For those of us who lived through the Iranian revolution, which toppled the government of the Shah and paved the way for the creation of the Islamic republic in 1979, there is a dreamlike familiarity to the massive riots roiling the streets of Tehran. I remember the seemingly spontaneous rallies that brought the country to a screeching halt. The young, fearless protesters daring the security forces to make them martyrs in the cause of freedom. The late-night call-and-response of Allahu akbar (God is great!) echoing from rooftop to rooftop. The strange confederacies between young students and elderly clerics, military men and intelligentsia, conservatives and reformists, all united by a common cause.
Never in the 30 years since that revolution has Iran experienced anything like the popular protests that we have seen in the past week. By now, the accusations of election fraud are fairly well known. It is implausible that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won in a landslide re-election. It is doubtful that he not only took the capital city, Tehran — the heart of the reformist movement — by a staggering 50% but also managed to win in Azerbaijan, the birthplace of his chief rival, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, by a 4-to-1 margin. (As an Azeri friend of mine said, this would be akin to Senator John McCain winning the African-American vote against Barack Obama.) It seems odd that the election was called so soon after the polls had closed, despite the many millions of ballots still to be counted, most of them by hand.
The young and the middle class are not the only ones outraged by these election results. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, perhaps the second most powerful man in Iran and certainly the richest, and former President Mohammed Khatami, by far the country's most popular statesman, have both thrown their support behind the protesters. Two of Iran's highest religious authorities, the Grand Ayatullahs Hossein Ali Montazeri and Yousof Sane'i, have issued fatwas condemning acts of election fraud. Even Ahmadinejad's conservative rival, Mohsen Rezaei, a former Revolutionary Guards commander and a far more hawkish figure than Ahmadinejad, has claimed the election was rigged.
The simplistic paradigms of "reformist vs. conservative," "secularists vs. theocrats," "young vs. old" that have colored so much of the Western media's perception of Iranian politics no longer apply. The unrest now taking place in Iran is about far more than a stolen election. It is about the future of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
I've heard some in the media compare the events in Iran with the "Tehran spring" of 1999, when hundreds of thousands of young Iranians, buoyed by the reformist policies of then President Khatami, poured onto the streets to demand greater freedoms, only to be brutally beaten back by the country's security forces. Others point to 1989 and the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing for a suitable historical analogy for the antigovernment demonstrations that have rocked Iran. Yet for me and millions of my fellow compatriots — both inside and outside Iran — it is the memory of 1979 that most keenly informs our perception of what's taking place in our home country. The similarities between today's protests and the events of 1979 suggest that this election represents a real turning point in Iranian history.
All of this is not to say that another revolution is afoot in Iran. The Iranian regime, despite all its multiple and often competing poles of power, is far too entrenched to be so easily dislodged. Still, whatever happens, whoever ends up leading the country, however this crisis of legitimacy is resolved, one thing is certain: Iran will never again be the same. For better or worse, a new Iran is emerging. Whether it will be more isolationist and militaristic or more accommodating and democratic remains to be seen.
Friday, June 19, 2009
Defeating al-Qaeda and Neutralizing Its Support Network by Ali Soufan
In mid-June, a group of tourists visiting Yemen's tribal areas were brutally murdered by terrorists most likely connected to al-Qaeda. This tragic event underscores a particularly difficult challenge for the United States and its allies: as al-Qaeda's activities are undermined in one part of the world, it adapts and moves its operations elsewhere. Yemen and Somalia -- where the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab movement is now a major force -- are the latest examples of this phenomenon. To thwart al-Qaeda's versatility, our counterterrorism strategy must adapt to the terrorist organization's changing modus operandi and theaters of battle. We also need to improve our ability to counter asymmetrical threats, which require more than just a military response. Against a foe like al Qaeda which operates in the shadows, it's intelligence that is crucial to defeating them. It is therefore crucial that we use the best and most effective intelligence-collection methods, and that our key counterterrorism agencies work seamlessly together.
Evolution of al-Qaeda
Prior to the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda conducted a series of strikes designed to carry out Usama bin Laden's 1996 "declaration of war" on the United States. Although the attacks started with the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998, it was not until the carnage of September 11 that bin Laden's true intent hit home. At that time, al-Qaeda's network acted like a state in many ways: it had a highly centralized command-and-control structure and a defined territorial sanctuary.
After the United States realized that a group of individuals had carried out violent acts on a scale, and with a level of sophistication, previously only achievable by organized states, we responded decisively, effectively dismantling what was then considered al-Qaeda's "center of gravity." The terrorist network, however, quickly adapted. Events after the 2001 fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan provided an opportunity for bin Laden's group to reinvent itself and evolve into a more lethal form. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave bin Laden a revived platform to reinforce his justification for the war against the United States, challenging Muslims to fight what he described as a Crusader invasion of Muslim lands.
Al-Qaeda also played on the widespread fear that a Shiite-dominated Iraq would extend Iranian influence to the primarily Sunni regions of the Gulf Arab states, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the rest of the Muslim world. In turn, for many Sunnis, supporting the insurgency in Iraq -- as a means of targeting invading Western forces and countering the growing strength and influence of Shiites in Iran and now Iraq -- became as legitimate as supporting the Afghan mujahedin had been twenty years before against the Soviets.
And when al-Qaeda's campaign began to weaken in Iraq -- after Gen. David Petraeus's strategy of applying political warfare tactics helped to include Sunnis in the political and security future of Iraq and eased their fears -- the terrorist organization slowly carved out a safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In sum, instead of the centralized command and control that had been al-Qaeda's trademark prior to September 11, the organization switched to a greater emphasis from being the "chief operator" to taking the role of "chief motivator." The terror network's focus turned to manipulating regional, local, tribal, and sectarian conflicts to promote its interests. It also "franchised" the al-Qaeda name and encouraged other terrorist groups in places such as North Africa, South East Asia, the Middle East, as well as those that emerged later, in places like Iraq, to operate under the al-Qaeda's banner.
New Sanctuaries
While the U.S. focus has been on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, al-Qaeda's efforts to broaden and shift its theaters of operation have continued, with a particular focus on Yemen and Somalia.
Yemen's weak central government and powerful regional tribes, which in many ways act as autonomous mini-governments, make Yemen an easy place for al-Qaeda to operate. Some tribes are sympathetic to al-Qaeda's aims while others are willing to assist the group for reasons ranging from monetary reward to help in battles with rival tribes.
In Somalia, with the world's focus on piracy, radical jihadists now have one of the largest territories from which to operate since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Influenced by al-Qaeda, a group known al-Shabab (the youths) aims to create a Taliban-style Islamic state in Somalia, and since Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia earlier this year, the group has taken control of important towns and is now battling the government in the capital Mogadishu.
Eliminating the al-Qaeda Support System
To counter asymmetrical threats, U.S. strategy cannot be limited to the military option, but must utilize all available tools, including diplomacy, intelligence, military force, covert special operations, law enforcement, psychological and cultural programs, and economic assistance. An asymmetrical organization cannot survive without a strong support system. The actual bomb placers and suicide bombers are few; they depend, however, on a ring of supporters for money, supplies, safe houses, travel documents, transportation, and other services. The U.S. strategy should aim to decrease the size of this outer ring as the most effective route to combat the most dangerous individuals at the center. The smaller the ring, the more successful the United States will be.
Unfortunately, the wrong strategy can increase the size of this outer ring, leading to additional sympathy and support, and consequently to more terrorist recruits. Images of Abu Ghraib, allegations of torture, and harsh interrogation techniques, for example, are counterproductive when trying to win hearts and minds. Such tactics produce a no-win situation: they weakened U.S. moral standing and undercut the positive message the United States was attempting to disseminate. In addition, using enhanced interrogation techniques on a subject trained to anticipate torture and resist questioning is counterproductive to the goal of eliciting accurate and reliable information. It's a lose-lose scenario.
Closing Guantanamo
The Obama administration's promise to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, affords us an opportunity to finally deal with the detainees held there and give the world an important lesson in American justice.
