Just when threats of terrorism had seemingly disappeared from the radar screen, Americans woke up Thursday morning to hear the news about four radical Muslims who plotted to bomb two synagogues in New York and shoot down a military plane using a Stinger missile. Fortunately, the FBI had infiltrated the plotters from the very beginning with a confidential informant who learned of the plan from an Afghan-born Muslim.
Prosecutors say the suspects obtained what they believed was a live Stinger missile and three improvised explosive devices with C-4 explosive. "While the weapons provided to the defendants by the cooperating witness were fake, the defendants thought they were absolutely real," said acting United States attorney Lev Dassin in a prepared statement.
Their intention was to punish America for killing Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The plotters identified two Jewish institutions in the Bronx to blow up using the C-4 plastic explosives and then planned on shooting down a military plane at a nearby military air base.
The virulent hatred for Jews was manifested in a statement made by the accused ringleader, James Cromitie. After lamenting that the "best target"—the World Trade Center—was no longer available, Cromitie spoke of killing Jews: "I hate those motherfuckers, those fucking Jewish bastards…I would like to [destroy] a synagogue."
As the plot developed and the would-be jihadists carried out surveillance, photographing synagogues and Jewish centers, the official FBI complaint released last night stated that "Cromitie pointed to people walking on the street in the vicinity of a Jewish Community Center and said if he had a gun, he would shoot each one in the head."
But Jews were not the only target. The complaint says the accused terrorists wanted to destroy American aircraft at a military base using missiles. According to the FBI document, would-be terrorist Onta Williams said the U.S. military "are killing brothers and sisters in Muslim countries so if we kill them here with IEDs and Stingers, it is equal."
There are several lessons that the U.S. government and public should finally learn from this plot.
The first is that the threat of home-grown terrorism is very real. The arrests come on the heels of convictions in a plot that targeted Fort Dix in New Jersey and one that sought to establish a jihadi training camp in Oregon.
All three cases ended without anyone being hurt—with the assistance of FBI informants. In Fort Dix, the defendants were arrested as they met with the informant to buy M-16 and AK-47 rifles to use in their planned attack.
As acting United States Attorney Ralph J. Marra Jr. said after the verdict: "The word should go out to any other would-be terrorists of the homegrown variety that the United States will find you, infiltrate your group, prosecute you and send you to a federal prison for a very long time."
In the training-camp case, the Seattle Times reported that "the government has relied significantly on information provided by James Ujaama, a Seattle man who lived in London for several years and became a confidant of radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, considered one of al Qaeda's leading supporters in western Europe.
And now, in the latest plot, the initial lead was developed by the confidential informant in a mosque in upstate New York. That's where the first conspirator confessed his desire last June to become a martyr against the United States.
Despite this record of success, protests and press conferences have been held by "mainstream" Islamic groups in California, Detroit, Chicago, and elsewhere during the past few months bitterly protesting the FBI's use of an informant in a California mosque. In that case, an FBI agent testified under oath that Ahmadullah Niazi had been trying to recruit jihadists and had disseminated al Qaeda and virulent and violent anti-American recordings. He allegedly exhorted the informant to carry out jihad, praised Osama bin Laden as an angel, and even promised to send the informant overseas to get terrorist training to carry out attacks here in the United States.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council have jumped on the informant's role, accusing the FBI of sending him out on a directionless fishing expedition. In interviews and press conferences, they promoted the lie that the FBI has been infiltrating mosques across the United States and actually radicalized the members and exhorted them to carry out jihad. Niazi, however, clearly was identified as the promoter of jihad and bin Laden by the FBI. He allegedly lied about his communication with his brother-in-law, who provided security to bin Laden.
After news of the Fort Dix arrests became public in 2007, with references to an informant's role, Niazi sought a restraining order against the informant monitoring him. The FBI agent, Thomas Ropel, testified that Niazi repeatedly lied to him about the informant's statements and actions. The approach to law enforcement was facilitated by CAIR officials, who have accepted all of Niazi's claims and passed them along to the media.
Well, I have news for these Islamist groups and the gullible mainstream media that is in their pockets: Scores of mosques have been linked to terrorist investigations, indictments, convictions, and deportations. In most of these cases, it was not the mosque leadership that pointed out the existence of potential terrorists among them. In return, confidential informants have been vilified as "snitches" by the mosque leadership. In one celebrated case, an informant helped bring down a Lodi, Calif., man who attended a jihad training camp, lied about it to the FBI, and plotted to "carry out acts of terrorism in the United States."
After this prosecution, MPAC chief Salam Al Marayati warned the FBI not to come through the "back door" and "spy" on mosque congregants, asserting that the FBI had to go through the front door; i.e., get formal permission before the FBI could ask questions. We can only wonder how far the Lodi plot would have advanced had law enforcement acquiesced.
Instead of being forthcoming about the radical presence in their mosques, Islamist activists urge mosque congregants to keep their mouths shut.
We should not be surprised to find new examples of radical ideology that continue to fester in the Islamist leadership—controlled largely by the Muslim Brotherhood or the Wahhabis in this country—and to instigate groups like the Fort Dix and other homegrown Islamic terrorists into carrying out planned violent attacks. What is surprising is that we have consistently refused to learn from experience that these jihadists need to be fully identified and condemned as radicals. And we have to recognize that the leadership of national Islamist organizations—the same ones who project their responsibility on us by falsely claiming we are carrying out a war against Islam—have consistently protected the jihadists.
How many examples does it take to show the threat is far more virulent than the self-anointed spokesmen at CAIR and MPAC claim?
Friday, May 22, 2009
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Supermax Prisons in U.S. Already Hold Terrorists by Carrie Johnson and Walter Pincus
"No good purpose is served by allowing known terrorists, who trained at terrorist training camps, to come to the U.S. to live among us," said Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Tex.).
Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) said Tuesday, before saying he was open to changing his position, "Part of what we don't want is them be put in prisons in the United States."
But the apocalyptic rhetoric rarely addresses this: Thirty-three international terrorists, many with ties to al-Qaeda, reside in a single federal prison in Florence, Colo., with little public notice.
Detained in the supermax facility in Colorado are Ramzi Yousef, who headed the group that carried out the first bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993; Zacarias Moussaoui, convicted of conspiring in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001; Ahmed Ressam, of the Dec. 31, 1999, Los Angeles airport millennium attack plots; Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, conspirator in several plots, including one to assassinate President George W. Bush; and Wadih el-Hage, convicted of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya.
Inmates in Florence and those at the maximum-security disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., rarely see other prisoners. At Leavenworth, the toughest prisoners are allowed outside their cells only one hour a day when they are moved with their legs shackled and accompanied by three guards.
"We have a vast amount of experience in how to judge the continued incarceration of highly dangerous prisoners, since we do this with thousands of prisoners every month, all over the United States, including some really quite dangerous people," Philip D. Zelikow, who was counselor to Bush administration Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and executive director of the 9/11 Commission, told the Senate Judiciary Committee last week.
For many of the most serious terrorists and violent criminals, Justice Department and prison officials impose special restrictions, allowing few visitors, for example, and closely monitoring mail. The inmates also are kept in solitary confinement.
But on Wednesday, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III told the House Judiciary Committee about his "concerns about providing financing to terrorists, radicalizing others with regard to violent extremism, the potential for individuals undertaking attacks in the United States. . . . If it's Florence or something, I think it would be very difficult for the person to get out and very difficult for the person to undertake any activity. However . . . there are individuals in our prisons today . . . who operate their gangs from inside the walls of prison."
