Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network is seizing a greater role behind the scenes in Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort that could block the Barack Obama administration's stated goal of denying the terror network sanctuary in South Asia.
A three-month investigation of al-Qaeda's activities, from Nuristan in the north to Paktika in the southeast, suggests that bin Laden's terror network - working through Afghan and Pakistani partners - is present in almost every Afghan and Pakistani province along the fluid border areas between the two countries.
Interviews with US military commanders and American radio intercepts of Arab and Chechen fighters as well as confirmed captures or kills of foreign fighters inside Afghanistan bolster the findings.
More alarming to Western terrorism analysts and US commanders, however, is the recognition that al-Qaeda has succeeded in goading its regional partners into accepting the idea of a "two-front-war" against US-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and the government in Pakistan. That war in turn guarantees bin Laden's network permanent safe havens along the porous border between the two nations, from which it can plan larger international terrorist attacks.
Unlike in Iraq, where al-Qaeda chose to participate directly in battles with its own frontline fighters and under its own brand name, bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in South Asia is increasingly content to play a role behind the scenes, influencing key players in the struggle and furthering its political interests, said Western terrorism analysts and Afghans.
American terrorism experts say that al-Qaeda's leadership has chosen the senior leader of Pakistan's Taliban, Baitullah Mahsud, as their point man. Uzbek and Chechen "trigger men", most of whom have been living opposite across the border in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas in Pakistan, have helped Mahsud, 34, consolidate his own authority up and down the border in the past year. In March, the US government offered a US$5 million reward for Mahsud, whom it says is a "key al-Qaeda facilitator", or ally, responsible for multiple suicide attacks.
Pakistani officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan said this week that Mahsud was using al-Qaeda's highly trained gunmen in the Pakistani Taliban's ongoing guerrilla struggle in the Swat Valley. Mahsud bullied his way into a position of leadership across most of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas earlier this year when a new coalition of insurgent groups confirmed him as their "supreme commander" in February.
American counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan are focused on building a bulwark against al-Qaeda, which the Barack Obama administration deems an essential part of the puzzle for peace in South Asia. But Mahsud and several of his deputies, who operate on both sides of the border, have created a strong bridge linking the Pakistani Taliban with the Afghan Taliban in a two-front war with a border that has proven impossible for US and Pakistani forces to control.
"Al-Qaeda is operating parasitically on the successes of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban by providing them with critical services, including global media networks, resource mobilization and precious human capital," said Vahid Brown, an al-Qaeda analyst with West Point's prestigious Combating Terrorism Center (CTC).
An Afghan, working with Western forces in Afghanistan and who asked to remain anonymous, said he had monitored al-Qaeda radio traffic in a Paktika province district that is a stronghold of the Haqqani network, run by Sirajuddin Haqqani. "I set up a radio scanner two months ago and I picked up Chechens and Arabs talking regularly," he said. "At one point, we heard an Arab talking to a Chechen say, 'Hey, the money has come in, you can attack soon'." The Afghan said that an Afghan al-Qaeda figure, Maulvi Twaha, who he said he had personally seen shoot dead five Afghan students in 2001, was operating openly in the province, assisting foreign agents and fighters to enter and leave the region.
An American, embedded as a trainer with the Afghan National Army, confirmed similar radio traffic. "It sounds from radio chatter like they have more recruits coming in, including Arabs, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Chechen fighters," said US Army Major Cory Schultz, 37, from the San Francisco Bay Area.
A leading al-Qaeda propagandist and ideologue, Abu Yahya al-Libbi, an escapee from the US prison at Bagram in July 2005, claimed in a propaganda booklet released in mid-March that Pakistan's army should be treated as an occupying infidel army waging an offensive war on an invaded Muslim population. He told Pakistanis that it was incumbent on them, as "good Muslims", to fight their own government.
Al-Libbi has helped the Pakistani Taliban set up successful propaganda operations of their own with FM broadcast stations that operate through portable Chinese transmission boxes. "Abu Yahya al-Libbi translates the network's ideas to a popular audience" on both sides of the border, said Brian Fishman, also at West Point's CTC.
Al-Libbi maintains close ties to the "Tora Bora Front" in eastern Afghanistan, north of the White Mountains, and has been interviewed on the website of the front, which is the domain of Mujahid Khalis, the son of deceased mujahideen leader Younus Khalis, who welcomed bin Laden to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996.
Al-Qaeda's proxy Mahsud has aligned his fighters closely with those of Mullah "Radio" Fazlullah, whose insurgents are fighting a protracted war with Pakistani forces well to the north of Waziristan and centered in the region of Swat in Pakistan.
In a 2007 interview with this correspondent, Fazlullah did not mince words in support of al-Qaeda's goals in neighboring Afghanistan and around the globe: "When Muslims are under attack in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a duty to fight back against the American crusaders and their allies," he said.
Other leading insurgent groups led by Jalaluddin Haqqani's son, Sirajuddin, as well as Mullah Nazir, who operate along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border out of Waziristan, have been forced to agree to the new al-Qaeda-backed strategy for the two-front war, said Western terrorism analysts.
Though bin Laden remains the head of al-Qaeda, operational control and support for wars in South Asia is largely believed to be the work of his right-hand man, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, who lives in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Other leading American terrorism experts said al-Qaeda had made significant adaptations meant to enhance its own power base, albeit usually well hidden behind the scenes. "Al-Qaeda is acting as a force multiplier by providing funding, assistance in propaganda efforts using its print and video outlets, strategic planning ability and aid on tactics," said Seth Jones, an advisor to the US military and the author of the forthcoming book, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires.
Terrorism analysts believe that bin Laden has likely taken refuge in North or South Waziristan, or a large city well inside Pakistan's settled areas. They say his larger-than-life presence remains a thorn in the side of US efforts. "He is the head of the snake and he does matter," said Fishman, adding that bin Laden still likely takes part in the network's major decision-making.
West Point's terrorism analysts believe that al-Qaeda stands to gain from continued fighting and chaos on both sides of the border. "There has already been a significant movement of Pakistani Taliban leaders in the al-Qaeda camp into the settled areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and their front for operations planning is spreading," said Brown. "Hundreds of thousands of additional internally displaced persons in Pakistan means lots of fresh blood for al-Qaeda's ranks."
Both US military and Afghan security officials confirmed a steady movement - by air from Dubai and other aerial hubs, by land across Iran and water from the Gulf - of international jihadis from the Middle East to South Asia. Many Arabs, Chechens and other foreign fighters recently completed tours of fighting in Iraq, where al-Qaeda suffered significant setbacks.
American military commanders say they are doing what they can to flush out known Taliban and al-Qaeda safe havens inside Afghanistan, but terrorism experts believe insurgents are planning fresh attacks in conjunction with an influx of 20,000 US and NATO forces this summer.
Colonel John Spiszer, 46, of Harker Heights, Texas, who commands US forces north of the White Mountains in eastern Afghanistan, acknowledged that one, Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian al-Qaeda member, was contributing to the intense fight against his forces in the province of Kunar, not far from the Pakistani regions of Swat and Bajaur.
"The guys [al-Qaeda and other financiers] giving the insurgents money right now are doing it to survive and get fighters," he said. He added that his goal in pressing the fight along the border with Pakistan was to keep "facilitators and financiers" locked down in a battle near the border and keep them from further impacting the fight inside Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the ties between al-Qaeda and leading insurgent groups go back to the days of bin Laden's own involvement in the fight against the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, he fought in eastern Afghanistan himself near Khost in the remote town of Jaji in Paktia province. Many of al-Qaeda's Arab operatives later took up residence inside Afghanistan as the Taliban rose to power in the late 1990s. Most of this crowd fled to Pakistan in the wake of the US invasion in 2001.
Leading Arabs and Uzbeks, in addition to plotting international terrorist actions, became successful in the cross-border trade of opium and heroin. Efforts of Pakistani and Afghan warlords to wrest more control of Pakistan's share of the regional drug trade from these same groups have failed, said Western analysts and Afghans.
Across from Khost in Pakistan, over mountains traversable by bicycle, al-Qaeda's own military trainers still work closely with strategic Taliban commanders at Haqqani command centers like the Manba Ulum Haqqania madrassa (seminary) in Northern Waziristan.
American unmanned Predator drones have repeatedly dropped bombs on or near the religious school, which is believed to maintain a number of secret bases across Waziristan. As a precaution against the US's aerial raids, al-Qaeda members in Waziristan rarely have tea in groups of more than three, said Afghans who travel to the region.
In addition, Taliban fighters, often working with al-Qaeda military trainers, have started to train indoors as well as in small mud-walled compounds, where they attract only limited attention from US aerial overflights and drone bombing runs.
Most Afghanistan-Pakistan insurgent groups, led by Mahsud and Mullah Omar's Afghan Taliban, have not officially adopted the "al-Qaeda" brand name, but they have essentially sworn their allegiance to bin Laden, say leading experts on the terror network. They claim that al-Qaeda has learned from the mistake of going into business under its own name in Iraq and it prefers, instead, to remain behind the scenes, protected by local gunmen on the one hand, but capable of influencing the fight against US and foreign "infidels" in South Asia on the other hand.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Pentagon Plans New Arm to Wage Cyberspace Wars by David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker
The Pentagon plans to create a new military command for cyberspace, administration officials said Thursday, stepping up preparations by the armed forces to conduct both offensive and defensive computer warfare.
The military command would complement a civilian effort to be announced by President Obama on Friday that would overhaul the way the United States safeguards its computer networks.
Mr. Obama, officials said, will announce the creation of a White House office — reporting to both the National Security Council and the National Economic Council — that will coordinate a multibillion-dollar effort to restrict access to government computers and protect systems that run the stock exchanges, clear global banking transactions and manage the air traffic control system.
White House officials say Mr. Obama has not yet been formally presented with the Pentagon plan. They said he would not discuss it Friday when he announced the creation of a White House office responsible for coordinating private-sector and government defenses against the thousands of cyberattacks mounted against the United States — largely by hackers but sometimes by foreign governments — every day.
But he is expected to sign a classified order in coming weeks that will create the military cybercommand, officials said. It is a recognition that the United States already has a growing number of computer weapons in its arsenal and must prepare strategies for their use — as a deterrent or alongside conventional weapons — in a wide variety of possible future conflicts.
The White House office will be run by a “cyberczar,” but because the position will not have direct access to the president, some experts said it was not high-level enough to end a series of bureaucratic wars that have broken out as billions of dollars have suddenly been allocated to protect against the computer threats.
The main dispute has been over whether the Pentagon or the National Security Agency should take the lead in preparing for and fighting cyberbattles. Under one proposal still being debated, parts of the N.S.A. would be integrated into the military command so they could operate jointly.
Officials said that in addition to the unclassified strategy paper to be released by Mr. Obama on Friday, a classified set of presidential directives is expected to lay out the military’s new responsibilities and how it coordinates its mission with that of the N.S.A., where most of the expertise on digital warfare resides today.
The decision to create a cybercommand is a major step beyond the actions taken by the Bush administration, which authorized several computer-based attacks but never resolved the question of how the government would prepare for a new era of warfare fought over digital networks.