Of the estimated 250 prisoners at Guantanamo, the United States has enough evidence to try and convict some of the detainees. One such example is Abdulrahim al-Nashiri, a Yemeni, known also as Mullah Billal, who was one of al-Qaeda's top field commanders and headed operations in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Nashiri could be tried and convicted without using any information provided under harsh techniques.
Some detainees can be tried in military courts; for others, enough evidence exists to try them in regular U.S. courts. Solid evidence exists, for example, against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian, to convict him for participating in the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
The final group of detainees includes those for whom evidence does not exist to convict them, either because they are lower ranking and just at the start of their terrorist careers, or because they simply should not be there in the first place. Ultimately, these prisoners need to be released into secure rehabilitation programs. The United States should send detainees to their native countries, where we trust them. Otherwise, detainees can be sent to allied countries that have strong rehabilitation programs.
Division of Labor between FBI and CIA
To successfully leverage all elements of national power against the threat from terrorism, we need to repair the division of labor between our intelligence and law enforcement agencies so that each is doing what it does best. While the FBI's expertise involves collecting evidence, following leads, unraveling criminal enterprises, questioning suspects, and putting together cases for trial, the CIA's main expertise is intelligence collection. The FBI operates knowing that all the evidence it collects may at some point need to stand up in court, while the CIA, by necessity, works in secrecy. Therefore, if the CIA is in charge of interrogations and counterterrorism investigations, either secrecy or justice is sacrificed -- neither of which being desirable. As such, the FBI should be the lead agency in collecting evidence, questioning terrorists, and building a case for potential trials, while the CIA should focus on what it does best, namely, collecting intelligence.
Evolution of al-Qaeda
Prior to the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda conducted a series of strikes designed to carry out Usama bin Laden's 1996 "declaration of war" on the United States. Although the attacks started with the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998, it was not until the carnage of September 11 that bin Laden's true intent hit home. At that time, al-Qaeda's network acted like a state in many ways: it had a highly centralized command-and-control structure and a defined territorial sanctuary.
After the United States realized that a group of individuals had carried out violent acts on a scale, and with a level of sophistication, previously only achievable by organized states, we responded decisively, effectively dismantling what was then considered al-Qaeda's "center of gravity." The terrorist network, however, quickly adapted. Events after the 2001 fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan provided an opportunity for bin Laden's group to reinvent itself and evolve into a more lethal form. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave bin Laden a revived platform to reinforce his justification for the war against the United States, challenging Muslims to fight what he described as a Crusader invasion of Muslim lands.
Al-Qaeda also played on the widespread fear that a Shiite-dominated Iraq would extend Iranian influence to the primarily Sunni regions of the Gulf Arab states, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the rest of the Muslim world. In turn, for many Sunnis, supporting the insurgency in Iraq -- as a means of targeting invading Western forces and countering the growing strength and influence of Shiites in Iran and now Iraq -- became as legitimate as supporting the Afghan mujahedin had been twenty years before against the Soviets.
And when al-Qaeda's campaign began to weaken in Iraq -- after Gen. David Petraeus's strategy of applying political warfare tactics helped to include Sunnis in the political and security future of Iraq and eased their fears -- the terrorist organization slowly carved out a safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In sum, instead of the centralized command and control that had been al-Qaeda's trademark prior to September 11, the organization switched to a greater emphasis from being the "chief operator" to taking the role of "chief motivator." The terror network's focus turned to manipulating regional, local, tribal, and sectarian conflicts to promote its interests. It also "franchised" the al-Qaeda name and encouraged other terrorist groups in places such as North Africa, South East Asia, the Middle East, as well as those that emerged later, in places like Iraq, to operate under the al-Qaeda's banner.
New Sanctuaries
While the U.S. focus has been on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, al-Qaeda's efforts to broaden and shift its theaters of operation have continued, with a particular focus on Yemen and Somalia.
Yemen's weak central government and powerful regional tribes, which in many ways act as autonomous mini-governments, make Yemen an easy place for al-Qaeda to operate. Some tribes are sympathetic to al-Qaeda's aims while others are willing to assist the group for reasons ranging from monetary reward to help in battles with rival tribes.
In Somalia, with the world's focus on piracy, radical jihadists now have one of the largest territories from which to operate since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Influenced by al-Qaeda, a group known al-Shabab (the youths) aims to create a Taliban-style Islamic state in Somalia, and since Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia earlier this year, the group has taken control of important towns and is now battling the government in the capital Mogadishu.
Eliminating the al-Qaeda Support System
To counter asymmetrical threats, U.S. strategy cannot be limited to the military option, but must utilize all available tools, including diplomacy, intelligence, military force, covert special operations, law enforcement, psychological and cultural programs, and economic assistance. An asymmetrical organization cannot survive without a strong support system. The actual bomb placers and suicide bombers are few; they depend, however, on a ring of supporters for money, supplies, safe houses, travel documents, transportation, and other services. The U.S. strategy should aim to decrease the size of this outer ring as the most effective route to combat the most dangerous individuals at the center. The smaller the ring, the more successful the United States will be.
Unfortunately, the wrong strategy can increase the size of this outer ring, leading to additional sympathy and support, and consequently to more terrorist recruits. Images of Abu Ghraib, allegations of torture, and harsh interrogation techniques, for example, are counterproductive when trying to win hearts and minds. Such tactics produce a no-win situation: they weakened U.S. moral standing and undercut the positive message the United States was attempting to disseminate. In addition, using enhanced interrogation techniques on a subject trained to anticipate torture and resist questioning is counterproductive to the goal of eliciting accurate and reliable information. It's a lose-lose scenario.
Closing Guantanamo
The Obama administration's promise to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, affords us an opportunity to finally deal with the detainees held there and give the world an important lesson in American justice.
Of the estimated 250 prisoners at Guantanamo, the United States has enough evidence to try and convict some of the detainees. One such example is Abdulrahim al-Nashiri, a Yemeni, known also as Mullah Billal, who was one of al-Qaeda's top field commanders and headed operations in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Nashiri could be tried and convicted without using any information provided under harsh techniques.
Some detainees can be tried in military courts; for others, enough evidence exists to try them in regular U.S. courts. Solid evidence exists, for example, against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian, to convict him for participating in the 1998 East African embassy bombings.
The final group of detainees includes those for whom evidence does not exist to convict them, either because they are lower ranking and just at the start of their terrorist careers, or because they simply should not be there in the first place. Ultimately, these prisoners need to be released into secure rehabilitation programs. The United States should send detainees to their native countries, where we trust them. Otherwise, detainees can be sent to allied countries that have strong rehabilitation programs.
Division of Labor between FBI and CIA
To successfully leverage all elements of national power against the threat from terrorism, we need to repair the division of labor between our intelligence and law enforcement agencies so that each is doing what it does best. While the FBI's expertise involves collecting evidence, following leads, unraveling criminal enterprises, questioning suspects, and putting together cases for trial, the CIA's main expertise is intelligence collection. The FBI operates knowing that all the evidence it collects may at some point need to stand up in court, while the CIA, by necessity, works in secrecy. Therefore, if the CIA is in charge of interrogations and counterterrorism investigations, either secrecy or justice is sacrificed -- neither of which being desirable. As such, the FBI should be the lead agency in collecting evidence, questioning terrorists, and building a case for potential trials, while the CIA should focus on what it does best, namely, collecting intelligence.
New Paper on Bolivia: Into the Abyss by Douglas Farah
The International Assessment and Strategy Center has just published a paper I wrote on the rapidly-deteriorating situation in Bolivia: Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Morales and the MAS.