Two years ago, an official from the Federal Bureau of Prisons told the House Committee on Homeland Security that authorities were monitoring inmates who might try to spread extremist ideologies, screening clerics and moving terrorist inmates to special facilities in Colorado and Terre Haute, Ind. The bulk of al-Qaeda-affiliated convicts in the United States are housed in those two facilities, law enforcement officials said yesterday.
Still, one economically pressed community in Montana is bucking the trend of "not in my back yard." Some residents in Hardin are volunteering to open their unused, 464-bed Two Rivers Regional Detention Facility to the detainees from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The City Council recently passed a resolution in support.
But Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) put his foot down. "We're not going to bring al-Qaeda to Big Sky Country -- no way, not on my watch," he told Time magazine this month.
Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) said Tuesday, before saying he was open to changing his position, "Part of what we don't want is them be put in prisons in the United States."
But the apocalyptic rhetoric rarely addresses this: Thirty-three international terrorists, many with ties to al-Qaeda, reside in a single federal prison in Florence, Colo., with little public notice.
Detained in the supermax facility in Colorado are Ramzi Yousef, who headed the group that carried out the first bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993; Zacarias Moussaoui, convicted of conspiring in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001; Ahmed Ressam, of the Dec. 31, 1999, Los Angeles airport millennium attack plots; Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, conspirator in several plots, including one to assassinate President George W. Bush; and Wadih el-Hage, convicted of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya.
Inmates in Florence and those at the maximum-security disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., rarely see other prisoners. At Leavenworth, the toughest prisoners are allowed outside their cells only one hour a day when they are moved with their legs shackled and accompanied by three guards.
"We have a vast amount of experience in how to judge the continued incarceration of highly dangerous prisoners, since we do this with thousands of prisoners every month, all over the United States, including some really quite dangerous people," Philip D. Zelikow, who was counselor to Bush administration Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and executive director of the 9/11 Commission, told the Senate Judiciary Committee last week.
For many of the most serious terrorists and violent criminals, Justice Department and prison officials impose special restrictions, allowing few visitors, for example, and closely monitoring mail. The inmates also are kept in solitary confinement.
But on Wednesday, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III told the House Judiciary Committee about his "concerns about providing financing to terrorists, radicalizing others with regard to violent extremism, the potential for individuals undertaking attacks in the United States. . . . If it's Florence or something, I think it would be very difficult for the person to get out and very difficult for the person to undertake any activity. However . . . there are individuals in our prisons today . . . who operate their gangs from inside the walls of prison."
Two years ago, an official from the Federal Bureau of Prisons told the House Committee on Homeland Security that authorities were monitoring inmates who might try to spread extremist ideologies, screening clerics and moving terrorist inmates to special facilities in Colorado and Terre Haute, Ind. The bulk of al-Qaeda-affiliated convicts in the United States are housed in those two facilities, law enforcement officials said yesterday.
Still, one economically pressed community in Montana is bucking the trend of "not in my back yard." Some residents in Hardin are volunteering to open their unused, 464-bed Two Rivers Regional Detention Facility to the detainees from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The City Council recently passed a resolution in support.
But Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) put his foot down. "We're not going to bring al-Qaeda to Big Sky Country -- no way, not on my watch," he told Time magazine this month.
Countering Jihadi Strategies by Walid Phares
Since the deadly attacks in Mumbai, counter-terrorism experts worldwide, particularly those based in democracies in the crosshairs, have been drawing long-term conclusions as to the forthcoming type of operations which may hit cities and interests on more than one continent. Today, we are in the post-Mumbai era where the expectation of recidivism and copycats is eerily high. Indeed, the jihadists who seized a few buildings in India's financial centre and who wreaked havoc at several locations in the city have brought to the attention of national security analysts a concept for the future: Urban jihad. I have predicted these scenarios of mayhem perpetrated by determined terrorists in chapter 13 of my first post 9/11 book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West, published in 2005.
My projection of al Qaeda and other jihadi tactics was based on a patient and thorough observation of their literature and actions for decades. By now, the public realizes that such scenarios are not possible but highly likely in the future. In all countries where jihadi cells and forces have left bloody traces over the past eight years, at least counter-terrorism agencies have been put on notice: it can happen there as well.
But the Mumbai Ghazwa (raid) reveals a more sinister shadow hovering over the entire subcontinent, if not Central Asia. Although a press release was issues by the so-called ‘Indian Mujahideen', many traces were left - almost on purpose - to show Pakistani involvement, or to be more precise, a link to forces operation within Pakistan, one of them at least being Lashkar-e-Toiba. Other suppositions left investigators in the region with the suspicion that elements within the intelligence service in Pakistan were involved, even if the cabinet wasn't aware of it. This strong probability, if anything, gave rise to much wider speculation since this attack took place in the midst of dramatic regional and international developments.
In the United States, the Obama Administration is gearing to redeploy from Iraq and send additional divisions to Afghanistan where the Taliban forces have been escalating their terror campaign. In a counter move, the jihadi web inside Pakistan has been waging both terror and political offensives. In Waziristan and the Swat Valley, just prior to the latest attempts to strike deals with local warlords, Pakistani units were compelled to retreat. A few weeks later, Islamabad authorized the provincial administrators to sign the so-called Malakand agreement with the ‘Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law', headed by Sufi Mohammad, in which local Taliban would enact religious laws instead of the national secular code.
Across the three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, it has become clear that the jihadists are acting as an overarching regional force. In short, while Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi are consumed with domestic challenges, ethnic and territorial crises, the nebulous beginning with al Qaeda and stretching to the local jihadi groups across the land is acting ironically as one, even though with many faces, tongues and scenarios. The jihadists have become continental, while the region's governments were forced into tensions among each other and with their own societies. Hence, exploring the regional strategies of the jihadists is now a must.
Pre-9/11 Strategies
In the post-Cold War era, a web of jihadi organizations came together throughout the Indian subcontinent from Kandahar to the Bay of Bengal. The nebulous was as vast as the spread of Islamist movements that took root in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The cobweb is extremely diverse and not entirely coordinated. In many cases, striking competitions and splinters characterize its intra-Islamist politics. But from political parties, to student unions, to jihadi guerrillas, the main cement of the plethora has been a solidly grounded ideology, inspired by local Deobandism and West Asian-generated Wahabism and Salafism. The ‘Jihadi causes' reflect a variety of claims, from political, sharia, to ethnic territorial. However, all these platforms end in the necessity of establishing local ‘emirates', which eventually are building blocks towards the creation of the Caliphate-to-come.
Inside Pakistan, the Islamists fight secularism, impose religious laws and crave for an all-out ‘Islamist' - not just ‘Islamic' - nation. From this country, a number of jihadist groups have been waging a war on India for the secession of Kashmir, but in order to establish a Taliban-like state. The Pakistan-based ‘Kashmiri jihadists' have connected with their India-based counterparts who in turn have bridges with jihadists operation across India through various networks, including the Islamic Student Union and later the ‘Indian Mujahideen'. The ‘web' stretches east to Dhaka and south all the way to Malaysia and Indonesia.
Unfortunately, western and non-western scholarship in the field didn't recognize the ‘regional' dimension of the jihadi threat on the subcontinent before the 2001 strikes in America and the subsequent attacks in Europe and beyond. Jihadism in South Asia has always been conventionally linked to local claims and foreign policies, while in reality the movement has developed a regional war room; even before the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the jihadists had been seeking transnational achievements.
