command first decided to upgrade the intelligence gathering and sharing that supported this effort. The task was undertaken by the 350th Electronic Systems Group, which specializes in hiring contractors knowledgeable in electronic communications and computer systems that integrate, standardize and analyze information.
The 350th initially turned to Cambridge to design and install a computerized intelligence system that could take data from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Center for Drug Information and fuse it with information from Global Positioning System satellites, signals intelligence, human intelligence, imagery (including full motion video), and data from other technical and open sources, including coalition partners.
The system also included a Dari-language-based interface, which allowed it to accept locally generated Afghan intelligence and in return supply finished reports in that language to the Afghan counternarcotics police. It became "the only source of critical intelligence captured that is available from host nation sources," according to the Aug. 6 notice.
In a report released by the Air Force in 2007, data from the Kabul-based fusion center got credit for aiding in the seizure of more than 45 tons of drugs with an estimated street value of $1 billion and aid that helped the drug arrest rate by 75 percent. Its information also helped break up groups involved in narcotics and weapons smuggling that originated in Nigeria, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Zambia, South Africa and Thailand. Its information aided in picking up 80 memory chips from cellphones, which when studied by the U.S. National Security Agency, has led to the identification of new smuggling rings outside Afghanistan.
The Afghan fusion center is linked in Kabul to the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), which is run jointly under U.S. and British leadership. The co-sponsors are the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Serious Organized Crimes Agency (SOCA), a British intelligence unit that has law enforcement powers. Leadership rotates between the two agencies.
DEA and SOCA personnel, along with Afghan units trained and mentored by those agencies, use the target packages to track down the country's major narcotics networks and interdict traffickers. Wing Commander Tom Wood of the British Royal Air Force, IOCC chief of staff, told a reporter for Stars and Stripes in May: "We look at the intel. We work out who the key players are."
Wood said with good information they get arrest warrants that the Afghan special narcotics police this year have used to take in 51 people through May 24. At that point, Wood said, there is a difficulty. "Even though we do arrest these people, they quite often get out," he said. "The judicial system is still being put into place. The problem is the system is so corrupt still."
Meanwhile, the report released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan noted that a new task force targeting drug traffickers along with insurgents and corrupt officials is planned for the Kandahar air field in southern Afghanistan. This unit, designed to gather intelligence and build legal cases, will inevitably link to both the fusion center and the IOCC. Though the committee report said formal approval from Washington and London has yet to come, operations are already being coordinated.
A SOCA operative told committee investigators it is critical to unite military and law enforcement experts. "In the past, the military would have hit and the evidence would not have been collected," he said. "Now, with law enforcement present, we are seizing the ledgers and other information to develop an intelligence profile of the networks and the drug kingpins."
The Aug. 6 announcement said that the Air Force's 350th Electronic Systems Group, based at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts, will award a six-month "bridge" contract to Virginia-based Cambridge Communications Systems this Friday to allow that company to continue operating and maintaining the fusion center through Feb. 22, 2010. Meanwhile, a broader new long-term contract will be opened for bidding.
As U.S., Afghan and coalition forces increase their focus on breaking up Afghan drug rings that help finance the insurgents, more support is being given to gathering and processing intelligence on drug operations. Years ago, the Air Force was designated as the lead service for drug detection and monitoring under the deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics. That's why an Air Force unit is in charge of the contract.
It was five years ago that the U.S. Central Command first decided to upgrade the intelligence gathering and sharing that supported this effort. The task was undertaken by the 350th Electronic Systems Group, which specializes in hiring contractors knowledgeable in electronic communications and computer systems that integrate, standardize and analyze information.
The 350th initially turned to Cambridge to design and install a computerized intelligence system that could take data from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Center for Drug Information and fuse it with information from Global Positioning System satellites, signals intelligence, human intelligence, imagery (including full motion video), and data from other technical and open sources, including coalition partners.
The system also included a Dari-language-based interface, which allowed it to accept locally generated Afghan intelligence and in return supply finished reports in that language to the Afghan counternarcotics police. It became "the only source of critical intelligence captured that is available from host nation sources," according to the Aug. 6 notice.
In a report released by the Air Force in 2007, data from the Kabul-based fusion center got credit for aiding in the seizure of more than 45 tons of drugs with an estimated street value of $1 billion and aid that helped the drug arrest rate by 75 percent. Its information also helped break up groups involved in narcotics and weapons smuggling that originated in Nigeria, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Zambia, South Africa and Thailand. Its information aided in picking up 80 memory chips from cellphones, which when studied by the U.S. National Security Agency, has led to the identification of new smuggling rings outside Afghanistan.
The Afghan fusion center is linked in Kabul to the Interagency Operations and Coordination Center (IOCC), which is run jointly under U.S. and British leadership. The co-sponsors are the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Serious Organized Crimes Agency (SOCA), a British intelligence unit that has law enforcement powers. Leadership rotates between the two agencies.
DEA and SOCA personnel, along with Afghan units trained and mentored by those agencies, use the target packages to track down the country's major narcotics networks and interdict traffickers. Wing Commander Tom Wood of the British Royal Air Force, IOCC chief of staff, told a reporter for Stars and Stripes in May: "We look at the intel. We work out who the key players are."
Wood said with good information they get arrest warrants that the Afghan special narcotics police this year have used to take in 51 people through May 24. At that point, Wood said, there is a difficulty. "Even though we do arrest these people, they quite often get out," he said. "The judicial system is still being put into place. The problem is the system is so corrupt still."