The study outlines several of the more dangerous elements of the Morales government and his ties to Venezuela and Iran. Among them are:
o The systematic de-institutionalization of the nation’s fragile democratic structures, including the judiciary and independent auditing agencies;
o A complete restructuring of the military patterned after the Venezuelan model of integrating the armed forces into a host of civic and traditionally civilian roles;
o A radical restructuring of the military doctrine, endorsing the asymmetrical warfare tactics embraced and employed by radical Islamist groups and formally adopted by Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan military;
o A complete restructuring of the nation’s intelligence apparatus, advised by Cuban and Venezuelan experts on internal security;
o Growing ties to the FARC and other armed groups in Latin America;
o Permanent confrontation, insults and attacks-verbal and physical-on members of the press, leading to numerous international expressions of concern.
Of greatest concern is the little-discussed endorsement of Chavez of the a doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States based on the principles pioneered by radical Islamist groups.
Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela’s security doctrine to scrub it of all outside, “imperialist” influences. To replace the old doctrine, Chávez and the Venezuelan military leadership have focused on developing a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan security is a U.S. invasion. One of the main books he has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge. Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge’s book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal)104 for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass—including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief that it involves fighters willing tosacrifice their lives in pursuit of their goals. Before writing extensively on how to make chemical weapons and listing helpful places to find information on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that “someone with a high school education could make,” Verstrynge writes: "We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to guerrilla warfare, but it is important. However, it is not a mistake to also use things that are classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means “the type of terrorism uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.”
Based on this book, Verstrynge was invited by Chávez to give keynote address to military leaders in a 2005 conference titled “First Military Forum on Fourth Generation Warfare and Asymmetric Conflict” held at the military academy. Following the conference Gen. Raúl Baduel, the army commander and Chávez confidant ordered a special pocket size edition of the book to be printed up and distributed throughout the officer corps with explicit orders that it be studied cover to cover. In a December 12, 2008 interview with Venezuelan state television Verstynge lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is “deterritorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized,” a war where suicide bombers act as “atomic bombs for the poor.” Given the level of training Venezuelan military institutions are giving their Bolivian counterparts and the level of on the ground Venezuelan leadership and advising in Bolivia, it is highly likely that this doctrine is being transmitted from one military to the other.
The study outlines several of the more dangerous elements of the Morales government and his ties to Venezuela and Iran. Among them are:
o The systematic de-institutionalization of the nation’s fragile democratic structures, including the judiciary and independent auditing agencies;
o A complete restructuring of the military patterned after the Venezuelan model of integrating the armed forces into a host of civic and traditionally civilian roles;
o A radical restructuring of the military doctrine, endorsing the asymmetrical warfare tactics embraced and employed by radical Islamist groups and formally adopted by Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan military;
o A complete restructuring of the nation’s intelligence apparatus, advised by Cuban and Venezuelan experts on internal security;
o Growing ties to the FARC and other armed groups in Latin America;
o Permanent confrontation, insults and attacks-verbal and physical-on members of the press, leading to numerous international expressions of concern.
Of greatest concern is the little-discussed endorsement of Chavez of the a doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States based on the principles pioneered by radical Islamist groups.
Since 2005 Chávez has rewritten Venezuela’s security doctrine to scrub it of all outside, “imperialist” influences. To replace the old doctrine, Chávez and the Venezuelan military leadership have focused on developing a doctrine centered on asymmetrical warfare, in the belief that the primary threat to Venezuelan security is a U.S. invasion. One of the main books he has adopted is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge. Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge’s book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal)104 for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass—including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief that it involves fighters willing tosacrifice their lives in pursuit of their goals. Before writing extensively on how to make chemical weapons and listing helpful places to find information on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that “someone with a high school education could make,” Verstrynge writes: "We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to guerrilla warfare, but it is important. However, it is not a mistake to also use things that are classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means “the type of terrorism uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.”
Based on this book, Verstrynge was invited by Chávez to give keynote address to military leaders in a 2005 conference titled “First Military Forum on Fourth Generation Warfare and Asymmetric Conflict” held at the military academy. Following the conference Gen. Raúl Baduel, the army commander and Chávez confidant ordered a special pocket size edition of the book to be printed up and distributed throughout the officer corps with explicit orders that it be studied cover to cover. In a December 12, 2008 interview with Venezuelan state television Verstynge lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is “deterritorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized,” a war where suicide bombers act as “atomic bombs for the poor.” Given the level of training Venezuelan military institutions are giving their Bolivian counterparts and the level of on the ground Venezuelan leadership and advising in Bolivia, it is highly likely that this doctrine is being transmitted from one military to the other.
Hezbollah Closely Monitoring Events in Iran by Raghida Bahnam
After refusing to comment on the demonstrations that have taken place in Iran over the past five days, Hezbollah finally issued a statement on Wednesday in which Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said that "Iran is under the authority of the Wali Al Faqih and will pass through this crisis." However despite admitting the existence of the "crisis" that Iran is facing, Nasrallah was careful not to express support for one side or the other, and even attempted to claim that the two rival candidates, Ahmadinejad and Moussavi, are not too [politically] dissimilar.
Speaking about the March 14 Alliance, Nasrallah said "I advise them to leave the Iranian elections alone because they do not understand anything about it. It makes no sense for them to say that Ahmadinejad is the March 8 Alliance, and Mir Hossein Moussavi is the March 14 Alliance."
Nasrallah failed to elaborate further on events in Iran.
The Hezbollah chief had sent congratulatory telegrams to Iran on the night that the election results were announced. Nasrallah sent a telegram to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in which he congratulated him on "the epic victory" saying that this had "put joy into the hearts of all the Mujahedeen, and strongly revived hopes from anew in this great republic [of Iran]." Nasrallah also sent a telegram to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, congratulating him on his re-election, and saying that this [electoral] victory represents "a great hope to all the Mujahedeen and Resistance who are fighting against the forces of oppression and occupation"
Other than the brief statement released on Wednesday, Hezbollah have remained silent on the protests that broke out throughout Tehran following the announcement of Ahmadinejad's election victory. Hezbollah members would answer questions about the situation in Iran, and whether this would have an impact on Hezbollah, by merely saying that "this is an internal Iranian manner, and we have no comment."
This position that was taken up by Hezbollah can be understood upon looking at the group's relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as this is a direct relationship with the Supreme Leader of Iran [in his position as the Wali Al Faqih]. This relationship is not connected to the Iranian government. Hezbollah's relationship to the Iranian Supreme Leader is not merely an ideological, religious and political relationship, but it is also a financial relationship as well. No Iranian official is fully aware of the annual budget allocated to Hezbollah, although this is estimated to range between 60 million and 100 million dollars per year. The financial assistance provided to Hezbollah by Iran comes via a special fund allocated to the Supreme Leader and comprised of revenue from oil resources and production organizations. This fund is no included in the public budget, and the Supreme Leader is solely in control of its distribution.
According to Qasim Qasir, a Lebanese journalist who specializes in Islamic Affairs, the direct link between [Supreme Leader of Iran] Ali Khamenei, and Hezbollah, gives the Lebanese party immunity from what is taking place in Iran. Qasir informed Asharq Al-Awsat that the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran takes place through the Supreme Leader, and not through the Iranian state itself, and that "this relationship has been ongoing since 1982 [when Hezbollah was established] regardless of who was President [of Iran]."
For example, [former Iranian President] Mohammad Khatami did not have as "ideal" a relationship with Hezbollah as Ahmadinejad. In 1997, Khatami visited Lebanon as part of his election campaign, he asked to meet with Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, but Nasrallah refused. Khatami won the [presidential] elections, and the tensions that marred his relationship with Hezbollah had no effect on Hezbollah's overall relationship with Iran. In fact some say that Hezbollah made considerable achievements during Khatami's time in office, and one can recall that Israel's armed forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon [in 2000] during this time.
Qasir also informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Khatami did not affect Iran's relationship with Hezbollah, but he added something new [to this relationship] which was to strengthen Iran's relation with Lebanon, especially with [former Prime Minister] Rafik al-Hariri."