The post-Soviet grand design of al Qaeda was to incite the ‘national' jihadi entities to act in concert with one another, even if their propaganda machines would intoxicate their foes with different narratives. Base in Kabul since the takeover by the Taliban in 1996, the initial plan was to grow stronger inside Afghanistan, make it a ‘perfect emirate' model to follow and from there expand in all directions. Evidently, the first space to penetrate was Pakistan, starting with the northwestern regions.
In the book Future Jihad, I have argued that one of the long-range goals of the 9/11 attacks was to provoke massive jihadi uprisings in many Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan - with help from insiders and the armed forces. The pre-9/11 plan was to infiltrate Islamabad from Kabul and thereafter to penetrate Kashmir and back a massive jihadi campaign inside India. The enormity of developments was supposed to enflame Bangladesh as well. In short, the plan was to ‘Talibanise' the region from Kabul to the Gulf, slicing many enclaves in northern India with it. Obviously, plan ‘A' collapsed as U.S. and NATO forces crumbled the Taliban regime and dispersed al Qaeda.
Post-Tora Bora
As Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad Omar crossed into Waziristan at the end of 2001, the jihadi strategy for the region shifted to Plan ‘B'. However, the basic goal didn't change - to establish a series of emirates in the subcontinent. What changed were the launching pads and the priorities. Now that the epicenter shifted to these valleys inside northwestern Pakistan, the strategic hierarchy imposed a new agenda: First, the tribal areas had to become a no-go zone for Pakistan's armed forces and a new Afghanistan-in-exile was to be established: al Qaeda's remnants in the centre, surrounded by a belt of Taliban, themselves surrounded by an outer belt of fundamentalist tribes and movements. General Pervez Musharraf understood that sending the bulk of his forces there meant an all-out civil war, hence he kept a status quo amidst western frustration.
But the jihadi forces moved on the offensive inside Pakistan via bombings and assassinations, including failed attempts against the former president and the murder of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Not only the border areas were falling to the insurgency, but segments of many cities fell under the expansion of urban jihadization. The Red Mosque bloodshed was only an example of the generalized push to seize more power. The minimal goal set by the cohorts of the Islamist and jihadi forces was to immunize Waziristan and the surrounding valleys from any incoming attacks while launching blitzkriegs from these areas in two directions: a comeback of the Taliban inside Afghanistan and strikes inside India.
To the west of Waziristan, the equation was reversed. Instead of a Taliban regime in Kabul spilling over Islamabad, the post Tora Bora situation witnessed the emergence of a quasi-Taliban regime inside Pakistan spilling over back to Afghanistan, hence the recrudescence of operations in the latter's provinces. Eastbound from Waziristan, the nebulous tasted the Pakistan-based jihadists to serve as strategic decoys.
Indeed, the best way to confuse the Pakistani military is to draw New Delhi into a renewed conflict with its western neighbor. Shrewdly, via Lashar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Kashmiri jihadists and in association with India-based jihadists - many terror attacks were launched inside Indian territories as of 2002, including strikes against the Parliament, trains and other targets. The inflaming of the India-Pakistan theatre was and remains a key strategic design in the hands of the regional jihadists. This is why the recent strikes in Mumbai were ordered.
Post-Mumbai
Inside the jihadi war room for the subcontinent, preparations are underway to meet two forthcoming challenges. One is the decision by the Obama Administration to send two additional divisions to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM, and his fellow military strategists have recommended a surge-type campaign to eradicate al Qaeda and its allies from inside most of the country and with the help of other NATO forces, push back the Taliban hordes all the way back to the borders. The second jihadi worry is possible military pressure on Waziristan from the Asif Ali Zardari Government.
Logically, the Taliban/al Qaeda Plan ‘C' will be to try to crumble both offensives before they happen. Therefore, in war games scenarios, if you are the jihadist, you would put all efforts possible to delay and weaken the forthcoming NATO-led surge. How will they go about accomplishing this is a good question. The terror network has more than one tool at its disposal: rapid deterioration inside Afghanistan, striking at NATO allies, disrupting NATO supply lines originating in Pakistan, assassinations and even possible strikes on the American homeland, if they can.
But one other tool may also be considered: luring Washington into negotiations with the Taliban. Already the propaganda machine of the jihadists from different corners of the planet, including via its tentacles inside the western media, is pushing the idea that discussions with the ‘good Taliban' is a viable and pragmatic option. Recently, a particular push for considering radical Islamism as a ‘fact of life' to be recognized has materialized in a publicized Newsweek article. Painting the jihadists as credible partners in a peacemaking equation is, in fact, part of a smart maneuver to gain time and delay U.S.-led efforts to defeat the network in Afghanistan. Ironically, similar moves were undertaken in Pakistan. In order to delay Islamabad's new secular government in its preparedness to confront the Taliban once and for all, good cop-bad cop tactics are employed: suicide bombings target officials and civilians alike, while offers for ceasefire from local Islamists shower the authorities.
The recent agreement of Malakand signed between Sufi Islam and Pakistani authorities allows the implantation of sharia in the province and guarantees a truce for a while. With time, the agreement will be used to the advantage of the Taliban to indoctrinate the youth, recruit fighters and suicide bombers, repress civil society movements and eradicate government presence. Just look at the Waziristan Accord (2006) as an example.
Another trap we should not allow ourselves to fall into is calling those who are reconcilable the ‘good' Taliban or the ‘little' Taliban. We should avoid assigning the label to armed opposition groups or other groups that may associate with the Taliban on a small level. Just as it would have been a strategic mistake to label the members of the Sahwa in Iraq little ‘q' al Qaeda or ‘good' al Qaeda - it would be quite the blunder to consider as Taliban those who cooperate with the Taliban out of fear or those that seek cooperation as a way to feed their family.
And as the stalling tactics are employed in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, reverse moves will be executed in India. Unfortunately, the regional war room more than likely will order terror activities on Indian soil to diminish the will of the Pakistani government to go to Waziristan. If violence erupts on its eastern border with India, Pakistan cannot be sending troops to battle the Taliban on its western frontiers. Inflaming tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad causes the latter to redeploy forces from the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province to the border with India, thereby relieving military pressure the Taliban faces in northwest Pakistan. Thus Plan ‘C' seems to announce waves of happenings in the subcontinent. What can and should be done about it, remains the most important question.
Counter Strategies
Any counter strategy design must being with the following affirmations:
That the threat is strategic and regional, not just local and legitimate.
That the counter strategies must put the confrontation of the regional threat above all local considerations and issues.
That the United States and its allies operating out of Afghanistan are determined to engage that threat with all the tools at their disposal and with the largest alliance it can muster.
That Pakistan and India should realize that they are both targeted by the jihadists regardless of their quarrels over ethno-territorial issues.
With these principles accepted, a global set of counter strategies can be set to deal with al Qaeda/Taliban and their jihadi nebulous in the subcontinent.
Afghanistan
The US-led NATO coalition should proceed with the reinforcement of the expeditionary force to levels capable of insuring a full control of the country's national soil; and at the same time a gigantic effort must be mustered in three directions: training and equipping the Afghan Army and Police, supporting a vast network of civil society NGOs countrywide, and reaching out to countries which haven't yet participated in the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, such as Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, and invite them to join the consortium in sectors of their choice. The further the campaign is internationalized, the more jihadists will be isolated.
Engagement Strategies
The U.S. and NATO should not be dragged to the path of the so-called partnership with jihadists to defeat other jihadists. In this game, the more ideological and sophisticated factions always win. Instead, the international coalition must engage the democratic forces and sustain them to win the intellectual and political battle.