It is still unclear whether the military’s new command or the N.S.A. — or both — will actually conduct this new kind of offensive cyberoperations.
The White House has never said whether Mr. Obama embraces the idea that the United States should use cyberweapons, and the public announcement on Friday is expected to focus solely on defensive steps and the government’s acknowledgment that it needs to be better organized to face the threat from foes attacking military, government and commercial online systems.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has pushed for the Pentagon to become better organized to address the security threat.
Initially at least, the new command would focus on organizing the various components and capabilities now scattered across the four armed services.
Officials declined to describe potential offensive operations, but said they now viewed cyberspace as comparable to more traditional battlefields.
“We are not comfortable discussing the question of offensive cyberoperations, but we consider cyberspace a war-fighting domain,“ said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. “We need to be able to operate within that domain just like on any battlefield, which includes protecting our freedom of movement and preserving our capability to perform in that environment.”
Although Pentagon civilian officials and military officers said the new command was expected to initially be a subordinate headquarters under the military’s Strategic Command, which controls nuclear operations as well as cyberdefenses, it could eventually become an independent command.
“No decision has been made,” said Lt. Col. Eric Butterbaugh, a Pentagon spokesman. “Just as the White House has completed its 60-day review of cyberspace policy, likewise, we are looking at how the department can best organize itself to fill our role in implementing the administration’s cyberpolicy.”
The creation of the cyberczar’s office inside the White House appears to be part of a significant expansion of the role of the national security apparatus there. A separate group overseeing domestic security, created by President George W. Bush after the Sept. 11 attacks, now resides within the National Security Council. A senior White House official responsible for countering the proliferation of nuclear and unconventional weapons has been given broader authority. Now, cybersecurity will also rank as one of the key threats that Mr. Obama is seeking to coordinate from the White House.
The strategy review Mr. Obama will discuss on Friday was completed weeks ago, but delayed because of continuing arguments over the authority of the White House office, and the budgets for the entire effort.
It was kept separate from the military debate over whether the Pentagon or the N.S.A. is best equipped to engage in offensive operations. Part of that debate hinges on the question of how much control should be given to American spy agencies, since they are prohibited from acting on American soil.
“It’s the domestic spying problem writ large,” one senior intelligence official said recently. “These attacks start in other countries, but they know no borders. So how do you fight them if you can’t act both inside and outside the United States?”
The military command would complement a civilian effort to be announced by President Obama on Friday that would overhaul the way the United States safeguards its computer networks.
Mr. Obama, officials said, will announce the creation of a White House office — reporting to both the National Security Council and the National Economic Council — that will coordinate a multibillion-dollar effort to restrict access to government computers and protect systems that run the stock exchanges, clear global banking transactions and manage the air traffic control system.
White House officials say Mr. Obama has not yet been formally presented with the Pentagon plan. They said he would not discuss it Friday when he announced the creation of a White House office responsible for coordinating private-sector and government defenses against the thousands of cyberattacks mounted against the United States — largely by hackers but sometimes by foreign governments — every day.
But he is expected to sign a classified order in coming weeks that will create the military cybercommand, officials said. It is a recognition that the United States already has a growing number of computer weapons in its arsenal and must prepare strategies for their use — as a deterrent or alongside conventional weapons — in a wide variety of possible future conflicts.
The White House office will be run by a “cyberczar,” but because the position will not have direct access to the president, some experts said it was not high-level enough to end a series of bureaucratic wars that have broken out as billions of dollars have suddenly been allocated to protect against the computer threats.
The main dispute has been over whether the Pentagon or the National Security Agency should take the lead in preparing for and fighting cyberbattles. Under one proposal still being debated, parts of the N.S.A. would be integrated into the military command so they could operate jointly.
Officials said that in addition to the unclassified strategy paper to be released by Mr. Obama on Friday, a classified set of presidential directives is expected to lay out the military’s new responsibilities and how it coordinates its mission with that of the N.S.A., where most of the expertise on digital warfare resides today.
The decision to create a cybercommand is a major step beyond the actions taken by the Bush administration, which authorized several computer-based attacks but never resolved the question of how the government would prepare for a new era of warfare fought over digital networks.
It is still unclear whether the military’s new command or the N.S.A. — or both — will actually conduct this new kind of offensive cyberoperations.
The White House has never said whether Mr. Obama embraces the idea that the United States should use cyberweapons, and the public announcement on Friday is expected to focus solely on defensive steps and the government’s acknowledgment that it needs to be better organized to face the threat from foes attacking military, government and commercial online systems.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has pushed for the Pentagon to become better organized to address the security threat.
Initially at least, the new command would focus on organizing the various components and capabilities now scattered across the four armed services.
Officials declined to describe potential offensive operations, but said they now viewed cyberspace as comparable to more traditional battlefields.
“We are not comfortable discussing the question of offensive cyberoperations, but we consider cyberspace a war-fighting domain,“ said Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. “We need to be able to operate within that domain just like on any battlefield, which includes protecting our freedom of movement and preserving our capability to perform in that environment.”
Although Pentagon civilian officials and military officers said the new command was expected to initially be a subordinate headquarters under the military’s Strategic Command, which controls nuclear operations as well as cyberdefenses, it could eventually become an independent command.
“No decision has been made,” said Lt. Col. Eric Butterbaugh, a Pentagon spokesman. “Just as the White House has completed its 60-day review of cyberspace policy, likewise, we are looking at how the department can best organize itself to fill our role in implementing the administration’s cyberpolicy.”
The creation of the cyberczar’s office inside the White House appears to be part of a significant expansion of the role of the national security apparatus there. A separate group overseeing domestic security, created by President George W. Bush after the Sept. 11 attacks, now resides within the National Security Council. A senior White House official responsible for countering the proliferation of nuclear and unconventional weapons has been given broader authority. Now, cybersecurity will also rank as one of the key threats that Mr. Obama is seeking to coordinate from the White House.
The strategy review Mr. Obama will discuss on Friday was completed weeks ago, but delayed because of continuing arguments over the authority of the White House office, and the budgets for the entire effort.
It was kept separate from the military debate over whether the Pentagon or the N.S.A. is best equipped to engage in offensive operations. Part of that debate hinges on the question of how much control should be given to American spy agencies, since they are prohibited from acting on American soil.
“It’s the domestic spying problem writ large,” one senior intelligence official said recently. “These attacks start in other countries, but they know no borders. So how do you fight them if you can’t act both inside and outside the United States?”
Stabilizing Iraq: Intelligence Lessons for Afghanistan by Barry White
After the U.S. initiation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, Washington's focus shifted away from the conflict in Afghanistan. Until recently, U.S. policy focused on winning the war in Iraq while securing an apparent coalition victory in Afghanistan. Although this policy yielded positive results in Iraq, it led to drift and a series of security reverses in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite vastly different circumstances, the United States has learned many lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom that can be applied to Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly in the intelligence arena.
Background
Not long ago, sectarian violence, brutal attacks with improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, and kidnappings were the norm in Iraq. This situation, however, has changed dramatically over the last eighteen months, and the frequency of these types of events has diminished significantly. Some observers attribute the dramatic changes in security to the 2007 "surge" of U.S. military ground forces into Iraq, while others believe the Sunni Awakening, in which U.S. forces helped establish local Sunni militias, should be credited with much of the success. Both factors contributed to the remarkable turnaround in Iraq; however, the major reason for success can be traced to timely and accurate intelligence, born of new technologies and innovation, new leadership at the combat support agencies (CSAs), and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) derived from lessons learned on the battlefield, which enabled U.S. forces to undertake highly effective, intelligence-driven operations.
In Iraq, initially, the enemy was always one or two steps ahead of the coalition, but improved intelligence capabilities and adjustments in TTPs changed this dynamic. Accurate, timely intelligence allowed coalition forces to be proactive rather than reactive -- often disrupting the enemy during the planning or implementation phase of an operation. Army and Marine intelligence along with the Department of Defense (DOD) and national intelligence agencies have made significant changes to better support counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
Intelligence-Driven Operations
The entire intelligence community and each intelligence discipline -- human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial or imagery intelligence (GEOINT), as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems -- primarily unmanned aerial vehicles -- have contributed in varying degrees to the effort in Iraq. The CSAs have begun to replicate in Afghanistan the support they have provided in Iraq, increasing the strain on the most precious resource -- manpower. But with a shift in priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, and with Washington committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, the manpower burden should ease.
Human Intelligence. Initially, HUMINT operations in Iraq were difficult and did not yield timely and accurate information: it takes time to develop HUMINT capabilities in any environment, especially under combat conditions, due to the need for operators to become familiar with their surroundings and understand the society and culture they are operating in. HUMINT was particularly important for exploiting the opportunities created by the Sunni Awakening, which yielded a torrent of information as local citizens began to identify al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) facilitators and operatives in their communities, allowing coalition forces to deliver a serious blow to AQI's infrastructure.
HUMINT has improved significantly in Iraq, and many of the lessons learned are being incorporated into training and preparing forces for future deployments. HUMINT units have also benefited from increased resourcing. HUMINT platoons are now being established in every military intelligence company at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, and two robust HUMINT companies are being incorporated into every battlefield surveillance brigade military intelligence battalion, providing an unprecedented level of tactical HUMINT capability. Experienced HUMINT planning and management sections have been added at the BCT and division levels. Civilian contractors have been employed to fill the need for more interpreters.
Lessons from Iraq have also informed an upgraded HUMINT in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, HUMINT assets are being pushed down to the BCT level, and operational commanders now have a better grasp of how best to employ HUMINT assets. Consequently, HUMINT teams and unit leadership are now more familiar with their surroundings and Afghan culture. Finally, through the use of civilian contractors and refocusing of the Army's language program, more interpreters and interrogators are being provided. Despite these successes, more needs to be done. U.S. forces must continue to make sensitive HUMINT information available to its coalition partners and the Afghan government. And NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must train Afghan military and civilian personnel to conduct HUMINT operations so they can collect, analyze, and disseminate this information to their own forces.
Signals Intelligence. SIGINT was very important at the onset of hostilities in Iraq, but became less relevant after the Iraqi army was defeated. With the reconstruction of Iraq's communication infrastructure, however, SIGINT has reemerged as a valuable source of information. The National Security Agency (NSA) has pushed cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level and deployed assets in theater so that information and support is timely and relevant. Because NSA has control over all SIGINT operations, it is able to lead effectively and synergize these operations. NSA hosts weekly meetings and video teleconferences in Iraq and Afghanistan with all SIGINT-producing entities to guide SIGINT collection, discuss successes and failures, share TTPs, and assess emerging enemy tactics.
SIGINT support continues to improve in Afghanistan, and as the country modernizes and the infrastructure improves, opportunities for collection and exploitation will increase. As it did in Iraq, NSA has started pushing cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level in Afghanistan. The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is being able to share intelligence with coalition partners without divulging sensitive collection methods. As with HUMINT, the Afghan government needs to be trained to conduct SIGINT operations on their own.