Even though the [Iranian] presidency does not affect Hezbollah's relationship with Iran, the Lebanese movement was relieved at Ahmadinejad's re-election, as according to sources close to the Iranian President, Hezbollah believes that his victory "strengthens the…resistance, and the confrontation of the Israeli, American, and Zionist projects in the region." This was evident in Hassan Nasrallah's [congratulatory] message to Ahmadinejad.
Observers also say that according to Khatami's experience, had the reformist candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who also has the support of the Iranian students been elected, this would not have affected any change in Iran's relationship with Hezbollah. This is why Hezbollah is relatively unconcerned with the demonstrations that are taking place in Iran that are calling for Ahmadinejad's dismissal. Qasir confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that "Hezbollah would be relieved by an Ahmadinejad victory, for although Moussavi has the support of [some] Islamists, he has a slightly different point of view [from Ahmadinejad]. Ahmadinejad has helped Hezbollah by creating a revolutionary atmosphere."
Despite the fact that Hezbollah's relationship with Iran is conducted solely via the Supreme Leader, the demonstrations that are taking place in Iran can affect Hezbollah's image.
Former US State Department adviser, Graham Bannerman, informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Nasrallah's role in the region may change because he enjoys great popularity." He added "if the situation in Iran deteriorates, and violence increases with Tehran becoming a Tiananmen Square, this will undoubtedly have a negative impact on Hezbollah." Bannerman believes that "the more credibility that the Iranian regime loses, and the more that it resorts to violence, the more this [situation] will negatively impact upon Hezbollah."
Graham Bannerman participated in the recent Lebanese elections as an international observer, where he was present in Southern Lebanon, which is a Hezbollah strong-hold. He informed Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah's image in Lebanon will not change, and that Hezbollah and the Amal movement won 95 percent of the Shiite vote in Lebanon. Bannerman revealed that Hezbollah's strength in Lebanon "is based upon their [external] relationships and their popularity with the Lebanese Shiites who view them as protectors of the Shiite community."
There can be no doubt that the eyes of Hezbollah are on Iran, and that the movement is watching carefully the events that tare taking place in Iran, even if they are refusing to comment on them. This position is well-known and easy to understand, and Hezbollah are only concerned that something unforeseen may happen, or that these demonstrations may affect Khamenei's position. Bannerman informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Hezbollah can do very little to influence what is happening in Iran today, but of course they are closely monitoring the situation."
Speaking about the March 14 Alliance, Nasrallah said "I advise them to leave the Iranian elections alone because they do not understand anything about it. It makes no sense for them to say that Ahmadinejad is the March 8 Alliance, and Mir Hossein Moussavi is the March 14 Alliance."
Nasrallah failed to elaborate further on events in Iran.
The Hezbollah chief had sent congratulatory telegrams to Iran on the night that the election results were announced. Nasrallah sent a telegram to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in which he congratulated him on "the epic victory" saying that this had "put joy into the hearts of all the Mujahedeen, and strongly revived hopes from anew in this great republic [of Iran]." Nasrallah also sent a telegram to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, congratulating him on his re-election, and saying that this [electoral] victory represents "a great hope to all the Mujahedeen and Resistance who are fighting against the forces of oppression and occupation"
Other than the brief statement released on Wednesday, Hezbollah have remained silent on the protests that broke out throughout Tehran following the announcement of Ahmadinejad's election victory. Hezbollah members would answer questions about the situation in Iran, and whether this would have an impact on Hezbollah, by merely saying that "this is an internal Iranian manner, and we have no comment."
This position that was taken up by Hezbollah can be understood upon looking at the group's relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as this is a direct relationship with the Supreme Leader of Iran [in his position as the Wali Al Faqih]. This relationship is not connected to the Iranian government. Hezbollah's relationship to the Iranian Supreme Leader is not merely an ideological, religious and political relationship, but it is also a financial relationship as well. No Iranian official is fully aware of the annual budget allocated to Hezbollah, although this is estimated to range between 60 million and 100 million dollars per year. The financial assistance provided to Hezbollah by Iran comes via a special fund allocated to the Supreme Leader and comprised of revenue from oil resources and production organizations. This fund is no included in the public budget, and the Supreme Leader is solely in control of its distribution.
According to Qasim Qasir, a Lebanese journalist who specializes in Islamic Affairs, the direct link between [Supreme Leader of Iran] Ali Khamenei, and Hezbollah, gives the Lebanese party immunity from what is taking place in Iran. Qasir informed Asharq Al-Awsat that the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran takes place through the Supreme Leader, and not through the Iranian state itself, and that "this relationship has been ongoing since 1982 [when Hezbollah was established] regardless of who was President [of Iran]."
For example, [former Iranian President] Mohammad Khatami did not have as "ideal" a relationship with Hezbollah as Ahmadinejad. In 1997, Khatami visited Lebanon as part of his election campaign, he asked to meet with Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, but Nasrallah refused. Khatami won the [presidential] elections, and the tensions that marred his relationship with Hezbollah had no effect on Hezbollah's overall relationship with Iran. In fact some say that Hezbollah made considerable achievements during Khatami's time in office, and one can recall that Israel's armed forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon [in 2000] during this time.
Qasir also informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Khatami did not affect Iran's relationship with Hezbollah, but he added something new [to this relationship] which was to strengthen Iran's relation with Lebanon, especially with [former Prime Minister] Rafik al-Hariri."
Even though the [Iranian] presidency does not affect Hezbollah's relationship with Iran, the Lebanese movement was relieved at Ahmadinejad's re-election, as according to sources close to the Iranian President, Hezbollah believes that his victory "strengthens the…resistance, and the confrontation of the Israeli, American, and Zionist projects in the region." This was evident in Hassan Nasrallah's [congratulatory] message to Ahmadinejad.
Observers also say that according to Khatami's experience, had the reformist candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who also has the support of the Iranian students been elected, this would not have affected any change in Iran's relationship with Hezbollah. This is why Hezbollah is relatively unconcerned with the demonstrations that are taking place in Iran that are calling for Ahmadinejad's dismissal. Qasir confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that "Hezbollah would be relieved by an Ahmadinejad victory, for although Moussavi has the support of [some] Islamists, he has a slightly different point of view [from Ahmadinejad]. Ahmadinejad has helped Hezbollah by creating a revolutionary atmosphere."
Despite the fact that Hezbollah's relationship with Iran is conducted solely via the Supreme Leader, the demonstrations that are taking place in Iran can affect Hezbollah's image.
Former US State Department adviser, Graham Bannerman, informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Nasrallah's role in the region may change because he enjoys great popularity." He added "if the situation in Iran deteriorates, and violence increases with Tehran becoming a Tiananmen Square, this will undoubtedly have a negative impact on Hezbollah." Bannerman believes that "the more credibility that the Iranian regime loses, and the more that it resorts to violence, the more this [situation] will negatively impact upon Hezbollah."
Graham Bannerman participated in the recent Lebanese elections as an international observer, where he was present in Southern Lebanon, which is a Hezbollah strong-hold. He informed Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah's image in Lebanon will not change, and that Hezbollah and the Amal movement won 95 percent of the Shiite vote in Lebanon. Bannerman revealed that Hezbollah's strength in Lebanon "is based upon their [external] relationships and their popularity with the Lebanese Shiites who view them as protectors of the Shiite community."
There can be no doubt that the eyes of Hezbollah are on Iran, and that the movement is watching carefully the events that tare taking place in Iran, even if they are refusing to comment on them. This position is well-known and easy to understand, and Hezbollah are only concerned that something unforeseen may happen, or that these demonstrations may affect Khamenei's position. Bannerman informed Asharq Al-Awsat that "Hezbollah can do very little to influence what is happening in Iran today, but of course they are closely monitoring the situation."
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
The Voting Manipulation Industry in Iran by Mehdi Khalaji
With Iran's presidential campaign culminating on June 12, all three challengers to incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad are expressing increased concern about the possibility of election fraud and manipulation of the election. Not only are there complaints about regime influence on the campaign, such as biased coverage by state-run television, the voting itself can be manipulated in numerous ways.