Meanwhile, the report released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan noted that a new task force targeting drug traffickers along with insurgents and corrupt officials is planned for the Kandahar air field in southern Afghanistan. This unit, designed to gather intelligence and build legal cases, will inevitably link to both the fusion center and the IOCC. Though the committee report said formal approval from Washington and London has yet to come, operations are already being coordinated.
A SOCA operative told committee investigators it is critical to unite military and law enforcement experts. "In the past, the military would have hit and the evidence would not have been collected," he said. "Now, with law enforcement present, we are seizing the ledgers and other information to develop an intelligence profile of the networks and the drug kingpins."
Damascus Agrees to Help Monitor Iraqi Border By Jay Solomon and Julien Barnes-Dacey
The Obama administration and Damascus tentatively agreed to establish a tripartite committee, with Baghdad, to better monitor the Syrian-Iraqi border as the Pentagon draws down American troops from Iraq in coming months, said senior U.S. officials.
The proposed three-way border-control assessments could boost Iraqi security and patch one of the region's most volatile fault lines. The initiative was made by a team of U.S. Central Command officers and their Syrian counterparts last week in Damascus.
The pact awaits the green light from Baghdad, which expressed frustration at being excluded from the U.S.-Syrian talks, saying they violated Iraqi sovereignty on security matters.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus on Tuesday. A statement issued late in the day by the Iraqi prime minister's office in Baghdad said only that the two sides "discussed the expansion of the Iraqi and Syrian cooperation" in border control.
Syria's prime minister, Naji Otari, far left, and his Iraqi counterpart, Nouri al-Maliki, second from left, review an honor guard at Mr. Maliki's arrival in Damascus on Tuesday. The two countries are working with the U.S. to improve monitoring of the Syrian-Iraqi border.
"Both governments are working seriously and practically to deal with all the issues," added Alaa al-Jawadi, the Iraqi ambassador in Damascus. "The Syrians have been positive with us."
A U.S. official briefed on the Centcom mission said that "the Syrians agree that a tripartite approach is the appropriate approach," adding "we don't have a response back from Maliki."
The border-security initiative provides for the assessment of border checkpoints, dealing with technical issues such as screenings and procedures.
The Pentagon regularly accused Syria of facilitating the flow of foreign fighters and al Qaeda militants into Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
In June, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, said there had been a significant decrease in the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. But U.S. officials also say there are issues to resolve. "We're still a little bit concerned with Syria's role in this," Gen. Odierno told reporters in Baghdad on Monday. "I think our bilateral discussions with them are important."
Syria says it has detained more than 1,700 militants, blocked potential combatants from passing through the country en route to Iraq and imposed stricter border policing. Syria also appears to have cracked down on former members of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime who fled to Damascus after the Iraqi invasion.
"The Baathists have been coming under a lot of pressure in the last few months," said one senior Western diplomat. "Some have been kicked out, some have been told to shut up."
Syria's moves seem to be a response to President Barack Obama's increasingly active outreach efforts. The administration has announced the return of a U.S ambassador to Damascus and recently eased U.S. sanctions in an apparent bid to draw Syria away from its alliance with Iran.
Senior Syrian officials were unavailable to comment. But members of Mr. Assad's government have stressed their desire for improved security cooperation with Washington.
"Now with a new administration, when we have assurances that the Unites States will withdraw from Iraq by 2011, then we do believe that full cooperation between Syria and the United States in different fields, not only security issues, will definitely be welcomed," said Fayssal Mekdad, Syria's deputy foreign minister, in a recent interview.
Mr. Maliki's visit, announced suddenly after the Central Command delegation visit to Damascus last week, also may have had domestic political motivations. Iraqi parliamentary elections are set for January and Mr. Maliki has positioned himself as a strong nationalist, promoting Iraqi sovereignty. Nationalist rhetoric is running high, and Iraqi officials appeared miffed about being excluded from the Damascus discussions about their country's security.
The proposed three-way border-control assessments could boost Iraqi security and patch one of the region's most volatile fault lines. The initiative was made by a team of U.S. Central Command officers and their Syrian counterparts last week in Damascus.
The pact awaits the green light from Baghdad, which expressed frustration at being excluded from the U.S.-Syrian talks, saying they violated Iraqi sovereignty on security matters.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus on Tuesday. A statement issued late in the day by the Iraqi prime minister's office in Baghdad said only that the two sides "discussed the expansion of the Iraqi and Syrian cooperation" in border control.
Syria's prime minister, Naji Otari, far left, and his Iraqi counterpart, Nouri al-Maliki, second from left, review an honor guard at Mr. Maliki's arrival in Damascus on Tuesday. The two countries are working with the U.S. to improve monitoring of the Syrian-Iraqi border.
"Both governments are working seriously and practically to deal with all the issues," added Alaa al-Jawadi, the Iraqi ambassador in Damascus. "The Syrians have been positive with us."
A U.S. official briefed on the Centcom mission said that "the Syrians agree that a tripartite approach is the appropriate approach," adding "we don't have a response back from Maliki."
The border-security initiative provides for the assessment of border checkpoints, dealing with technical issues such as screenings and procedures.
The Pentagon regularly accused Syria of facilitating the flow of foreign fighters and al Qaeda militants into Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003.
In June, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, said there had been a significant decrease in the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. But U.S. officials also say there are issues to resolve. "We're still a little bit concerned with Syria's role in this," Gen. Odierno told reporters in Baghdad on Monday. "I think our bilateral discussions with them are important."
