The United States is phasing out funding for opium eradication programs in poppy-filled Afghanistan while significantly boosting funding for alternate crop and drug interdiction efforts, the U.S. envoy for Afghanistan.
The aim of the new policy: to deprive the Taliban of the tens of millions of dollars in drug revenues that are fueling its insurgency while promoting viable crop alternatives for Afghan farmers and cracking down on the illicit cross-border heroin trade.
The U.S. envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, told the AP also that the U.S. eradication programs were only driving Afghan farmers into the hands of the Taliban.
"Eradication is a waste of money," Holbrooke said on the sidelines of a Group of Eight foreign ministers' meeting on Afghanistan, during which he briefed regional representatives on the new policy.
"It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban. So we're going to phase out eradication," he said. The Afghan foreign minister also attended the G-8 meeting.
Poppy eradication efforts - for years a cornerstone of U.S. and U.N. drug trafficking efforts in Afghanistan - were seen as inefficient because too little was being destroyed at too high a cost, U.N. drug chief Antonio Maria Costa told the AP.
The old policy was also deeply unpopular among powerless small-scale farmers, who often were targeted in the eradication efforts.
Afghanistan is the world's leading source of opium, cultivating 93 percent of the world's heroin-producing crop. While opium cultivation dropped 19 percent last year, it remains concentrated in Afghanistan's southern provinces where the Taliban is strongest and earned insurgents an estimated $50 million to $70 million last year, according to the U.N. drug office.
While there was no immediate comment from Kabul on Saturday, the U.S. policy shift was likely to be welcomed by Afghanistan's government. Officials eradicating poppies have often been attacked by militants. Afghan citizens, many of whom rely on farming for sustenance and income, would also invite new agricultural programs.
The new policy calls for assisting farmers who abandon poppy cultivation. Holbrooke said the international community wasn't trying to target Afghan farmers, just the Taliban militants who buy their crops.
"The farmers are not our enemy, they're just growing a crop to make a living," he said. "It's the drug system. So the U.S. policy was driving people into the hands of the Taliban."
While Holbrooke did not provide the AP with a dollar figure for the new U.S. commitment, he told the G-8 ministers that Washington was increasing its funding for agricultural assistance from tens of millions of dollars a year to hundreds of millions of dollars, said Foreign Minister Franco Frattini of Italy, the current G-8 president.
"We're essentially phasing out our support for crop eradication and using the money to work on interdiction, rule of law, alternate crops," Holbrooke.
The policy also calls for coordinating a crackdown on drug trafficking across Afghanistan's border before the heroin reaches addicts in Europe, Russia and Iran.
In recent months, U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan have begun attacking drug labs and opium storage sites in an effort to deprive the Taliban of drug profits.
The G-8 ministers "strongly appreciated" the policy shift, Frattini said. Costa, of the U.N., said the new focus "seems to be the winning strategy, and I'm glad that all of this has received support from the G-8 ministers."
The G-8 foreign ministers along with Afghan counterpart Rangin Dadfar Spanta issued a statement at the end of their three-day summit Saturday also calling for a regional intelligence network to prevent opium from leaving Afghanistan and the chemical precursors needed to turn it into heroin from getting in.
They said supporting sustainable farming was key to Afghanistan's and Pakistan's future in that it would boost incomes, create jobs, improve rural development and lower regional tensions.
"Food insecurity and chronic poverty are root causes of civil instability and forced migration," the statement said.
The ministers said it was urgent to find alternatives for farming communities where "narco-trafficking and extremism are endemic."
Costa told the G-8 meeting that the recent dip in cultivation was "vulnerable to relapse" without concerted international efforts to help farmers with new crops and to boost law enforcement operations to disrupt drug markets, production labs and convoys.
According to a U.N. report this week, opium eradication reached a high in 2003, after the Taliban were ousted from power, with over 21,000 hectares (51,900 acres) destroyed. In 2008, only 5,480 hectares (13,500 acres) were cut down, compared with 19,047 hectares (47,000 acres) in 2007.
Costa said Afghan opium would kill 100,000 people this year in the parts of world where demand for heroin is highest: Europe, Russia and West Asia.
To fight it, he said major powers had to expand their counter-drug efforts to neighboring Pakistan as well as Iran, where half the 7,000 tons of exported Afghan opium transits, "causing the highest addiction rate in the world."
"Facing a grave health epidemic, Iran should be given the chance to engage in common efforts to combat illicit trafficking," he said.
Iran had been invited to attend the G-8 meeting on Afghanistan, because anti-drug efforts in Afghanistan have been identified as a key area where the United States and Iran can work together - part of President Barack Obama's outreach effort.
But Italy withdrew the invitation after Iran failed to respond and after its bloody postelection crackdown on protesters, which has sparked international condemnation.
Associated Press reporter Alessandra Rizzo in Trieste and Jason Straziuso in Kabul contributed to this report.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Can Hezbollah Launch Long-Range Terror Attacks? by Aaron Mannes
In his new book Homeland Security, Assessing the First Five Years, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff argues:
Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives.
Chertoff’s statement is conventional wisdom among many terrorism experts. Shortly after 9/11 then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated:
Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team.
But Hezbollah has not carried out a successful out-of-area attack since the 1996 Khobar strike. Is Hezbollah still capable of carrying out long-range terror attacks?
In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2.
In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack.
Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered.
Terror International
There is no question that Hezbollah has been one of the most terrorist groups. The bombings and hostage crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s were textbooks cases of how to use terrorism to advance a cause. The 1983 Marine barracks bombing led to the withdrawal of an international peacekeeping force from Beirut – leaving Lebanon as prey for Syria and Iran. Six months earlier a Hezbollah car bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 including about half a dozen experienced CIA Middle East operatives – a blow from which the CIA has never recovered.
Hezbollah attacks were not limited to Lebanon. Besides the Buenos Aires attacks, Iran and Hezbollah worked hand in hand throughout the 1980s to carry out attacks in Europe to advance Iranian interests and eliminate opposition to the regime.
Victims of their Success
Hezbollah’s very effectiveness led to a heavy focus on their operations. Hezbollah’s international terror attacks declined after the 1996 Khobar tower bombing. One reason was that U.S. intelligence outed Iranian intelligence operatives worldwide. According to Jeff Stein’s always informative blog SpyTalk intelligence agencies worldwide have focused on Hezbollah and have scored a number of successes rolling up Hezbollah cells. In addition, in 2007 Ali Resa Asgari, an IRGC commander who had worked closely with Hezbollah defected to the west.
The Weakest Link
Hezbollah is known to have supporters everywhere there is a substantial Lebanese Shiite population (including West Africa, Latin America, Europe, Australia, and the United States.) Cells of Hezbollah operatives committing petty crimes to raise money for the organization have been discovered in Latin America but also in the United States. At the same time, Hezbollah remains an organization with tremendous capabilities. It has money, recruits, overseas supporters, and access to technology. So what Hezbollah capability has been degraded that hampers their international operations?
While Hezbollah has supporters worldwide, this support may have limits. Some of these groups, such as the network of drug traffickers recently arrested in Curacao are in it for the money and their support is limited to financing. This is NOT to downgrade the importance of cracking down on terrorist financing operations, merely to point out that such groups may have limited utility in carrying out terror attacks. Even if they have the motivation to carry out these attacks, they usually lack the skills. Terror attacks require high-level skills at constructing explosives, surveillance of targets, and operational security. In addition, suicide bombings require suicide bombers who need to be indoctrinated.
It would appear that Hezbollah is having some difficulties moving these key personnel without detection. Past attacks have relied heavily on support from Iranian Embassies. These Embassies appear to be carefully monitored by intelligence agencies. While there have been numerous reports of high staffing levels at Iranian Embassies throughout Latin America, the mere fact that these reports are public (to the extent that Iran’s Ambassador to Nicaragua had to publicly deny that the IRGC was operating out of his Embassy) indicates that the Iranians and Hezbollah are no longer able to operate in the shadows.
Implications
The downgrading of Hezbollah’s international reach (if it is true, as this post posits, and not the product of a strategic decision by Hezbollah) has been achieved at a high cost in intelligence resources. Unfortunately, Hezbollah continues to have the motivation to carryout international attacks, and will search for new avenues through which to launch these attacks. Intelligence agencies must remain vigilant. Further, Hezbollah and Iran certainly retain capabilities in Iraq and the Persian Gulf - which are particularly sensitive theaters.
However, Hezbollah is being pulled in a number of directions and the inability to carryout international attacks complicates their situation. In my work modeling Hezbollah at the University of Maryland there is substantial evidence that Hezbollah is sensitive to public opinion in Lebanon. One crucial example is not launching attacks against Israel before elections. It is unclear what Hezbollah will do now that the elections are over, but the fallout from the 2006 as well as Lebanon’s mini-civil war in which Hezbollah fought the government, have tarnished Hezbollah’s reputation. There are some reports that suggest Hezbollah is now facing recruitment difficulties. However, their core constituency and their Iranian sponsors are virulently anti-Israel and will insist that Hezbollah strike at Israel. Unwilling to open a direct front on Israel’s northern border and unable to strike at Israeli targets abroad, Hezbollah will find it difficult to satisfy its constituencies.
Now is the time for a political offensive that exacerbates these tensions and works to deligitimate Hezbollah.
Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives.
Chertoff’s statement is conventional wisdom among many terrorism experts. Shortly after 9/11 then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated:
Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team.
But Hezbollah has not carried out a successful out-of-area attack since the 1996 Khobar strike. Is Hezbollah still capable of carrying out long-range terror attacks?
In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2.
In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack.
Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered.
Terror International
There is no question that Hezbollah has been one of the most terrorist groups. The bombings and hostage crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s were textbooks cases of how to use terrorism to advance a cause. The 1983 Marine barracks bombing led to the withdrawal of an international peacekeeping force from Beirut – leaving Lebanon as prey for Syria and Iran. Six months earlier a Hezbollah car bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 including about half a dozen experienced CIA Middle East operatives – a blow from which the CIA has never recovered.
Hezbollah attacks were not limited to Lebanon. Besides the Buenos Aires attacks, Iran and Hezbollah worked hand in hand throughout the 1980s to carry out attacks in Europe to advance Iranian interests and eliminate opposition to the regime.
Victims of their Success
Hezbollah’s very effectiveness led to a heavy focus on their operations. Hezbollah’s international terror attacks declined after the 1996 Khobar tower bombing. One reason was that U.S. intelligence outed Iranian intelligence operatives worldwide. According to Jeff Stein’s always informative blog SpyTalk intelligence agencies worldwide have focused on Hezbollah and have scored a number of successes rolling up Hezbollah cells. In addition, in 2007 Ali Resa Asgari, an IRGC commander who had worked closely with Hezbollah defected to the west.
The Weakest Link
Hezbollah is known to have supporters everywhere there is a substantial Lebanese Shiite population (including West Africa, Latin America, Europe, Australia, and the United States.) Cells of Hezbollah operatives committing petty crimes to raise money for the organization have been discovered in Latin America but also in the United States. At the same time, Hezbollah remains an organization with tremendous capabilities. It has money, recruits, overseas supporters, and access to technology. So what Hezbollah capability has been degraded that hampers their international operations?
While Hezbollah has supporters worldwide, this support may have limits. Some of these groups, such as the network of drug traffickers recently arrested in Curacao are in it for the money and their support is limited to financing. This is NOT to downgrade the importance of cracking down on terrorist financing operations, merely to point out that such groups may have limited utility in carrying out terror attacks. Even if they have the motivation to carry out these attacks, they usually lack the skills. Terror attacks require high-level skills at constructing explosives, surveillance of targets, and operational security. In addition, suicide bombings require suicide bombers who need to be indoctrinated.
It would appear that Hezbollah is having some difficulties moving these key personnel without detection. Past attacks have relied heavily on support from Iranian Embassies. These Embassies appear to be carefully monitored by intelligence agencies. While there have been numerous reports of high staffing levels at Iranian Embassies throughout Latin America, the mere fact that these reports are public (to the extent that Iran’s Ambassador to Nicaragua had to publicly deny that the IRGC was operating out of his Embassy) indicates that the Iranians and Hezbollah are no longer able to operate in the shadows.
Implications
The downgrading of Hezbollah’s international reach (if it is true, as this post posits, and not the product of a strategic decision by Hezbollah) has been achieved at a high cost in intelligence resources. Unfortunately, Hezbollah continues to have the motivation to carryout international attacks, and will search for new avenues through which to launch these attacks. Intelligence agencies must remain vigilant. Further, Hezbollah and Iran certainly retain capabilities in Iraq and the Persian Gulf - which are particularly sensitive theaters.
However, Hezbollah is being pulled in a number of directions and the inability to carryout international attacks complicates their situation. In my work modeling Hezbollah at the University of Maryland there is substantial evidence that Hezbollah is sensitive to public opinion in Lebanon. One crucial example is not launching attacks against Israel before elections. It is unclear what Hezbollah will do now that the elections are over, but the fallout from the 2006 as well as Lebanon’s mini-civil war in which Hezbollah fought the government, have tarnished Hezbollah’s reputation. There are some reports that suggest Hezbollah is now facing recruitment difficulties. However, their core constituency and their Iranian sponsors are virulently anti-Israel and will insist that Hezbollah strike at Israel. Unwilling to open a direct front on Israel’s northern border and unable to strike at Israeli targets abroad, Hezbollah will find it difficult to satisfy its constituencies.
Now is the time for a political offensive that exacerbates these tensions and works to deligitimate Hezbollah.
Michael Jackson's Science Fictional Life by Annalee Newitz
With Michael Jackson dead, we're at the end of an era. But even though we have to hustle into the future without him, nobody will ever forget Jackson's strangely brilliant contributions to science fiction and fantasy.