Voting Procedures
According to Iranian law, the Interior Ministry administers elections. In each ward or county, the ministry forms an executive committee that consists of the ward or county head, the local head of the National Organization for Civil Registration, the chief prosecutor or his representative, and eight respected local figures. The Guardian Council has the duty of supervising the electoral process at each polling station and has created observation committees with more than 130,000 members. Each candidate has the right to send an observer to each fixed polling station to observe both the voting process and the ballot count.
In Iran, voting follows quite different procedures than those used in most Western countries. For instance, there is no voter registration. Instead, a person's voting eligibility is determined by a "birth certificate" (BC). (Although Iran has recently introduced national identification cards, these are not used for voting.) The BC, issued by the National Organization for Civil Registration, looks like a passport, with pages that can be stamped. Voters can go to any of the more than 60,000 voting stations across the country or around the world, including those in thirty-five U.S. cities. Since there is no requirement to vote near one's residence, voter turnout at a particular voting station, or even in a city, can theoretically exceed the estimated number of eligible voters in that locality. When a person receives a ballot, the BC is recorded and stamped, but there appears to be no verification, either during the voting or after, of the documentation.
Manipulation Mechanisms
Voting can be easily manipulated in several ways:
Collecting birth certificates. In previous elections, reports have surfaced that the Imam Khomeini Committee, a large state charity affiliated with the leader (or, as he insists, supreme leader), Ali Khamenei, "rent" BCs belonging to the poor. It has been alleged that after regular voting hours, those engaged in fraud fill out ballots using the rented BCs. In some elections, polls remained open for many hours after the designated closing time, feeding concern that irregular votes were being cast.
Eligible voters. Relying on birth certificates complicates the calculation of eligible voters. Different government offices give very different estimates: while the Interior Ministry puts the total number of eligible Iranian voters at 46 million, Iran's Center for Statistics claims the number is over 51 million. Not being able to even estimate the number of eligible voters makes it difficult to judge if "ghost" votes have been cast. According to the National Organization for Civil Registration, the number of existing BCs considerably exceeds the number of Iranians. Many BCs are issued as replacements for reportedly lost BCs, and there is little to prevent people from using the duplicate BCs to vote at two different polling stations. Also, some Iranians do not invalidate their relatives' BCs after they die. In the last presidential election, reformist sources announced that more than two million fraudulent BCs may have been used by the Basij militia and others to obtain ballots.
Illiteracy. According to official statistics, the illiteracy rate in Iran is more than 20 percent. Voters are required to write the name of their preferred candidate on the ballot; there are no pictorial symbols, and voters are not allowed to make an "X" to indicate their choice. Since many people are unable to write, the government allows volunteers, mostly affiliated with the Basij, to be inside polling stations to help voters write the name of their preferred candidate. Obviously, these Basij volunteers can easily write in any name they wish.
Mobile polling stations. According to the Ministry of Interior, there will be more than 14,000 mobile ballot boxes for people unable to vote at the nearly 47,000 fixed polling stations (for instance, the infirm, the elderly, and the military); the number of mobile boxes is more than ten times the number used in the previous election. Adequate supervision of the mobile boxes is extremely difficult, creating a situation where no one watches who casts the ballots or is present during the tally.
Counting process. The two-stage counting process presents perhaps the most troubling aspect of the elections. At each polling station, after the end of voting hours, the votes are counted and recorded on Form 22 in the presence of representatives from the candidates, the Interior Ministry, and the Guardian Council. These forms are secret however; the results are not announced to the press or released to the candidates. Instead, in the second stage of the counting process, the forms are sent to the Interior Ministry, where the votes are tallied and published on Form 28, which reports the votes by province or county. But because there is no supervision of the preparation, there is no way to compare Form 28 to Form 22. In other words, it is possible for agents from the Guardian Council or the Interior Ministry to change the vote totals before announcing them. This stage provokes suspicion among candidates as well as independent observers about the accuracy and fairness of the counting.
Validation of the election. The official validation of the election results is a two-stage process. The first stage is validation by the Guardian Council, which is a partisan body that does not bother to conceal its political preference. In the past, the Guardian Council has canceled the voting in some districts where voting problems allegedly occurred, and not surprisingly, these are often districts where reformers do well. The second stage of validation is by Khamenei, who has the constitutional authority to overrule the voters if he so chooses. In an open letter published on June 7, a group of Interior Ministry employees expressed concern about the ministry's plans to intervene and manipulate the election by various means. They mentioned a fatwa issued by an ayatollah in Qom, which provides ministry officials with a religious justification for manipulating the election in favor of Ahmadinezhad. Some reformist sources such as roozonline.com believe that the fatwa was issued by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, who is known to be a fervent supporter of Ahmadinezhad and his religious worldview. The representatives of Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karrobi also sent an open letter, published on June 8, to Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of the Guardian Council, warning about manipulation of the election.
Conclusion
Ahmadinezhad's rivals have no faith that the Interior Ministry will respect the law and conduct a fair election. Mehdi Karrobi and Mir Hossein Moussavi suggested that a "committee for safeguarding the fairness of vote" supervise the election on behalf of the candidates, but the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council rejected the idea. It is not clear how much voting manipulation will occur on June 12, but it is abundantly clear that Iran's election procedures leave ample opportunity for massive voter fraud.
Voting Procedures
According to Iranian law, the Interior Ministry administers elections. In each ward or county, the ministry forms an executive committee that consists of the ward or county head, the local head of the National Organization for Civil Registration, the chief prosecutor or his representative, and eight respected local figures. The Guardian Council has the duty of supervising the electoral process at each polling station and has created observation committees with more than 130,000 members. Each candidate has the right to send an observer to each fixed polling station to observe both the voting process and the ballot count.
In Iran, voting follows quite different procedures than those used in most Western countries. For instance, there is no voter registration. Instead, a person's voting eligibility is determined by a "birth certificate" (BC). (Although Iran has recently introduced national identification cards, these are not used for voting.) The BC, issued by the National Organization for Civil Registration, looks like a passport, with pages that can be stamped. Voters can go to any of the more than 60,000 voting stations across the country or around the world, including those in thirty-five U.S. cities. Since there is no requirement to vote near one's residence, voter turnout at a particular voting station, or even in a city, can theoretically exceed the estimated number of eligible voters in that locality. When a person receives a ballot, the BC is recorded and stamped, but there appears to be no verification, either during the voting or after, of the documentation.
Manipulation Mechanisms
Voting can be easily manipulated in several ways:
Collecting birth certificates. In previous elections, reports have surfaced that the Imam Khomeini Committee, a large state charity affiliated with the leader (or, as he insists, supreme leader), Ali Khamenei, "rent" BCs belonging to the poor. It has been alleged that after regular voting hours, those engaged in fraud fill out ballots using the rented BCs. In some elections, polls remained open for many hours after the designated closing time, feeding concern that irregular votes were being cast.
Eligible voters. Relying on birth certificates complicates the calculation of eligible voters. Different government offices give very different estimates: while the Interior Ministry puts the total number of eligible Iranian voters at 46 million, Iran's Center for Statistics claims the number is over 51 million. Not being able to even estimate the number of eligible voters makes it difficult to judge if "ghost" votes have been cast. According to the National Organization for Civil Registration, the number of existing BCs considerably exceeds the number of Iranians. Many BCs are issued as replacements for reportedly lost BCs, and there is little to prevent people from using the duplicate BCs to vote at two different polling stations. Also, some Iranians do not invalidate their relatives' BCs after they die. In the last presidential election, reformist sources announced that more than two million fraudulent BCs may have been used by the Basij militia and others to obtain ballots.
Illiteracy. According to official statistics, the illiteracy rate in Iran is more than 20 percent. Voters are required to write the name of their preferred candidate on the ballot; there are no pictorial symbols, and voters are not allowed to make an "X" to indicate their choice. Since many people are unable to write, the government allows volunteers, mostly affiliated with the Basij, to be inside polling stations to help voters write the name of their preferred candidate. Obviously, these Basij volunteers can easily write in any name they wish.