Geospatial Intelligence. In the area of imagery or geospatial support, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) continues to enhance the operational commander's ability to visualize the battlefield. In Iraq, NGA established geospatial support teams at the force, corps, and division levels, and in coordination with NSA recently provided manning down to the BCT level. NGA analysts were integrated into cryptologic support teams providing near-real-time actionable SIGINT and GEOINT to brigade combat team commanders. In conjunction with NSA, NGA developed the TTPs and identified requirements for integrating GEOINT into SIGINT and HUMINT "find-fix-finish" support operations. In addition, NGA advisors, working with the Iraqi Directorate of Imagery and Mapping-Intelligence Affairs (DIMA), forged an effective relationship with their Iraqi counterparts and helped them develop the analytic skills to support Iraqi combat units. These interactions also led to the development of a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement between NGA and the Iraqi DIMA. The agreement facilitates the exchange of geospatial data, allows the Imagery and Mapping Directorate to support Iraqi military forces with GEOINT, and decreases Iraq's reliance on U.S. forces. No other CSA has developed this level of intelligence cooperation and sharing with its Iraqi counterparts.
In Afghanistan, GEOINT has eclipsed the other intelligence disciplines in sharing of information and TTPs as well as training of analysts, just as it did in Iraq. NGA established geospatial support teams at various levels within ISAF and, again, similar to Iraq, plans to integrate NGA analysts into cryptologic support teams. In 2008, NGA advisors developed an excellent relationship with the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office. As a result, Afghan GEOINT analysts are providing products at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement has been developed between the two organizations.
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review Report states that persistent reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems have proven to be invaluable force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan. ISR platforms such as these give ground forces the ability to cover more territory, including previously inaccessible terrain. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, commented that "employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency doctrine, set the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed brigade combat team and regimental combat team commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight."
The robust ISR currently available to brigade-level commanders in Iraq provides them with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and is now being deployed to Afghanistan, where ISR use on the battlefield is becoming critical and decisive. Commanders will now have the flexibility to push ISR assets -- which are among the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today -- to the lowest tactical echelon. Afghanistan is a large country, roughly the size of Texas, with diverse and treacherous terrain, which in many places is not easily accessible. Persistent surveillance will significantly multiply coalition combat capabilities in Afghanistan. (See PolicyWatch #1519, "Intelligence Transformation: Meeting New Challenges in the Middle East and Beyond")
Conclusion
While Iraq and Afghanistan have many similarities, one major difference is the presence in Afghanistan of forty nations working as part of ISAF, under NATO command. The complexity of interoperability, data management, and data sharing (in part due to classification issues) is one of the top issues that NATO faces in day-to-day operations. The recent establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Center in Afghanistan, where analysts from NATO nations work together on critical intelligence products, provides an excellent example of needed cooperation. Sharing sensitive data in a multinational environment is challenging, but these issues must be resolved in order to win the counterinsurgency campaign and provide a peaceful and secure environment in Afghanistan.
Background
Not long ago, sectarian violence, brutal attacks with improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, and kidnappings were the norm in Iraq. This situation, however, has changed dramatically over the last eighteen months, and the frequency of these types of events has diminished significantly. Some observers attribute the dramatic changes in security to the 2007 "surge" of U.S. military ground forces into Iraq, while others believe the Sunni Awakening, in which U.S. forces helped establish local Sunni militias, should be credited with much of the success. Both factors contributed to the remarkable turnaround in Iraq; however, the major reason for success can be traced to timely and accurate intelligence, born of new technologies and innovation, new leadership at the combat support agencies (CSAs), and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) derived from lessons learned on the battlefield, which enabled U.S. forces to undertake highly effective, intelligence-driven operations.
In Iraq, initially, the enemy was always one or two steps ahead of the coalition, but improved intelligence capabilities and adjustments in TTPs changed this dynamic. Accurate, timely intelligence allowed coalition forces to be proactive rather than reactive -- often disrupting the enemy during the planning or implementation phase of an operation. Army and Marine intelligence along with the Department of Defense (DOD) and national intelligence agencies have made significant changes to better support counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
Intelligence-Driven Operations
The entire intelligence community and each intelligence discipline -- human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial or imagery intelligence (GEOINT), as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems -- primarily unmanned aerial vehicles -- have contributed in varying degrees to the effort in Iraq. The CSAs have begun to replicate in Afghanistan the support they have provided in Iraq, increasing the strain on the most precious resource -- manpower. But with a shift in priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, and with Washington committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, the manpower burden should ease.
Human Intelligence. Initially, HUMINT operations in Iraq were difficult and did not yield timely and accurate information: it takes time to develop HUMINT capabilities in any environment, especially under combat conditions, due to the need for operators to become familiar with their surroundings and understand the society and culture they are operating in. HUMINT was particularly important for exploiting the opportunities created by the Sunni Awakening, which yielded a torrent of information as local citizens began to identify al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) facilitators and operatives in their communities, allowing coalition forces to deliver a serious blow to AQI's infrastructure.
HUMINT has improved significantly in Iraq, and many of the lessons learned are being incorporated into training and preparing forces for future deployments. HUMINT units have also benefited from increased resourcing. HUMINT platoons are now being established in every military intelligence company at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, and two robust HUMINT companies are being incorporated into every battlefield surveillance brigade military intelligence battalion, providing an unprecedented level of tactical HUMINT capability. Experienced HUMINT planning and management sections have been added at the BCT and division levels. Civilian contractors have been employed to fill the need for more interpreters.
Lessons from Iraq have also informed an upgraded HUMINT in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, HUMINT assets are being pushed down to the BCT level, and operational commanders now have a better grasp of how best to employ HUMINT assets. Consequently, HUMINT teams and unit leadership are now more familiar with their surroundings and Afghan culture. Finally, through the use of civilian contractors and refocusing of the Army's language program, more interpreters and interrogators are being provided. Despite these successes, more needs to be done. U.S. forces must continue to make sensitive HUMINT information available to its coalition partners and the Afghan government. And NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must train Afghan military and civilian personnel to conduct HUMINT operations so they can collect, analyze, and disseminate this information to their own forces.
Signals Intelligence. SIGINT was very important at the onset of hostilities in Iraq, but became less relevant after the Iraqi army was defeated. With the reconstruction of Iraq's communication infrastructure, however, SIGINT has reemerged as a valuable source of information. The National Security Agency (NSA) has pushed cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level and deployed assets in theater so that information and support is timely and relevant. Because NSA has control over all SIGINT operations, it is able to lead effectively and synergize these operations. NSA hosts weekly meetings and video teleconferences in Iraq and Afghanistan with all SIGINT-producing entities to guide SIGINT collection, discuss successes and failures, share TTPs, and assess emerging enemy tactics.
SIGINT support continues to improve in Afghanistan, and as the country modernizes and the infrastructure improves, opportunities for collection and exploitation will increase. As it did in Iraq, NSA has started pushing cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level in Afghanistan. The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is being able to share intelligence with coalition partners without divulging sensitive collection methods. As with HUMINT, the Afghan government needs to be trained to conduct SIGINT operations on their own.
Geospatial Intelligence. In the area of imagery or geospatial support, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) continues to enhance the operational commander's ability to visualize the battlefield. In Iraq, NGA established geospatial support teams at the force, corps, and division levels, and in coordination with NSA recently provided manning down to the BCT level. NGA analysts were integrated into cryptologic support teams providing near-real-time actionable SIGINT and GEOINT to brigade combat team commanders. In conjunction with NSA, NGA developed the TTPs and identified requirements for integrating GEOINT into SIGINT and HUMINT "find-fix-finish" support operations. In addition, NGA advisors, working with the Iraqi Directorate of Imagery and Mapping-Intelligence Affairs (DIMA), forged an effective relationship with their Iraqi counterparts and helped them develop the analytic skills to support Iraqi combat units. These interactions also led to the development of a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement between NGA and the Iraqi DIMA. The agreement facilitates the exchange of geospatial data, allows the Imagery and Mapping Directorate to support Iraqi military forces with GEOINT, and decreases Iraq's reliance on U.S. forces. No other CSA has developed this level of intelligence cooperation and sharing with its Iraqi counterparts.
In Afghanistan, GEOINT has eclipsed the other intelligence disciplines in sharing of information and TTPs as well as training of analysts, just as it did in Iraq. NGA established geospatial support teams at various levels within ISAF and, again, similar to Iraq, plans to integrate NGA analysts into cryptologic support teams. In 2008, NGA advisors developed an excellent relationship with the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office. As a result, Afghan GEOINT analysts are providing products at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement has been developed between the two organizations.
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review Report states that persistent reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems have proven to be invaluable force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan. ISR platforms such as these give ground forces the ability to cover more territory, including previously inaccessible terrain. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, commented that "employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency doctrine, set the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed brigade combat team and regimental combat team commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight."
The robust ISR currently available to brigade-level commanders in Iraq provides them with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and is now being deployed to Afghanistan, where ISR use on the battlefield is becoming critical and decisive. Commanders will now have the flexibility to push ISR assets -- which are among the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today -- to the lowest tactical echelon. Afghanistan is a large country, roughly the size of Texas, with diverse and treacherous terrain, which in many places is not easily accessible. Persistent surveillance will significantly multiply coalition combat capabilities in Afghanistan. (See PolicyWatch #1519, "Intelligence Transformation: Meeting New Challenges in the Middle East and Beyond")
Conclusion
While Iraq and Afghanistan have many similarities, one major difference is the presence in Afghanistan of forty nations working as part of ISAF, under NATO command. The complexity of interoperability, data management, and data sharing (in part due to classification issues) is one of the top issues that NATO faces in day-to-day operations. The recent establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Center in Afghanistan, where analysts from NATO nations work together on critical intelligence products, provides an excellent example of needed cooperation. Sharing sensitive data in a multinational environment is challenging, but these issues must be resolved in order to win the counterinsurgency campaign and provide a peaceful and secure environment in Afghanistan.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa (TG-149)
Kassim Tajideen and Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi, two Africa-based supporters of the Hizballah terrorist organization, under E.O. 13224. E.O. 13224 targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism by freezing any assets the designees have under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.
"We will continue to take steps to protect the financial system from the threat posed by Hizballah and those who support it," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Not only is Hizballah itself a terrorist organization with global reach, it also recently acknowledged publicly that it provides support to Hamas."
Kassim Tajideen is an important financial contributor to Hizballah who operates a network of businesses in Lebanon and Africa. He has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah and has sent funds to Hizballah through his brother, a Hizballah commander in Lebanon. In addition, Kassim Tajideen and his brothers run cover companies for Hizballah in Africa. In 2003, Tajideen was arrested in Belgium in connection with fraud, money laundering, and diamond smuggling.
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi is a Cote d'Ivoire-based Hizballah supporter and is the personal representative of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Qubaysi communicates with Hizballah leaders and has hosted senior Hizballah officials traveling to Cote d'Ivoire and other parts of Africa to raise money for Hizballah. Qubaysi plays a visible role in Hizballah activities in Cote d'Ivoire, including speaking at Hizballah fundraising events and sponsoring meetings with high-ranking members of the terrorist organization.
Qubaysi also helped establish an official Hizballah foundation in Cote d'Ivoire which has been used to recruit new members for Hizballah's military ranks in Lebanon.