It's no secret that Jackson always loved fantasy, and he turned to one of the masters of scifi/horror, John Landis, to direct his music video masterpiece Thriller. When the video hit MTV in the mid 1980s, audiences were shocked by how far Jackson went in this horror-parody. The special effects were genuinely scary, and Jackson wasn't afraid to make himself look like a real monster. Though the zombie werewolf boogie seemed like a weird idea at the time, it has become a staple of pop culture and a perennial favorite with the YouTube flash mob generation. Here you can see one of the YouTube memes the song spawned - a group of prisoners reenacted the dance sequence and made internet history.
Later, Jackson made a science fiction movie called Captain EO which aired exclusively at Disneyland. This allowed him to bring together his obsession with Disney-related fantasies and outer space. In fact, it was a perfect match. Disneyland has always been about science fiction, which is why there is an entire area of the park called Tomorrowland filled with rockets and outer space themed roller coasters.
Among the many things about Jackson that caught the public's imagination in the 1990s was the way he turned his body into a kind of science fiction story. He became an enhanced human, using plastic surgery and pharmaceuticals to change his face and seemingly his race as well. He became whiter than most white people, and his pale bandaged skin became his trademark.
Jackson was a post-human celebrity, and nowhere was this more obvious than in his video "Black or White" (also directed by Landis). Once again, Jackson turned to one of the greatest minds in science fiction to help with the video. He used the morphing software used by James Cameron for The Abyss and Terminator 2 to create a memorable and oft-copied scene where dozens of people's faces morph into each other, streaming through different racial identities, ages, and genders with an uncanny ease.
In the years since that time, Jackson went from being a science fictional figure to a scandal-plagued mystery. It seemed that his body was still morphing, and every time he made a public appearance people tried to figure out what new enhancements he'd gotten. He made the scifi-themed video "Scream" with his sister Janet, filled with weird anime characters and hints that Janet was as alien as Michael was.
Recently, he immigrated to Dubai, possibly the most science fictional city in the world right now. There he was apparently helping to design a theme park, which seems fitting for someone whose identity has always been so closely linked with fantasy.
No matter what you think about Michael Jackson the man, Michael Jackson the legend has transformed the way we think about identity. He injected pop culture with the future, and showed us what happens (good and bad) when you have the means to make fantasies real.
It's no secret that Jackson always loved fantasy, and he turned to one of the masters of scifi/horror, John Landis, to direct his music video masterpiece Thriller. When the video hit MTV in the mid 1980s, audiences were shocked by how far Jackson went in this horror-parody. The special effects were genuinely scary, and Jackson wasn't afraid to make himself look like a real monster. Though the zombie werewolf boogie seemed like a weird idea at the time, it has become a staple of pop culture and a perennial favorite with the YouTube flash mob generation. Here you can see one of the YouTube memes the song spawned - a group of prisoners reenacted the dance sequence and made internet history.
Later, Jackson made a science fiction movie called Captain EO which aired exclusively at Disneyland. This allowed him to bring together his obsession with Disney-related fantasies and outer space. In fact, it was a perfect match. Disneyland has always been about science fiction, which is why there is an entire area of the park called Tomorrowland filled with rockets and outer space themed roller coasters.
Among the many things about Jackson that caught the public's imagination in the 1990s was the way he turned his body into a kind of science fiction story. He became an enhanced human, using plastic surgery and pharmaceuticals to change his face and seemingly his race as well. He became whiter than most white people, and his pale bandaged skin became his trademark.
Jackson was a post-human celebrity, and nowhere was this more obvious than in his video "Black or White" (also directed by Landis). Once again, Jackson turned to one of the greatest minds in science fiction to help with the video. He used the morphing software used by James Cameron for The Abyss and Terminator 2 to create a memorable and oft-copied scene where dozens of people's faces morph into each other, streaming through different racial identities, ages, and genders with an uncanny ease.
In the years since that time, Jackson went from being a science fictional figure to a scandal-plagued mystery. It seemed that his body was still morphing, and every time he made a public appearance people tried to figure out what new enhancements he'd gotten. He made the scifi-themed video "Scream" with his sister Janet, filled with weird anime characters and hints that Janet was as alien as Michael was.
Recently, he immigrated to Dubai, possibly the most science fictional city in the world right now. There he was apparently helping to design a theme park, which seems fitting for someone whose identity has always been so closely linked with fantasy.
No matter what you think about Michael Jackson the man, Michael Jackson the legend has transformed the way we think about identity. He injected pop culture with the future, and showed us what happens (good and bad) when you have the means to make fantasies real.
ICANN Appoints Beckstrom to Look After Names and Numbers by C Shanti
A former director of the US National Cybersecurity Center has been appointed as chief executive officer and president of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
Rod Beckstrom's appontment came as the organization finished its 35th international meeting in South Australia.
The chairman of ICANN, Peter Dengate Thrush, described him as having the strong personal and technical background the organization needs. He said: "It's an extreme understatement to say we are enthused." That means, we think, they like him. "He's been a successful CEO of a global enterprise, done NGO work and volunteer work and is a bestselling author."
Beckstrom said: "The importance of the Internet as a free flowing source of information is being underscored right now by the events in Iran. It shows the power of human expression through a free and open net."
A bunch of luminaries endorsed him including Google CEO Eric Schmidt, Vint Cerf and Verisign's Mark McLaughlin.
Rod Beckstrom's appontment came as the organization finished its 35th international meeting in South Australia.
The chairman of ICANN, Peter Dengate Thrush, described him as having the strong personal and technical background the organization needs. He said: "It's an extreme understatement to say we are enthused." That means, we think, they like him. "He's been a successful CEO of a global enterprise, done NGO work and volunteer work and is a bestselling author."
Beckstrom said: "The importance of the Internet as a free flowing source of information is being underscored right now by the events in Iran. It shows the power of human expression through a free and open net."
A bunch of luminaries endorsed him including Google CEO Eric Schmidt, Vint Cerf and Verisign's Mark McLaughlin.
Oculis Labs Uses Eye Tracking to Blur and Obscure Screen For Massive Privacy (Physical Security) by Jason Chen
Oculis Labs has two products, Chameleon and PrivateEye, that protect your screen from over-the-shoulder peepers in two incredibly novel ways. The catch that makes this product unique is that it uses eye tracking, something we haven't heard much of yet.
The high end Chameleon product is targeted towards government offices that really need to protect secrets and are willing pay. It works by learning the unique way that a user's eye jumps around while reading, called their "gaze pattern", and calibrates the text on screen to match.
A low end, webcam based version called PrivateEye is just as interesting. It detects your eyes so that if someone comes in the room and you turn away to address them, the screen will automatically blur to obfuscate whatever you were working on. It also displays the face of the person looking over your shoulder in a little video thumbnail so that you can see who's coming in, and that person can see that YOU know he's in the room.
The high end Chameleon product is targeted towards government offices that really need to protect secrets and are willing pay. It works by learning the unique way that a user's eye jumps around while reading, called their "gaze pattern", and calibrates the text on screen to match.
A low end, webcam based version called PrivateEye is just as interesting. It detects your eyes so that if someone comes in the room and you turn away to address them, the screen will automatically blur to obfuscate whatever you were working on. It also displays the face of the person looking over your shoulder in a little video thumbnail so that you can see who's coming in, and that person can see that YOU know he's in the room.
Friday, June 26, 2009
Obama's Courage on the Israeli Settlements Issue and Sunni v. Shia realpolitik by Thomas Barnett
FRONT PAGE: "New Focus on Settlements: Obama Pressures Israelis Over West Bank, But Effort to Stop Growth Faces Hurdles," by Ethan Bronner, New York Times, 6 June 2009.
A description of how Obama has changed an essential past aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, one that's gone on for a very long time and yielded nothing but more violence.
Says a former leftist Israeli minister: "Obama may have found the soft underbelly of Israel, because ending settlements is a consensus issue in the world, among American Jewry and even among a majority of Israelis."
Another example of the mix of intelligence and practical courage that Obama brings to the job, not on everything by any stretch, but on a host of tough subjects.
WORLD NEWS: "Saudi Arabia's Renewed Political Clout Counters Iran," by Margaret Coker, Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2009.
The Saudis are feeling confident after buying themselves a nice defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Fine by me, because it beats the alternative.
The roll-up of Iranian regional influence begins in earnest.
A description of how Obama has changed an essential past aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, one that's gone on for a very long time and yielded nothing but more violence.
Says a former leftist Israeli minister: "Obama may have found the soft underbelly of Israel, because ending settlements is a consensus issue in the world, among American Jewry and even among a majority of Israelis."
Another example of the mix of intelligence and practical courage that Obama brings to the job, not on everything by any stretch, but on a host of tough subjects.
WORLD NEWS: "Saudi Arabia's Renewed Political Clout Counters Iran," by Margaret Coker, Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2009.
The Saudis are feeling confident after buying themselves a nice defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Fine by me, because it beats the alternative.
The roll-up of Iranian regional influence begins in earnest.
Why Ahmadinejad Is Better for the U.S. Than Moussavi by Thomas Barnett
"Do you want to speak with this tone? If that is your stance, then what is left to talk about?" So said a defiant Mahmoud Ahmadinejad today, in response to Barack Obama's calculated escalation of commentary (from "we respect..." to "we stand behind..." to "I strongly condemn..."). That escalation — and, in turn, the would-be Iranian president's call for Obama to "avoid interfering in Iran's affairs" — is a direct effect of the brave (if waning) uprising in the streets of Tehran and beyond. But the rhetoric reflects a more complex and surprising reality — that we are now at the beginning of what is likely to be a long and nasty internal struggle, one that will inevitably force the Iranian regime to publicly reveal its true colors. And that process alone is, strategically, quite positive for American interests during this widely recognized era of Shia revival throughout the Middle East. At this, the moment of our great weakness and vulnerability — both at home and in the region — we have been incredibly blessed by this spontaneous discrediting of the mullahs' theocratic rule.
But make no mistake: Our diplomatic leverage has everything to do with the dynamics of unrest in Iran, not its de facto leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi. If Obama seems prepared for the long haul, it is because he recognizes this nuance (Ahmadinejad, in comparing him to Bush, seemed to not realize that the times were a-changin'). "This is not about the United States and the West," Obama said at his Tuesday press conference. "This is about the people of Iran, and the future that they — and only they — will choose." America's one true strategic asset in this equation, then, is the widespread desire of the Iranian people for improved relations with the United States. Remember, this is the one country in the region where it's the ruling regime that hates America and the public that admires it. Everywhere else, it's the other way around — and only because we pay through the nose.
But, as I mentioned last week, the Red State-Blue State divide in Iran runs close and deep. Ahmadinejad is truly loved in the countryside because he promises to hold all the scary and libertine forces of globalization at bay. And while the demographics — roughly 70 percent of Iran is under the age of 30 — would seem to lean in favor of the opposition's rise, the opposition (whose stunning courage in the face of violence should not be lost on anyone) remains relatively unorganized, for two reasons:
1. The Revolutionary Guard Is Taking Control
The thugs you see beating up Tehran's educated youth and urban professionals — and, today, allegedly detaining 70 professors for meeting with Moussavi — are members of an expanding elite force of military and security operatives known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. They are running scared, but they are, like their never-to-be-underestimated leader Ahmadinejad, running straight ahead into their fears as the putch continues.
The danger to the Guards in this case, as The Economist argued this week, "is that Iran's pure Islamic identity will be diluted by a wave of Western materialism, encouraged by a corrupt elite whose revolutionary ardor has faded." Again, it's American-style emancipation (aka globalization) knocking at the door, and while a Moussavi-led candidacy may have exposed the Guard's greatest fears (His wife is campaigning with her progressive fashion sense threatening to sue Ahmadinejad for slander!), the Moussavi-backed protests have exposed the Guard's great, if misogynist, power (it was no accident that one of the first opposition figures targeted for arrest was former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's outspoken daughter, and then, of course, there's Neda).
You need look no further than at the dissident clerics marching with protestors for a sure sign of the mullahs' disintegrating grip. But while the end of clerical rule seems at hand (bye-bye, Supreme Leader; hello, pliant bobblehead!), the internally brutal and externally aggressive rule of the Revolutionary Guard (and, by proxy, Ahmadinejad) is just going into overdrive.
2. Moussavi Is a Mistaken Revolutionary
In another case of today's uptick in rhetoric, Moussavi offered some bite on his Web site: "I will not back down," "it is a must for us to neutralise this evil conspiracy," and "I am prepared to prove that those behind the rigging are responsible for the bloodshed."
But the harsh truth remains: Moussavi was a candidate mischosen by history — a figure not unlike Howard Dean, who in 2004 offered a faint preview of what Obama largely fulfilled four years later. In the televised debates during the long Iranian campaign, the politically astute Ahmadinejad totally kicked the former prime minister's ass. Unfortunately, the truly potential game-changing candidate, current Tehran mayor Muhammed Qalibef, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guard but widely perceived as more the technocratic problem-solver, was talked out of running by the powers-that-be. If Qalibef had been the recipient of the opposition's (still arguably misplaced) fervor, the Guards would have likely acquiesced. And who knows where things could have ended up then?
But, alas, for now the opposition lacks any great unifying figure. This is an upscale Solidarnosc in the making, but it lacks its Lech Walesa (or, perhaps, more befitting of its class origins, a Vaclav Havel). Still, despite the diminishing size of protests in Tehran after the Guard's crackdown (Mehdi Karroubi cancelled his today, and it remained unclear whether Moussavi's encouragement to gather at Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's shrine had been followed), word abounds that nationwide strikes are the next step for the opposition. That may force the Revolutionary Guards to institute martial law, and we know how that worked out for General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish communist regime.
Obama, for his part (where has Hillary Clinton been?), might consider working quietly and behind the scenes (he does need Tehran's forbearance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the nuclear labs, after all) to encourage such a pathway for a nation-wide opposition. Although Obama may be enjoying some Reagan-esque good timing here, but Ahmadinejad could get caught in some Nixon-esque ambition, and there would be nothing better than protests beyond even the Guard's control to expose to the world the naked ambitions of Iran's "re-elected" president.