Mobile polling stations. According to the Ministry of Interior, there will be more than 14,000 mobile ballot boxes for people unable to vote at the nearly 47,000 fixed polling stations (for instance, the infirm, the elderly, and the military); the number of mobile boxes is more than ten times the number used in the previous election. Adequate supervision of the mobile boxes is extremely difficult, creating a situation where no one watches who casts the ballots or is present during the tally.
Counting process. The two-stage counting process presents perhaps the most troubling aspect of the elections. At each polling station, after the end of voting hours, the votes are counted and recorded on Form 22 in the presence of representatives from the candidates, the Interior Ministry, and the Guardian Council. These forms are secret however; the results are not announced to the press or released to the candidates. Instead, in the second stage of the counting process, the forms are sent to the Interior Ministry, where the votes are tallied and published on Form 28, which reports the votes by province or county. But because there is no supervision of the preparation, there is no way to compare Form 28 to Form 22. In other words, it is possible for agents from the Guardian Council or the Interior Ministry to change the vote totals before announcing them. This stage provokes suspicion among candidates as well as independent observers about the accuracy and fairness of the counting.
Validation of the election. The official validation of the election results is a two-stage process. The first stage is validation by the Guardian Council, which is a partisan body that does not bother to conceal its political preference. In the past, the Guardian Council has canceled the voting in some districts where voting problems allegedly occurred, and not surprisingly, these are often districts where reformers do well. The second stage of validation is by Khamenei, who has the constitutional authority to overrule the voters if he so chooses. In an open letter published on June 7, a group of Interior Ministry employees expressed concern about the ministry's plans to intervene and manipulate the election by various means. They mentioned a fatwa issued by an ayatollah in Qom, which provides ministry officials with a religious justification for manipulating the election in favor of Ahmadinezhad. Some reformist sources such as roozonline.com believe that the fatwa was issued by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, who is known to be a fervent supporter of Ahmadinezhad and his religious worldview. The representatives of Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karrobi also sent an open letter, published on June 8, to Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of the Guardian Council, warning about manipulation of the election.
Conclusion
Ahmadinezhad's rivals have no faith that the Interior Ministry will respect the law and conduct a fair election. Mehdi Karrobi and Mir Hossein Moussavi suggested that a "committee for safeguarding the fairness of vote" supervise the election on behalf of the candidates, but the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council rejected the idea. It is not clear how much voting manipulation will occur on June 12, but it is abundantly clear that Iran's election procedures leave ample opportunity for massive voter fraud.
Introducing the Warpship by Ian O'Neill
Until now, there has been little idea about what a spaceship propelled by a warp drive (or a warpship) would look like. Would it resemble the sleek Starship Enterprise? Or will it be like nothing we've seen before?
After speaking with Dr. Richard Obousy, he shared his concept for a futuristic, yet scientifically accurate, warpship design.
The physics behind the warpship is purely theoretical, however. 'Dark energy' needs to be understood and harnessed, plus vast amounts of energy needs to be generated, meaning the warpship is a technology that could only be conceived in the far future. That said, Dr. Obousy's warpship design uses our current knowledge of spacetime and superstring theory to arrive at this futuristic concept.
The physics behind the warp drive is, as you'd expect, complex. However, it is hoped that in the future mankind will learn how to harness 'dark energy', an energy that is theorized to permeate through the entire universe. Cosmologists are particularly interested in dark energy as it is most commonly associated with the observed expansion of the universe.
Immediately after the Big Bang, some 13.73 billion years ago, the universe expanded faster than the speed of light, an event called universal inflation. Dark energy (which still has experts baffled as to what it actually is) is theorized to have driven this expansion, and it continues to this day. Much like the 2-dimensional surface of a balloon stretching when being inflated, 3-dimensional space is stretching, propelling the galaxies away from one another.
If an advanced technology could harness this dark energy, a warpship could possibly manipulate the spacetime surrounding it. According to Dr. Obousy, the extra dimensions as predicted by superstring theory could be shrunk and expanded by the warp drive through manipulation of local dark energy. At the front of the warpship spacetime would be compressed, and it would expand behind.
"You can apply the analogy of a surfer riding a 'wave' of spacetime," Dr. Obousy told Discovery Space. This 'wave' would facilitate faster-than-light-speed propulsion without breaking any laws of physics.
The shape of the warpship was chosen to optimize the manipulation of surrounding dark energy, creating a spacetime bubble. How exactly the bubble would be created is still a mystery. But once the bubble gets created, spacetime at the front of the warpship would be compressed, and behind, it would expand. Inside the bubble, spacetime remains unchanged; therefore the warpship floats in the center of stationary space while the bubble moves through spacetime.
The bubble itself, containing the warpship, "drives the spacecraft forwards at arbitrarily high speeds," said Obousy. This means the warpship can travel faster than the speed of light.
To initiate the warp drive, however, vast amounts of energy would be required. Also, there will be some practical issues to overcome, such as preventing the creation of artificial black holes, as well as catastrophic warp bubble collapse when the power is switched off.
After speaking with Dr. Richard Obousy, he shared his concept for a futuristic, yet scientifically accurate, warpship design.
The physics behind the warpship is purely theoretical, however. 'Dark energy' needs to be understood and harnessed, plus vast amounts of energy needs to be generated, meaning the warpship is a technology that could only be conceived in the far future. That said, Dr. Obousy's warpship design uses our current knowledge of spacetime and superstring theory to arrive at this futuristic concept.
The physics behind the warp drive is, as you'd expect, complex. However, it is hoped that in the future mankind will learn how to harness 'dark energy', an energy that is theorized to permeate through the entire universe. Cosmologists are particularly interested in dark energy as it is most commonly associated with the observed expansion of the universe.
Immediately after the Big Bang, some 13.73 billion years ago, the universe expanded faster than the speed of light, an event called universal inflation. Dark energy (which still has experts baffled as to what it actually is) is theorized to have driven this expansion, and it continues to this day. Much like the 2-dimensional surface of a balloon stretching when being inflated, 3-dimensional space is stretching, propelling the galaxies away from one another.
If an advanced technology could harness this dark energy, a warpship could possibly manipulate the spacetime surrounding it. According to Dr. Obousy, the extra dimensions as predicted by superstring theory could be shrunk and expanded by the warp drive through manipulation of local dark energy. At the front of the warpship spacetime would be compressed, and it would expand behind.
"You can apply the analogy of a surfer riding a 'wave' of spacetime," Dr. Obousy told Discovery Space. This 'wave' would facilitate faster-than-light-speed propulsion without breaking any laws of physics.
The shape of the warpship was chosen to optimize the manipulation of surrounding dark energy, creating a spacetime bubble. How exactly the bubble would be created is still a mystery. But once the bubble gets created, spacetime at the front of the warpship would be compressed, and behind, it would expand. Inside the bubble, spacetime remains unchanged; therefore the warpship floats in the center of stationary space while the bubble moves through spacetime.
The bubble itself, containing the warpship, "drives the spacecraft forwards at arbitrarily high speeds," said Obousy. This means the warpship can travel faster than the speed of light.
To initiate the warp drive, however, vast amounts of energy would be required. Also, there will be some practical issues to overcome, such as preventing the creation of artificial black holes, as well as catastrophic warp bubble collapse when the power is switched off.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Ex-surgeon hurls criticisms at VA by Doug Davis
Bob Brown, 78, of Murfreesboro, an Army private first class for 3 1/2 years during the Korean War, was one of more than 6,800 veterans notified by the VA of possible exposure to infectious diseases because of misused equipment.
Brown, who had a colonoscopy at the York VA Medical Center in Murfreesboro, though, is one of the lucky ones; his tests were negative for HIV or hepatitis.
"I talked to one guy who can't touch his wife anymore. He's been married 25 years," said Brown. "He was one of the unlucky ones (who has an infectious disease)."