Syria says it has detained more than 1,700 militants, blocked potential combatants from passing through the country en route to Iraq and imposed stricter border policing. Syria also appears to have cracked down on former members of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime who fled to Damascus after the Iraqi invasion.
"The Baathists have been coming under a lot of pressure in the last few months," said one senior Western diplomat. "Some have been kicked out, some have been told to shut up."
Syria's moves seem to be a response to President Barack Obama's increasingly active outreach efforts. The administration has announced the return of a U.S ambassador to Damascus and recently eased U.S. sanctions in an apparent bid to draw Syria away from its alliance with Iran.
Senior Syrian officials were unavailable to comment. But members of Mr. Assad's government have stressed their desire for improved security cooperation with Washington.
"Now with a new administration, when we have assurances that the Unites States will withdraw from Iraq by 2011, then we do believe that full cooperation between Syria and the United States in different fields, not only security issues, will definitely be welcomed," said Fayssal Mekdad, Syria's deputy foreign minister, in a recent interview.
Mr. Maliki's visit, announced suddenly after the Central Command delegation visit to Damascus last week, also may have had domestic political motivations. Iraqi parliamentary elections are set for January and Mr. Maliki has positioned himself as a strong nationalist, promoting Iraqi sovereignty. Nationalist rhetoric is running high, and Iraqi officials appeared miffed about being excluded from the Damascus discussions about their country's security.
Iraq's Long Marathon Elections by Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
There still are more than five months until the parliamentary elections in Iraq, which are scheduled for the end of January 2010. Despite the fact that there still is a long time to that date, anyone who follows up the moves of the parties and leaders will realize how sensational and controversial these elections are going to be, and perhaps decisive in the formulation of the new state. The election campaign was opened practically by the establishment of the new alliances, and by the flying of test balloons to understand the nature of the popular tendencies. Perhaps the most important issue in the election maneuvers is the promise of divorce from sectarianism.
Sectarian quotas have been the new order since the establishment of the Governing Council representing all the principal religions and sects in the country; then came the elections to reflect the state of sectarian tension, which became political headlines in the elections. Sectarianism has given birth to the first government so far, which is led by the leader of the religious Al-Dawa Party, Nuri al-Maliki.
Al-Maliki's party has triggered a major sound bomb when it expressed its preparedness to leave the Shiite coalition, which brought it to power, and when it said that it was prepared to open the door for a coalition with the other sides, be they secular or religious parties.
We do not want to preempt the results, and say that the Iraqi voter has completely recovered from the sectarian belonging, which has colored all the principal theses in the past six years. However, indeed there are indications in this direction. The latest governorate elections surprised the politicians when both Sunni and Shiite religious symbols and parties lost in their principal strongholds. Also the latest Kurdish elections shocked the observers with their results.
It is not strange that we are less enthusiastic about dragging religion or ethnicity in the political process. This is because the religious difference is not the subject of the supposed political argument, and because the disputes among the religions, and the religious sects and groups are more destructive, as the battles of the past dark years have shown us.
Despite my doubts about the ability of the religious parties to shed their old skin and turn into real political parties, there is no option other than to wait and see how they will present themselves, and how the Iraqis will see them! If the prime minister's party, Al-Dawa Party, leaves the Shiite coalition, and enters an alliance with the Sunni Islamic Party, this will appear as a consolidation of the Iraqi unity, but it is not sufficient. It is true that the consolidation of the religious unity is fundamental for the repairing of the relations among the citizens who have been divided by the "death squads," "Al-Qaeda," and "uprooting." However, the hegemony of the religious parties will continue to be a permanent problem, because resorting to the sectarian disputes is an easy means to tempt and frighten to be used by the candidates who fail to satisfy the needs of the citizens.
It is too early to believe all that is said about the alliances, and about the changes in the geographical stances and directions. If there is something worthy of consolidation in the minds of the Iraqi candidates, it is thinking of their future as leaders and parties in the post-elections stage by getting rid of the burden of sectarian and ethnic theses in an explicit way, and by turning to partisan action that serves all the Iraqis, and not merely the Shiite serves the Shiite, the Sunni serves the Sunni, and the Kurd serves the Kurd.
The upcoming Iraqi elections will be a watershed. This is what has motivated the competing sides to open the doors of their campaigns very early, because they know that these elections will decide their fate; some of the defeated sides will face the danger of extinction for the next four years.
Sectarian quotas have been the new order since the establishment of the Governing Council representing all the principal religions and sects in the country; then came the elections to reflect the state of sectarian tension, which became political headlines in the elections. Sectarianism has given birth to the first government so far, which is led by the leader of the religious Al-Dawa Party, Nuri al-Maliki.
Al-Maliki's party has triggered a major sound bomb when it expressed its preparedness to leave the Shiite coalition, which brought it to power, and when it said that it was prepared to open the door for a coalition with the other sides, be they secular or religious parties.
We do not want to preempt the results, and say that the Iraqi voter has completely recovered from the sectarian belonging, which has colored all the principal theses in the past six years. However, indeed there are indications in this direction. The latest governorate elections surprised the politicians when both Sunni and Shiite religious symbols and parties lost in their principal strongholds. Also the latest Kurdish elections shocked the observers with their results.
It is not strange that we are less enthusiastic about dragging religion or ethnicity in the political process. This is because the religious difference is not the subject of the supposed political argument, and because the disputes among the religions, and the religious sects and groups are more destructive, as the battles of the past dark years have shown us.