Those ambitions, since 2004, have been to openly and aggressively expand the powers of the heretofore weak Iranian presidency. Ahmadinejad's goal all along has been to create a non-clerical ruling power base, and this mishandled "landslide" pulls back the curtains on his quest for an "imperial presidency" reminiscent of Richard Nixon's in that it answers to no opposition — either at home or abroad. Like Nixon, Ahmadinejad is now forced to fight a difficult two-front war: against the furor of both his people and the West. And that immense challenge just may finally render him — believe it or not — our preferred negotiating partner in any U.S.-Iranian rapprochement.
Foreign policy realists (myelf included) have long maintained that, if "only Nixon can go to China," then logically only a hardliner like Ahmadinejad can come to America. You have to understand that, if Moussavi had been slimly elected, the knives would have come out immediately regarding any potential opening with Obama, who is proving — again, in Reagan-esque fashion — to be an ideological nightmare for the regime. As one conservative told Time magazine's Joe Klein:
Look, for the past 30 years, the Supreme Leader — first Khomeini, now Khamenei — has blamed all our problems on the Great Satan. If you take away the Great Satan and we still have problems, how does he explain it?
How indeed.
But Ahmadinejad, with his record — again, in Nixon-esque fashion — for doggedly hating the regime's avowed enemies (Israel and America), could likewise employ a Nixonian reversal under the right conditions. Just as Beijing's paranoia with the Soviets in the early 1970s left China isolated and internally conflicted, Iran faces a conflict with Israel that it cannot win, even as it might temporarily rally the public around the flag. Moreover, the regime's emerging economic sponsor and largest importer of its oil and gas — China, again — has zero interest in seeing its future supplies put at danger by war.
What would those conditions entail? At best, we might talk Iran into curtailing its nuclear program to a point just shy of open weaponization, in exchange for an ending of economic sanctions and the normalization of ties with the United States. That might not be enough to stave off Israeli strikes, but Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard must realize how much this display of crippling internal weakness has empowered the region's anti-Iran Sunni coalition (led by Saudi Arabia), so beggars can't be choosers.
And, yes, that diplomatic scenario could be politically galling for the Obama administration. And, yes, we're nowhere near the point where Ahmadinejad and the Guards are likely to deal. But we're a helluva lot closer than we were just a dozen days ago. So the longer this unrest continues, the better Obama's poker hand becomes.
But make no mistake: Our diplomatic leverage has everything to do with the dynamics of unrest in Iran, not its de facto leader, Mir Hussein Moussavi. If Obama seems prepared for the long haul, it is because he recognizes this nuance (Ahmadinejad, in comparing him to Bush, seemed to not realize that the times were a-changin'). "This is not about the United States and the West," Obama said at his Tuesday press conference. "This is about the people of Iran, and the future that they — and only they — will choose." America's one true strategic asset in this equation, then, is the widespread desire of the Iranian people for improved relations with the United States. Remember, this is the one country in the region where it's the ruling regime that hates America and the public that admires it. Everywhere else, it's the other way around — and only because we pay through the nose.
But, as I mentioned last week, the Red State-Blue State divide in Iran runs close and deep. Ahmadinejad is truly loved in the countryside because he promises to hold all the scary and libertine forces of globalization at bay. And while the demographics — roughly 70 percent of Iran is under the age of 30 — would seem to lean in favor of the opposition's rise, the opposition (whose stunning courage in the face of violence should not be lost on anyone) remains relatively unorganized, for two reasons:
1. The Revolutionary Guard Is Taking Control
The thugs you see beating up Tehran's educated youth and urban professionals — and, today, allegedly detaining 70 professors for meeting with Moussavi — are members of an expanding elite force of military and security operatives known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. They are running scared, but they are, like their never-to-be-underestimated leader Ahmadinejad, running straight ahead into their fears as the putch continues.
The danger to the Guards in this case, as The Economist argued this week, "is that Iran's pure Islamic identity will be diluted by a wave of Western materialism, encouraged by a corrupt elite whose revolutionary ardor has faded." Again, it's American-style emancipation (aka globalization) knocking at the door, and while a Moussavi-led candidacy may have exposed the Guard's greatest fears (His wife is campaigning with her progressive fashion sense threatening to sue Ahmadinejad for slander!), the Moussavi-backed protests have exposed the Guard's great, if misogynist, power (it was no accident that one of the first opposition figures targeted for arrest was former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's outspoken daughter, and then, of course, there's Neda).
You need look no further than at the dissident clerics marching with protestors for a sure sign of the mullahs' disintegrating grip. But while the end of clerical rule seems at hand (bye-bye, Supreme Leader; hello, pliant bobblehead!), the internally brutal and externally aggressive rule of the Revolutionary Guard (and, by proxy, Ahmadinejad) is just going into overdrive.
2. Moussavi Is a Mistaken Revolutionary
In another case of today's uptick in rhetoric, Moussavi offered some bite on his Web site: "I will not back down," "it is a must for us to neutralise this evil conspiracy," and "I am prepared to prove that those behind the rigging are responsible for the bloodshed."
But the harsh truth remains: Moussavi was a candidate mischosen by history — a figure not unlike Howard Dean, who in 2004 offered a faint preview of what Obama largely fulfilled four years later. In the televised debates during the long Iranian campaign, the politically astute Ahmadinejad totally kicked the former prime minister's ass. Unfortunately, the truly potential game-changing candidate, current Tehran mayor Muhammed Qalibef, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guard but widely perceived as more the technocratic problem-solver, was talked out of running by the powers-that-be. If Qalibef had been the recipient of the opposition's (still arguably misplaced) fervor, the Guards would have likely acquiesced. And who knows where things could have ended up then?
But, alas, for now the opposition lacks any great unifying figure. This is an upscale Solidarnosc in the making, but it lacks its Lech Walesa (or, perhaps, more befitting of its class origins, a Vaclav Havel). Still, despite the diminishing size of protests in Tehran after the Guard's crackdown (Mehdi Karroubi cancelled his today, and it remained unclear whether Moussavi's encouragement to gather at Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's shrine had been followed), word abounds that nationwide strikes are the next step for the opposition. That may force the Revolutionary Guards to institute martial law, and we know how that worked out for General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish communist regime.
Obama, for his part (where has Hillary Clinton been?), might consider working quietly and behind the scenes (he does need Tehran's forbearance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the nuclear labs, after all) to encourage such a pathway for a nation-wide opposition. Although Obama may be enjoying some Reagan-esque good timing here, but Ahmadinejad could get caught in some Nixon-esque ambition, and there would be nothing better than protests beyond even the Guard's control to expose to the world the naked ambitions of Iran's "re-elected" president.
Those ambitions, since 2004, have been to openly and aggressively expand the powers of the heretofore weak Iranian presidency. Ahmadinejad's goal all along has been to create a non-clerical ruling power base, and this mishandled "landslide" pulls back the curtains on his quest for an "imperial presidency" reminiscent of Richard Nixon's in that it answers to no opposition — either at home or abroad. Like Nixon, Ahmadinejad is now forced to fight a difficult two-front war: against the furor of both his people and the West. And that immense challenge just may finally render him — believe it or not — our preferred negotiating partner in any U.S.-Iranian rapprochement.
Foreign policy realists (myelf included) have long maintained that, if "only Nixon can go to China," then logically only a hardliner like Ahmadinejad can come to America. You have to understand that, if Moussavi had been slimly elected, the knives would have come out immediately regarding any potential opening with Obama, who is proving — again, in Reagan-esque fashion — to be an ideological nightmare for the regime. As one conservative told Time magazine's Joe Klein:
Look, for the past 30 years, the Supreme Leader — first Khomeini, now Khamenei — has blamed all our problems on the Great Satan. If you take away the Great Satan and we still have problems, how does he explain it?
How indeed.
But Ahmadinejad, with his record — again, in Nixon-esque fashion — for doggedly hating the regime's avowed enemies (Israel and America), could likewise employ a Nixonian reversal under the right conditions. Just as Beijing's paranoia with the Soviets in the early 1970s left China isolated and internally conflicted, Iran faces a conflict with Israel that it cannot win, even as it might temporarily rally the public around the flag. Moreover, the regime's emerging economic sponsor and largest importer of its oil and gas — China, again — has zero interest in seeing its future supplies put at danger by war.
What would those conditions entail? At best, we might talk Iran into curtailing its nuclear program to a point just shy of open weaponization, in exchange for an ending of economic sanctions and the normalization of ties with the United States. That might not be enough to stave off Israeli strikes, but Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard must realize how much this display of crippling internal weakness has empowered the region's anti-Iran Sunni coalition (led by Saudi Arabia), so beggars can't be choosers.
And, yes, that diplomatic scenario could be politically galling for the Obama administration. And, yes, we're nowhere near the point where Ahmadinejad and the Guards are likely to deal. But we're a helluva lot closer than we were just a dozen days ago. So the longer this unrest continues, the better Obama's poker hand becomes.
Inaccurate and unsubstantiated report from State of Play VI
The conference began with a seemingly angry Raph Koster making the argument that virtual worlds would not move forward unless they became more like the web. He seemed to discount the idea of immersion and certainly his latest creation metaplace does not appear to be an overly immersive place. Koster’s argument does agree with a large trend -- increasingly digital life is moving into the browser. Google’s Chrome is the most advanced of the browser gateways to the coming cloud and building a world that takes advantage of the rise of the browser seems like a sensible bet. Similarly, creating a virtual world language that enables the creation of browser-based content is an inherently ‘smart’ thing to do. However, there is a potential logic trap for Koster’s world view, just because the web has exploded using the mechanics espoused by Koster of pages linking together this doesn’t mean this will apply to multiple virtual worlds linking together. In fact, it may mean the opposite.
Koster demanded to know what important action Virtual Worlds had accomplished – asking the question in juxtaposition to the claim that is younger brother had just managed to shut down ‘Iranian government’ websites. This struck me as odd then and more so now. It is true that groups based around the Internet meme 'Anonymous' are attempting to assist Iranian protesters and also to organize DDOS attacks against Iranian government sites - but this could have just as easily been organized from within Second Life -- would that suddenly make virtual worlds relevant? The truth is cyber-attacks or indeed any variant of information warfare is not platform specific.
I can’t help but think that there is a background theme of dislike for Second Life, which stole the thunder from the virtual world traditionalists and hammered virtual worlds into mainstream consciousness. A number of at least noteworthy events have occurred in Second Life, and these were ignored in this debate.
When Governments come out to play
Next up for me at least was a panel relating to government interaction in virtual worlds. This was pretty much a re-hash of things already known, already tried and seemed empty of inspiration. Interestingly, when asked (by Mike Theis) the panel did not think government services would migrate wholesale into virtual worlds. This some touchingly naive. In California DMV services are effectively moving online. The government largesse, which paid for workers at the DMV is declining by the minute in California – but DMV services are still required. It doesn’t seem to be much of a leap of faith to imagine the whole thing going online with some reserved human interaction that replicates some airline check-in functions in function and form (there to serve the baffled or to check identities).
Lunch was with Dr. Rita Bush from IARPA who was after ideas for future projects in 3 areas:
- Effect of Virtual Worlds on the Real World
- Virtual Worlds as collaborative environments
- Time Machine:
o Forensic rewind for events
o Predictive capability/ Scenario planning tool
There was a lot of discussion about having a baseline census on use of virtual worlds. Seems important but I can’t say it intrigued me. Edward Castronova was in the room who has of course previously speculated on the effect of virtual worlds on the real world in his ‘exodus’ book. This topic is an interesting one. I’ve heard Philip Rosedale play with this idea during lectures on Second Life - and particularly at the Long Now Foundation. He conflated the Burning Man experience with Second Life and suggested by being involved in either you are never the same again having experienced ‘super-positioning’ ….maybe. Nevertheless intriguing topic and worth it.
Virtual Worlds as Time Machines
The Time Machine idea is a good one and the ability to do this is probably nearer than anyone thinks. Microsoft Labs has mashed together PhotoSynth with their Virtual Earth project. Having seen Photosynth last year I was intrigued by its utility -- there are standalone versions of this. It is remarkably effective and if they move the open version to pulling pictures off the web, which update in real-time – then the time machine will exist or at least will be on the way.
The predictive aspect of this is arguably being worked on under the title of what Steve Steinberg described as ‘Crowd Dynamic’. His blog on the subject is here . This is by far the best treatment of the subject and expertly synthesizes a lot of the thinking in this realm. It would seem that Paul Torrens has moved towards developing at least the first half of a predictive world.
Rita ended with a request for imagination.
Magic Circle
Next up was probably the most interesting part of the conference. A panel entitled breaking the magic circle. At first I was confused as in the UK this term is used to describe the largest law firms. However, I re-calibrated and enjoyed the panel. The theme of the panel seemed to be that there is a different way of motivating human behavior by using game-based constructs. Instead of being rewarded in US Dollars users of the systems could be motivated by virtual badges or similar online merit systems. It doesn’t take much of a leap to consider that these rewards could then be traded and developed for 'Real Money' much in the same way all virtual currencies are traded.
In a world looking for a new economic theory I’m not sure the panel was aware of how they were tapping into this debate. Last month Wired Magazine had a big piece on New Socialism - basically people acting for the common good in a digital realm. I struggled to believe this theory but I can imagine people taking positive action in the public realm in order to win another virtual badge. ARG’s are probably one of the more interesting potential developments. Nobody has developed the secret sauce to make an ARG where people pay to play. So far large-scale ARG's have all been marketing attempts from 42 Entertainment et al.