According to the York VA Medical Center's Web site, on Dec. 1, 2008, staff at the G.I. Clinic noticed a discrepancy in tubing while conducting a routine colonoscopy. After a complete review, the Tennessee Valley Healthcare System and the VA's National Center for Patient Safety could not rule out the possibility that an incorrect valve was used that day.
Ultimately, even though the Tennessee Valley Healthcare system believed the occurrence was isolated, all patients who received colonoscopies at York campus between April 23, 2003, and Dec. 1, 2008, were notified to come in for precautionary testing.
According to June 1 numbers on the York VA Web site, 6,805 patients were potentially affected, and all were notified. Of that number, 6,503 responded to the VA's outreach and agreed to be tested for possible infection. A total of 512 patients declined testing or appointment, while 302 patients are subject to continuing VA outreach efforts.
A total of 5,140 patients have been notified of test results, with six having the Hepatitis B virus, 19 Hepatitis C cases and one case of HIV exposure.
Brown continues to go to the Murfreesboro hospital regularly for medical care.
"It's pretty good," he said, "but they ought to get their equipment right."
Problems run deep
In a tell-all book, Rudolph Cumberbatch, 77, a retired chief of surgery at the York VA, hurls numerous criticisms at the VA health system, and at procedures between the Murfreesboro and Nashville campuses in particular.
"Two of the major problems were the mixing up the instruments from both campuses during the repackaging after sterilization, and the damage of the smaller and delicate instruments, particularly eye instruments, during the transportation back by truck to Murfreesboro," he wrote.
But Cumberbatch maintains that there were no incidents of botched tests reported while he was there.
"From 2001 until I left (in 2005), there was no incident" of an improper valve being used, he said.
Cumberbatch joined the Veterans Administration after 18 years of private practice in Washington state, beginning as chief of surgery in Cheyenne, Wy. He later served in similar capacities at VA hospitals in Salisbury, N.C., and Topeka, Kan., before moving to Murfreesboro in July 1992.
He spent 13 years in the Tennessee Valley Healthcare System, which oversees both York and Nashville VA campuses, with most of his time as chief of surgery at the Murfreesboro site.
The last four years of his employment, he was assistant chief of surgery over quality assurance. His specific assignment during that time was to review all the clinical data, internal and external reports. He had to evaluate the data and make recommendations for improvements on the quality of surgical care being delivered at the York and Nashville VA campuses.
In his recent book, "Failure Masquerading as Success," he writes:
"There are two critical reasons why the Veterans Healthcare System continues to be a dismal failure in multiple locations, including the Middle Tennessee region: An air of arrogance, a complete lack of knowledge and curiosity of the past history of the institutions by those folks chosen to manage these institutions ..." (and) "the level of mediocrity, lack of understanding of the basics of the health care delivery they are managing, and in many instances, the lack of integrity which exists among the many directors, associate directors, chiefs of staffs and other managers currently in the VHS."
He goes on to cite problems resulting from the process of sterilizing all surgical instruments from the York VA and the Nashville campus.
In speaking with The Murfreesboro Daily News Journal, Cumberbatch said that if any incidents of an improper valve being used were reported in Murfreesboro from 2001 to 2005 he would have known about it; he thinks the valve mix-up happened later.
"I think it is a valve mix-up in Nashville," Cumberbatch said. "All the valves were cleaned in Nashville, and none were cleaned (in Murfreesboro)."
Brown, who had a colonoscopy at the York VA Medical Center in Murfreesboro, though, is one of the lucky ones; his tests were negative for HIV or hepatitis.
"I talked to one guy who can't touch his wife anymore. He's been married 25 years," said Brown. "He was one of the unlucky ones (who has an infectious disease)."
According to the York VA Medical Center's Web site, on Dec. 1, 2008, staff at the G.I. Clinic noticed a discrepancy in tubing while conducting a routine colonoscopy. After a complete review, the Tennessee Valley Healthcare System and the VA's National Center for Patient Safety could not rule out the possibility that an incorrect valve was used that day.
Ultimately, even though the Tennessee Valley Healthcare system believed the occurrence was isolated, all patients who received colonoscopies at York campus between April 23, 2003, and Dec. 1, 2008, were notified to come in for precautionary testing.
According to June 1 numbers on the York VA Web site, 6,805 patients were potentially affected, and all were notified. Of that number, 6,503 responded to the VA's outreach and agreed to be tested for possible infection. A total of 512 patients declined testing or appointment, while 302 patients are subject to continuing VA outreach efforts.
A total of 5,140 patients have been notified of test results, with six having the Hepatitis B virus, 19 Hepatitis C cases and one case of HIV exposure.
Brown continues to go to the Murfreesboro hospital regularly for medical care.
"It's pretty good," he said, "but they ought to get their equipment right."
Problems run deep
In a tell-all book, Rudolph Cumberbatch, 77, a retired chief of surgery at the York VA, hurls numerous criticisms at the VA health system, and at procedures between the Murfreesboro and Nashville campuses in particular.
"Two of the major problems were the mixing up the instruments from both campuses during the repackaging after sterilization, and the damage of the smaller and delicate instruments, particularly eye instruments, during the transportation back by truck to Murfreesboro," he wrote.
But Cumberbatch maintains that there were no incidents of botched tests reported while he was there.
"From 2001 until I left (in 2005), there was no incident" of an improper valve being used, he said.
Cumberbatch joined the Veterans Administration after 18 years of private practice in Washington state, beginning as chief of surgery in Cheyenne, Wy. He later served in similar capacities at VA hospitals in Salisbury, N.C., and Topeka, Kan., before moving to Murfreesboro in July 1992.
He spent 13 years in the Tennessee Valley Healthcare System, which oversees both York and Nashville VA campuses, with most of his time as chief of surgery at the Murfreesboro site.
The last four years of his employment, he was assistant chief of surgery over quality assurance. His specific assignment during that time was to review all the clinical data, internal and external reports. He had to evaluate the data and make recommendations for improvements on the quality of surgical care being delivered at the York and Nashville VA campuses.
In his recent book, "Failure Masquerading as Success," he writes:
"There are two critical reasons why the Veterans Healthcare System continues to be a dismal failure in multiple locations, including the Middle Tennessee region: An air of arrogance, a complete lack of knowledge and curiosity of the past history of the institutions by those folks chosen to manage these institutions ..." (and) "the level of mediocrity, lack of understanding of the basics of the health care delivery they are managing, and in many instances, the lack of integrity which exists among the many directors, associate directors, chiefs of staffs and other managers currently in the VHS."
He goes on to cite problems resulting from the process of sterilizing all surgical instruments from the York VA and the Nashville campus.
In speaking with The Murfreesboro Daily News Journal, Cumberbatch said that if any incidents of an improper valve being used were reported in Murfreesboro from 2001 to 2005 he would have known about it; he thinks the valve mix-up happened later.
"I think it is a valve mix-up in Nashville," Cumberbatch said. "All the valves were cleaned in Nashville, and none were cleaned (in Murfreesboro)."
Muted Response Reflects U.S. Diplomatic Dilemma by Scott Wilson
The confused aftermath of Iran's presidential election is complicating the Obama administration's planned outreach to the Islamic republic and underscoring the challenges facing the president's new approach to the Middle East based on shared values and common interests.
The administration has remained as quiet as possible during the Iranian election season and in the days of street protests since Friday's vote. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been declared the winner over his more reform-minded opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, by a margin that opposition supporters have found impossible to believe.
As the Iranian government cracked down on public demonstrations and reportedly detained dozens of opposition leaders, Vice President Biden said yesterday on NBC's "Meet the Press" that he had "doubts" about the election returns but that "we're going to withhold comment" until a more intensive review takes place in the coming days.
"There's an awful lot of question about how this election was run," Biden said, noting that the high voter turnout in Iran's urban areas would argue against such a wide margin of victory for Ahmadinejad, whose conservative populism holds more appeal in rural areas. "I mean we're just waiting to see."