Despite my doubts about the ability of the religious parties to shed their old skin and turn into real political parties, there is no option other than to wait and see how they will present themselves, and how the Iraqis will see them! If the prime minister's party, Al-Dawa Party, leaves the Shiite coalition, and enters an alliance with the Sunni Islamic Party, this will appear as a consolidation of the Iraqi unity, but it is not sufficient. It is true that the consolidation of the religious unity is fundamental for the repairing of the relations among the citizens who have been divided by the "death squads," "Al-Qaeda," and "uprooting." However, the hegemony of the religious parties will continue to be a permanent problem, because resorting to the sectarian disputes is an easy means to tempt and frighten to be used by the candidates who fail to satisfy the needs of the citizens.
It is too early to believe all that is said about the alliances, and about the changes in the geographical stances and directions. If there is something worthy of consolidation in the minds of the Iraqi candidates, it is thinking of their future as leaders and parties in the post-elections stage by getting rid of the burden of sectarian and ethnic theses in an explicit way, and by turning to partisan action that serves all the Iraqis, and not merely the Shiite serves the Shiite, the Sunni serves the Sunni, and the Kurd serves the Kurd.
The upcoming Iraqi elections will be a watershed. This is what has motivated the competing sides to open the doors of their campaigns very early, because they know that these elections will decide their fate; some of the defeated sides will face the danger of extinction for the next four years.
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
GAZA: Big Jihad VS Little Jihad by Walid Phares
Hamas’ attack against a Jihadist group inside Gaza is about to provide the Palestinian Islamist organization a pass to become a “mainstream” movement, acceptable internationally as a partner in negotiations. Or at least that is what Hamas strategists think may happen as a result of crushing the minuscule militant entity known as Jund Ansar Allah (The Soldiers or the Partisans of Allah) last week. This is another murky development in the world of Jihadism, where the biggest brothers in holy war devoured the little ones, in a race between who can achieve final victory against the Kuffar (infidels). But in Gaza, these intra Jihadist slaughter fests are peculiar in as much as the “Palestine cause” is so central to the Islamist political narrative worldwide.
In November of 2008, a new group in Rafah declared itself as the ultimate Salafi Jihadist force of Palestine. After many previous attempts made previously by al Qaeda inspired factions at least since 2001, Jund Ansar Allah (JAA) led by Abel Latif Mussa, aka Abu al Nour al Maqdissi, seized the control of a local Mosque and segments of a neighborhood and launched a couple attacks against Israel as of early 2009. The JAA issued many declarations calling for “real Jihad,” ending negotiations with Fatah, the international community and opposing any type of elections and constitutional structure in Gaza other than pure Sharia. From his pulpit, Sheikh Mussa criticized Hamas’ leadership for failing the Jihad they promised to deliver, and for betraying their own constitution calling for an Islamic Emirate all over Palestine, not just in Gaza and the West Bank. Hundreds of already indoctrinated youth joined the JAA and formed the nucleus of a Jihadi milita. Their ranks were growing at an alarming rate for Hamas, which felt time came to squash them, before they became a competitive organization. The JAA was on its ballistic way to devour Hamas from the inside. It was using the same doctrines upon which Hamas was founded, grew and used to overthrew Fatah from Gaza.
After a few incidents, Hamas forces overwhelmed the headquarters of JAA killing dozens of militants. The fighting took its toll on both groups. Unverified reports said Abu Jibril Shemali, commander of Izzedine al Qassam Brigades (Hamas’ SS-like force) and Abu Abdallah al Suri, JAA’s military commander were both killed in the clashes. The founder of the Jund Ansar Allah Abdel Latif Moussa was killed during the explosion of one of his suicide bombers as he targeted advancing Hamas fighters. By now, the “Jund” has been crushed, its Mosque seized and its survivors pursued. In return JAA underground has threatened to punish Hamas leadership for their apostasy against “Allah’s true fighters.” In this is Jihad versus Jihad inside a world of indoctrinated circles of militants, one circle enjoying power, money and recognition and the smaller circle wanting to snatch it away from the most powerful. But what are lessons we need to learn from this pool of piranhas, where big Jihadi fish eat little Jihadi fish?
1. According to many commentators on al Jazeera, Hamas chose to finish up the “Jund” as a maneuver to lure the West in general -- Great Britain and the United States in particular -- into “engaging” the organization, lifting its name from terror lists and adding it to the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. Hamas spokespersons rushed to use one term, that resonates greatly in Western ears, especially with the Obama Administration and the Brown Government, “we too are fighting the extremists, the terrorists as you are fighting them and pursuing al Qaeda,” declared Hamas English speaking communicators, hours after the combat was over. Analysts in the Arab world, shrewd enough to detect the Hamas tactical move wasn’t greedy in revealing their game: crushing an “al Qaeda” like group in Gaza would grant an immediate license to the mainstream for Hamas. One must expect sympathizing journalists, apologist academics and soon enough diplomats and envoys citing the “glorious” deeds of Hamas as evidence of fight “against terrorism.” Some savvier analysts believe many “engagement” architects in Europe and America have even suggested such a move to break the veto against Hamas. Interestingly, the US narrative lately has been underlining that there is no war against “Global Jihadsim” but only a “war against al Qaeda” only. So those in the business of Jihad, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and a plethora of other groups, can make their credential known to the West by slapping some local, little al Qaeda boys, and claiming a green card to the world of “accepted Jihadists.” Two summers ago, the Syrian regime and to an extent, Hezbollah, tried to come up with a similar model: Damascus released a copycat group in northern Lebanon, Fatah al Islam, before they claimed they beheaded the organization few months later, suggesting to Washington that Bashar can also kill al Qaeda crowds.