Identifying Information
KASSIM TAJIDEEN
Individual:
TAJIDEEN, Kassim
AKA:
Kassim Mohammad Tajiddine
AKA:
Qasim Taji Al-Din
AKA:
Kasim Taji Al-Din
AKA:
Kasim Tajmudin
DOB:
March 21, 1955
POB:
Sierra Leone
Passport 1:
0285669 (Sierra Leone)
Passport 2:
RL1794375 (Lebanon)
Nationality 1:
Leonean
Nationality 2:
Lebanese
ABD AL MENHEM QUBAYSI
Individual:
Abd-Al-Munim Al-Qubaysi
AKA:
Abd Al Menhem Kobeissi
AKA:
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi
AKA:
Abd Al Munhim Kubaysy
AKA:
Abdul Menhem Kobeissy
AKA:
Abdul Menhem Kobeissi
AKA:
Abdel Menhem Kobeissi
DOB 1:
January 1, 1964
DOB 2:
1961
POB:
Beirut, Lebanon
Passport:
RL1622378 (Lebanon)
Nationality:
Lebanese
Background on Hizballah
Hizballah is a Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, until September 11, 2001, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, but it also can and does act independently. In addition, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region, although Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime's secular orientation.
Iran and Syria provide significant support to Hizballah, giving money, weapons and training to the terrorist organization. In turn, Hizballah is closely allied with and has an allegiance to these states. Iran is Hizballah's main source of weapons and uses its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to train Hizballah operatives in Lebanon and Iran. Iran provides hundreds of millions of dollars per year to Hizballah.
The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group's highest governing body and has been led by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah since 1992. Hizballah is known or suspected to have been involved in numerous terrorist attacks throughout the world, including the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984.
Hizballah also perpetrated the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome, and has been implicated in the attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. The U.S. Government has indicted members of Hizballah for their participation in the June 1996 truck bomb attack of the U.S. Air Force dormitory at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Most recently, in July 2006, Hizballah terrorists kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, triggering a violent conflict that resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties in Lebanon and Israel.
The Annex to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995 listed Hizballah as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT). The Department of State designated Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997. Additionally, on October 31, 2001, Hizballah was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
"We will continue to take steps to protect the financial system from the threat posed by Hizballah and those who support it," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Not only is Hizballah itself a terrorist organization with global reach, it also recently acknowledged publicly that it provides support to Hamas."
Kassim Tajideen is an important financial contributor to Hizballah who operates a network of businesses in Lebanon and Africa. He has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah and has sent funds to Hizballah through his brother, a Hizballah commander in Lebanon. In addition, Kassim Tajideen and his brothers run cover companies for Hizballah in Africa. In 2003, Tajideen was arrested in Belgium in connection with fraud, money laundering, and diamond smuggling.
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi is a Cote d'Ivoire-based Hizballah supporter and is the personal representative of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Qubaysi communicates with Hizballah leaders and has hosted senior Hizballah officials traveling to Cote d'Ivoire and other parts of Africa to raise money for Hizballah. Qubaysi plays a visible role in Hizballah activities in Cote d'Ivoire, including speaking at Hizballah fundraising events and sponsoring meetings with high-ranking members of the terrorist organization.
Qubaysi also helped establish an official Hizballah foundation in Cote d'Ivoire which has been used to recruit new members for Hizballah's military ranks in Lebanon.
Identifying Information
KASSIM TAJIDEEN
Individual:
TAJIDEEN, Kassim
AKA:
Kassim Mohammad Tajiddine
AKA:
Qasim Taji Al-Din
AKA:
Kasim Taji Al-Din
AKA:
Kasim Tajmudin
DOB:
March 21, 1955
POB:
Sierra Leone
Passport 1:
0285669 (Sierra Leone)
Passport 2:
RL1794375 (Lebanon)
Nationality 1:
Leonean
Nationality 2:
Lebanese
ABD AL MENHEM QUBAYSI
Individual:
Abd-Al-Munim Al-Qubaysi
AKA:
Abd Al Menhem Kobeissi
AKA:
Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi
AKA:
Abd Al Munhim Kubaysy
AKA:
Abdul Menhem Kobeissy
AKA:
Abdul Menhem Kobeissi
AKA:
Abdel Menhem Kobeissi
DOB 1:
January 1, 1964
DOB 2:
1961
POB:
Beirut, Lebanon
Passport:
RL1622378 (Lebanon)
Nationality:
Lebanese
Background on Hizballah
Hizballah is a Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, until September 11, 2001, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, but it also can and does act independently. In addition, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region, although Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime's secular orientation.
Iran and Syria provide significant support to Hizballah, giving money, weapons and training to the terrorist organization. In turn, Hizballah is closely allied with and has an allegiance to these states. Iran is Hizballah's main source of weapons and uses its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to train Hizballah operatives in Lebanon and Iran. Iran provides hundreds of millions of dollars per year to Hizballah.
The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group's highest governing body and has been led by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah since 1992. Hizballah is known or suspected to have been involved in numerous terrorist attacks throughout the world, including the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984.
Hizballah also perpetrated the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 en route from Athens to Rome, and has been implicated in the attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. The U.S. Government has indicted members of Hizballah for their participation in the June 1996 truck bomb attack of the U.S. Air Force dormitory at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Most recently, in July 2006, Hizballah terrorists kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, triggering a violent conflict that resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties in Lebanon and Israel.
The Annex to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995 listed Hizballah as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT). The Department of State designated Hizballah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997. Additionally, on October 31, 2001, Hizballah was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
The Global Economic Crisis & Iraq's Future by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Joshua D. Goodman
Last summer, when oil prices reached all-time highs virtually every day, it seemed that one of the few silver linings was a more stable future for Iraq. Surging oil prices appeared to give Iraq a windfall; experts forecast an improving economy that could diminish support for the insurgency and increase resources for Iraq's nascent security forces. But now that the collapse in the world's economy has caused oil prices to plummet, what does the future hold for Iraq?
While estimates of Iraq's dependence on oil revenues vary wildly, oil clearly lies at the heart of the country's economy. Indeed, median estimates hold that oil accounts for more than 80 percent of its revenues. Iraq now faces several challenges spawned by the global recession. These challenges come just as the U.S.—pursuant to agreements with Iraq's government—is due to cease its patrols of cities. While a spiral into chaos is not inevitable, there is a clear opening for insurgent factions.
Impeding Iraqi Security
The decline in oil prices has left Iraq short of revenues. Speaking at a London-based think tank in early May, Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Saleh said that the economic crisis "has had a serious impact" on Iraq's economy, with "plummeting oil prices" forcing the country "to constrain our government spending."
Accordingly, Iraq's government slashed its 2009 budget by about 25 percent, from $80 billion to nearly $60 billion. Yet, despite this reduction in expenditures, around $20 billion of that figure will be deficit spending. This is made possible in part by the fact that a budgetary surplus of around $35 billion remains from the 2008 oil boom.
Jim Durso, who served in the transportation ministry of the Coalition Provisional Authority, predicts that Iraq will try to "make that money last as long as they can, spend it on essential services, and hope that foreign investment can pay for infrastructure."
However, budgetary shortfalls will likely directly impact Iraq's ability to maintain security. Over the past two years, the size of the Iraqi security forces has almost tripled—from 250,000 uniformed personnel to 609,000. With less money in its coffers for salaries, Iraq must curtail the expansion of these forces.
Bill Roggio, a civilian military affairs analyst and Iraq specialist, notes that budget problems will also slow down Iraq's acquisition of military hardware. "There are cutbacks in equipment, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters," he explained. "The army is also developing to protect the country from external threats, and growth in that capability will slow as well."
While monetary shortfalls are not the only reason behind Iraq's decision to curtail some counterinsurgency programs, the Iraqi armed forces are abandoning counterinsurgency tactics that have served the U.S. well since 2007. The Wall Street Journal notes a few examples:
In the Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad, once an al-Qaeda stronghold, contractor Hossam Hadi used to send 1,000 military-aged men out on U.S.-funded jobs to pick up trash and repair bullet-riddled storefronts. That work pacified potential troublemakers, but now he's down to 60 workers. In Baghdad's Shaab district, residents say that when the constant patrols of U.S. troops gave way recently to Iraqis who manned static posts, kidnappings and robberies rose. And just south of the capital, a former Sunni insurgent hired by the U.S. to keep the peace says his 145 militiamen are angry because they've received only a month's pay since Baghdad took over their program in January.
Budgetary limitations have also impeded Iraq's ability to pay the salaries of participants in the "Sons of Iraq," a U.S. military-initiated program that authorized the formation of paramilitary security forces to ensure stability at the local level. The Sons of Iraq had a stabilizing effect, not only because of the capabilities of these local forces, but also because the program provided individuals an economic alternative to the insurgency.
The U.S. transferred responsibility for paying the salaries of Sons of Iraq fighters to Iraq's government in early 2009, yet the process has been fraught with problems. Time reported in early May that "[n]umerous reports out of Iraq suggest that growing numbers of [Sons of Iraq] fighters have abandoned their posts, and that at least some have returned to the insurgent fold."
Economy & Infrastructure
The fear that some people who leave Sons of Iraq could return to the insurgency is linked to the broader dynamics of violence in Iraq: many insurgents are driven by economic factors. Writing in the Winter 2009 issue of Middle East Quarterly, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) research fellow Jeffrey Azarva notes, "63 percent of detainees were married, 79 percent had children, and the overwhelming majority lived with their extended family." When such individuals act as breadwinners for their family, Azarva concludes, "the allure of $200-$300 a month in supplemental income—al-Qaeda's average recompense for planting a roadside bomb—was simply too strong to resist."
For now, Iraq will be unable to do what government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh predicted in 2008: shift its spending focus from security to economy, social spending, and investment. Aside from the high price of security outlays, another problem stems from the fact that government employees received hefty raises last year. The New York Times reported in February that wages ate up 35 percent of Iraq's budget—and that was before the budget was trimmed.
Many Iraqi lawmakers now fear that the government has gone too far in cutting critical spending. The electricity ministry, for example, has had its capital expenditure budget chopped by over 80 percent, from $6.4 billion down to $1.1 billion. "What can we do with $1 billion?" a ministry spokesman lamented to the Wall Street Journal. "That is nothing compared to all the work we have to do to fix power."
Michael Rubin, a former Department of Defense official now at AEI, believes that high oil prices had previously covered up inefficiencies in Iraq's government. "While oil has subsidized the government bureaucracy," he observed, "any visitor to Baghdad sees how few 'cranes' there are. The oil boom simply hasn't translated into infrastructure projects."
"Much of the insurgency was greased by cold, hard cash," Rubin said. "When jobs disappear or young people enter the market to find there are no jobs, they will turn to other paymasters. So long as neighboring states can interject money, they can sponsor a resurgence in sectarian forces or even insurgent violence."
Will U.S. Commitment Flag?
America's economic woes, coupled with dwindling political will, make it unlikely that the U.S. will provide additional aid to cover Iraq's budgetary shortfalls. But it is also unlikely that the U.S. will curtail substantially its current commitments to Iraq.
One reason U.S. commitment will not waver stems from the fact that the course has essentially been set for U.S. efforts. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed on November 18, 2008, stipulates that American combat forces will withdraw in three years. The timetable for the drawdown of American commitments has dissipated calls for immediate cuts in war funding.