The most energetic presenter who could be taping a theme who’s time has come was Dennis Crowley who founded FourSquare – a relatively low-tech ARG based on cities. By combining ideas taken from gaming with the big shift to the mobile handset computing coupled to GPS he may be at the right place in the right time. Extrapolating out from the 'Nike+ ipod' idea foursquare shows how increasing sophistication of hand-held devices linked to online communities are the necessary ingredients for development in this space. The better mobile computing becomes the more sophisticated ARG's will be able to be.
The final panel of the day was on the Economics of Virtual Worlds. It was kicked off by Julian Dibbell who went over his work on IGE. The conversation meandered around and nothing much of interest was discussed. Slightly off-topic Castronova got into a debate about governance and privacy, essentially saying that if he wanted to play a game as an elf he should be allowed to do so unmolested. This seemed to be in direct counter-point to the opening comments made by Koster on immersion –- it would seem people still like to be immersed. Castronova also said he felt there was a new category of user who went around sampling different virtual worlds all the time without sticking in one. This sounded more like a virtual world researcher than a new category of user.
Andrew Schnedier from Live Gamer a RMT trading company gave a decent presentation and a live demo of currency transfers in EverQuest. I asked him after the panel what level of organized crime activity he had noted in his service. He said none. Either this is true or they aren’t looking for it. Considering back in 2007 that a high number of premium account Linden Dollars were being acquired fraudulently in a variety of ways Schneider’s comment seems out of place. Virtual currency fraud and money laundering are seemingly inevitable.
Lawyering
Saturday kicked off with a panel on virtual world governance governance chaired by Ren Reynolds. Nothing much to note other than the fact that lawyers are likely to continue to make money from the shift of content onto a variety of digital platforms – each new iteration of a platform spawns legal questions about content and the need for various EU working groups to examine the subject and write a report, which will be debated in the legislative chambers of Europe on Friday afternoon before recess.
Security and Surveillance
The panel began with my quick note on how information war may develop. If virtual worlds are used to cut through the cloud of data then information war could transfer into virtual worlds. This then may look like current griefing campaigns - which may after all prove to be important (see Burcu S. Bakioglu PhD work on Griefers).
This was followed by Bart Simon who expertly asked whether, virtual worlds are becoming impossible to monitor or expressions of perfect surveillance – the idea of dataveillance was suggested, defined as sustained and systemic surveillance attention. He also clearly established his academic credentials by referring to Bentham the Panopticon and Foucoult in almost the same sentence. Chuck Cohen then jumped in by offering a series of examples that seemed to suggest virtual worlds were impossible to monitor. Michael Schrage added his spin and suggested that the title of the conference being plateau was nonsense given the tendency towards rapid improvisation in technology. He also introduced the phrase – malevolent mashups – by way of explaining how the convergence of these systems can be exploited in a variety of ways by a variety of bad-guys. Micheal Theis ended the formal piece of the presentation with a rundown of surveillance that is currently possible in virtual worlds and outlined his three design items for protection: trustworthiness, right-sizing permissions and effective monitoring capability. The Q and A through up some interesting ideas about the nature of torture – Mike Schrage liked the idea of connecting body parts to virtual worlds – torturing someones virtual identity however, seemed like a distinct possibility. There was also a question asked about whether it was legal to smoke virtual pot in your own virtual residence....there is a profound question lurking in there somewhere.
Overall impressions
One of the main items I took away from the conference was a discussion with Chuck Cohen about Entropia Universe and how Banking licenses could be easily manipulated in this virtual space to launder money and otherwise conduct illegal activity. Plus of course the nagging doubt about Koster and browser based worlds. While he is correct that the browser is about to dominate our interaction with cloud-computing it remains to be seen whether he is correct about virtual worlds having to have the same mechanics as the web in order to succeed.
Koster demanded to know what important action Virtual Worlds had accomplished – asking the question in juxtaposition to the claim that is younger brother had just managed to shut down ‘Iranian government’ websites. This struck me as odd then and more so now. It is true that groups based around the Internet meme 'Anonymous' are attempting to assist Iranian protesters and also to organize DDOS attacks against Iranian government sites - but this could have just as easily been organized from within Second Life -- would that suddenly make virtual worlds relevant? The truth is cyber-attacks or indeed any variant of information warfare is not platform specific.
I can’t help but think that there is a background theme of dislike for Second Life, which stole the thunder from the virtual world traditionalists and hammered virtual worlds into mainstream consciousness. A number of at least noteworthy events have occurred in Second Life, and these were ignored in this debate.
When Governments come out to play
Next up for me at least was a panel relating to government interaction in virtual worlds. This was pretty much a re-hash of things already known, already tried and seemed empty of inspiration. Interestingly, when asked (by Mike Theis) the panel did not think government services would migrate wholesale into virtual worlds. This some touchingly naive. In California DMV services are effectively moving online. The government largesse, which paid for workers at the DMV is declining by the minute in California – but DMV services are still required. It doesn’t seem to be much of a leap of faith to imagine the whole thing going online with some reserved human interaction that replicates some airline check-in functions in function and form (there to serve the baffled or to check identities).
Lunch was with Dr. Rita Bush from IARPA who was after ideas for future projects in 3 areas:
- Effect of Virtual Worlds on the Real World
- Virtual Worlds as collaborative environments
- Time Machine:
o Forensic rewind for events
o Predictive capability/ Scenario planning tool
There was a lot of discussion about having a baseline census on use of virtual worlds. Seems important but I can’t say it intrigued me. Edward Castronova was in the room who has of course previously speculated on the effect of virtual worlds on the real world in his ‘exodus’ book. This topic is an interesting one. I’ve heard Philip Rosedale play with this idea during lectures on Second Life - and particularly at the Long Now Foundation. He conflated the Burning Man experience with Second Life and suggested by being involved in either you are never the same again having experienced ‘super-positioning’ ….maybe. Nevertheless intriguing topic and worth it.
Virtual Worlds as Time Machines
The Time Machine idea is a good one and the ability to do this is probably nearer than anyone thinks. Microsoft Labs has mashed together PhotoSynth with their Virtual Earth project. Having seen Photosynth last year I was intrigued by its utility -- there are standalone versions of this. It is remarkably effective and if they move the open version to pulling pictures off the web, which update in real-time – then the time machine will exist or at least will be on the way.
The predictive aspect of this is arguably being worked on under the title of what Steve Steinberg described as ‘Crowd Dynamic’. His blog on the subject is here . This is by far the best treatment of the subject and expertly synthesizes a lot of the thinking in this realm. It would seem that Paul Torrens has moved towards developing at least the first half of a predictive world.
Rita ended with a request for imagination.
Magic Circle
Next up was probably the most interesting part of the conference. A panel entitled breaking the magic circle. At first I was confused as in the UK this term is used to describe the largest law firms. However, I re-calibrated and enjoyed the panel. The theme of the panel seemed to be that there is a different way of motivating human behavior by using game-based constructs. Instead of being rewarded in US Dollars users of the systems could be motivated by virtual badges or similar online merit systems. It doesn’t take much of a leap to consider that these rewards could then be traded and developed for 'Real Money' much in the same way all virtual currencies are traded.
In a world looking for a new economic theory I’m not sure the panel was aware of how they were tapping into this debate. Last month Wired Magazine had a big piece on New Socialism - basically people acting for the common good in a digital realm. I struggled to believe this theory but I can imagine people taking positive action in the public realm in order to win another virtual badge. ARG’s are probably one of the more interesting potential developments. Nobody has developed the secret sauce to make an ARG where people pay to play. So far large-scale ARG's have all been marketing attempts from 42 Entertainment et al.
The most energetic presenter who could be taping a theme who’s time has come was Dennis Crowley who founded FourSquare – a relatively low-tech ARG based on cities. By combining ideas taken from gaming with the big shift to the mobile handset computing coupled to GPS he may be at the right place in the right time. Extrapolating out from the 'Nike+ ipod' idea foursquare shows how increasing sophistication of hand-held devices linked to online communities are the necessary ingredients for development in this space. The better mobile computing becomes the more sophisticated ARG's will be able to be.
The final panel of the day was on the Economics of Virtual Worlds. It was kicked off by Julian Dibbell who went over his work on IGE. The conversation meandered around and nothing much of interest was discussed. Slightly off-topic Castronova got into a debate about governance and privacy, essentially saying that if he wanted to play a game as an elf he should be allowed to do so unmolested. This seemed to be in direct counter-point to the opening comments made by Koster on immersion –- it would seem people still like to be immersed. Castronova also said he felt there was a new category of user who went around sampling different virtual worlds all the time without sticking in one. This sounded more like a virtual world researcher than a new category of user.
Andrew Schnedier from Live Gamer a RMT trading company gave a decent presentation and a live demo of currency transfers in EverQuest. I asked him after the panel what level of organized crime activity he had noted in his service. He said none. Either this is true or they aren’t looking for it. Considering back in 2007 that a high number of premium account Linden Dollars were being acquired fraudulently in a variety of ways Schneider’s comment seems out of place. Virtual currency fraud and money laundering are seemingly inevitable.
Lawyering
Saturday kicked off with a panel on virtual world governance governance chaired by Ren Reynolds. Nothing much to note other than the fact that lawyers are likely to continue to make money from the shift of content onto a variety of digital platforms – each new iteration of a platform spawns legal questions about content and the need for various EU working groups to examine the subject and write a report, which will be debated in the legislative chambers of Europe on Friday afternoon before recess.
Security and Surveillance
The panel began with my quick note on how information war may develop. If virtual worlds are used to cut through the cloud of data then information war could transfer into virtual worlds. This then may look like current griefing campaigns - which may after all prove to be important (see Burcu S. Bakioglu PhD work on Griefers).
This was followed by Bart Simon who expertly asked whether, virtual worlds are becoming impossible to monitor or expressions of perfect surveillance – the idea of dataveillance was suggested, defined as sustained and systemic surveillance attention. He also clearly established his academic credentials by referring to Bentham the Panopticon and Foucoult in almost the same sentence. Chuck Cohen then jumped in by offering a series of examples that seemed to suggest virtual worlds were impossible to monitor. Michael Schrage added his spin and suggested that the title of the conference being plateau was nonsense given the tendency towards rapid improvisation in technology. He also introduced the phrase – malevolent mashups – by way of explaining how the convergence of these systems can be exploited in a variety of ways by a variety of bad-guys. Micheal Theis ended the formal piece of the presentation with a rundown of surveillance that is currently possible in virtual worlds and outlined his three design items for protection: trustworthiness, right-sizing permissions and effective monitoring capability. The Q and A through up some interesting ideas about the nature of torture – Mike Schrage liked the idea of connecting body parts to virtual worlds – torturing someones virtual identity however, seemed like a distinct possibility. There was also a question asked about whether it was legal to smoke virtual pot in your own virtual residence....there is a profound question lurking in there somewhere.
Overall impressions
One of the main items I took away from the conference was a discussion with Chuck Cohen about Entropia Universe and how Banking licenses could be easily manipulated in this virtual space to launder money and otherwise conduct illegal activity. Plus of course the nagging doubt about Koster and browser based worlds. While he is correct that the browser is about to dominate our interaction with cloud-computing it remains to be seen whether he is correct about virtual worlds having to have the same mechanics as the web in order to succeed.
Iran: Has Political Fundamentalism been Defeated? by Mshari Al-Zaydi
Are the latest developments in Iran evidence that political Islam is weakening?
This is the question that comes to mind after having read some published articles in support of this conclusion, such as the article written by the well-known Kuwaiti journalist Abdul Latif al Duaij in the Kuwaiti Al Qabas newspaper on June 21 entitled, ‘Has the Civil Awakening Begun?’
In Lebanon, parliamentary elections were held recently and the opposition, led by the Khomeinist fundamentalist party, suffered an overwhelming defeat to the March 14 Alliance, which presents itself (in its own words) as a guardian of the concept of the state and an enemy to fundamentalist radicalism represented by Hezbollah as well as some Christian allies.
In Kuwait, after the dissolving of parliament in March 2009 as a result of the escalating attacks launched by Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood MPs against the government, another round of parliamentary elections was held. Four women were voted to parliament for the first time much to the disappointment of fundamentalist currents that campaigned against women’s political rights. Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood currents suffered heavy losses in those elections.
In Iraq, provincial elections were held and fundamentalist parties lost to other currents, some of which had simply changed their names such as the party that Nouri al Maliki belongs to (but that’s another story altogether!) In Karbala, an independent candidate, who does not belong to any fundamentalist party, managed to win and defy all the odds.
Are these examples enough to confirm that fundamentalist parties are losing ground?
It is important to state that each case has its own individual circumstances. What is happening in Iran is complicated. What we are seeing is the bigger picture, the details of which are not yet clear. These details are related to the social, political, religious, psychological and economic dimensions in Iran, all against a backdrop of cultural individuality and the pride of civilization embedded in the Iranian consciousness. Iran’s current predicament is a far cry from what happened in the battle between the March 14 Alliance and March 8 Coalition in Lebanon where there is manifold sectarian fanaticism as well as the sudden frostiness of the Syrian ally
Moreover, in Lebanon the vigilance of Sunni fanaticism is offset by its Shia counterpart, and the close proximity of Israel and the historic European role in Mount Lebanon are strongly felt.
We could say the same about Kuwait, where battles are being fought between those trapped behind the wall and those on the other side of it, those who have increased in wealth and status and those who have not based on what they believe in, and where Salafist excessiveness faces Shia extremism and where other developments are taking place outside of the parliament in other institutions.
With regards to Iraq, the issue is much more complex as Maliki’s iron fist has begun to tighten, conflict between coalition leaders has begun to surface, and elimination of old friends and the battle for power can now be seen as the political structure of Iraq has started to take shape. Everybody wants to remain within this developing structure so as not to be expelled from the circle of power and influence. The coalition was formed on this basis and this is what will break it up. This is what created the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) Councils and pushed them to fight the Islamist party. But this is also another issue altogether.