Pakistan
The present government must undertake a full reassessment of its past strategies and reform its own forces so that it can ready itself to wage a national mobilization, part of which will be on the military level, but the most significant part must be on the popular and political levels. The campaign to counter the terror forces can only be successful if large segments of the population are engaged in the struggle against fundamentalism.
India
New Delhi, too, will have to reshape its plan to counter the jihadi strategies in the region and on its soil. While the military and security engagement against local terror groups will continue, Indian resources in the war of ideas will have to be tapped. As a major economic and technological power in the region, and now worldwide, India has the ability of opening a new front against radical ideologies with the help of linguistic, cultural and intellectual skills, crucial to the battle. The establishment of a vast network of television and radio broadcasts, NGOs and intelligence capability based on Indian soil can weaken Islamist radicalism.
Last but not least, the vital cement of all the above strategies is their integration and eventually fusion under one platform. If the United States, NATO and other international partners can bring together the three democratically-elected governments of the subcontinent - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (and perhaps Bangladesh) - under a unified and coordinated global strategy, the jihadi forces will be isolated and gradually rolled back.
My projection of al Qaeda and other jihadi tactics was based on a patient and thorough observation of their literature and actions for decades. By now, the public realizes that such scenarios are not possible but highly likely in the future. In all countries where jihadi cells and forces have left bloody traces over the past eight years, at least counter-terrorism agencies have been put on notice: it can happen there as well.
But the Mumbai Ghazwa (raid) reveals a more sinister shadow hovering over the entire subcontinent, if not Central Asia. Although a press release was issues by the so-called ‘Indian Mujahideen', many traces were left - almost on purpose - to show Pakistani involvement, or to be more precise, a link to forces operation within Pakistan, one of them at least being Lashkar-e-Toiba. Other suppositions left investigators in the region with the suspicion that elements within the intelligence service in Pakistan were involved, even if the cabinet wasn't aware of it. This strong probability, if anything, gave rise to much wider speculation since this attack took place in the midst of dramatic regional and international developments.
In the United States, the Obama Administration is gearing to redeploy from Iraq and send additional divisions to Afghanistan where the Taliban forces have been escalating their terror campaign. In a counter move, the jihadi web inside Pakistan has been waging both terror and political offensives. In Waziristan and the Swat Valley, just prior to the latest attempts to strike deals with local warlords, Pakistani units were compelled to retreat. A few weeks later, Islamabad authorized the provincial administrators to sign the so-called Malakand agreement with the ‘Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law', headed by Sufi Mohammad, in which local Taliban would enact religious laws instead of the national secular code.
Across the three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, it has become clear that the jihadists are acting as an overarching regional force. In short, while Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi are consumed with domestic challenges, ethnic and territorial crises, the nebulous beginning with al Qaeda and stretching to the local jihadi groups across the land is acting ironically as one, even though with many faces, tongues and scenarios. The jihadists have become continental, while the region's governments were forced into tensions among each other and with their own societies. Hence, exploring the regional strategies of the jihadists is now a must.
Pre-9/11 Strategies
In the post-Cold War era, a web of jihadi organizations came together throughout the Indian subcontinent from Kandahar to the Bay of Bengal. The nebulous was as vast as the spread of Islamist movements that took root in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The cobweb is extremely diverse and not entirely coordinated. In many cases, striking competitions and splinters characterize its intra-Islamist politics. But from political parties, to student unions, to jihadi guerrillas, the main cement of the plethora has been a solidly grounded ideology, inspired by local Deobandism and West Asian-generated Wahabism and Salafism. The ‘Jihadi causes' reflect a variety of claims, from political, sharia, to ethnic territorial. However, all these platforms end in the necessity of establishing local ‘emirates', which eventually are building blocks towards the creation of the Caliphate-to-come.
Inside Pakistan, the Islamists fight secularism, impose religious laws and crave for an all-out ‘Islamist' - not just ‘Islamic' - nation. From this country, a number of jihadist groups have been waging a war on India for the secession of Kashmir, but in order to establish a Taliban-like state. The Pakistan-based ‘Kashmiri jihadists' have connected with their India-based counterparts who in turn have bridges with jihadists operation across India through various networks, including the Islamic Student Union and later the ‘Indian Mujahideen'. The ‘web' stretches east to Dhaka and south all the way to Malaysia and Indonesia.
Unfortunately, western and non-western scholarship in the field didn't recognize the ‘regional' dimension of the jihadi threat on the subcontinent before the 2001 strikes in America and the subsequent attacks in Europe and beyond. Jihadism in South Asia has always been conventionally linked to local claims and foreign policies, while in reality the movement has developed a regional war room; even before the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the jihadists had been seeking transnational achievements.
The post-Soviet grand design of al Qaeda was to incite the ‘national' jihadi entities to act in concert with one another, even if their propaganda machines would intoxicate their foes with different narratives. Base in Kabul since the takeover by the Taliban in 1996, the initial plan was to grow stronger inside Afghanistan, make it a ‘perfect emirate' model to follow and from there expand in all directions. Evidently, the first space to penetrate was Pakistan, starting with the northwestern regions.
In the book Future Jihad, I have argued that one of the long-range goals of the 9/11 attacks was to provoke massive jihadi uprisings in many Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan - with help from insiders and the armed forces. The pre-9/11 plan was to infiltrate Islamabad from Kabul and thereafter to penetrate Kashmir and back a massive jihadi campaign inside India. The enormity of developments was supposed to enflame Bangladesh as well. In short, the plan was to ‘Talibanise' the region from Kabul to the Gulf, slicing many enclaves in northern India with it. Obviously, plan ‘A' collapsed as U.S. and NATO forces crumbled the Taliban regime and dispersed al Qaeda.
Post-Tora Bora
As Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammad Omar crossed into Waziristan at the end of 2001, the jihadi strategy for the region shifted to Plan ‘B'. However, the basic goal didn't change - to establish a series of emirates in the subcontinent. What changed were the launching pads and the priorities. Now that the epicenter shifted to these valleys inside northwestern Pakistan, the strategic hierarchy imposed a new agenda: First, the tribal areas had to become a no-go zone for Pakistan's armed forces and a new Afghanistan-in-exile was to be established: al Qaeda's remnants in the centre, surrounded by a belt of Taliban, themselves surrounded by an outer belt of fundamentalist tribes and movements. General Pervez Musharraf understood that sending the bulk of his forces there meant an all-out civil war, hence he kept a status quo amidst western frustration.
But the jihadi forces moved on the offensive inside Pakistan via bombings and assassinations, including failed attempts against the former president and the murder of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Not only the border areas were falling to the insurgency, but segments of many cities fell under the expansion of urban jihadization. The Red Mosque bloodshed was only an example of the generalized push to seize more power. The minimal goal set by the cohorts of the Islamist and jihadi forces was to immunize Waziristan and the surrounding valleys from any incoming attacks while launching blitzkriegs from these areas in two directions: a comeback of the Taliban inside Afghanistan and strikes inside India.
To the west of Waziristan, the equation was reversed. Instead of a Taliban regime in Kabul spilling over Islamabad, the post Tora Bora situation witnessed the emergence of a quasi-Taliban regime inside Pakistan spilling over back to Afghanistan, hence the recrudescence of operations in the latter's provinces. Eastbound from Waziristan, the nebulous tasted the Pakistan-based jihadists to serve as strategic decoys.
Indeed, the best way to confuse the Pakistani military is to draw New Delhi into a renewed conflict with its western neighbor. Shrewdly, via Lashar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Kashmiri jihadists and in association with India-based jihadists - many terror attacks were launched inside Indian territories as of 2002, including strikes against the Parliament, trains and other targets. The inflaming of the India-Pakistan theatre was and remains a key strategic design in the hands of the regional jihadists. This is why the recent strikes in Mumbai were ordered.