2. Is there a link between Hamas and the “Jund” it just sacrificed as a price for its public international image to be enhanced? In classical Western eyes, these links cannot be seen. But seasoned observers of Middle Eastern politics and Jihadi tactics can swiftly detect the equation Hamas-Jihadist factions. Firstly, the constituents of the “Jund” (JAA) are part of the larger indoctrinated pools created by Hamas. There are no differences in the basic doctrine between Hamas and JAA: they are both adepts of Jihadi Salafism. Secondly, Hamas tolerated the presence of these ultra-Jihadists in their midst for a reason, that is as long as their size was small and as long as they were allowed to grow so that they can be used tactically: either by blaming them for wild rocket launching or to crush them and cash in. Comparatively, Hamas couldn’t “tolerate” Fatah for example. By June 2007 the followers of Mahmoud Abbas were massacred in the enclave, because they were credible partners in a potential peace process and real competitors. Ghazi Hamad, a Hamas spokesperson told al Jazeera English his organization was always dialoguing with the “Jund.” Which means they had relationship with them even though Hamas was the only dominant force in Gaza. Hence there was a reason for this “tolerance” before Hamad admitted that Hamas stopped “tolerating.” Logically, the Jihadist regime in Gaza fed the little Jihadists and allowed them to grow until the time of the sacrifice came.
3. This brings us back to review the current Western re-reading of the so-called War on Terror and the decision by the Obama and Brown Administrations to let go of the counter Jihadist narrative hoping, as they said, to drive a wedge between the so-called “good Jihadists” and the “extremists.” Hamas quickly understood the message and delivered the goods promptly hoping they will be reclassified as “good Js.” Not so fast, because Hamas needs to also cater to its own Gaza indoctrinated constituencies, which were made to believe for decades that Jihad fi Sabeel Allah is the only way. Tragicomically, Hamas was trapped by a smart question fielded by an al Jazeera English anchor who was pressing their spokesperson to show the difference between Hamas and the JAA. “Don’t you think that the people you just killed are more faithful to your constitution calling for the establishment of an Islamic Emirate on all of Palestine than yourselves, who are in power now? Ghazi Hamad rushed to answer by instincts, revealing too much perhaps: “These guys wants to establish the Caliphate immediately on any part of liberated land, they are irrational; they don’t understand how Jihad works, we do.” He said Hamas knows better how to achieve victory. In my book Future Jihad, I have often argued that the Jihadists are of several strategic schools of thought: short term, medium term and long term. The difference between Hamas and the JAA is not about good or bad Jihad, as experts to Western Governments are claiming. Not at all. It is a difference about when to trigger the missile, under whose orders and within which framework of alliances. The “Jund” wants it all the time, anytime they can. Hamas wants a perfect kill, coordinated with its allies Hezbollah, Syria’s Baath and Iran’s Pasdaran. The Jund doesn’t care what the infidels in Washington and London think. Hamas cares strategically how the allies of its immediate enemy, Israel, behave. It wants to be part of the widest regional alliance against the Jewish state, while the latter loses all its allies, before D-Day is unleashed.
Monday, August 17, 2009
A Culture of Suicide and Death by Muhammad Diyab
Recalling the scenes of my childhood and youth, I sometimes find myself asking the question; was I ever at any stage of my life tempted by extremist currents into taking up arms and killing God's creations in the same manner as armed militias throughout our region? Every time I ask myself this question I am always certain that I have never been tempted or lured by any such ideologies, and that I have always felt that human life is sacred. This is why I am astonished to see some of our youth adopting such suicidal ideology and drifting into violent organizations. I am certain that the only difference between this generation and the majority of my own generation is the lack of standards in the education of the former. This is something that we should all be aware of, in our homes, our schools, and our constituencies, before this lack in educational standards becomes more dangerous and even more difficult to reform.
Anybody observing these armed movements can clearly see that they belong to a culture of suicide, they are well aware that their ideology lacks the power to convince, and so resort to shows of strength. In spite of this, these militias act ceaselessly in order to convince others to accept this culture of suicide. One of the most recent of such movements was the Salafist Jihadist movement in Gaza that called itself the Jund Ansar Allah. This group was led by Dr. Abdul Latif Moussa AKA Abu Noor al-Maqdisi who during his Friday sermon announced the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Palestine in the Gaza Strip. Hamas took action against the group in response of this, resulting in 88 casualties [including the death of the group's leader]. This situation is similar to that of Fatah Al Islam in Lebanon; the group's leader Shaker al-Absi mobilized a large group of youth in Nahr Al-Bared in a hopeless confrontation with the Lebanese army on the pretext of liberating Palestine.
The Pakistani Taliban is also a good example that illustrates this culture of suicide, and its leader Baitullah Mehsud - who was killed in a US raid last week – was leading a suicide project since the movement's establishment. He challenged his country and the world with a narrow minded ideology that goes against modernity, normality, and [the wishes of] the people. In fact, Mehsud's ideology was so narrow-minded and ignorant that he even refused to allow young girls in the area that he controlled to receive an education, threatening to bomb schools that allowed girls to enter the education system. Such an ignorant ideology is completely contradictory to the normality of life and Mehsud wasted his life playing a game of hunter and hunted.
Death is the ultimate end of this culture of suicide that is embraced by some extremist leaders, and the youth who adopt this culture suffer and become lost in an endless maze where there is no light at the end of the tunnel. The question that must be asked is; how can we aid the development of the ideology of the youth, where they are able to judge ideas rationally and recognize the dangers of temptation, in order to achieve ideological security for the vulnerable youth?