Let us go back to what’s happening in Iran; we all know that Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and Mohsen Rezaee are legitimate products of the Khomeini womb. They have never spoken out against the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was blessed by the author of the ‘Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist,’ Ayatollah Ali Khomeini.
So how can anyone say that Mousavi represents a revolution against the Islamic Revolution? What are the features of this counter-revolution on the conceptual level? Does Mousavi use a language that is based on an ideology that differs to Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, not to mention of course Mehdi Karroubi or former AGIR Chief Commander Mohsen Rezaee? In fact, Mousavi repeatedly states that he is a staunch supporter of Khomeini legitimacy. Perhaps this is the way to understand the latest developments in Iran through the characters of the protest leaders, most prominently Mousavi, or perhaps not. The Iranian masses, the men, the women and the youth, are driven by much stronger motives than those of Mousavi and his associates. Mousavi is merely a symbol around which the masses can unite.
Generally speaking, in Iran or any other country, at present or at any other time, some political demands form over time.
It is difficult to say that we are facing a new phase of ideology and political climate on the Arab and Islamic streets based on these facts. It would be easier and safer to conclude that we are encountering a new “situation” and surprises from the Arab and Islamic masses. Who would’ve believed that Kuwaiti voters who had once elected strict, fundamentalist, isolated MPs would turn on them in a matter of months and for the first time elect far more moderate MPs, four of whom are women, as well as two liberals. Did this change in consciousness take place within a matter of months?
Fundamentalist currents and political Islamist groups still enjoy a vast majority amongst Arab and Muslim masses. But the public protests staged against them at times are merely protests against particular policies adopted by those parties or movements, or in the case of the Iranian regime, against its policies rather than its “base”. It is likely that these protests stemmed from the fact that the Iranian public has had enough of increasing tensions and confrontations, and their demand for better living conditions. For example, if the contention was between an Islamist who had conflicting policies and another Islamist with agreeable policies and a third who is a not a fundamentalist, but all three shared the same philosophy and ideological beliefs, the winner, in my opinion, would be the Islamist with agreeable policies.
Professor of Political Sciences at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran, Dr. Qayos Sayyid Imami’s analysis supports this idea. In an interview with the New York Times he spoke about the nature of the current political conflict in Iran and said, “One party seeks gradual development of democratic institutions and a more democratic interpretation of Islamic institutions, whereas the other party (Ahmadinejad’s supporters and Khamenei) seek a populist and totalitarian interpretation of Islam,” as quoted by Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.
The profound awareness of the importance of the concept of the civil state and the neutralization of religious slogans in political disputes is a kind of awareness that requires more experience and ongoing education in raising societies. But this has never happened in our Arab and Islamic world for many complicated reasons. So how can some of us assume that such a highly-aware movement exists when the awareness is yet to be formed?
Societies and the vigour of history have taught us that our social development goes through phases of continuous creation. Some elements and intertwined interests might combine to spark a Darwinist consciousness in a way that would make everybody’s jaws drop at the beauty of the surprise and the absolute capability of human beings to evolve.
The Iranian masses, especially the youth, has demonstrated a level of bravery and determination that has embarrassed the political leaders of Iran. This is true, and we are witnessing a spectacular moment in the history of our region. However, we must not be too optimistic or jump to conclusions.
In my own view, all the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and most importantly Iran, indicate that there are less conflicting policies adopted by fundamentalist groups and states but this is not the case with their bases, ideologies and concepts. The story has only just begun with respect to this level of action.
This is the question that comes to mind after having read some published articles in support of this conclusion, such as the article written by the well-known Kuwaiti journalist Abdul Latif al Duaij in the Kuwaiti Al Qabas newspaper on June 21 entitled, ‘Has the Civil Awakening Begun?’
In Lebanon, parliamentary elections were held recently and the opposition, led by the Khomeinist fundamentalist party, suffered an overwhelming defeat to the March 14 Alliance, which presents itself (in its own words) as a guardian of the concept of the state and an enemy to fundamentalist radicalism represented by Hezbollah as well as some Christian allies.
In Kuwait, after the dissolving of parliament in March 2009 as a result of the escalating attacks launched by Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood MPs against the government, another round of parliamentary elections was held. Four women were voted to parliament for the first time much to the disappointment of fundamentalist currents that campaigned against women’s political rights. Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood currents suffered heavy losses in those elections.
In Iraq, provincial elections were held and fundamentalist parties lost to other currents, some of which had simply changed their names such as the party that Nouri al Maliki belongs to (but that’s another story altogether!) In Karbala, an independent candidate, who does not belong to any fundamentalist party, managed to win and defy all the odds.
Are these examples enough to confirm that fundamentalist parties are losing ground?
It is important to state that each case has its own individual circumstances. What is happening in Iran is complicated. What we are seeing is the bigger picture, the details of which are not yet clear. These details are related to the social, political, religious, psychological and economic dimensions in Iran, all against a backdrop of cultural individuality and the pride of civilization embedded in the Iranian consciousness. Iran’s current predicament is a far cry from what happened in the battle between the March 14 Alliance and March 8 Coalition in Lebanon where there is manifold sectarian fanaticism as well as the sudden frostiness of the Syrian ally
Moreover, in Lebanon the vigilance of Sunni fanaticism is offset by its Shia counterpart, and the close proximity of Israel and the historic European role in Mount Lebanon are strongly felt.
We could say the same about Kuwait, where battles are being fought between those trapped behind the wall and those on the other side of it, those who have increased in wealth and status and those who have not based on what they believe in, and where Salafist excessiveness faces Shia extremism and where other developments are taking place outside of the parliament in other institutions.
With regards to Iraq, the issue is much more complex as Maliki’s iron fist has begun to tighten, conflict between coalition leaders has begun to surface, and elimination of old friends and the battle for power can now be seen as the political structure of Iraq has started to take shape. Everybody wants to remain within this developing structure so as not to be expelled from the circle of power and influence. The coalition was formed on this basis and this is what will break it up. This is what created the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) Councils and pushed them to fight the Islamist party. But this is also another issue altogether.
Let us go back to what’s happening in Iran; we all know that Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and Mohsen Rezaee are legitimate products of the Khomeini womb. They have never spoken out against the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was blessed by the author of the ‘Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist,’ Ayatollah Ali Khomeini.
So how can anyone say that Mousavi represents a revolution against the Islamic Revolution? What are the features of this counter-revolution on the conceptual level? Does Mousavi use a language that is based on an ideology that differs to Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, not to mention of course Mehdi Karroubi or former AGIR Chief Commander Mohsen Rezaee? In fact, Mousavi repeatedly states that he is a staunch supporter of Khomeini legitimacy. Perhaps this is the way to understand the latest developments in Iran through the characters of the protest leaders, most prominently Mousavi, or perhaps not. The Iranian masses, the men, the women and the youth, are driven by much stronger motives than those of Mousavi and his associates. Mousavi is merely a symbol around which the masses can unite.
Generally speaking, in Iran or any other country, at present or at any other time, some political demands form over time.
It is difficult to say that we are facing a new phase of ideology and political climate on the Arab and Islamic streets based on these facts. It would be easier and safer to conclude that we are encountering a new “situation” and surprises from the Arab and Islamic masses. Who would’ve believed that Kuwaiti voters who had once elected strict, fundamentalist, isolated MPs would turn on them in a matter of months and for the first time elect far more moderate MPs, four of whom are women, as well as two liberals. Did this change in consciousness take place within a matter of months?
Fundamentalist currents and political Islamist groups still enjoy a vast majority amongst Arab and Muslim masses. But the public protests staged against them at times are merely protests against particular policies adopted by those parties or movements, or in the case of the Iranian regime, against its policies rather than its “base”. It is likely that these protests stemmed from the fact that the Iranian public has had enough of increasing tensions and confrontations, and their demand for better living conditions. For example, if the contention was between an Islamist who had conflicting policies and another Islamist with agreeable policies and a third who is a not a fundamentalist, but all three shared the same philosophy and ideological beliefs, the winner, in my opinion, would be the Islamist with agreeable policies.
Professor of Political Sciences at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran, Dr. Qayos Sayyid Imami’s analysis supports this idea. In an interview with the New York Times he spoke about the nature of the current political conflict in Iran and said, “One party seeks gradual development of democratic institutions and a more democratic interpretation of Islamic institutions, whereas the other party (Ahmadinejad’s supporters and Khamenei) seek a populist and totalitarian interpretation of Islam,” as quoted by Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.
The profound awareness of the importance of the concept of the civil state and the neutralization of religious slogans in political disputes is a kind of awareness that requires more experience and ongoing education in raising societies. But this has never happened in our Arab and Islamic world for many complicated reasons. So how can some of us assume that such a highly-aware movement exists when the awareness is yet to be formed?
Societies and the vigour of history have taught us that our social development goes through phases of continuous creation. Some elements and intertwined interests might combine to spark a Darwinist consciousness in a way that would make everybody’s jaws drop at the beauty of the surprise and the absolute capability of human beings to evolve.
The Iranian masses, especially the youth, has demonstrated a level of bravery and determination that has embarrassed the political leaders of Iran. This is true, and we are witnessing a spectacular moment in the history of our region. However, we must not be too optimistic or jump to conclusions.
In my own view, all the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and most importantly Iran, indicate that there are less conflicting policies adopted by fundamentalist groups and states but this is not the case with their bases, ideologies and concepts. The story has only just begun with respect to this level of action.
The Security Forces of the Islamic Republic and the Fate of the Opposition by Michael Eisenstadt
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's Friday sermon, which called for an end to mass protests contesting the outcome of last week's presidential elections and which carried an implicit threat of "bloodshed and chaos" if they continued, has raised the stakes in the ongoing standoff between the government and opposition in Iran. The stage may now be set for a violent showdown. Past experience, however, raises questions whether the security forces can be uniformly relied on to implement an order to violently quash the protests, and whether such an order could in fact spark unrest within the ranks of the security forces that could have significant implications for the future stability of the regime.
Security Organs of the Islamic Republic
According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the army is responsible for defending Iran's borders and maintaining internal order, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is responsible for protecting the regime. In practice, matters are not so clear-cut. During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC (and its popular militia, the Basij) fought alongside regular military units at the front.
This ambiguity regarding roles and missions has continued until today: the regular military and IRGC routinely hold joint military exercises, while the Basij has, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, played a greater role in preparing to confront a foreign invasion, implementing the regime's new "mosaic" doctrine, and preserving the values of the revolution. The IRGC and Basij also routinely participate in exercises that hone their ability to deal with domestic unrest. The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) is a partner with the Basij (and ultimately the IRGC) in these efforts to maintain domestic order.
A History of Civil-Military Tensions and Ferment in the Ranks
The intermittent unrest that has racked Iran since the early 1990s has occasionally exposed latent tensions between the country's political and military leadership, as well as political differences between the senior echelons of the armed forces and the rank-and-file, raising questions about the implications of a violent crackdown in Iran today.
The first sign of trouble was the refusal of army and IRGC units garrisoned near Qazvin (a major town northwest of Tehran) to obey orders to quash riots there in August 1994. The commanders of these units apparently refused to turn their weapons on the Iranian people. The regime was forced to airlift in special IRGC and Basij antiriot units from elsewhere to put down the violence. The May 1997 election of reformist candidate Muhammad Khatami to the presidency put further stress on civil-military relations. Though senior IRGC officers had endorsed his conservative opponent (Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri), credible post-election press reports indicated that IRGC personnel voted for Khatami in even greater proportions than did the general population (73 percent versus 69 percent).
This indicates that the IRGC -- a military organization long thought to have been a bastion of support for conservative hardliners -- was in fact riven by the same divisions as Iranian society. This, perhaps, should not have come as a surprise, due to the fact that for the past two decades, the IRGC has increasingly come to rely on conscripts to meet its manpower needs, due to a drastic decline in volunteers. This raised questions about the political reliability of the IRGC should it be needed to quell popular unrest.
The student riots of July 1999 provided the backdrop for the next crisis in civil-military relations. These riots were put down by the LEF (often aided by the thugs of the Ansar-e Hizballah, a shady vigilante group sponsored by the IRGC and Basij) who were relieved by the Basij once the situation had stabilized. These events highlighted the fact that by July 1999, a new division of labor within the security forces had emerged: the LEF had become the regime's first line of defense against domestic unrest, with the Basij providing backup. When necessary, they might be reinforced by the IRGC's "Special Units," followed by the IRGC's ground forces. The regular military's ground forces would be deployed only as a last resort.
At the height of the July 1999 unrest, twenty-four senior IRGC commanders sent President Khatami a letter that in effect threatened a coup should he not restore order quickly. Such a threat was unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic, though given the political divisions in the armed forces, it is unclear whether a coup would have succeeded. The result could well have been bloody street violence, perhaps even civil war. In the end, Iran's clerical leadership was able to restore calm, thereby preempting a coup, though the threat of overt military intervention was an unsettling new development.
Hardline elements, however, in the security services and armed forces had already covertly intervened in the political arena, through their participation in the murder of dissident and reformist intellectuals starting in the autumn of 1998 (and continuing through the spring of 2000). Through these actions, the senior leadership of the security services and armed forces threw their support behind the conservative rivals of President Khatami. This development raised doubts not only about the prospects of the reform movement, but also about the impact of the growing politicization of the armed forces on discipline and effectiveness.
The rise of these security hardliners accelerated under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. A former Revolutionary Guard member, Ahmadinezhad was a manifestation of the ascendancy of a power elite comprised largely of IRGC veterans, who make up a majority of the cabinet and more than a third of the current parliament, and who have benefited from the expansion of the IRGC into nontraditional roles in business and industry. Under Ahmadinezhad, the IRGC -- through its current and former members -- has emerged as the main pillar of the regime.