Post-Mumbai
Inside the jihadi war room for the subcontinent, preparations are underway to meet two forthcoming challenges. One is the decision by the Obama Administration to send two additional divisions to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM, and his fellow military strategists have recommended a surge-type campaign to eradicate al Qaeda and its allies from inside most of the country and with the help of other NATO forces, push back the Taliban hordes all the way back to the borders. The second jihadi worry is possible military pressure on Waziristan from the Asif Ali Zardari Government.
Logically, the Taliban/al Qaeda Plan ‘C' will be to try to crumble both offensives before they happen. Therefore, in war games scenarios, if you are the jihadist, you would put all efforts possible to delay and weaken the forthcoming NATO-led surge. How will they go about accomplishing this is a good question. The terror network has more than one tool at its disposal: rapid deterioration inside Afghanistan, striking at NATO allies, disrupting NATO supply lines originating in Pakistan, assassinations and even possible strikes on the American homeland, if they can.
But one other tool may also be considered: luring Washington into negotiations with the Taliban. Already the propaganda machine of the jihadists from different corners of the planet, including via its tentacles inside the western media, is pushing the idea that discussions with the ‘good Taliban' is a viable and pragmatic option. Recently, a particular push for considering radical Islamism as a ‘fact of life' to be recognized has materialized in a publicized Newsweek article. Painting the jihadists as credible partners in a peacemaking equation is, in fact, part of a smart maneuver to gain time and delay U.S.-led efforts to defeat the network in Afghanistan. Ironically, similar moves were undertaken in Pakistan. In order to delay Islamabad's new secular government in its preparedness to confront the Taliban once and for all, good cop-bad cop tactics are employed: suicide bombings target officials and civilians alike, while offers for ceasefire from local Islamists shower the authorities.
The recent agreement of Malakand signed between Sufi Islam and Pakistani authorities allows the implantation of sharia in the province and guarantees a truce for a while. With time, the agreement will be used to the advantage of the Taliban to indoctrinate the youth, recruit fighters and suicide bombers, repress civil society movements and eradicate government presence. Just look at the Waziristan Accord (2006) as an example.
Another trap we should not allow ourselves to fall into is calling those who are reconcilable the ‘good' Taliban or the ‘little' Taliban. We should avoid assigning the label to armed opposition groups or other groups that may associate with the Taliban on a small level. Just as it would have been a strategic mistake to label the members of the Sahwa in Iraq little ‘q' al Qaeda or ‘good' al Qaeda - it would be quite the blunder to consider as Taliban those who cooperate with the Taliban out of fear or those that seek cooperation as a way to feed their family.
And as the stalling tactics are employed in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, reverse moves will be executed in India. Unfortunately, the regional war room more than likely will order terror activities on Indian soil to diminish the will of the Pakistani government to go to Waziristan. If violence erupts on its eastern border with India, Pakistan cannot be sending troops to battle the Taliban on its western frontiers. Inflaming tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad causes the latter to redeploy forces from the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province to the border with India, thereby relieving military pressure the Taliban faces in northwest Pakistan. Thus Plan ‘C' seems to announce waves of happenings in the subcontinent. What can and should be done about it, remains the most important question.
Counter Strategies
Any counter strategy design must being with the following affirmations:
That the threat is strategic and regional, not just local and legitimate.
That the counter strategies must put the confrontation of the regional threat above all local considerations and issues.
That the United States and its allies operating out of Afghanistan are determined to engage that threat with all the tools at their disposal and with the largest alliance it can muster.
That Pakistan and India should realize that they are both targeted by the jihadists regardless of their quarrels over ethno-territorial issues.
With these principles accepted, a global set of counter strategies can be set to deal with al Qaeda/Taliban and their jihadi nebulous in the subcontinent.
Afghanistan
The US-led NATO coalition should proceed with the reinforcement of the expeditionary force to levels capable of insuring a full control of the country's national soil; and at the same time a gigantic effort must be mustered in three directions: training and equipping the Afghan Army and Police, supporting a vast network of civil society NGOs countrywide, and reaching out to countries which haven't yet participated in the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, such as Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, and invite them to join the consortium in sectors of their choice. The further the campaign is internationalized, the more jihadists will be isolated.
Engagement Strategies
The U.S. and NATO should not be dragged to the path of the so-called partnership with jihadists to defeat other jihadists. In this game, the more ideological and sophisticated factions always win. Instead, the international coalition must engage the democratic forces and sustain them to win the intellectual and political battle.
Pakistan
The present government must undertake a full reassessment of its past strategies and reform its own forces so that it can ready itself to wage a national mobilization, part of which will be on the military level, but the most significant part must be on the popular and political levels. The campaign to counter the terror forces can only be successful if large segments of the population are engaged in the struggle against fundamentalism.
India
New Delhi, too, will have to reshape its plan to counter the jihadi strategies in the region and on its soil. While the military and security engagement against local terror groups will continue, Indian resources in the war of ideas will have to be tapped. As a major economic and technological power in the region, and now worldwide, India has the ability of opening a new front against radical ideologies with the help of linguistic, cultural and intellectual skills, crucial to the battle. The establishment of a vast network of television and radio broadcasts, NGOs and intelligence capability based on Indian soil can weaken Islamist radicalism.
Last but not least, the vital cement of all the above strategies is their integration and eventually fusion under one platform. If the United States, NATO and other international partners can bring together the three democratically-elected governments of the subcontinent - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (and perhaps Bangladesh) - under a unified and coordinated global strategy, the jihadi forces will be isolated and gradually rolled back.
A Single-Minded Focus on Dual Wars: Defense Secretary Is Reorienting the Military to Meet U.S. Troops' Needs Now by Greg Jaffe
On a rainy night in March, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates traveled to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware to witness the military's ritual for welcoming home its war dead.
In a small building next to the tarmac, an officer briefed the defense secretary on the four deceased troops arriving that evening. They had been driving along a rutted road near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, when their Humvee hit a powerful roadside bomb.
Gates flashed with anger, according to people with him that day. He had spent most of his tenure in the Pentagon pushing to replace Humvees in Afghanistan and Iraq with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, built to withstand such blasts. "Find out why they hadn't gotten their goddamn MRAPs yet," he snapped at his staff.
Clad in the black suit he had worn to work that morning in the Pentagon, Gates climbed into the cargo hold of the white 747 bearing the remains. From the ground, troops could see the defense secretary as he knelt, alone, by the flag-draped transfer cases. Five minutes passed.
Then Gates, a small man with white hair neatly combed across his head, appeared in the plane's door and summoned the chaplain and the honor guard to begin the 17-minute welcome-home ritual.
A few days later, he was asked at a Pentagon news conference if he would talk about his visit. He started to answer the question but stopped. "Actually, no," he said. "I will tell you it was very difficult."
Gates's experience at Dover offers a window into what is driving him as he seeks to remake Washington's biggest and most ponderous bureaucracy. For decades, the Pentagon's focus has been on building expensive, high-tech weapons programs for conventional wars. Gates has embarked on an ambitious effort to force the department to focus more of its energy on developing arms and equipment that can help troops on the ground as they battle insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
His push to refocus the department comes as the war in Afghanistan appears in stalemate and violence against U.S. troops and Afghan forces is on the rise. In neighboring Pakistan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have carved out a haven from which they can launch attacks on U.S. troops, the government's hold on power throughout the country has grown shakier.