There are also political reasons that American commitments are unlikely to further decrease. The Obama administration is keenly aware that it could come under fire for "losing" Iraq if the country backslides into chaos. Though the administration is intent on reducing defense spending, cuts to date have mostly impacted conventional and ballistic warfare programs—not programs associated with the irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in April that about 10 percent of the budget—a significant portion—would be allocated to counterinsurgency.
Foreign Investment
Iraqi officials hope that foreign investment can make up the revenue shortfalls caused by declining oil prices. Incentives for investing in Iraq certainly exist: improving security makes investment less risky, and Iraq sits on some of the world's largest oil reserves.
Oil-producers in the Persian Gulf may lead the charge. Sterling Jensen, who played a significant role in the U.S. government's tribal engagements in Anbar Province, observes that "oil-producing countries got burned by the financial crisis, by investing in the West, and they're looking to use their capital in the region instead."
But Gulf money is not the only potential revenue stream. The "Invest Iraq 2009" conference in London earlier this year reportedly attracted more than 200 companies, including heavy hitters like General Electric and Vodafone. Iraq has also opened its oil fields to bids from multinational firms for the first time since 1973, when its oil industry was nationalized. As one British Petroleum (BP) spokesman told the Financial Times, "we could see ourselves back in Iraq by the end of the year barring any unforeseen delays."
Bill Murray, a political correspondent for the Energy Intelligence Group in Washington, D.C., predicts that investments by foreign oil companies could help to address the country's economic challenges. "If billions in up-front money from international oil firms becomes available in the fall through new oil contracts, this would obviously fill in part of the budget deficit in the short-term," he said.
However, questions remain about exactly when foreign funds invested now will boost Iraq's economy—particularly because these projects will not be operational immediately. Moreover, not all observers think that Iraq will attract the investments it requires.
"If I were a Gulf investor, I'd sit on my cash," Durso said. "There's plenty to develop in Qatar."
Whither the Insurgency?
One might naturally hope that the economic crisis would hurt not only Iraq's government, but also the insurgency. After all, Iran has been one of the insurgency's primary backers, and its economy absorbed an enormous blow as oil prices fell.
However, Iran's funding for the insurgency seems unlikely to slow, for two reasons. First, Iran's political system is largely immune from the popular will. Demands from the Iranian public to reallocate funds from Iran's schemes in Iraq to the Iranian infrastructure are unlikely to have an impact within the current system. Moreover, funding for the insurgency is well within the budgetary capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the primary state instrument that supports the insurgency.
Michael Rubin notes that the IRGC "have independent resources, through the revolutionary foundations and their own industries, and do not hesitate to apply them in Iraq."
Looking Forward
Even if Iraq's economy sags and Iran continues to sponsor insurgents, it is not inevitable that chaos will return. As Roggio posits, "the current problems are survivable as long as the violence doesn't spiral. But if the enemy takes advantage of this situation, if they're able to regroup and sustain a campaign, then this can have an impact."
Independent of the economy, there is likely to be a spike in violence when the U.S. leaves Iraq's cities. But as Durso notes, "the key question is whether violence goes down again when the Iraqi army and police start to address it."
Violence aside, economic indicators will provide critical clues about Iraq's future. One intelligence analyst who recently returned from the Anbar Province believes that major indicators for that region will include the flow of oil and development of the Okaz gas fields.
Other indicators will be important to watch for, too. For example, since economic conditions have fueled the insurgency, a drop in job creation could be a "warning sign."
While Iraq's decline is not preordained, the present situation will require its government to make smart, calculated fiscal decisions. Until the American departure, it will be critical for the Obama administration's Iraq advisors to help guide them.
While estimates of Iraq's dependence on oil revenues vary wildly, oil clearly lies at the heart of the country's economy. Indeed, median estimates hold that oil accounts for more than 80 percent of its revenues. Iraq now faces several challenges spawned by the global recession. These challenges come just as the U.S.—pursuant to agreements with Iraq's government—is due to cease its patrols of cities. While a spiral into chaos is not inevitable, there is a clear opening for insurgent factions.
Impeding Iraqi Security
The decline in oil prices has left Iraq short of revenues. Speaking at a London-based think tank in early May, Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Saleh said that the economic crisis "has had a serious impact" on Iraq's economy, with "plummeting oil prices" forcing the country "to constrain our government spending."
Accordingly, Iraq's government slashed its 2009 budget by about 25 percent, from $80 billion to nearly $60 billion. Yet, despite this reduction in expenditures, around $20 billion of that figure will be deficit spending. This is made possible in part by the fact that a budgetary surplus of around $35 billion remains from the 2008 oil boom.
Jim Durso, who served in the transportation ministry of the Coalition Provisional Authority, predicts that Iraq will try to "make that money last as long as they can, spend it on essential services, and hope that foreign investment can pay for infrastructure."
However, budgetary shortfalls will likely directly impact Iraq's ability to maintain security. Over the past two years, the size of the Iraqi security forces has almost tripled—from 250,000 uniformed personnel to 609,000. With less money in its coffers for salaries, Iraq must curtail the expansion of these forces.
Bill Roggio, a civilian military affairs analyst and Iraq specialist, notes that budget problems will also slow down Iraq's acquisition of military hardware. "There are cutbacks in equipment, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters," he explained. "The army is also developing to protect the country from external threats, and growth in that capability will slow as well."
While monetary shortfalls are not the only reason behind Iraq's decision to curtail some counterinsurgency programs, the Iraqi armed forces are abandoning counterinsurgency tactics that have served the U.S. well since 2007. The Wall Street Journal notes a few examples:
In the Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad, once an al-Qaeda stronghold, contractor Hossam Hadi used to send 1,000 military-aged men out on U.S.-funded jobs to pick up trash and repair bullet-riddled storefronts. That work pacified potential troublemakers, but now he's down to 60 workers. In Baghdad's Shaab district, residents say that when the constant patrols of U.S. troops gave way recently to Iraqis who manned static posts, kidnappings and robberies rose. And just south of the capital, a former Sunni insurgent hired by the U.S. to keep the peace says his 145 militiamen are angry because they've received only a month's pay since Baghdad took over their program in January.
Budgetary limitations have also impeded Iraq's ability to pay the salaries of participants in the "Sons of Iraq," a U.S. military-initiated program that authorized the formation of paramilitary security forces to ensure stability at the local level. The Sons of Iraq had a stabilizing effect, not only because of the capabilities of these local forces, but also because the program provided individuals an economic alternative to the insurgency.
The U.S. transferred responsibility for paying the salaries of Sons of Iraq fighters to Iraq's government in early 2009, yet the process has been fraught with problems. Time reported in early May that "[n]umerous reports out of Iraq suggest that growing numbers of [Sons of Iraq] fighters have abandoned their posts, and that at least some have returned to the insurgent fold."
Economy & Infrastructure
The fear that some people who leave Sons of Iraq could return to the insurgency is linked to the broader dynamics of violence in Iraq: many insurgents are driven by economic factors. Writing in the Winter 2009 issue of Middle East Quarterly, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) research fellow Jeffrey Azarva notes, "63 percent of detainees were married, 79 percent had children, and the overwhelming majority lived with their extended family." When such individuals act as breadwinners for their family, Azarva concludes, "the allure of $200-$300 a month in supplemental income—al-Qaeda's average recompense for planting a roadside bomb—was simply too strong to resist."
For now, Iraq will be unable to do what government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh predicted in 2008: shift its spending focus from security to economy, social spending, and investment. Aside from the high price of security outlays, another problem stems from the fact that government employees received hefty raises last year. The New York Times reported in February that wages ate up 35 percent of Iraq's budget—and that was before the budget was trimmed.
Many Iraqi lawmakers now fear that the government has gone too far in cutting critical spending. The electricity ministry, for example, has had its capital expenditure budget chopped by over 80 percent, from $6.4 billion down to $1.1 billion. "What can we do with $1 billion?" a ministry spokesman lamented to the Wall Street Journal. "That is nothing compared to all the work we have to do to fix power."
Michael Rubin, a former Department of Defense official now at AEI, believes that high oil prices had previously covered up inefficiencies in Iraq's government. "While oil has subsidized the government bureaucracy," he observed, "any visitor to Baghdad sees how few 'cranes' there are. The oil boom simply hasn't translated into infrastructure projects."
"Much of the insurgency was greased by cold, hard cash," Rubin said. "When jobs disappear or young people enter the market to find there are no jobs, they will turn to other paymasters. So long as neighboring states can interject money, they can sponsor a resurgence in sectarian forces or even insurgent violence."
Will U.S. Commitment Flag?
America's economic woes, coupled with dwindling political will, make it unlikely that the U.S. will provide additional aid to cover Iraq's budgetary shortfalls. But it is also unlikely that the U.S. will curtail substantially its current commitments to Iraq.
One reason U.S. commitment will not waver stems from the fact that the course has essentially been set for U.S. efforts. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed on November 18, 2008, stipulates that American combat forces will withdraw in three years. The timetable for the drawdown of American commitments has dissipated calls for immediate cuts in war funding.
There are also political reasons that American commitments are unlikely to further decrease. The Obama administration is keenly aware that it could come under fire for "losing" Iraq if the country backslides into chaos. Though the administration is intent on reducing defense spending, cuts to date have mostly impacted conventional and ballistic warfare programs—not programs associated with the irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in April that about 10 percent of the budget—a significant portion—would be allocated to counterinsurgency.
Foreign Investment
Iraqi officials hope that foreign investment can make up the revenue shortfalls caused by declining oil prices. Incentives for investing in Iraq certainly exist: improving security makes investment less risky, and Iraq sits on some of the world's largest oil reserves.
Oil-producers in the Persian Gulf may lead the charge. Sterling Jensen, who played a significant role in the U.S. government's tribal engagements in Anbar Province, observes that "oil-producing countries got burned by the financial crisis, by investing in the West, and they're looking to use their capital in the region instead."
But Gulf money is not the only potential revenue stream. The "Invest Iraq 2009" conference in London earlier this year reportedly attracted more than 200 companies, including heavy hitters like General Electric and Vodafone. Iraq has also opened its oil fields to bids from multinational firms for the first time since 1973, when its oil industry was nationalized. As one British Petroleum (BP) spokesman told the Financial Times, "we could see ourselves back in Iraq by the end of the year barring any unforeseen delays."
Bill Murray, a political correspondent for the Energy Intelligence Group in Washington, D.C., predicts that investments by foreign oil companies could help to address the country's economic challenges. "If billions in up-front money from international oil firms becomes available in the fall through new oil contracts, this would obviously fill in part of the budget deficit in the short-term," he said.
However, questions remain about exactly when foreign funds invested now will boost Iraq's economy—particularly because these projects will not be operational immediately. Moreover, not all observers think that Iraq will attract the investments it requires.
"If I were a Gulf investor, I'd sit on my cash," Durso said. "There's plenty to develop in Qatar."
Whither the Insurgency?
One might naturally hope that the economic crisis would hurt not only Iraq's government, but also the insurgency. After all, Iran has been one of the insurgency's primary backers, and its economy absorbed an enormous blow as oil prices fell.