The protests that followed in the wake of the 2009 presidential elections constitute the most serious challenge ever to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. They have revealed new organizational arrangements for dealing with domestic unrest that raise questions as to whether the use of force to quell antiregime protests would produce unrest in the ranks, and spark a new crisis in civil-military relations. Film and television footage of the protests show that this time the Basij are in the lead in dealing with the unrest, with LEF playing a supporting role. IRGC units have not yet been committed. This is consistent with the growing role assigned the Basij since 2003 as the first line of defense against possible U.S. regime-change attempts -- whether through an invasion or a color revolution. It is not clear, however, that this apparent confidence in the Basij is justified.
While the recruitment base of the Basij is much narrower than that of the IRGC (which draws on conscripts from all sectors of Iranian society), it is a volunteer force that many join for opportunistic reasons -- for a paycheck, a scholarship, or a bit of authority. And while the Basij is probably more thoroughly vetted than other mass organizations (due to the role of local clerics and mosques in the recruitment process), it is hard to believe that its membership is insulated from the broader political forces at work in Iranian society today. Accordingly, some units might experience significant desertions if employed to violently suppress the protests.
Conclusions
So far, the government has avoided a head-on confrontation with the opposition, and has contented itself with harassing demonstrators and detaining or arresting opposition organizers and prominent reformist politicians. This approach, however, has not succeeded in slowing the momentum of the opposition protests. As a result, the regime might be tempted to employ greater violence in an effort to crush the opposition.
Iran so often surprises even the most seasoned observers that it is impossible to foresee the outcome of a violent clash between regime and opposition. Much will depend on the following questions: which security forces the regime chooses to employ (Basij supported by LEF, or by IRGC as well), how it chooses to employ them (confronting protesters through a massive show of strength with a relatively limited and focused use of violence, or by overwhelming numbers and an unrestrained use of violence), and how skillful the opposition is in encouraging dissent in and defections from the ranks of the security forces. But a violent crackdown, even if successful (as seems likely), could be the opening round of a long and bitter struggle, with far-reaching implications for the cohesiveness of the security forces and the long-term stability of the regime.
Security Organs of the Islamic Republic
According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the army is responsible for defending Iran's borders and maintaining internal order, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is responsible for protecting the regime. In practice, matters are not so clear-cut. During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC (and its popular militia, the Basij) fought alongside regular military units at the front.
This ambiguity regarding roles and missions has continued until today: the regular military and IRGC routinely hold joint military exercises, while the Basij has, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, played a greater role in preparing to confront a foreign invasion, implementing the regime's new "mosaic" doctrine, and preserving the values of the revolution. The IRGC and Basij also routinely participate in exercises that hone their ability to deal with domestic unrest. The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) is a partner with the Basij (and ultimately the IRGC) in these efforts to maintain domestic order.
A History of Civil-Military Tensions and Ferment in the Ranks
The intermittent unrest that has racked Iran since the early 1990s has occasionally exposed latent tensions between the country's political and military leadership, as well as political differences between the senior echelons of the armed forces and the rank-and-file, raising questions about the implications of a violent crackdown in Iran today.
The first sign of trouble was the refusal of army and IRGC units garrisoned near Qazvin (a major town northwest of Tehran) to obey orders to quash riots there in August 1994. The commanders of these units apparently refused to turn their weapons on the Iranian people. The regime was forced to airlift in special IRGC and Basij antiriot units from elsewhere to put down the violence. The May 1997 election of reformist candidate Muhammad Khatami to the presidency put further stress on civil-military relations. Though senior IRGC officers had endorsed his conservative opponent (Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri), credible post-election press reports indicated that IRGC personnel voted for Khatami in even greater proportions than did the general population (73 percent versus 69 percent).
This indicates that the IRGC -- a military organization long thought to have been a bastion of support for conservative hardliners -- was in fact riven by the same divisions as Iranian society. This, perhaps, should not have come as a surprise, due to the fact that for the past two decades, the IRGC has increasingly come to rely on conscripts to meet its manpower needs, due to a drastic decline in volunteers. This raised questions about the political reliability of the IRGC should it be needed to quell popular unrest.
The student riots of July 1999 provided the backdrop for the next crisis in civil-military relations. These riots were put down by the LEF (often aided by the thugs of the Ansar-e Hizballah, a shady vigilante group sponsored by the IRGC and Basij) who were relieved by the Basij once the situation had stabilized. These events highlighted the fact that by July 1999, a new division of labor within the security forces had emerged: the LEF had become the regime's first line of defense against domestic unrest, with the Basij providing backup. When necessary, they might be reinforced by the IRGC's "Special Units," followed by the IRGC's ground forces. The regular military's ground forces would be deployed only as a last resort.
At the height of the July 1999 unrest, twenty-four senior IRGC commanders sent President Khatami a letter that in effect threatened a coup should he not restore order quickly. Such a threat was unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic, though given the political divisions in the armed forces, it is unclear whether a coup would have succeeded. The result could well have been bloody street violence, perhaps even civil war. In the end, Iran's clerical leadership was able to restore calm, thereby preempting a coup, though the threat of overt military intervention was an unsettling new development.
Hardline elements, however, in the security services and armed forces had already covertly intervened in the political arena, through their participation in the murder of dissident and reformist intellectuals starting in the autumn of 1998 (and continuing through the spring of 2000). Through these actions, the senior leadership of the security services and armed forces threw their support behind the conservative rivals of President Khatami. This development raised doubts not only about the prospects of the reform movement, but also about the impact of the growing politicization of the armed forces on discipline and effectiveness.
The rise of these security hardliners accelerated under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. A former Revolutionary Guard member, Ahmadinezhad was a manifestation of the ascendancy of a power elite comprised largely of IRGC veterans, who make up a majority of the cabinet and more than a third of the current parliament, and who have benefited from the expansion of the IRGC into nontraditional roles in business and industry. Under Ahmadinezhad, the IRGC -- through its current and former members -- has emerged as the main pillar of the regime.
The protests that followed in the wake of the 2009 presidential elections constitute the most serious challenge ever to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. They have revealed new organizational arrangements for dealing with domestic unrest that raise questions as to whether the use of force to quell antiregime protests would produce unrest in the ranks, and spark a new crisis in civil-military relations. Film and television footage of the protests show that this time the Basij are in the lead in dealing with the unrest, with LEF playing a supporting role. IRGC units have not yet been committed. This is consistent with the growing role assigned the Basij since 2003 as the first line of defense against possible U.S. regime-change attempts -- whether through an invasion or a color revolution. It is not clear, however, that this apparent confidence in the Basij is justified.
While the recruitment base of the Basij is much narrower than that of the IRGC (which draws on conscripts from all sectors of Iranian society), it is a volunteer force that many join for opportunistic reasons -- for a paycheck, a scholarship, or a bit of authority. And while the Basij is probably more thoroughly vetted than other mass organizations (due to the role of local clerics and mosques in the recruitment process), it is hard to believe that its membership is insulated from the broader political forces at work in Iranian society today. Accordingly, some units might experience significant desertions if employed to violently suppress the protests.
Conclusions
So far, the government has avoided a head-on confrontation with the opposition, and has contented itself with harassing demonstrators and detaining or arresting opposition organizers and prominent reformist politicians. This approach, however, has not succeeded in slowing the momentum of the opposition protests. As a result, the regime might be tempted to employ greater violence in an effort to crush the opposition.
Iran so often surprises even the most seasoned observers that it is impossible to foresee the outcome of a violent clash between regime and opposition. Much will depend on the following questions: which security forces the regime chooses to employ (Basij supported by LEF, or by IRGC as well), how it chooses to employ them (confronting protesters through a massive show of strength with a relatively limited and focused use of violence, or by overwhelming numbers and an unrestrained use of violence), and how skillful the opposition is in encouraging dissent in and defections from the ranks of the security forces. But a violent crackdown, even if successful (as seems likely), could be the opening round of a long and bitter struggle, with far-reaching implications for the cohesiveness of the security forces and the long-term stability of the regime.
Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East by Rep. Howard Berman and David Makovsky
On June 17, 2009, Rep. Howard Berman and David Makovsky addressed a special Policy Forum at The Washington Institute to mark the publication of Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East, coauthored by David Makovsky and Dennis Ross. Representative Berman (D-CA) is the chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. David Makovsky is The Washington Institute's Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.
Rep. Howard Berman
Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, in a brilliant book that calls for a "new realism" in the Middle East, reject the idea of "linkage" -- the notion that the key to solving every problem in the Middle East lies in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors, however, are passionate about the importance of U.S. activism in Middle East peacemaking. In addition, they emphasize support for regional reformers, because the Middle East public, now more exposed to international norms of good governance thanks to the internet and pan-Arab media, is growing increasingly impatient with governments that are not accountable.
The chapter on Iran will undoubtedly attract much attention because of Ross's position in the Obama administration as one of the primary shapers of Iran policy. Part of the excitement of reading this book, which was completed before the Obama administration took office, comes from measuring its analysis and recommendations against the emerging policies of the new administration. Not surprisingly, the prescription for Iran policy comes close to what the administration seems to be pursuing: namely, agreeing to talk to Iran while simultaneously persuading U.S. allies to declare support for significantly intensified sanctions if Iran does not suspend its uranium enrichment program. The authors refer to this concept as "engagement without illusions." Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has suggested that she is working with Washington's allies and partners to effect "crippling sanctions," should engagement fail. Still, it is unclear if U.S. allies -- much less the Russians and Chinese -- are on board with this approach. For now, it appears that even if they are prepared to impose tougher sanctions, they are not yet ready to make this position public.
Representative Berman has introduced legislation that could greatly damage the Iranian economy, essentially prohibiting any foreign company from doing business with the United States if it sells or facilitates the sale of refined petroleum to Iran or if it helps to enhance or maintain Iran's capacity to refine its own petroleum. Because of its limited domestic refining capacity, oil-rich Iran must import approximately 25 to 40 percent of its gasoline. If imports of refined petroleum ceased, both the Iranian economy and the domestic political standing of the Iranian regime would suffer a heavy blow.
If engagement succeeds and leads to the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program, the bill will be withdrawn. But if the process of engagement falters, Berman will begin the process of passing the bill. Engagement must have a time limit to prevent Iran from simply running out the clock, and President Obama has said that by the end of this year the administration will have a good indication of whether engagement will succeed. The Iranians should view this legislation as a Sword of Damocles.
The authors' analysis of how Sinn Fein was drawn into the 1997 Good Friday agreement is also interesting, given that this experience is sometimes cited as a paradigm for bringing Hamas into the Middle East peace process. It is also woth noting that the current Middle East special envoy, George Mitchell, negotiated this agreement. According to the authors, the conditions placed on Sinn Fein were far stricter than those that the Quartet imposed on Hamas. Moreover, the authors claim that unrelenting British military pressure was a key factor in convincing Sinn Fein to renounce violence.
The volume closes with a cautionary note about the importance of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, warning that the United States should never "dissociate" itself from Israel, even if the two nations disagree from time to time. In Berman's view, even the recent disagreement over settlements and natural growth should not be allowed to mask the reality that there is far more convergence than divergence in U.S.-Israeli regional views and policies. This is all the more true since Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently endorsed the concept of the two-state solution.
A major breach with Israel, the authors say, would damage U.S. credibility throughout the region, calling into question the reliability of America's commitments. Going further, the Ross and Makovsky assert provocatively that most Arab governments prefer a strong Israel that is able to confront mutual enemies such as Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas. Indeed, the international community glimpsed this during Israel's 2006 war with Hizballah and its 2008 military action against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
One of the hallmarks of the "new realism" propounded by this book is that it is grounded in Middle Eastern reality, taking fully into account the domestic political situations of regional actors. The United States might want to change the regional reality, but in order to do that -- the authors say -- it is critical first to understand it.
Myths, Illusions, and Peace is a fascinating and absorbing discourse on the Middle East. The congressman expressed his gratitude that one of the book's authors is helping direct America's Iran policy and the other is at The Washington Institute helping guide policymakers and the public alike through the complexities of the Middle East.
David Makovsky
America's place in the world and the purpose of its foreign policy can never be strictly based on the abstract concepts of power and interest. No policy is sustainable if it is not seen by the U.S. public and its representatives as serving some higher purpose. That is part of the American ethos. Thus, it is not surprising to see Americans concerned over the protests unfolding in Iran.
During the Cold War, the United States engaged the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons while it simultaneously promoted human rights and worked with Soviet dissidents, thereby balancing U.S. interests and values. While Washington should attempt to duplicate the balance achieved during the Cold War, in regard to deterrence it should be cautious about using the Soviet Union-Iran analogy. During the Cold War, half a million NATO troops were stationed in Europe, but some key baselines were in place: diplomatic relations existed between the countries on each side of the East-West divide, and a White House-Kremlin hotline was operational for much of this period. Yet despite these realities, miscalculation remained a serious risk. Even if Iran is assumed to be a rational actor, these baselines do not exist in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, making a policy of deterrence substantially riskier.
The Bush administration's policy of isolation was unsuccessful, and therefore U.S. policy toward Iran should be characterized by engagement without illusions. Since the success of engagement is uncertain, in order to gain leverage, the United States must find ways to convey to Iran that if engagement fails, there will be profound consequences.
This book also seeks to debunk the idea of linkage, which declares that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will solve all Middle East conflicts. Ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, Arab states have linked their relationships with the United States to how Washington deals with the Palestine question -- and later the state of Israel. Yet, with some notable exceptions, Arab states have largely aligned their policies with the United States based on their own national interests rather than on professed regional concerns. Even during one of the few times that the Arab states acted on this linkage -- the Arab oil embargo in the mid-1970s -- they lifted it within a few months due to inter-Arab rivalries and their desire to have close relations with Washington.