Last week, Gates fired the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. The new commanders will be responsible for fighting the war and implementing President Obama's new strategy. Gates sees his job as making sure they have the tools they need.
An Emphasis on Now
The deteriorating conditions in the two countries seem to have sharpened the secretary's sense of urgency. His 2010 defense budget, introduced this month, proposes to cut or curtail a spate of large-scale weapons programs.
"Listening to our troops and commanders, unvarnished and unscripted, has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source of ideas on what the department needs to do," he told lawmakers Wednesday. When some lawmakers questioned whether he had done the rigorous analysis to justify his budget cuts, Gates responded in his flat Kansas twang that the Pentagon is "drowning in analysis." Most of the changes he'd made were "kind of no-brainers," he said. Gates declined to be interviewed for this article.
Gates's critics, including some active-duty generals and many of the senior officials he has fired, say his intense focus on Afghanistan and Iraq threatens to turn the vaunted U.S. military into an army of occupiers and nation-builders. "I am sure the North Koreans fear the MRAP and the Iranians are cringing in their boots about the threat from our stability forces," former Air Force secretary Michael W. Wynne, who was dismissed last year, wrote in an online column. "Our national interests are being reduced to becoming the armed custodians in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq."
Last year, the four-star generals who run the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps formally "non-concurred" with the classified version of Gates's National Defense Strategy, which called for "taking additional, acceptable risk" in the area of conventional war so that the military could improve its ability to fight irregular wars. Gates met with all of the chiefs to listen to their objections. He then concluded that their concerns were "not compelling," said a senior Pentagon official involved in the process, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
The defense secretary has since described the strategy document as the foundation for the shift he's making in the Pentagon.
When He Arrived
Gates, who is 65, didn't come to the Pentagon to make major changes. With only two years left in George W. Bush's presidency, his mandate was a narrow one: fix the war in Iraq. Arriving from the presidency of Texas A&M University, Gates brought no aides with him, choosing to retain even the confidential assistant and chief of staff to his predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Even Gates's detractors concede that he is a ruthlessly effective manager of the Pentagon bureaucracy. He demands that all briefing slides from his staff and military commanders reach his office the day before the meeting in which they will be discussed. With the slides in hand, he plots how he wants to drive the discussion. If slides arrive after the deadline, the meeting will be canceled or postponed, Pentagon officials said.
In contrast with Rumsfeld, who allowed debates over weapons programs to drag on for months or years, Gates sets deadlines of weeks or even days. Meetings with top generals rarely run more than 45 minutes. "The natural propensity of a bureaucracy is not to decide," he has often said. "It will just chew the cud until there is no taste at all."
Gates also has moved quickly to demand accountability for mistakes from his senior leadership. Just three months into his tenure, he fired Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey after articles in The Washington Post exposed appalling living conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Harvey wasn't dismissed for the conditions at the hospital, defense officials said. Gates relieved him for failing to acknowledge the severity of the problems and fix them swiftly.
The Army secretary was visiting troops at Fort Benning, Ga., when he got an unexpected call from Gates's chief of staff ordering him to return immediately to the Pentagon. After Gates told him that he was fired, Harvey tried to argue his case, insisting that Gates and his staff had approved every move he had made in response to the failures at the hospital.
Gates, who colleagues describe as consistent and self-controlled, often grows quiet when he disagrees with someone. "It was like arguing with a stone," Harvey recalled. "The meeting lasted maybe 90 seconds."
A few days later, Gates asked through an intermediary if he could attend the goodbye ceremony that the Army was holding for Harvey. It was Gates's attempt to show respect for the office, said a defense official. Harvey sent word back that Gates wasn't welcome. "It was astounding to me that he'd even ask," Harvey recalled.
The Secretary's Vision
Since the early days of his tenure, Gates's vision for remaking the military has been shaped more by the daily frustrations of running the vast Pentagon bureaucracy than grand ideas about future war. Those frustrations came to a head in early 2008 when commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan were clamoring for more intelligence equipment, particularly Predator unmanned surveillance aircraft.
The field commanders estimated that they needed more than 40 Predator combat air patrols in the two war zones, defense officials said. At the time, the Air Force was able to maintain 12. When Gates asked the Air Force to find more surveillance planes, senior officials replied that they could provide four more patrols. Some Air Force officials also questioned whether the wartime commanders needed so many surveillance planes.
"The bureaucracy's first impulse was to deny that the demand really existed," said Brad Berkson, who served as director of program analysis and evaluation in the defense secretary's office.
In the weeks that followed, Gates pulled together a special task force, made up of his immediate staff and some military officers, to find more surveillance planes, both manned and unmanned. "We literally counted every tail in the fleet," said one Pentagon official involved in the effort. The results were stunning: Less than 25 percent of the military's arsenal of surveillance aircraft, which included Air Force Predators, Army Shadows and Navy P-3 Orion planes, was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the task force found.
The deficiencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were a result of a shortage of Air Force control stations, from which pilots fly the unmanned aircraft. The Air Force also hadn't trained enough pilots to operate all of the Predators in its rapidly expanding arsenal.
Gates's team went to extreme lengths to get more hours out of the available ground control stations and pilots. The task force arranged for experienced pilots to use stations normally set aside for training to fly combat missions during off hours. Because the Predators are controlled using satellite links, pilots can operate aircraft flying in Afghanistan and Iraq from bases in the United States.
The Air Force also lost a few hours of flying time each day because Predator pilots controlling planes from Creech Air Force Base, Nev., had to make an hour-long drive into town to buy lunch, visit the bank or pick up their children from day care. Gates set aside money to build a cafeteria, child-care facilities and other amenities at Creech. "We decided the pilots' time was extremely valuable," Berkson said. "We didn't even want them to have to stand in line at the bank."
Some Air Force officials complained bitterly that the defense secretary's staffers were micromanaging commanders at Creech. In one case, a member of Gates's staff called one of the base's commanders to ask him why his pilots were working shorter hours than Army pilots flying similar unmanned aircraft. "I was having to justify my organization down to the gnat's ass just about every week," an Air Force officer recalled, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to talk freely about his superiors. "It became a distraction."
Results on Predators
By early 2009, the task force's efforts had produced results: The number of U.S. military Predators in the air over Afghanistan and Iraq had increased almost three-fold, to 31 from 12. In a speech last year at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala., Gates compared the effort to "pulling teeth."
In the months since he was asked by Obama to stay on as defense secretary as the Cabinet's lone holdover, Gates's top priority has been incorporating the lessons of the task force and similar initiatives into the 2010 defense budget. "His engagement on this budget has been orders of magnitude greater than any other secretary of defense that I can recall," said Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. "There is a certainty about what he wants, and you can't get around it."
The current budget, for example, sets aside $2 billion so the Air Force will be able to keep as many as 50 unmanned surveillance planes in the air by 2011. Gates also carved out $500 million to increase the number of helicopters in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been in short supply since 2003. As with the Predators, the helicopter shortfall was caused by a lack of crews to maintain and fly the aircraft. The Pentagon has 6,000 helicopters in its fleet, but about 800 of them are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mullen said.
'We . . . Must Do Better'
Last week, Gates flew to Afghanistan, where he asked for the resignation of the top American general in charge of the war. He had chosen Gen. David D. McKiernan for the post 11 months earlier but had become convinced that a new commander was needed to arrest the decline in the country. "We can and must do better," he later told reporters at a Pentagon news conference.