The cautious response illustrates the balance that the Obama administration is seeking between condemning what increasingly appears to be a fraudulent election and the likelihood that it will be dealing with Ahmadinejad after the dust settles.
The measured tone and approach stand in contrast to some of the Bush administration's reactions to democratic challenges abroad. For instance, that administration decided a day after the April 2002 coup toppling Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to recognize the unelected interim government, only to see the populist president back in office within days. The administration's relations with Chávez, who controls one of the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and with other left-leaning Latin American leaders deteriorated sharply in the ensuing years.
But the Obama administration's subdued response also reflects the peculiar nature of Iran's democracy, and what -- if any -- difference the winner of this presidential election signifies to U.S. policy interests in the region.
Iran's decisive political authority lies with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a Shiite cleric who holds the title of supreme leader. Such internationally pressing issues as Iran's nuclear program, which its leaders claim is for civilian power purposes only, fall under his purview.
But even within Iran's constrained democracy -- which Obama hailed last week for its robust debate -- Ahmadinejad held some political legitimacy for winning the 2005 presidential election. That vote was viewed at the time as fair, even though the list of candidates was culled by Iran's unelected religious leadership, as it was this time as well.
Questions surrounding Ahmadinejad's defeat of Mousavi -- who favored greater rights for women, a more moderate tone in Iran's dealings with the West, and maintaining Iran's nuclear program -- could make Obama's efforts to engage his government even more politically problematic.
Biden said yesterday that "talks with Iran are not a reward for good behavior" and indicated that negotiations should be pursued regardless of how the next few days unfold in Tehran.
"Our interests are the same before the election as after the election, and that is: We want them to cease and desist from seeking a nuclear weapon and having one in its possession, and secondly to stop supporting terror," he said.
But some Republicans, as well as Israel's government, say talks with a leader who has denied the Holocaust, threatened the Jewish state with annihilation and called Iran's nuclear program non-negotiable should be isolated. With accusations of fraud swirling around Ahmadinejad's victory, those hawkish voices are rising for Obama to change course.
Appearing yesterday on ABC's "This Week," former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney (R) said, "What has occurred is that the election is a fraud, the results are inaccurate, and you're seeing a brutal repression of the people as they protest."
"The president ought to come out and state exactly those words, indicate that this has been a terribly managed decision by the autocratic regime in Iran," said Romney, who has not ruled out another run for president in 2012. "It's very clear that the president's policies of going around the world and apologizing for America aren't working."
In his speech to Muslim nations in Cairo this month, Obama noted that "in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government" and recounted decades of subsequent hostility between the two countries.
"Rather than remain trapped in the past," he said, "I've made it clear to Iran's leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build."
Days later, Lebanese voters chose a coalition of pro-U.S. parties known as the "March 14 alliance" to form the next government, upsetting a movement led by the Islamist party Hezbollah.
The largely Shiite Muslim party receives large amounts of financial support from Iran, and the election outcome signaled the first pro-U.S. vote in the Middle East in years.
Whether Obama's overture to Muslims played a part in the result -- some analysts have identified higher-than-expected turnout for the March 14 alliance as a possibly decisive factor -- remains the subject of debate.
But one senior administration official said just after the Lebanese vote that Obama's Cairo speech "created leverage in a region where we were on defense" and that "the extremists now have to dance to the beat of our music."
Iran's hard-liners, at least for now, are backing another term for Ahmadinejad. How the Iranian electorate responds will probably shape the Obama administration's next steps. For now, as Biden indicated, the administration is watching.
"This was always going to be hard," said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity while the White House awaits a clearer sense of the results. "The fact is that there is clearly a debate going on among Iranians about Iran. It is not about us."
The administration has remained as quiet as possible during the Iranian election season and in the days of street protests since Friday's vote. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been declared the winner over his more reform-minded opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, by a margin that opposition supporters have found impossible to believe.
As the Iranian government cracked down on public demonstrations and reportedly detained dozens of opposition leaders, Vice President Biden said yesterday on NBC's "Meet the Press" that he had "doubts" about the election returns but that "we're going to withhold comment" until a more intensive review takes place in the coming days.
"There's an awful lot of question about how this election was run," Biden said, noting that the high voter turnout in Iran's urban areas would argue against such a wide margin of victory for Ahmadinejad, whose conservative populism holds more appeal in rural areas. "I mean we're just waiting to see."
The cautious response illustrates the balance that the Obama administration is seeking between condemning what increasingly appears to be a fraudulent election and the likelihood that it will be dealing with Ahmadinejad after the dust settles.
The measured tone and approach stand in contrast to some of the Bush administration's reactions to democratic challenges abroad. For instance, that administration decided a day after the April 2002 coup toppling Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to recognize the unelected interim government, only to see the populist president back in office within days. The administration's relations with Chávez, who controls one of the largest oil reserves outside the Middle East, and with other left-leaning Latin American leaders deteriorated sharply in the ensuing years.
But the Obama administration's subdued response also reflects the peculiar nature of Iran's democracy, and what -- if any -- difference the winner of this presidential election signifies to U.S. policy interests in the region.
Iran's decisive political authority lies with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a Shiite cleric who holds the title of supreme leader. Such internationally pressing issues as Iran's nuclear program, which its leaders claim is for civilian power purposes only, fall under his purview.
But even within Iran's constrained democracy -- which Obama hailed last week for its robust debate -- Ahmadinejad held some political legitimacy for winning the 2005 presidential election. That vote was viewed at the time as fair, even though the list of candidates was culled by Iran's unelected religious leadership, as it was this time as well.
Questions surrounding Ahmadinejad's defeat of Mousavi -- who favored greater rights for women, a more moderate tone in Iran's dealings with the West, and maintaining Iran's nuclear program -- could make Obama's efforts to engage his government even more politically problematic.
Biden said yesterday that "talks with Iran are not a reward for good behavior" and indicated that negotiations should be pursued regardless of how the next few days unfold in Tehran.
"Our interests are the same before the election as after the election, and that is: We want them to cease and desist from seeking a nuclear weapon and having one in its possession, and secondly to stop supporting terror," he said.
But some Republicans, as well as Israel's government, say talks with a leader who has denied the Holocaust, threatened the Jewish state with annihilation and called Iran's nuclear program non-negotiable should be isolated. With accusations of fraud swirling around Ahmadinejad's victory, those hawkish voices are rising for Obama to change course.
Appearing yesterday on ABC's "This Week," former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney (R) said, "What has occurred is that the election is a fraud, the results are inaccurate, and you're seeing a brutal repression of the people as they protest."
"The president ought to come out and state exactly those words, indicate that this has been a terribly managed decision by the autocratic regime in Iran," said Romney, who has not ruled out another run for president in 2012. "It's very clear that the president's policies of going around the world and apologizing for America aren't working."
In his speech to Muslim nations in Cairo this month, Obama noted that "in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government" and recounted decades of subsequent hostility between the two countries.
"Rather than remain trapped in the past," he said, "I've made it clear to Iran's leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build."
Days later, Lebanese voters chose a coalition of pro-U.S. parties known as the "March 14 alliance" to form the next government, upsetting a movement led by the Islamist party Hezbollah.
The largely Shiite Muslim party receives large amounts of financial support from Iran, and the election outcome signaled the first pro-U.S. vote in the Middle East in years.
Whether Obama's overture to Muslims played a part in the result -- some analysts have identified higher-than-expected turnout for the March 14 alliance as a possibly decisive factor -- remains the subject of debate.
But one senior administration official said just after the Lebanese vote that Obama's Cairo speech "created leverage in a region where we were on defense" and that "the extremists now have to dance to the beat of our music."
Iran's hard-liners, at least for now, are backing another term for Ahmadinejad. How the Iranian electorate responds will probably shape the Obama administration's next steps. For now, as Biden indicated, the administration is watching.
"This was always going to be hard," said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity while the White House awaits a clearer sense of the results. "The fact is that there is clearly a debate going on among Iranians about Iran. It is not about us."
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