However, Iran's funding for the insurgency seems unlikely to slow, for two reasons. First, Iran's political system is largely immune from the popular will. Demands from the Iranian public to reallocate funds from Iran's schemes in Iraq to the Iranian infrastructure are unlikely to have an impact within the current system. Moreover, funding for the insurgency is well within the budgetary capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the primary state instrument that supports the insurgency.
Michael Rubin notes that the IRGC "have independent resources, through the revolutionary foundations and their own industries, and do not hesitate to apply them in Iraq."
Looking Forward
Even if Iraq's economy sags and Iran continues to sponsor insurgents, it is not inevitable that chaos will return. As Roggio posits, "the current problems are survivable as long as the violence doesn't spiral. But if the enemy takes advantage of this situation, if they're able to regroup and sustain a campaign, then this can have an impact."
Independent of the economy, there is likely to be a spike in violence when the U.S. leaves Iraq's cities. But as Durso notes, "the key question is whether violence goes down again when the Iraqi army and police start to address it."
Violence aside, economic indicators will provide critical clues about Iraq's future. One intelligence analyst who recently returned from the Anbar Province believes that major indicators for that region will include the flow of oil and development of the Okaz gas fields.
Other indicators will be important to watch for, too. For example, since economic conditions have fueled the insurgency, a drop in job creation could be a "warning sign."
While Iraq's decline is not preordained, the present situation will require its government to make smart, calculated fiscal decisions. Until the American departure, it will be critical for the Obama administration's Iraq advisors to help guide them.
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Hizbollah tries to secure IMF funds by Roula Khalaf and Anna Fifield
Lebanon’s Hizbollah has held talks with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union as it seeks to secure continued financial support for Lebanon if the alliance it leads was to win next month’s parliamentary elections.
The discussions between the Shia militant group and donors take place amid intensifying concern in Beirut that a politically fragile, heavily indebted economy could come under severe strain if the current pro-western parliamentary majority was to lose the June 7 elections.
The Beirut government has benefited from the international support of Gulf states and western governments as it has sought to curb the powers of Hizbollah. Saudi Arabia in particular has been a backer of the government.
A victory by Hizbollah and its allies would be seen as a boost to Syria and Iran, the group’s backers. It could lead the US and other supporters of the current parliamentary majority to reconsider economic support for Lebanon. Washington considers Hizbollah a terrorist organisation but the group is seen by much of the Arab world as a resistance movement against Israel.
The pro-western coalition that dominates the government says it is confident it can maintain its parliamentary majority. But the race is tight, and a group of independents could decide which side is to form the next government.
Ali Fayad, a Hizbollah candidate who also heads the party’s think-tank, warned against punishing Lebanon economically if elections favoured the opposition.
He told the Financial Times his party was nonetheless considering the economic risks and discussing such prospects with the EU and the IMF.
The EU says it makes no distinction between Hizbollah and other parties in Lebanon, and will work with any democratically elected government. The EU has been providing about €60m ($84m) a year to Lebanon.
The IMF, with an assistance programme of $114m, also says it has met Hizbollah parliamentarians and officials from its economic think-tank as part of its normal work in Lebanon. But its financial assistance ends soon and another programme will depend on a decision by the fund’s executive board.
Washington has yet to make up its mind about Lebanon in the event of an opposition victory. But in recent weeks it has stressed the pivotal role played by Michel Suleiman, the Lebanese president, who belongs to neither camp.
The discussions between the Shia militant group and donors take place amid intensifying concern in Beirut that a politically fragile, heavily indebted economy could come under severe strain if the current pro-western parliamentary majority was to lose the June 7 elections.
The Beirut government has benefited from the international support of Gulf states and western governments as it has sought to curb the powers of Hizbollah. Saudi Arabia in particular has been a backer of the government.
A victory by Hizbollah and its allies would be seen as a boost to Syria and Iran, the group’s backers. It could lead the US and other supporters of the current parliamentary majority to reconsider economic support for Lebanon. Washington considers Hizbollah a terrorist organisation but the group is seen by much of the Arab world as a resistance movement against Israel.
The pro-western coalition that dominates the government says it is confident it can maintain its parliamentary majority. But the race is tight, and a group of independents could decide which side is to form the next government.
Ali Fayad, a Hizbollah candidate who also heads the party’s think-tank, warned against punishing Lebanon economically if elections favoured the opposition.
He told the Financial Times his party was nonetheless considering the economic risks and discussing such prospects with the EU and the IMF.
The EU says it makes no distinction between Hizbollah and other parties in Lebanon, and will work with any democratically elected government. The EU has been providing about €60m ($84m) a year to Lebanon.
The IMF, with an assistance programme of $114m, also says it has met Hizbollah parliamentarians and officials from its economic think-tank as part of its normal work in Lebanon. But its financial assistance ends soon and another programme will depend on a decision by the fund’s executive board.
Washington has yet to make up its mind about Lebanon in the event of an opposition victory. But in recent weeks it has stressed the pivotal role played by Michel Suleiman, the Lebanese president, who belongs to neither camp.
Al-Maliki's Call for a Presidential Regime in Iraq: Iraqi Politicians and Tribal Leaders Sound Off from Asharq Al-Awsat
The statements made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki last week, and in which he reiterated, for the second time, his criticism of the system of consensual democracy, as well as that of quotas, have given rise to diverse reactions. Some reject the idea for fear of a return to "monopolization of power and dictatorship," while others consider it as a reorganization of political life in anticipation of the elections.
Asma al-Musawi, member of the Political Bureau of the Al-Sadr Trend, which had withdrawn its ministers from the Al-Maliki government, in addition to its withdrawal from the Unified Iraqi Coalition that includes the Al-Maliki-led Al-Dawa Party, says: "Initially, after the National Assembly, and during the second Parliament mandate, the principle of participation in the political process was in force, but some parties have turned it into a quota system. This has [adversely] affected the legislative and executive powers in the country, and many problems have been caused by the quota system that turned the democracy sought by any Iraqi into a democracy where the [political] parties seek consensus among them on their respective quotas in government." Asma affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the quota system was the reason for the withdrawal of the Al-Sadr Trend ministers from the government, stressing that "the quota system can never succeed in Iraq."
In this connection, Al-Maliki previously called for a return to the presidential system, which means holding elections for the direct election of a president, by the people, and which means also giving the president extensive prerogatives which have been largely curtailed by the Iraqi Constitution. Concerning Al-Maliki's call, Asma says that "a return to the presidential system, in lieu of the parliamentary one, needs a decision by all the political blocs in Iraq. Such a decision would be followed by legislation and then by an amendment of the Constitution, which now provides for a parliamentary system."
For his part, Ali al-Hatim, chief of the Al-Dulaym tribes in Iraq and chairman of the Council of Chieftains and Tribes, and who participated as a leader of the Awakening groups in Al-Anbar in the fight against the Al-Qaeda Organization, welcomed Al-Maliki's call to abolish consensual democracy. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that "consensual democracy has proved to be a failure in Iraq, and that it is the main cause of past and present problems in the country," pointing out that "many political blocs bring to mind the dictatorship principle each time they think that their interests might be threatened by a return of the presidential system, through elections, to replace the parliamentary system."
Al-Hatim stresses that "some have stolen Iraq in the name of the consensual democracy that has been introduced by the American forces in Iraq, and that has proved that it has failed," calling for the adoption of a presidential system, through elections, and taking into consideration that "the person chosen by the people will be qualified to lead Iraq and political action in the country."
It should be noted that the tribes and the Awakening organizations in Iraq had entered into a fierce competition with the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is led by Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, in the local elections that were held last January. These forces and other Sunni quarters accuse the Islamic party of "grabbing" all the posts allocated for the Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi Government, under the principle of consensual democracy. In fact, if elections were to be held, the Islamic Party might not win any significant sovereignty-related post.
For his part, Firyad Rawanduzi, Deputy for the Kurdistan Alliance, has told Asharq Al-Awsat that the presidential system called for by the prime minister is prestigious and successful, but in a society with many ethnic minorities, many sects, and many nationalities, as is the case in Iraq, such a system cannot be used to establish a democratic rule on the basis of majority and minority considerations."
Furthermore, Rawanduzi asks: "If majority rule democracy is adopted, and the Shiites take power, for instance, where would the Kurds and the Sunnis go, then? And suppose that an alliance is concluded between the Shiites and the Kurds, where would the Sunni's role be then? Would they be excluded from government?"
Rawanduzi further says that "Iraq is like a triangle: removing any side from partnership in government would mean the elimination of Iraq."
For his part, Basim Sharif, deputy for the Al-Fadilah Party, affirms that "Al-Maliki's call is warranted, but it needs steps and study by all," but he adds that "consensual democracy is neither negative nor positive, even though it has been adopted, mainly because of the current situation in Iraq. Moreover, consensual democracy is not suitable to be adopted as a strategy or as an instrument of action for the future. Majority rule democracy should be used only at a specific stage. We should call entities by their political names, not their sect names, and we should consider citizens as free to choose whom they want; so, we can move to the majority rules system."
Asma al-Musawi, member of the Political Bureau of the Al-Sadr Trend, which had withdrawn its ministers from the Al-Maliki government, in addition to its withdrawal from the Unified Iraqi Coalition that includes the Al-Maliki-led Al-Dawa Party, says: "Initially, after the National Assembly, and during the second Parliament mandate, the principle of participation in the political process was in force, but some parties have turned it into a quota system. This has [adversely] affected the legislative and executive powers in the country, and many problems have been caused by the quota system that turned the democracy sought by any Iraqi into a democracy where the [political] parties seek consensus among them on their respective quotas in government." Asma affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the quota system was the reason for the withdrawal of the Al-Sadr Trend ministers from the government, stressing that "the quota system can never succeed in Iraq."
In this connection, Al-Maliki previously called for a return to the presidential system, which means holding elections for the direct election of a president, by the people, and which means also giving the president extensive prerogatives which have been largely curtailed by the Iraqi Constitution. Concerning Al-Maliki's call, Asma says that "a return to the presidential system, in lieu of the parliamentary one, needs a decision by all the political blocs in Iraq. Such a decision would be followed by legislation and then by an amendment of the Constitution, which now provides for a parliamentary system."
For his part, Ali al-Hatim, chief of the Al-Dulaym tribes in Iraq and chairman of the Council of Chieftains and Tribes, and who participated as a leader of the Awakening groups in Al-Anbar in the fight against the Al-Qaeda Organization, welcomed Al-Maliki's call to abolish consensual democracy. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that "consensual democracy has proved to be a failure in Iraq, and that it is the main cause of past and present problems in the country," pointing out that "many political blocs bring to mind the dictatorship principle each time they think that their interests might be threatened by a return of the presidential system, through elections, to replace the parliamentary system."
Al-Hatim stresses that "some have stolen Iraq in the name of the consensual democracy that has been introduced by the American forces in Iraq, and that has proved that it has failed," calling for the adoption of a presidential system, through elections, and taking into consideration that "the person chosen by the people will be qualified to lead Iraq and political action in the country."