During his trip, Gates flew to a sprawling American base being built in southern Afghanistan to accommodate thousands of new U.S. troops now arriving in the country. He met four Marines who showed him their charred and dented MRAP. A few days earlier, as they patrolled the desert surrounding the base, a roadside bomb had detonated under the vehicle.
One of the Marines inside had broken his arm. The other three emerged with minor scratches and bruises.
Gates looked pleased. He shook their hands, struggled to make small talk and thanked them for their service.
In a small building next to the tarmac, an officer briefed the defense secretary on the four deceased troops arriving that evening. They had been driving along a rutted road near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, when their Humvee hit a powerful roadside bomb.
Gates flashed with anger, according to people with him that day. He had spent most of his tenure in the Pentagon pushing to replace Humvees in Afghanistan and Iraq with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, built to withstand such blasts. "Find out why they hadn't gotten their goddamn MRAPs yet," he snapped at his staff.
Clad in the black suit he had worn to work that morning in the Pentagon, Gates climbed into the cargo hold of the white 747 bearing the remains. From the ground, troops could see the defense secretary as he knelt, alone, by the flag-draped transfer cases. Five minutes passed.
Then Gates, a small man with white hair neatly combed across his head, appeared in the plane's door and summoned the chaplain and the honor guard to begin the 17-minute welcome-home ritual.
A few days later, he was asked at a Pentagon news conference if he would talk about his visit. He started to answer the question but stopped. "Actually, no," he said. "I will tell you it was very difficult."
Gates's experience at Dover offers a window into what is driving him as he seeks to remake Washington's biggest and most ponderous bureaucracy. For decades, the Pentagon's focus has been on building expensive, high-tech weapons programs for conventional wars. Gates has embarked on an ambitious effort to force the department to focus more of its energy on developing arms and equipment that can help troops on the ground as they battle insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
His push to refocus the department comes as the war in Afghanistan appears in stalemate and violence against U.S. troops and Afghan forces is on the rise. In neighboring Pakistan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have carved out a haven from which they can launch attacks on U.S. troops, the government's hold on power throughout the country has grown shakier.
Last week, Gates fired the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. The new commanders will be responsible for fighting the war and implementing President Obama's new strategy. Gates sees his job as making sure they have the tools they need.
An Emphasis on Now
The deteriorating conditions in the two countries seem to have sharpened the secretary's sense of urgency. His 2010 defense budget, introduced this month, proposes to cut or curtail a spate of large-scale weapons programs.
"Listening to our troops and commanders, unvarnished and unscripted, has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source of ideas on what the department needs to do," he told lawmakers Wednesday. When some lawmakers questioned whether he had done the rigorous analysis to justify his budget cuts, Gates responded in his flat Kansas twang that the Pentagon is "drowning in analysis." Most of the changes he'd made were "kind of no-brainers," he said. Gates declined to be interviewed for this article.
Gates's critics, including some active-duty generals and many of the senior officials he has fired, say his intense focus on Afghanistan and Iraq threatens to turn the vaunted U.S. military into an army of occupiers and nation-builders. "I am sure the North Koreans fear the MRAP and the Iranians are cringing in their boots about the threat from our stability forces," former Air Force secretary Michael W. Wynne, who was dismissed last year, wrote in an online column. "Our national interests are being reduced to becoming the armed custodians in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq."
Last year, the four-star generals who run the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps formally "non-concurred" with the classified version of Gates's National Defense Strategy, which called for "taking additional, acceptable risk" in the area of conventional war so that the military could improve its ability to fight irregular wars. Gates met with all of the chiefs to listen to their objections. He then concluded that their concerns were "not compelling," said a senior Pentagon official involved in the process, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
The defense secretary has since described the strategy document as the foundation for the shift he's making in the Pentagon.
When He Arrived
Gates, who is 65, didn't come to the Pentagon to make major changes. With only two years left in George W. Bush's presidency, his mandate was a narrow one: fix the war in Iraq. Arriving from the presidency of Texas A&M University, Gates brought no aides with him, choosing to retain even the confidential assistant and chief of staff to his predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Even Gates's detractors concede that he is a ruthlessly effective manager of the Pentagon bureaucracy. He demands that all briefing slides from his staff and military commanders reach his office the day before the meeting in which they will be discussed. With the slides in hand, he plots how he wants to drive the discussion. If slides arrive after the deadline, the meeting will be canceled or postponed, Pentagon officials said.
In contrast with Rumsfeld, who allowed debates over weapons programs to drag on for months or years, Gates sets deadlines of weeks or even days. Meetings with top generals rarely run more than 45 minutes. "The natural propensity of a bureaucracy is not to decide," he has often said. "It will just chew the cud until there is no taste at all."
Gates also has moved quickly to demand accountability for mistakes from his senior leadership. Just three months into his tenure, he fired Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey after articles in The Washington Post exposed appalling living conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Harvey wasn't dismissed for the conditions at the hospital, defense officials said. Gates relieved him for failing to acknowledge the severity of the problems and fix them swiftly.
The Army secretary was visiting troops at Fort Benning, Ga., when he got an unexpected call from Gates's chief of staff ordering him to return immediately to the Pentagon. After Gates told him that he was fired, Harvey tried to argue his case, insisting that Gates and his staff had approved every move he had made in response to the failures at the hospital.
Gates, who colleagues describe as consistent and self-controlled, often grows quiet when he disagrees with someone. "It was like arguing with a stone," Harvey recalled. "The meeting lasted maybe 90 seconds."
A few days later, Gates asked through an intermediary if he could attend the goodbye ceremony that the Army was holding for Harvey. It was Gates's attempt to show respect for the office, said a defense official. Harvey sent word back that Gates wasn't welcome. "It was astounding to me that he'd even ask," Harvey recalled.
The Secretary's Vision
Since the early days of his tenure, Gates's vision for remaking the military has been shaped more by the daily frustrations of running the vast Pentagon bureaucracy than grand ideas about future war. Those frustrations came to a head in early 2008 when commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan were clamoring for more intelligence equipment, particularly Predator unmanned surveillance aircraft.
The field commanders estimated that they needed more than 40 Predator combat air patrols in the two war zones, defense officials said. At the time, the Air Force was able to maintain 12. When Gates asked the Air Force to find more surveillance planes, senior officials replied that they could provide four more patrols. Some Air Force officials also questioned whether the wartime commanders needed so many surveillance planes.
"The bureaucracy's first impulse was to deny that the demand really existed," said Brad Berkson, who served as director of program analysis and evaluation in the defense secretary's office.
In the weeks that followed, Gates pulled together a special task force, made up of his immediate staff and some military officers, to find more surveillance planes, both manned and unmanned. "We literally counted every tail in the fleet," said one Pentagon official involved in the effort. The results were stunning: Less than 25 percent of the military's arsenal of surveillance aircraft, which included Air Force Predators, Army Shadows and Navy P-3 Orion planes, was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the task force found.
The deficiencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were a result of a shortage of Air Force control stations, from which pilots fly the unmanned aircraft. The Air Force also hadn't trained enough pilots to operate all of the Predators in its rapidly expanding arsenal.
Gates's team went to extreme lengths to get more hours out of the available ground control stations and pilots. The task force arranged for experienced pilots to use stations normally set aside for training to fly combat missions during off hours. Because the Predators are controlled using satellite links, pilots can operate aircraft flying in Afghanistan and Iraq from bases in the United States.
The Air Force also lost a few hours of flying time each day because Predator pilots controlling planes from Creech Air Force Base, Nev., had to make an hour-long drive into town to buy lunch, visit the bank or pick up their children from day care. Gates set aside money to build a cafeteria, child-care facilities and other amenities at Creech. "We decided the pilots' time was extremely valuable," Berkson said. "We didn't even want them to have to stand in line at the bank."