The United States should engage in peace efforts because resolving the conflict is desirable in and of itself and would marginalize and diminish the appeal of extremists who exploit this emotional issue. In approaching the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, neither a pure top-down or bottom-up approach is possible. The top-down approach assumes that all core issues can be solved immediately, but since some of them are currently intractable, this approach will not work. The bottom-up approach, which focuses on creating economic and security institutions and deepening Palestinian security cooperation with Israel, is important, but it cannot succeed on its own if the Palestinians think Israel is just buying time to expand settlements at their expense. This issue needs to be addressed or it will undermine the Palestinian Authority and benefit Hamas. The best way to deal with settlements is to render them moot by moving forward and demarcating a border between Israel and the future Palestinian state. Therefore, negotiations should begin with a focus on land; while it is not a simple issue, progress in this area is realistic.
The issues of security and settlements must be decoupled. Given the ongoing problem of rocket fire from Gaza and the fact that Palestinian security forces are only starting to be professionally trained, security will need its own track. The settlement issue, on the other hand, can be addressed now. Settlers should no longer remain in limbo; a demarcated border would place an estimated 75-80 percent of the settlers inside Israel. In exchange, the Palestinians would receive land swaps inside Israel equivalent to all of the West Bank. Successful land negotiations would prove that diplomacy -- and not terror -- is the key to making progress and achieving results. Solving the land issue will not solve the remaining contentious issues, but taking a pragmatic approach will demonstrate progress, and a clear plan can then be devised for addressing the remaining issues. If some progress is not achieved, the two-state solution will lose its credibility.
Rep. Howard Berman
Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, in a brilliant book that calls for a "new realism" in the Middle East, reject the idea of "linkage" -- the notion that the key to solving every problem in the Middle East lies in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors, however, are passionate about the importance of U.S. activism in Middle East peacemaking. In addition, they emphasize support for regional reformers, because the Middle East public, now more exposed to international norms of good governance thanks to the internet and pan-Arab media, is growing increasingly impatient with governments that are not accountable.
The chapter on Iran will undoubtedly attract much attention because of Ross's position in the Obama administration as one of the primary shapers of Iran policy. Part of the excitement of reading this book, which was completed before the Obama administration took office, comes from measuring its analysis and recommendations against the emerging policies of the new administration. Not surprisingly, the prescription for Iran policy comes close to what the administration seems to be pursuing: namely, agreeing to talk to Iran while simultaneously persuading U.S. allies to declare support for significantly intensified sanctions if Iran does not suspend its uranium enrichment program. The authors refer to this concept as "engagement without illusions." Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has suggested that she is working with Washington's allies and partners to effect "crippling sanctions," should engagement fail. Still, it is unclear if U.S. allies -- much less the Russians and Chinese -- are on board with this approach. For now, it appears that even if they are prepared to impose tougher sanctions, they are not yet ready to make this position public.
Representative Berman has introduced legislation that could greatly damage the Iranian economy, essentially prohibiting any foreign company from doing business with the United States if it sells or facilitates the sale of refined petroleum to Iran or if it helps to enhance or maintain Iran's capacity to refine its own petroleum. Because of its limited domestic refining capacity, oil-rich Iran must import approximately 25 to 40 percent of its gasoline. If imports of refined petroleum ceased, both the Iranian economy and the domestic political standing of the Iranian regime would suffer a heavy blow.
If engagement succeeds and leads to the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program, the bill will be withdrawn. But if the process of engagement falters, Berman will begin the process of passing the bill. Engagement must have a time limit to prevent Iran from simply running out the clock, and President Obama has said that by the end of this year the administration will have a good indication of whether engagement will succeed. The Iranians should view this legislation as a Sword of Damocles.
The authors' analysis of how Sinn Fein was drawn into the 1997 Good Friday agreement is also interesting, given that this experience is sometimes cited as a paradigm for bringing Hamas into the Middle East peace process. It is also woth noting that the current Middle East special envoy, George Mitchell, negotiated this agreement. According to the authors, the conditions placed on Sinn Fein were far stricter than those that the Quartet imposed on Hamas. Moreover, the authors claim that unrelenting British military pressure was a key factor in convincing Sinn Fein to renounce violence.
The volume closes with a cautionary note about the importance of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, warning that the United States should never "dissociate" itself from Israel, even if the two nations disagree from time to time. In Berman's view, even the recent disagreement over settlements and natural growth should not be allowed to mask the reality that there is far more convergence than divergence in U.S.-Israeli regional views and policies. This is all the more true since Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently endorsed the concept of the two-state solution.
A major breach with Israel, the authors say, would damage U.S. credibility throughout the region, calling into question the reliability of America's commitments. Going further, the Ross and Makovsky assert provocatively that most Arab governments prefer a strong Israel that is able to confront mutual enemies such as Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas. Indeed, the international community glimpsed this during Israel's 2006 war with Hizballah and its 2008 military action against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
One of the hallmarks of the "new realism" propounded by this book is that it is grounded in Middle Eastern reality, taking fully into account the domestic political situations of regional actors. The United States might want to change the regional reality, but in order to do that -- the authors say -- it is critical first to understand it.
Myths, Illusions, and Peace is a fascinating and absorbing discourse on the Middle East. The congressman expressed his gratitude that one of the book's authors is helping direct America's Iran policy and the other is at The Washington Institute helping guide policymakers and the public alike through the complexities of the Middle East.
David Makovsky
America's place in the world and the purpose of its foreign policy can never be strictly based on the abstract concepts of power and interest. No policy is sustainable if it is not seen by the U.S. public and its representatives as serving some higher purpose. That is part of the American ethos. Thus, it is not surprising to see Americans concerned over the protests unfolding in Iran.
During the Cold War, the United States engaged the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons while it simultaneously promoted human rights and worked with Soviet dissidents, thereby balancing U.S. interests and values. While Washington should attempt to duplicate the balance achieved during the Cold War, in regard to deterrence it should be cautious about using the Soviet Union-Iran analogy. During the Cold War, half a million NATO troops were stationed in Europe, but some key baselines were in place: diplomatic relations existed between the countries on each side of the East-West divide, and a White House-Kremlin hotline was operational for much of this period. Yet despite these realities, miscalculation remained a serious risk. Even if Iran is assumed to be a rational actor, these baselines do not exist in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, making a policy of deterrence substantially riskier.
The Bush administration's policy of isolation was unsuccessful, and therefore U.S. policy toward Iran should be characterized by engagement without illusions. Since the success of engagement is uncertain, in order to gain leverage, the United States must find ways to convey to Iran that if engagement fails, there will be profound consequences.
This book also seeks to debunk the idea of linkage, which declares that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will solve all Middle East conflicts. Ever since Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, Arab states have linked their relationships with the United States to how Washington deals with the Palestine question -- and later the state of Israel. Yet, with some notable exceptions, Arab states have largely aligned their policies with the United States based on their own national interests rather than on professed regional concerns. Even during one of the few times that the Arab states acted on this linkage -- the Arab oil embargo in the mid-1970s -- they lifted it within a few months due to inter-Arab rivalries and their desire to have close relations with Washington.
The United States should engage in peace efforts because resolving the conflict is desirable in and of itself and would marginalize and diminish the appeal of extremists who exploit this emotional issue. In approaching the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, neither a pure top-down or bottom-up approach is possible. The top-down approach assumes that all core issues can be solved immediately, but since some of them are currently intractable, this approach will not work. The bottom-up approach, which focuses on creating economic and security institutions and deepening Palestinian security cooperation with Israel, is important, but it cannot succeed on its own if the Palestinians think Israel is just buying time to expand settlements at their expense. This issue needs to be addressed or it will undermine the Palestinian Authority and benefit Hamas. The best way to deal with settlements is to render them moot by moving forward and demarcating a border between Israel and the future Palestinian state. Therefore, negotiations should begin with a focus on land; while it is not a simple issue, progress in this area is realistic.
The issues of security and settlements must be decoupled. Given the ongoing problem of rocket fire from Gaza and the fact that Palestinian security forces are only starting to be professionally trained, security will need its own track. The settlement issue, on the other hand, can be addressed now. Settlers should no longer remain in limbo; a demarcated border would place an estimated 75-80 percent of the settlers inside Israel. In exchange, the Palestinians would receive land swaps inside Israel equivalent to all of the West Bank. Successful land negotiations would prove that diplomacy -- and not terror -- is the key to making progress and achieving results. Solving the land issue will not solve the remaining contentious issues, but taking a pragmatic approach will demonstrate progress, and a clear plan can then be devised for addressing the remaining issues. If some progress is not achieved, the two-state solution will lose its credibility.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power by Anthony Shadid
At 11 a.m. one day in May, eight Iraqi army Humvees barreled into government headquarters of fractious Diyala province, clouds of dust billowing behind them. They had orders to arrest a council member who belonged to a party that had run afoul of Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's increasingly assertive prime minister.
Shouts rang out as the man's colleagues heckled the captain who served the warrant. The council chairman frantically called lawmakers in Baghdad and pleaded with the provincial security chief to intervene. Desperate, he then ran after the captain as he led the council member, Abdel-Jabbar Ibrahim, to the waiting Humvee.
The captain promised to return Ibrahim in an hour, no more than two. Chosen in the January elections to represent the province, he has remained in custody since May 18.
"This is a message," said Amr al-Taqi, a colleague of Ibrahim's on the council.
Although Iraq's parliamentary elections are not until January, the campaign has begun, and Maliki has shown a determination to fight with a tenacity and ruthlessness borrowed from the handbook of Iraq's last strongman, Saddam Hussein. From Diyala, where men under Maliki's command have arrested and threatened to detain a host of his rivals, to Basra, where security forces have swept up scores of his opponents since January, the message is: cooperate or risk his wrath.
Although Iraq's sectarian war has largely ended, and the Sunnis feel they lost, another struggle for power, perhaps no less perilous, has begun in earnest. Maliki has resorted to a more traditional notion of politics in which violence is simply another form of leverage. His goal is simple -- to ensure he emerges as prime minister again after the vote.
To allies, he is what Iraq needs, a proponent of law in a state still without order.
"Is Maliki a strongman, personally and through the constitution? Or is he a dictator?" asked Sami al-Askari, an aide to the prime minister. The former, he answered. "Maliki has a strong personality. The constitution gives him great powers, but if he was not a strongman, he would not have done what the constitution allows him to do."
Opponents, some of whom decry the arrests as "a systematic campaign," warned that the strife unleashed by the jockeying could soon spiral beyond control.
"These political tensions are undermining the security of the country, and I'm worried about it," said Barham Salih, the deputy prime minister and a Kurdish leader.
The Instruments of Power
Maliki's ascent has become a familiar narrative in Iraq. In 2006, a reputation for weakness helped secure him the post. Opponents deemed him malleable. Since then, buoyed in part by his success in the provincial elections, he has concentrated power in the hands of what critics call "the impenetrable circle" and taken command of military units that delivered him and his Dawa party what they had lacked since 2003: men with guns.
But the narrative still tells only part of the story of how complicated Iraq is these days. Everyone seems to be looking for an angle, in pursuit of the coalition they think can triumph in the January elections. Everyone has a grievance, no less pronounced.
Maliki's Shiite rivals -- followers of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq -- have fought for primacy in the southern province of Qadisiyah. Another group, known as Sahwa or Awakening, filled by former Sunni fighters and long backed by the U.S. military, is hopelessly divided. Maliki has cracked down on some of its leaders, especially in Baghdad.
Others in Anbar, Salahuddin and even Diyala provinces profess loyalty to Maliki, wagering he will eventually come out on top. Another Shiite faction outmaneuvered Maliki's party in Diyala in negotiations over leadership positions there. But there remains a sense that Maliki wields the initiative, now more than ever, as he tries to hone a mix of patronage and coercion, a proven combination here.
"Whoever controls the instruments of power can keep himself in power," said Jawad al-Hasnawi, a leader of the Sadr movement in the sacred Shiite city of Karbala.
Diyala, a fertile land of citrus and dates, watered by the Diyala River and stretching to the Iranian border, remains a battleground, with its Sunni majority and Kurdish and Shiite minorities. In the elections in January, Sunni candidates allied with the Iraqi Islamic Party, a foe of Maliki, took the greatest number of seats in a province where Sunnis had been disenfranchised after largely boycotting the vote in 2005.
An Iraqi official said Maliki had ordered the arrests of at least six of the party's candidates a week before the January elections. The official said he was stopped only after Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, personally intervened. American and Iraqi officials said warrants were again issued after the vote, in which the Islamic Party won nearly a third of the seats, prompting another intervention by U.S. officials.
A spokesman for Odierno declined to comment on the report. "It would be categorically inappropriate to discuss private conversations between Gen. Odierno and the Prime Minister," Col. James Hutton said in an e-mailed response to questions.
Ibrahim's arrest was not the first. In November, Hussein al-Zubaidi, a former council member from the same party, was arrested. He is still in custody.
Provincial officials said Ibrahim was detained by the Baghdad Brigade, which, along with the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, reported directly to Maliki. (After an outcry in parliament, the Baghdad Brigade has at least formally returned under the purview of the Defense Ministry.)
"Why the Baghdad Brigade? This is my question," said Taqi, the council member.
Officials with Maliki's Dawa party in Baqubah and Baghdad defended the arrest as legitimate. Indeed, some of them describe the Islamic Party as only a step removed from the insurgency. Askari, Maliki's aide, said Ibrahim's name had surfaced during interrogations of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the reputed leader of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq whom officials said they arrested in April. Baghdadi's arrest has been met with skepticism, as has his true identity.
The Islamic Party seems an implacable foe of Maliki, leading a campaign against government corruption that may prove Maliki's greatest vulnerability in the election. The position of the Sadr movement, though, is more ambiguous. It helped secure Maliki's election as prime minister but was a victim of a crackdown he launched in Baghdad and Basra, and now complains he is trying to browbeat it into a new alliance on his terms.
Sadr officials say scores of their followers have been arrested in southern provinces as a way to pressure them.
"Maliki has given them the green light to do it," said Salah al-Obaidi, a Sadr spokesman in Najaf, another sacred Shiite city. "He has always wanted to use our movement for his benefit and the benefit of his government."