It should be noted that the tribes and the Awakening organizations in Iraq had entered into a fierce competition with the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is led by Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, in the local elections that were held last January. These forces and other Sunni quarters accuse the Islamic party of "grabbing" all the posts allocated for the Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi Government, under the principle of consensual democracy. In fact, if elections were to be held, the Islamic Party might not win any significant sovereignty-related post.
For his part, Firyad Rawanduzi, Deputy for the Kurdistan Alliance, has told Asharq Al-Awsat that the presidential system called for by the prime minister is prestigious and successful, but in a society with many ethnic minorities, many sects, and many nationalities, as is the case in Iraq, such a system cannot be used to establish a democratic rule on the basis of majority and minority considerations."
Furthermore, Rawanduzi asks: "If majority rule democracy is adopted, and the Shiites take power, for instance, where would the Kurds and the Sunnis go, then? And suppose that an alliance is concluded between the Shiites and the Kurds, where would the Sunni's role be then? Would they be excluded from government?"
Rawanduzi further says that "Iraq is like a triangle: removing any side from partnership in government would mean the elimination of Iraq."
For his part, Basim Sharif, deputy for the Al-Fadilah Party, affirms that "Al-Maliki's call is warranted, but it needs steps and study by all," but he adds that "consensual democracy is neither negative nor positive, even though it has been adopted, mainly because of the current situation in Iraq. Moreover, consensual democracy is not suitable to be adopted as a strategy or as an instrument of action for the future. Majority rule democracy should be used only at a specific stage. We should call entities by their political names, not their sect names, and we should consider citizens as free to choose whom they want; so, we can move to the majority rules system."
In Security Shuffle, White House Merges Staffs by Helene Cooper
President Obama is scrapping the way President George W. Bush oversaw homeland security, and will incorporate domestic security officials into an expanded National Security Council.
The plan unveiled on Tuesday folds the White House Homeland Security Council, an advisory group created by Mr. Bush after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, into the National Security Council, which reports to Gen. James L. Jones, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser.
“The United States faces a wide array of challenges to its security,” Mr. Obama said in a statement, “and the White House must be organized to effectively and efficiently leverage the tremendous talent and expertise of the dedicated Americans who work within it.”
General Jones, in a briefing with reporters Tuesday, added: “There is no right hand, left hand anymore.”
The new configuration, he said, would “allow the president to make better decisions even more rapidly.”
The homeland security council will continue to be Mr. Obama’s first responder for natural disasters and other catastrophic events, White House officials said. But now homeland security council advisers will report to the National Security Council, and will have a seat at the table for meetings on national security issues.
The council is separate from the Cabinet-level Homeland Security Department, which is not affected by Tuesday’s announcement.
“The idea that somehow counterterrorism is a homeland security issue doesn’t make sense when you recognize the fact that terror around the world doesn’t recognize borders,” General Jones said.
He said Mr. Obama’s homeland security adviser, John Brennan, would strive to make sure that both domestic and foreign policy advisers worked closely on counterterrorism.
Mr. Obama ordered a 60-day review of the homeland security apparatus in February, and General Jones has been up front in wanting to see a more expansive security structure, with an enlarged National Security Council that would address broad issues of cybersecurity, drug trafficking by terrorists, arms proliferation and other issues.
At a time when Republicans have been increasingly critical of Mr. Obama’s handling of national security issues like terrorism suspects and the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, White House officials are taking pains to avoid looking like they are downgrading domestic security as a priority. Some White House officials had initially discussed getting rid of the homeland security council altogether.
But that council will continue to exist under the new plan.
House Republican staff members said they did not expect the reorganization to draw much fire from their bosses.
In his statement, Mr. Obama said, “These decisions reflect the fundamental truth that the challenges of the 21st century are increasingly unconventional and transnational, and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates all aspects of American power.”
The plan unveiled on Tuesday folds the White House Homeland Security Council, an advisory group created by Mr. Bush after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, into the National Security Council, which reports to Gen. James L. Jones, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser.
“The United States faces a wide array of challenges to its security,” Mr. Obama said in a statement, “and the White House must be organized to effectively and efficiently leverage the tremendous talent and expertise of the dedicated Americans who work within it.”
General Jones, in a briefing with reporters Tuesday, added: “There is no right hand, left hand anymore.”
The new configuration, he said, would “allow the president to make better decisions even more rapidly.”
The homeland security council will continue to be Mr. Obama’s first responder for natural disasters and other catastrophic events, White House officials said. But now homeland security council advisers will report to the National Security Council, and will have a seat at the table for meetings on national security issues.
The council is separate from the Cabinet-level Homeland Security Department, which is not affected by Tuesday’s announcement.
“The idea that somehow counterterrorism is a homeland security issue doesn’t make sense when you recognize the fact that terror around the world doesn’t recognize borders,” General Jones said.
He said Mr. Obama’s homeland security adviser, John Brennan, would strive to make sure that both domestic and foreign policy advisers worked closely on counterterrorism.
Mr. Obama ordered a 60-day review of the homeland security apparatus in February, and General Jones has been up front in wanting to see a more expansive security structure, with an enlarged National Security Council that would address broad issues of cybersecurity, drug trafficking by terrorists, arms proliferation and other issues.
At a time when Republicans have been increasingly critical of Mr. Obama’s handling of national security issues like terrorism suspects and the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, White House officials are taking pains to avoid looking like they are downgrading domestic security as a priority. Some White House officials had initially discussed getting rid of the homeland security council altogether.
But that council will continue to exist under the new plan.
House Republican staff members said they did not expect the reorganization to draw much fire from their bosses.
In his statement, Mr. Obama said, “These decisions reflect the fundamental truth that the challenges of the 21st century are increasingly unconventional and transnational, and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates all aspects of American power.”
Obama to visit Saudi Arabia to discuss peace, Iran by Ross Colvin
U.S. President Barack Obama will meet Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah in Riyadh next week to seek his support over the nuclear standoff with Iran and reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Obama will visit Riyadh on June 3 in a surprise addition to his scheduled three-day trip to Egypt, Germany and France, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said on Tuesday.
Saudi Arabia, the world's top oil exporter, is a staunch U.S. ally in the region and potentially a key player in the drive for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which Obama has declared a top foreign policy priority.
The Obama administration has embraced the 2002 Arab peace initiative, a proposal authored by Saudi Arabia that offered Israel normal ties with all Arab states in return for a full withdrawal from the lands it seized in the 1967 Middle East war, creation of a Palestinian state and a "just solution" for Palestinian refugees.
Gibbs dismissed the idea the Saudi stop was added to persuade Arab states to make conciliatory gestures to Israel.
"The president believes it's an important opportunity to discuss important business, like Middle East peace, but it's not born out of anything specific," he said.
Gibbs last week scotched speculation that Obama would use his much-anticipated speech to Muslims, which he is due to deliver in Egypt on June 4, to unveil a new Middle East peace initiative.
Obama has held talks with Jordan's King Abdullah and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent weeks as part of efforts to jumpstart stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace moves and will meet Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas at the White House on Thursday.
ANTI-IRAN ALLIANCE
The visit to Saudi Arabia comes as Obama is seeking to build an alliance of moderate Muslim nations to put pressure on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, which Washington fears is a cover to build a nuclear bomb.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal called in March for Arabs to agree on how to tackle Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for electricity generation.
Obama's administration has been at pains to reassure Saudi Arabia that Washington's efforts to reach out diplomatically to Iran will not affect bilateral relations.
Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of mainstream Sunni Islam, fears the growing regional power of non-Arab, Shi'ite Iran, which backs Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamist factions such as Hamas and has considerable influence in neighboring Iraq.
The United States has raised the idea of sending Yemeni terrorism detainees held at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, which Obama has said he will close by next January, to Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh has a program to rehabilitate militants.
Saudi Arabia is among the United States' top 15 trading partners. Last year, two-way trade was $67.3 billion, which equaled about 2 percent of total U.S. exports and imports.
Saudi Arabia exported $54.8 billion worth of oil and a few other products to the United States in 2008 and imported $12.5 billion of U.S. goods.
(Additional reporting by Doug Palmer in Washington and Ulf Laessing in Riyadh; Editing by John O'Callaghan)
Obama will visit Riyadh on June 3 in a surprise addition to his scheduled three-day trip to Egypt, Germany and France, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said on Tuesday.
Saudi Arabia, the world's top oil exporter, is a staunch U.S. ally in the region and potentially a key player in the drive for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which Obama has declared a top foreign policy priority.
The Obama administration has embraced the 2002 Arab peace initiative, a proposal authored by Saudi Arabia that offered Israel normal ties with all Arab states in return for a full withdrawal from the lands it seized in the 1967 Middle East war, creation of a Palestinian state and a "just solution" for Palestinian refugees.
Gibbs dismissed the idea the Saudi stop was added to persuade Arab states to make conciliatory gestures to Israel.
"The president believes it's an important opportunity to discuss important business, like Middle East peace, but it's not born out of anything specific," he said.
Gibbs last week scotched speculation that Obama would use his much-anticipated speech to Muslims, which he is due to deliver in Egypt on June 4, to unveil a new Middle East peace initiative.
Obama has held talks with Jordan's King Abdullah and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent weeks as part of efforts to jumpstart stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace moves and will meet Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas at the White House on Thursday.
ANTI-IRAN ALLIANCE
The visit to Saudi Arabia comes as Obama is seeking to build an alliance of moderate Muslim nations to put pressure on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, which Washington fears is a cover to build a nuclear bomb.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal called in March for Arabs to agree on how to tackle Iran's nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for electricity generation.
Obama's administration has been at pains to reassure Saudi Arabia that Washington's efforts to reach out diplomatically to Iran will not affect bilateral relations.
Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of mainstream Sunni Islam, fears the growing regional power of non-Arab, Shi'ite Iran, which backs Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamist factions such as Hamas and has considerable influence in neighboring Iraq.
The United States has raised the idea of sending Yemeni terrorism detainees held at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, which Obama has said he will close by next January, to Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh has a program to rehabilitate militants.
Saudi Arabia is among the United States' top 15 trading partners. Last year, two-way trade was $67.3 billion, which equaled about 2 percent of total U.S. exports and imports.
Saudi Arabia exported $54.8 billion worth of oil and a few other products to the United States in 2008 and imported $12.5 billion of U.S. goods.
(Additional reporting by Doug Palmer in Washington and Ulf Laessing in Riyadh; Editing by John O'Callaghan)
Coffee Counter Insurgency Analyzing by Aaron Mannes
The invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute recently posted a video from al-Nas TV in Egypt. A cleric named Safwat Higazi calls for a boycott against Starbucks because the Starbucks logo is Queen Esther (the heroine of Purim, a Jewish holiday celebrating a foiled plot to murder the Jews of ancient Persia.)
Higazi is not alone, another Egyptian cleric on another channel, citing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion cites detergents, soft drinks, as well as several chain fast food restaurants (including Little Ceasars along with Starbucks) as being Jewish-Zionist products that are part of a plot “to erase Islamic identity.”
This is, of course, like so much in the Arab media, simply ridiculous – feverish conspiracy theories intended to distract from a squalid reality. Hopefully recent Islamist calls to boycott Starbucks will not lead to violence. But the anti-Starbucks campaign has historic resonance and speaks to the root of frustrations in the greater Middle East.