Anybody observing these armed movements can clearly see that they belong to a culture of suicide, they are well aware that their ideology lacks the power to convince, and so resort to shows of strength. In spite of this, these militias act ceaselessly in order to convince others to accept this culture of suicide. One of the most recent of such movements was the Salafist Jihadist movement in Gaza that called itself the Jund Ansar Allah. This group was led by Dr. Abdul Latif Moussa AKA Abu Noor al-Maqdisi who during his Friday sermon announced the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Palestine in the Gaza Strip. Hamas took action against the group in response of this, resulting in 88 casualties [including the death of the group's leader]. This situation is similar to that of Fatah Al Islam in Lebanon; the group's leader Shaker al-Absi mobilized a large group of youth in Nahr Al-Bared in a hopeless confrontation with the Lebanese army on the pretext of liberating Palestine.
The Pakistani Taliban is also a good example that illustrates this culture of suicide, and its leader Baitullah Mehsud - who was killed in a US raid last week – was leading a suicide project since the movement's establishment. He challenged his country and the world with a narrow minded ideology that goes against modernity, normality, and [the wishes of] the people. In fact, Mehsud's ideology was so narrow-minded and ignorant that he even refused to allow young girls in the area that he controlled to receive an education, threatening to bomb schools that allowed girls to enter the education system. Such an ignorant ideology is completely contradictory to the normality of life and Mehsud wasted his life playing a game of hunter and hunted.
Death is the ultimate end of this culture of suicide that is embraced by some extremist leaders, and the youth who adopt this culture suffer and become lost in an endless maze where there is no light at the end of the tunnel. The question that must be asked is; how can we aid the development of the ideology of the youth, where they are able to judge ideas rationally and recognize the dangers of temptation, in order to achieve ideological security for the vulnerable youth?
Nasrallah and the Double-Edged Sword of Israel by Tariq Alhomayed
Israel is like a double-edged sword in the hands of our extremists; it both cuts us and reconciles us. Under the pretext of Israel, coups are undertaken and ties are severed. Arabs attack one another on every issue under the pretext of Israel, and even the combatants in the collapsed state of Somalia say that they wish to liberate it [Palestine].
The latest of these displacements i.e. the negative or positive actions that take place using Israel as an excuse came last Friday from Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah leader said that Netanyahu's threat that the Lebanese government would bear full responsibility for any attacks on Israel [originating from its territory] should Hezbollah join the government, aims to put pressure on the government and obstruct its formation, as well as put pressure on Hezbollah not to participate in government.
According to Nasrallah, Netanyahu's words demonstrate that "It is clear that the Israelis will be vexed if a national unity government were formed in Lebanon." Nasrallah therefore believes that "the response is that we will increase our efforts and cooperate to form a national unity government…because there is a need for us to have a government in Lebanon as soon as possible." Nasrallah ended by saying that Hezbollah would participate in government "in defiance" of Netanyahu.
Nasrallah boycotted and besieged the previous government, and using Israel as an excuse demanded a third minority [in parliament]. Under the pretext of Israel, Nasrallah also established a network of contacts throughout Lebanon and disagreed with his Lebanese rivals. Under the pretext of Israel, Nasrallah mobilized for Election Day - which the resistance lost – saying that Lebanon is a country of resistance, and its government should therefore also be one of resistance.
Using Israel as a pretext, Hassan Nasrallah also sent a sleeper cell to Egypt, and today the Hezbollah leader has called for the formation of a Lebanese national unity government as soon as possible, because he believes that political power in Lebanon is "following the Israeli goal" of returning tension to the country. Nasrallah added that "[currently] the climate is calm, thank God." Of course, he has used Israel as a pretext for all of this.
Is there a greater disregard of reason than this?
What about the reality in Lebanon; its requirements, and the requirements of its citizens?
What about the economy, education, and stability?
Above all else, where are the people of Lebanon, not just today, but for the past four years?
When development, stability, and human growth becomes disrupted under the pretext of responding to Israel, this is a crime equal to that of collaborating with Israel against the security of any Arab state.
We can say this because in our region today we have watched as a large group plummets from the peak of arrogance [as a result of this] and their justifications are laughable. We are also fortunate to have exposed many of the projects that are dangerous to our Arab states, as well as exposing the fragile and false Iranian democracy. Just look at what Hamas are saying about Jund Ansar Allah, with regards to the group illegally using weapons and the other justifications that it made. Look at Hezbollah as it dims the lights, and monitor Syria's language towards the US. Also monitor the actions of some in the Gulf. This list goes on, even in Africa. Only then will we know how many lives have been spent for obsolete slogans, and how many opportunities for progress and development have been thrown away by undertaken adventures and telling gross lies about democracy, jihad, the resistance, and other empty slogans.
The latest of these displacements i.e. the negative or positive actions that take place using Israel as an excuse came last Friday from Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The Hezbollah leader said that Netanyahu's threat that the Lebanese government would bear full responsibility for any attacks on Israel [originating from its territory] should Hezbollah join the government, aims to put pressure on the government and obstruct its formation, as well as put pressure on Hezbollah not to participate in government.
According to Nasrallah, Netanyahu's words demonstrate that "It is clear that the Israelis will be vexed if a national unity government were formed in Lebanon." Nasrallah therefore believes that "the response is that we will increase our efforts and cooperate to form a national unity government…because there is a need for us to have a government in Lebanon as soon as possible." Nasrallah ended by saying that Hezbollah would participate in government "in defiance" of Netanyahu.