'A New Equation'
Basra, once beholden to militias, is a compelling illustration of the shifting struggle in Iraq. Iraqi forces, with the decisive assistance of U.S. troops, restored a semblance of order last year. In the provincial elections, Maliki's party won a majority of seats. Since then, Sadr's followers complain, they have endured a wave of arrests they deem political.
Naseer al-Musawi, the head of the Sadr office there, put the number of arrests at 70. Others who were released have complained of torture.
Aqeel al-Musawi, a security adviser to the governor in Basra, denied there was any crackdown. "Outlaws," he called those arrested. The rest, he said, were remnants of the militias. But as the Sadr official noted, "You can arrest anyone and call them a militiaman."
The creation of the coalitions that will stand in the election is still thought to be months away. Even now, though, virtually every party, faction and personality is involved in some level of negotiation, and officials with Maliki's party speak with confidence, deemed arrogance by their opponents, about their ability to forge the most inclusive one.
They believe they can reconstitute the Shiite alliance that competed in the 2005 elections, but draw in elements of Sahwa and other Sunni factions in northern Iraq as well. Notable is whom they omit: the Iraqi Islamic Party and the leading Kurdish parties.
"There's a new equation of power," said Fayad al-Shamari, the head of the provincial council in Najaf who was elected as part of Maliki's list.
Others put it more bluntly. "I will not be surprised at all if there is a lot of brinkmanship to bring people back into the tent," an Iraqi official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity so as not to cross the prime minister. "Politics is getting rough."
Shouts rang out as the man's colleagues heckled the captain who served the warrant. The council chairman frantically called lawmakers in Baghdad and pleaded with the provincial security chief to intervene. Desperate, he then ran after the captain as he led the council member, Abdel-Jabbar Ibrahim, to the waiting Humvee.
The captain promised to return Ibrahim in an hour, no more than two. Chosen in the January elections to represent the province, he has remained in custody since May 18.
"This is a message," said Amr al-Taqi, a colleague of Ibrahim's on the council.
Although Iraq's parliamentary elections are not until January, the campaign has begun, and Maliki has shown a determination to fight with a tenacity and ruthlessness borrowed from the handbook of Iraq's last strongman, Saddam Hussein. From Diyala, where men under Maliki's command have arrested and threatened to detain a host of his rivals, to Basra, where security forces have swept up scores of his opponents since January, the message is: cooperate or risk his wrath.
Although Iraq's sectarian war has largely ended, and the Sunnis feel they lost, another struggle for power, perhaps no less perilous, has begun in earnest. Maliki has resorted to a more traditional notion of politics in which violence is simply another form of leverage. His goal is simple -- to ensure he emerges as prime minister again after the vote.
To allies, he is what Iraq needs, a proponent of law in a state still without order.
"Is Maliki a strongman, personally and through the constitution? Or is he a dictator?" asked Sami al-Askari, an aide to the prime minister. The former, he answered. "Maliki has a strong personality. The constitution gives him great powers, but if he was not a strongman, he would not have done what the constitution allows him to do."
Opponents, some of whom decry the arrests as "a systematic campaign," warned that the strife unleashed by the jockeying could soon spiral beyond control.
"These political tensions are undermining the security of the country, and I'm worried about it," said Barham Salih, the deputy prime minister and a Kurdish leader.
The Instruments of Power
Maliki's ascent has become a familiar narrative in Iraq. In 2006, a reputation for weakness helped secure him the post. Opponents deemed him malleable. Since then, buoyed in part by his success in the provincial elections, he has concentrated power in the hands of what critics call "the impenetrable circle" and taken command of military units that delivered him and his Dawa party what they had lacked since 2003: men with guns.
But the narrative still tells only part of the story of how complicated Iraq is these days. Everyone seems to be looking for an angle, in pursuit of the coalition they think can triumph in the January elections. Everyone has a grievance, no less pronounced.
Maliki's Shiite rivals -- followers of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq -- have fought for primacy in the southern province of Qadisiyah. Another group, known as Sahwa or Awakening, filled by former Sunni fighters and long backed by the U.S. military, is hopelessly divided. Maliki has cracked down on some of its leaders, especially in Baghdad.
Others in Anbar, Salahuddin and even Diyala provinces profess loyalty to Maliki, wagering he will eventually come out on top. Another Shiite faction outmaneuvered Maliki's party in Diyala in negotiations over leadership positions there. But there remains a sense that Maliki wields the initiative, now more than ever, as he tries to hone a mix of patronage and coercion, a proven combination here.
"Whoever controls the instruments of power can keep himself in power," said Jawad al-Hasnawi, a leader of the Sadr movement in the sacred Shiite city of Karbala.
Diyala, a fertile land of citrus and dates, watered by the Diyala River and stretching to the Iranian border, remains a battleground, with its Sunni majority and Kurdish and Shiite minorities. In the elections in January, Sunni candidates allied with the Iraqi Islamic Party, a foe of Maliki, took the greatest number of seats in a province where Sunnis had been disenfranchised after largely boycotting the vote in 2005.
An Iraqi official said Maliki had ordered the arrests of at least six of the party's candidates a week before the January elections. The official said he was stopped only after Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, personally intervened. American and Iraqi officials said warrants were again issued after the vote, in which the Islamic Party won nearly a third of the seats, prompting another intervention by U.S. officials.
A spokesman for Odierno declined to comment on the report. "It would be categorically inappropriate to discuss private conversations between Gen. Odierno and the Prime Minister," Col. James Hutton said in an e-mailed response to questions.
Ibrahim's arrest was not the first. In November, Hussein al-Zubaidi, a former council member from the same party, was arrested. He is still in custody.
Provincial officials said Ibrahim was detained by the Baghdad Brigade, which, along with the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, reported directly to Maliki. (After an outcry in parliament, the Baghdad Brigade has at least formally returned under the purview of the Defense Ministry.)
"Why the Baghdad Brigade? This is my question," said Taqi, the council member.
Officials with Maliki's Dawa party in Baqubah and Baghdad defended the arrest as legitimate. Indeed, some of them describe the Islamic Party as only a step removed from the insurgency. Askari, Maliki's aide, said Ibrahim's name had surfaced during interrogations of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the reputed leader of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq whom officials said they arrested in April. Baghdadi's arrest has been met with skepticism, as has his true identity.
The Islamic Party seems an implacable foe of Maliki, leading a campaign against government corruption that may prove Maliki's greatest vulnerability in the election. The position of the Sadr movement, though, is more ambiguous. It helped secure Maliki's election as prime minister but was a victim of a crackdown he launched in Baghdad and Basra, and now complains he is trying to browbeat it into a new alliance on his terms.
Sadr officials say scores of their followers have been arrested in southern provinces as a way to pressure them.
"Maliki has given them the green light to do it," said Salah al-Obaidi, a Sadr spokesman in Najaf, another sacred Shiite city. "He has always wanted to use our movement for his benefit and the benefit of his government."
'A New Equation'
Basra, once beholden to militias, is a compelling illustration of the shifting struggle in Iraq. Iraqi forces, with the decisive assistance of U.S. troops, restored a semblance of order last year. In the provincial elections, Maliki's party won a majority of seats. Since then, Sadr's followers complain, they have endured a wave of arrests they deem political.
Naseer al-Musawi, the head of the Sadr office there, put the number of arrests at 70. Others who were released have complained of torture.
Aqeel al-Musawi, a security adviser to the governor in Basra, denied there was any crackdown. "Outlaws," he called those arrested. The rest, he said, were remnants of the militias. But as the Sadr official noted, "You can arrest anyone and call them a militiaman."
The creation of the coalitions that will stand in the election is still thought to be months away. Even now, though, virtually every party, faction and personality is involved in some level of negotiation, and officials with Maliki's party speak with confidence, deemed arrogance by their opponents, about their ability to forge the most inclusive one.
They believe they can reconstitute the Shiite alliance that competed in the 2005 elections, but draw in elements of Sahwa and other Sunni factions in northern Iraq as well. Notable is whom they omit: the Iraqi Islamic Party and the leading Kurdish parties.
"There's a new equation of power," said Fayad al-Shamari, the head of the provincial council in Najaf who was elected as part of Maliki's list.
Others put it more bluntly. "I will not be surprised at all if there is a lot of brinkmanship to bring people back into the tent," an Iraqi official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity so as not to cross the prime minister. "Politics is getting rough."
IDF to radically reduce army presence in 5 West Bank cities by Yaakov Katz
Israel has decided to radically reduce its military presence in the West Bank cities of Kalkilya, Ramallah, Jericho, Jenin, and Bethlehem as part of an effort to bolster the Palestinian Authority, defense officials said on Thursday.
The decision was announced at a Wednesday meeting between IDF officers and their Palestinians counterparts in Bethlehem. The meeting was attended by the head of the IDF Civil Administration Brig-Gen. Yoav Mordechai.
Defense officials said that the move was aimed at giving the Palestinians the ability to enforce law and order and crack down on Hamas and other terror elements independently without Israeli intervention. Nevertheless, the sources said that if there was intelligence regarding planned terror attacks against Israel, the IDF would not hesitate to operate within the cities to thwart those attacks.
In addition, the move was also connected to the continued deployment of Palestinian battalions trained by the United States security coordinator Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton in Jordan. Officials said a battalion of several hundred Palestinian soldiers recently returned from Jordan, and another battalion traveled to the country for training.
The officials said that the deployment of Dayton-trained battalions would continue in cooperation with the IDF.
Previous to the decision, the IDF would primarily dominate night-time security activities, while Palestinian security forces were permitted to operate almost exclusively during the day. However, following the decision, PA troops will operate during both the night and day, with Israeli troops only operating when urgent threats arise.
The decision was announced at a Wednesday meeting between IDF officers and their Palestinians counterparts in Bethlehem. The meeting was attended by the head of the IDF Civil Administration Brig-Gen. Yoav Mordechai.
Defense officials said that the move was aimed at giving the Palestinians the ability to enforce law and order and crack down on Hamas and other terror elements independently without Israeli intervention. Nevertheless, the sources said that if there was intelligence regarding planned terror attacks against Israel, the IDF would not hesitate to operate within the cities to thwart those attacks.
In addition, the move was also connected to the continued deployment of Palestinian battalions trained by the United States security coordinator Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton in Jordan. Officials said a battalion of several hundred Palestinian soldiers recently returned from Jordan, and another battalion traveled to the country for training.
The officials said that the deployment of Dayton-trained battalions would continue in cooperation with the IDF.
Previous to the decision, the IDF would primarily dominate night-time security activities, while Palestinian security forces were permitted to operate almost exclusively during the day. However, following the decision, PA troops will operate during both the night and day, with Israeli troops only operating when urgent threats arise.
Pan-European Security Agency Proposed by Paul Meller
The European Commission has proposed a new independent agency to manage massive IT systems used by border control authorities, the first step in the creation of a pan-European system of security and surveillance.
The so-far-unnamed agency will initially house passport, visa and fingerprint databases from across the EU, but later it will take control of other IT systems, such as ones that record all entry and exit movements of individuals. Biometric data will also be added to the existing databases, said a Commission official who asked not to be named.
However, civil liberties groups have warned that EU security officials are seeking to build an increasingly sophisticated security machine that reaches across the 27 EU countries. The Commission has tried to play down these fears by insisting that the new agency will not itself have access to any of the information in the databases it manages.
"It will have access to technical data needed for operational purposes and it will draw up statistics on, for example, illegal immigrants, as the databases do at present, but it won't have access to the details in the data, and nor will it connect the information from the separate databases into one system," the official said.
The three existing databases that will initially be the focus of the new agency will be SISii - the second generation Schengen Information System containing passport data; the visa information system (VIS); and EURODAC, an IT system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.
Justice commissioner Jacques Barrot said in a statement that the purpose of the agency is "to simplify the current situation by establishing a single management structure for several large-scale IT systems in the areas of freedom, security and justice."
The agency should become operational in 2012, assuming the plan gets political backing from the 27 national governments and the European Parliament, the Commission said in the statement.
The start-up costs are estimated at 113 million euros to be spent over three years from 2010. Running costs of the agency include software and hardware management, which are expected to cost 10 million euros per year.
"No calls for tender will be published until there is political agreement, which we expect next year. We will probably look for suppliers for more than one year," the Commission official said, adding that a 50 million IT contract for five years is a possibility.
The so-far-unnamed agency will initially house passport, visa and fingerprint databases from across the EU, but later it will take control of other IT systems, such as ones that record all entry and exit movements of individuals. Biometric data will also be added to the existing databases, said a Commission official who asked not to be named.
However, civil liberties groups have warned that EU security officials are seeking to build an increasingly sophisticated security machine that reaches across the 27 EU countries. The Commission has tried to play down these fears by insisting that the new agency will not itself have access to any of the information in the databases it manages.
"It will have access to technical data needed for operational purposes and it will draw up statistics on, for example, illegal immigrants, as the databases do at present, but it won't have access to the details in the data, and nor will it connect the information from the separate databases into one system," the official said.
The three existing databases that will initially be the focus of the new agency will be SISii - the second generation Schengen Information System containing passport data; the visa information system (VIS); and EURODAC, an IT system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.
Justice commissioner Jacques Barrot said in a statement that the purpose of the agency is "to simplify the current situation by establishing a single management structure for several large-scale IT systems in the areas of freedom, security and justice."
The agency should become operational in 2012, assuming the plan gets political backing from the 27 national governments and the European Parliament, the Commission said in the statement.
The start-up costs are estimated at 113 million euros to be spent over three years from 2010. Running costs of the agency include software and hardware management, which are expected to cost 10 million euros per year.
"No calls for tender will be published until there is political agreement, which we expect next year. We will probably look for suppliers for more than one year," the Commission official said, adding that a 50 million IT contract for five years is a possibility.
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