Mocha vs. Java
Bernard Lewis’ The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years begins by describing a typical coffee shop in the Middle East. He writes:
"In outward appearance this Middle Eastern café patron does not look very different from a similar figure sitting in a café in Europe… He will look very different from his predecessors in the same place fifty years ago, still more a hundred years ago. That of course is also true of the European sitting in his café, but the two cases are far from being the same. The changes that have taken place in the appearance, the demeanor, the garb, the behavior of the European during that time are almost entirely of European origin…. In the Middle East, on the other hand, the changes, for the most part, originated from outside, from societies and cultures profoundly alien to the indigenous traditions of the Middle Easterner."
Lewis then goes on to describe how virtually everything in the coffee-shop is of Western origin, from the newspaper read by the patron to the clothes he wears, to the furniture he sits on, is of Western origin. Trousers, newspapers, radios, and cigarettes – all items readily found in a Middle Eastern café – are innovations introduced from the West. But to understand the profound extent of these changes, consider that coffee was originally exported to Europe from the Middle East. The term mocha comes from al-Mukha a Red Sea port in Yemen that was a major center of the coffee trade. For a time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coffee was the key to prosperity, after the western powers mastered ocean routes to the Far East – undermining Middle Eastern dominance of the spice trade. But this did not last, Lewis writes:
"By the end of the eighteenth century, when a Turk or Arab drank a cup of coffee, both the coffee and the sugar had been grown in European colonies and imported by Europeans. Only the hot water was of local provenance. During the nineteenth century, even that became doubtful, as European companies developed the new utilities in Middle Eastern cities."
Lewis’ book is about far more than the history of coffee in the Middle East. But coffee is an apt symbol of how Middle Easterners have been overwhelmed by the West and hopelessly buffeted by its overpowering military, economic, and cultural strength. Conspiracy theories flourish in that environment. 9/11 (and to some extent terrorism in general) is a product of this feeling of helplessness. Western military powers can bomb the Middle East at will. 9/11 was a response.
New Narrative Needed
None of the above is to justify terrorism. But the conflict with radical Islam is a global insurgency and in an insurgency the critical battlespace is hearts and minds. David KilCullen, in his landmark article Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency gives a ground level view of what is required – but it is worth considering and extrapolating to a global scale.
Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion-makers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a — single narrative“: a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organizes people‘s experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. …you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area, or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps, by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.
The jihad against Starbucks fits into a well established narrative. The challenge of developing a compelling alternative remains.
Higazi is not alone, another Egyptian cleric on another channel, citing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion cites detergents, soft drinks, as well as several chain fast food restaurants (including Little Ceasars along with Starbucks) as being Jewish-Zionist products that are part of a plot “to erase Islamic identity.”
This is, of course, like so much in the Arab media, simply ridiculous – feverish conspiracy theories intended to distract from a squalid reality. Hopefully recent Islamist calls to boycott Starbucks will not lead to violence. But the anti-Starbucks campaign has historic resonance and speaks to the root of frustrations in the greater Middle East.
Mocha vs. Java
Bernard Lewis’ The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years begins by describing a typical coffee shop in the Middle East. He writes:
"In outward appearance this Middle Eastern café patron does not look very different from a similar figure sitting in a café in Europe… He will look very different from his predecessors in the same place fifty years ago, still more a hundred years ago. That of course is also true of the European sitting in his café, but the two cases are far from being the same. The changes that have taken place in the appearance, the demeanor, the garb, the behavior of the European during that time are almost entirely of European origin…. In the Middle East, on the other hand, the changes, for the most part, originated from outside, from societies and cultures profoundly alien to the indigenous traditions of the Middle Easterner."
Lewis then goes on to describe how virtually everything in the coffee-shop is of Western origin, from the newspaper read by the patron to the clothes he wears, to the furniture he sits on, is of Western origin. Trousers, newspapers, radios, and cigarettes – all items readily found in a Middle Eastern café – are innovations introduced from the West. But to understand the profound extent of these changes, consider that coffee was originally exported to Europe from the Middle East. The term mocha comes from al-Mukha a Red Sea port in Yemen that was a major center of the coffee trade. For a time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, coffee was the key to prosperity, after the western powers mastered ocean routes to the Far East – undermining Middle Eastern dominance of the spice trade. But this did not last, Lewis writes:
"By the end of the eighteenth century, when a Turk or Arab drank a cup of coffee, both the coffee and the sugar had been grown in European colonies and imported by Europeans. Only the hot water was of local provenance. During the nineteenth century, even that became doubtful, as European companies developed the new utilities in Middle Eastern cities."
Lewis’ book is about far more than the history of coffee in the Middle East. But coffee is an apt symbol of how Middle Easterners have been overwhelmed by the West and hopelessly buffeted by its overpowering military, economic, and cultural strength. Conspiracy theories flourish in that environment. 9/11 (and to some extent terrorism in general) is a product of this feeling of helplessness. Western military powers can bomb the Middle East at will. 9/11 was a response.
New Narrative Needed
None of the above is to justify terrorism. But the conflict with radical Islam is a global insurgency and in an insurgency the critical battlespace is hearts and minds. David KilCullen, in his landmark article Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency gives a ground level view of what is required – but it is worth considering and extrapolating to a global scale.
Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion-makers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a — single narrative“: a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organizes people‘s experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. …you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area, or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps, by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.
The jihad against Starbucks fits into a well established narrative. The challenge of developing a compelling alternative remains.
Monday, May 25, 2009
Memorial Day 2009 (from the Patriot Post)
INSIGHT
"[L]et us solemnly remember the sacrifices of all those who fought so valiantly, on the seas, in the air, and on foreign shores, to preserve our heritage of freedom, and let us re-consecrate ourselves to the task of promoting an enduring peace so that their efforts shall not have been in vain." -- Dwight Eisenhower
"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." -- Sir Winston Churchill
"No person was ever honored for what he received. Honor has been the reward for what he gave." -- Calvin Coolidge
"Not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions, but there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men." -- Pericles
LIBERTY
"These Endured All And Gave All That
Justice Among Nations Might Prevail and
That Mankind Might Enjoy Freedom and
Inherit Peace."
-- inscription on a memorial at the American Cemetery overlooking Omaha Beach
THE GIPPER
"I have no illusions about what little I can add now to the silent testimony of those who gave their lives willingly for their country. Words are even more feeble on this Memorial Day, for the sight before us is that of a strong and good nation that stands in silence and remembers those who were loved and who, in return, loved their countrymen enough to die for them. Yet, we must try to honor them -- not for their sakes alone, but for our own. And if words cannot repay the debt we owe these men, surely with our actions we must strive to keep faith with them and with the vision that led them to battle and to final sacrifice. Our first obligation to them and ourselves is plain enough: The United States and the freedom for which it stands, the freedom for which they died, must endure and prosper." -- Ronald Reagan
CULTURE
"As we pause this Memorial Day to honor those who died to preserve our freedom, it's a good time to take stock of the threats to our nation. I believe that the greatest threat is internal decay that results from a lack of knowledge of those things that make America great." -- Lee Wishing, administrative director of The Center for Vision & Values at Grove City College
OPINION IN BRIEF
"More than most nations, America has been, from its start, a hero-loving place. ... George Washington was our first national hero, known everywhere, famous to children. When he died, we had our first true national mourning, with cities and states re-enacting his funeral. There was the genius cluster that surrounded him, and invented us -- Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Hamilton. Through much of the 20th century our famous heroes were in sports (Jack Dempsey, Joe Louis, the Babe, Joltin' Joe) the arts (Clark Gable, Robert Frost) business and philanthropy (from Andrew Carnegie to Bill Gates) and religion (Billy Graham). Nobody does fame like America, and they were famous. The category of military hero -- warrior -- fell off a bit, in part because of the bad reputation of war. Some emerged of heroic size -- Gens. Pershing and Patton, Eisenhower and Marshall. But somewhere in the 1960s I think we decided, or the makers of our culture decided, that to celebrate great warriors was to encourage war. And we always have too much of that. So they made a lot of movies depicting soldiers as victims and officers as brutish. This was especially true in the Vietnam era and the years that followed. Maybe a correction was in order: It's good to remember war is hell. But when we removed the warrior, we removed something intensely human, something ancestral and stirring, something celebrated naturally throughout the long history of man. Also it was ungrateful: They put themselves in harm's way for us." -- columnist Peggy Noonan
"[L]et us solemnly remember the sacrifices of all those who fought so valiantly, on the seas, in the air, and on foreign shores, to preserve our heritage of freedom, and let us re-consecrate ourselves to the task of promoting an enduring peace so that their efforts shall not have been in vain." -- Dwight Eisenhower
"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." -- Sir Winston Churchill
"No person was ever honored for what he received. Honor has been the reward for what he gave." -- Calvin Coolidge
"Not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions, but there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men." -- Pericles
LIBERTY
"These Endured All And Gave All That
Justice Among Nations Might Prevail and
That Mankind Might Enjoy Freedom and
Inherit Peace."
-- inscription on a memorial at the American Cemetery overlooking Omaha Beach
THE GIPPER
"I have no illusions about what little I can add now to the silent testimony of those who gave their lives willingly for their country. Words are even more feeble on this Memorial Day, for the sight before us is that of a strong and good nation that stands in silence and remembers those who were loved and who, in return, loved their countrymen enough to die for them. Yet, we must try to honor them -- not for their sakes alone, but for our own. And if words cannot repay the debt we owe these men, surely with our actions we must strive to keep faith with them and with the vision that led them to battle and to final sacrifice. Our first obligation to them and ourselves is plain enough: The United States and the freedom for which it stands, the freedom for which they died, must endure and prosper." -- Ronald Reagan
CULTURE
"As we pause this Memorial Day to honor those who died to preserve our freedom, it's a good time to take stock of the threats to our nation. I believe that the greatest threat is internal decay that results from a lack of knowledge of those things that make America great." -- Lee Wishing, administrative director of The Center for Vision & Values at Grove City College
OPINION IN BRIEF
"More than most nations, America has been, from its start, a hero-loving place. ... George Washington was our first national hero, known everywhere, famous to children. When he died, we had our first true national mourning, with cities and states re-enacting his funeral. There was the genius cluster that surrounded him, and invented us -- Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Hamilton. Through much of the 20th century our famous heroes were in sports (Jack Dempsey, Joe Louis, the Babe, Joltin' Joe) the arts (Clark Gable, Robert Frost) business and philanthropy (from Andrew Carnegie to Bill Gates) and religion (Billy Graham). Nobody does fame like America, and they were famous. The category of military hero -- warrior -- fell off a bit, in part because of the bad reputation of war. Some emerged of heroic size -- Gens. Pershing and Patton, Eisenhower and Marshall. But somewhere in the 1960s I think we decided, or the makers of our culture decided, that to celebrate great warriors was to encourage war. And we always have too much of that. So they made a lot of movies depicting soldiers as victims and officers as brutish. This was especially true in the Vietnam era and the years that followed. Maybe a correction was in order: It's good to remember war is hell. But when we removed the warrior, we removed something intensely human, something ancestral and stirring, something celebrated naturally throughout the long history of man. Also it was ungrateful: They put themselves in harm's way for us." -- columnist Peggy Noonan
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