Nasrallah boycotted and besieged the previous government, and using Israel as an excuse demanded a third minority [in parliament]. Under the pretext of Israel, Nasrallah also established a network of contacts throughout Lebanon and disagreed with his Lebanese rivals. Under the pretext of Israel, Nasrallah mobilized for Election Day - which the resistance lost – saying that Lebanon is a country of resistance, and its government should therefore also be one of resistance.
Using Israel as a pretext, Hassan Nasrallah also sent a sleeper cell to Egypt, and today the Hezbollah leader has called for the formation of a Lebanese national unity government as soon as possible, because he believes that political power in Lebanon is "following the Israeli goal" of returning tension to the country. Nasrallah added that "[currently] the climate is calm, thank God." Of course, he has used Israel as a pretext for all of this.
Is there a greater disregard of reason than this?
What about the reality in Lebanon; its requirements, and the requirements of its citizens?
What about the economy, education, and stability?
Above all else, where are the people of Lebanon, not just today, but for the past four years?
When development, stability, and human growth becomes disrupted under the pretext of responding to Israel, this is a crime equal to that of collaborating with Israel against the security of any Arab state.
We can say this because in our region today we have watched as a large group plummets from the peak of arrogance [as a result of this] and their justifications are laughable. We are also fortunate to have exposed many of the projects that are dangerous to our Arab states, as well as exposing the fragile and false Iranian democracy. Just look at what Hamas are saying about Jund Ansar Allah, with regards to the group illegally using weapons and the other justifications that it made. Look at Hezbollah as it dims the lights, and monitor Syria's language towards the US. Also monitor the actions of some in the Gulf. This list goes on, even in Africa. Only then will we know how many lives have been spent for obsolete slogans, and how many opportunities for progress and development have been thrown away by undertaken adventures and telling gross lies about democracy, jihad, the resistance, and other empty slogans.
US Commander in Iraq Wants Troops in Disputed Land by Kim Gamel
America's top commander in Iraq said Monday he wants to deploy U.S. soldiers alongside Iraqi and Kurdish troops in a disputed swath of northern territory following a series of horrific bombings by insurgents hoping to stoke an Arab-Kurdish conflict.
The move would be a departure from the security pact that called for Americans to pull back from populated areas on June 30. But Gen. Ray Odierno warned that al-Qaida in Iraq was exploiting tensions between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish militia, the peshmerga, to carry out attacks on villages not guarded by either side. The bombings have killed scores of people since Aug. 7.
The U.S. soldiers would act in an oversight role to help the troops work together to secure areas along a fault line of land claimed by both Arabs and Kurds, Odierno said, stressing no final decision had been made.
"It won't be for long if we do it. It'll be just to build confidence in the forces so they're comfortable working together, then we'll slowly pull ourselves out," Odierno told reporters during a briefing at the U.S. military headquarters on the outskirts of Baghdad. "I think they just all feel more comfortable if we're there initially."
Odierno said he had met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki earlier Monday and found him receptive to the idea.
Several top defense officials have identified the split between Iraq's majority Arabs and the Kurdish minority as a greater long-term threat to Iraq's stability than the Sunni-Shiite conflict. Defense Secretary Robert Gates went to the Kurdish self-rule area in the north late last month to tell both sides they need to resolve their differences before U.S. troops leave.
At the heart of the dispute is the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as well as villages in Ninevah province that the Kurds want to incorporate into their semiautonomous area despite opposition from Arabs and minority Turkomen ethnic group.
"We have al-Qaida exploiting this fissure that you're seeing between Arabs and Kurds," Odierno said. "What we're trying to do is close that fissure."
He said al-Qaida was targeting minorities, small towns that don't have a police force and other so-called soft targets to avoid heavy security concentrated in more central areas.
The Kurdish peshmerga have set up checkpoints on the outskirts of such villages and small towns to provide at least some security. The overstretched Iraqi security forces stay out of these areas altogether, partly to avoid antagonizing the Kurds.
Odierno said the deployment of the U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish protection forces would start in Ninevah province, which includes the volatile city of Mosul, and then extend to Kirkuk and to Diyala province north of the capital.
He did not say how many U.S. troops would be sent to the disputed territories but pointed out that the Americans still have a lot of forces that have been pulled back to large bases near Mosul and other cities.
"I'm still very confident in the overall security here," Odierno said. "Unfortunately they're killing a lot of innocent civilians."
Nevertheless, U.S. forces have never had a heavy presence in the villages outside Mosul, and the move to establish a presence signals a more pessimistic outlook about security in the region.
Neither al-Maliki nor his spokesman could be reached for comment because they were traveling to Syria to discuss the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq.
The general, however, said he has discussed the idea with al-Maliki and other senior Iraqi and Kurdish officials and planned another high-level meeting in early September.
"Having met with all these leaders, I think there is room to work this out," he said.
Kurdish leaders and a senior Iraqi lawmaker said they supported the plan.
"This is a type of solution for the tense situation in the disputed territories between Kurds and Arabs," said Hassan al-Sineid, a Shiite lawmaker close to al-Maliki.
Underscoring the tensions, the Ninevah provincial governor said he would welcome the Americans and Iraqi forces — but not the Kurds.
"But since the Kurdish officials object to this idea, then I think there is no need for joint forces in these areas," said Atheel al-Nujaifi, a hardline Sunni who was chosen in provincial elections that ousted the Kurds from a ruling position. "The U.S. soldiers could help turn these places into neutral zones."
The move to deploy U.S. troops there would represent a step back from a security pact that called for Americans to withdraw from populated areas — including cities, villages and localities — by June 30.
Odierno did not expect the decision to affect the overall timeline, which calls for U.S. combat forces to leave the country by the end of August 2010 and a full withdrawal by the end of 2011. He said the pullout would be slower in the north than in other parts of the country.
Iraq's government, meanwhile, approved a draft law paving the way for a referendum on the security pact that lays out the U.S. withdrawal timeline to be held simultaneously with national parliamentary elections on Jan. 16, spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said in a statement. The measure still needs to be approved by Iraq's parliament, which is in recess until next month.
Iraqi lawmakers agreed to the security pact last November after months of bitter negotiations. But it included the caveat that the deal should go before voters in a referendum to be held by July 30 — a concession to opponents who argued that Americans should leave immediately after the Dec. 31 expiration of a U.N. mandate for foreign forces.
The government said earlier this year that to save time and money, it wanted the referendum to be held on the same day as the national elections.
That raised the possibility that a majority of Iraqis could reject the deal, forcing the U.S. military to withdraw by January 2010. But many Iraqis said Monday that the referendum was being held too late to make a difference.
The move would be a departure from the security pact that called for Americans to pull back from populated areas on June 30. But Gen. Ray Odierno warned that al-Qaida in Iraq was exploiting tensions between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish militia, the peshmerga, to carry out attacks on villages not guarded by either side. The bombings have killed scores of people since Aug. 7.
The U.S. soldiers would act in an oversight role to help the troops work together to secure areas along a fault line of land claimed by both Arabs and Kurds, Odierno said, stressing no final decision had been made.
"It won't be for long if we do it. It'll be just to build confidence in the forces so they're comfortable working together, then we'll slowly pull ourselves out," Odierno told reporters during a briefing at the U.S. military headquarters on the outskirts of Baghdad. "I think they just all feel more comfortable if we're there initially."
Odierno said he had met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki earlier Monday and found him receptive to the idea.
Several top defense officials have identified the split between Iraq's majority Arabs and the Kurdish minority as a greater long-term threat to Iraq's stability than the Sunni-Shiite conflict. Defense Secretary Robert Gates went to the Kurdish self-rule area in the north late last month to tell both sides they need to resolve their differences before U.S. troops leave.
At the heart of the dispute is the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as well as villages in Ninevah province that the Kurds want to incorporate into their semiautonomous area despite opposition from Arabs and minority Turkomen ethnic group.
"We have al-Qaida exploiting this fissure that you're seeing between Arabs and Kurds," Odierno said. "What we're trying to do is close that fissure."
He said al-Qaida was targeting minorities, small towns that don't have a police force and other so-called soft targets to avoid heavy security concentrated in more central areas.
The Kurdish peshmerga have set up checkpoints on the outskirts of such villages and small towns to provide at least some security. The overstretched Iraqi security forces stay out of these areas altogether, partly to avoid antagonizing the Kurds.
Odierno said the deployment of the U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish protection forces would start in Ninevah province, which includes the volatile city of Mosul, and then extend to Kirkuk and to Diyala province north of the capital.
He did not say how many U.S. troops would be sent to the disputed territories but pointed out that the Americans still have a lot of forces that have been pulled back to large bases near Mosul and other cities.
"I'm still very confident in the overall security here," Odierno said. "Unfortunately they're killing a lot of innocent civilians."
Nevertheless, U.S. forces have never had a heavy presence in the villages outside Mosul, and the move to establish a presence signals a more pessimistic outlook about security in the region.
Neither al-Maliki nor his spokesman could be reached for comment because they were traveling to Syria to discuss the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq.
The general, however, said he has discussed the idea with al-Maliki and other senior Iraqi and Kurdish officials and planned another high-level meeting in early September.
"Having met with all these leaders, I think there is room to work this out," he said.
Kurdish leaders and a senior Iraqi lawmaker said they supported the plan.
"This is a type of solution for the tense situation in the disputed territories between Kurds and Arabs," said Hassan al-Sineid, a Shiite lawmaker close to al-Maliki.
Underscoring the tensions, the Ninevah provincial governor said he would welcome the Americans and Iraqi forces — but not the Kurds.
"But since the Kurdish officials object to this idea, then I think there is no need for joint forces in these areas," said Atheel al-Nujaifi, a hardline Sunni who was chosen in provincial elections that ousted the Kurds from a ruling position. "The U.S. soldiers could help turn these places into neutral zones."
The move to deploy U.S. troops there would represent a step back from a security pact that called for Americans to withdraw from populated areas — including cities, villages and localities — by June 30.
Odierno did not expect the decision to affect the overall timeline, which calls for U.S. combat forces to leave the country by the end of August 2010 and a full withdrawal by the end of 2011. He said the pullout would be slower in the north than in other parts of the country.
Iraq's government, meanwhile, approved a draft law paving the way for a referendum on the security pact that lays out the U.S. withdrawal timeline to be held simultaneously with national parliamentary elections on Jan. 16, spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said in a statement. The measure still needs to be approved by Iraq's parliament, which is in recess until next month.
Iraqi lawmakers agreed to the security pact last November after months of bitter negotiations. But it included the caveat that the deal should go before voters in a referendum to be held by July 30 — a concession to opponents who argued that Americans should leave immediately after the Dec. 31 expiration of a U.N. mandate for foreign forces.
The government said earlier this year that to save time and money, it wanted the referendum to be held on the same day as the national elections.
That raised the possibility that a majority of Iraqis could reject the deal, forcing the U.S. military to withdraw by January 2010. But many Iraqis said Monday that the referendum was being held too late to make a difference.
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