Some Air Force officials complained bitterly that the defense secretary's staffers were micromanaging commanders at Creech. In one case, a member of Gates's staff called one of the base's commanders to ask him why his pilots were working shorter hours than Army pilots flying similar unmanned aircraft. "I was having to justify my organization down to the gnat's ass just about every week," an Air Force officer recalled, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to talk freely about his superiors. "It became a distraction."
Results on Predators
By early 2009, the task force's efforts had produced results: The number of U.S. military Predators in the air over Afghanistan and Iraq had increased almost three-fold, to 31 from 12. In a speech last year at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala., Gates compared the effort to "pulling teeth."
In the months since he was asked by Obama to stay on as defense secretary as the Cabinet's lone holdover, Gates's top priority has been incorporating the lessons of the task force and similar initiatives into the 2010 defense budget. "His engagement on this budget has been orders of magnitude greater than any other secretary of defense that I can recall," said Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. "There is a certainty about what he wants, and you can't get around it."
The current budget, for example, sets aside $2 billion so the Air Force will be able to keep as many as 50 unmanned surveillance planes in the air by 2011. Gates also carved out $500 million to increase the number of helicopters in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been in short supply since 2003. As with the Predators, the helicopter shortfall was caused by a lack of crews to maintain and fly the aircraft. The Pentagon has 6,000 helicopters in its fleet, but about 800 of them are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mullen said.
'We . . . Must Do Better'
Last week, Gates flew to Afghanistan, where he asked for the resignation of the top American general in charge of the war. He had chosen Gen. David D. McKiernan for the post 11 months earlier but had become convinced that a new commander was needed to arrest the decline in the country. "We can and must do better," he later told reporters at a Pentagon news conference.
During his trip, Gates flew to a sprawling American base being built in southern Afghanistan to accommodate thousands of new U.S. troops now arriving in the country. He met four Marines who showed him their charred and dented MRAP. A few days earlier, as they patrolled the desert surrounding the base, a roadside bomb had detonated under the vehicle.
One of the Marines inside had broken his arm. The other three emerged with minor scratches and bruises.
Gates looked pleased. He shook their hands, struggled to make small talk and thanked them for their service.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Twitter to Release New Tools, Business Model
Twitter has finally declared its hand on the “where’s the business model?” question by saying the future is paved with add-on tools.
In an interview posted by Reuters, Twitter co-founder Biz Stone said that Twitter was “developing various add-on tools and services for the businesses and professional users of Twitter, which could create a revenue stream for the company” which would be released by the end of the year.
Advertising though isn’t on the radar. “There are a few reasons why we’re not pursuing advertising — one is it’s just not quite as interesting to us,” said Stone, who also noted that “There are no people at Twitter who know anything about advertising or work in advertising. So we don’t have anyone there to make or take those calls.”
The function of the new tools, or if they will compete with existing third party tools was not made clear.
In an interview posted by Reuters, Twitter co-founder Biz Stone said that Twitter was “developing various add-on tools and services for the businesses and professional users of Twitter, which could create a revenue stream for the company” which would be released by the end of the year.
Advertising though isn’t on the radar. “There are a few reasons why we’re not pursuing advertising — one is it’s just not quite as interesting to us,” said Stone, who also noted that “There are no people at Twitter who know anything about advertising or work in advertising. So we don’t have anyone there to make or take those calls.”
The function of the new tools, or if they will compete with existing third party tools was not made clear.
Monday, May 18, 2009
Will Russia Help the United States with Iran? by Mark N. Katz
Russia's recent decision not to sell the S-300 antiaircraft missile system to Iran (at least for now) raised hopes that Moscow would cooperate more fully in the effort to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. Recent statements from Russian leaders indicating that they were on board with the U.S. strategy further buoyed optimism. Despite these promising signs, however, there is strong reason to doubt that Moscow's cooperation will continue.
The Need for Russian Help
While the Obama administration has been formulating its Iran strategy, Congress and many pundits have touted the need for Russian support. At the opening session of the hearing "Prospects for Engagement with Russia" held on March 19, Senator John Kerry (D-MA) observed that "Vital to our efforts toward a nuclear-free world will be a greater effort from Russia to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The president is right to open the door to direct engagement with Iran. But it is imperative that we back a strategy of engagement with a commitment to more effective multilateral sanctions if negotiations do not bring progress. To do this effectively, we need Russia on board."
In a speech on March 23, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) stated: "For some international security challenges, like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we need Russia's cooperation; we cannot do the job adequately without Russia." He went on to make clear that Iran was one of these issues.
In a May 1 Wall Street Journal interview, Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser to Republican presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, said with regard to "the looming Iranian nuclear danger" that "the only chance to dissuade Iran is if the United States and Russia are linked together on Iran."
Russia's Real Agenda
Like Europe, Israel, the United States, and most Arab governments, Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The expectation that this will lead to joint Russian-American cooperation, however, is seriously mistaken. Moscow does not want Iran to either voluntarily renounce or be forcefully prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if -- as Moscow fears -- this results in a diminution of Russia's value to Iran as a protector or partner. Even a nuclear-armed Iran would be preferable to Moscow than this prospect.
Moscow has little interest in working with Washington to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons for two important reasons: First, Moscow has reasonably good -- though not untroubled -- relations with Tehran. Russian firms profit from selling arms and nuclear technology to Iran, and Russian petroleum firms are actively seeking to invest in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. Moscow is also deeply appreciative that Tehran has not supported Chechen or other Muslim rebels in Russia, or challenged Moscow's influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Moscow does not want to jeopardize any of this by seriously cooperating with Washington against Tehran. What Moscow would prefer instead is that others -- the United States, Europe, Israel, or some combination -- take the lead in confronting Tehran on the nuclear issue. If they succeed in getting Iran to halt its efforts, then Russia gains by avoiding the strategic challenge of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. But if they fail to halt this activity, Moscow prefers that these actors -- and not Russia -- be the focus of Iran's ire. This is especially true if Iran actually acquires nuclear weapons.
Second, the Kremlin sees the Obama administration as asking Russia to risk harming its Iranian ties while Washington is openly attempting to improve Iranian-American relations. Moscow has long feared that if U.S.-Iranian ties improve, Russia's importance to Iran will diminish. Many Russian observers are convinced that Tehran would much prefer to purchase weapons, nuclear reactors, and virtually everything else from America and the West rather than from Russia. Although Moscow does not want to see open conflict between the United States and Iran (especially if it leads to greater American influence in the region), it certainly has no interest in facilitating an improvement in American-Iranian relations that the Kremlin fears will diminish Russian influence over Iran.
Medvedev's False Reassurances
Some observers dismiss these concerns, citing reports that Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told President Obama that Russia is increasingly concerned about Iran's nuclear program and wants to increase cooperation with the United States. Yet even if such reports are accurate, they should not be taken at face value.
First, Medvedev's alleged desire for greater cooperation with the United States does not mean that he will follow through. He knows Washington wants Russia's help, and he may hold out the prospect of collaboration to see what concessions the Obama administration might make to secure Moscow's support. Second, the Russian president's cool response to Obama's letter -- stating that there would be no need for U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic (something Moscow vociferously opposes) if there were no Iranian threat -- indicates that this concession is not enough for Moscow. Even if Medvedev meant what he reportedly told Obama, it is Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, not Medvedev, who has the final say on Russian foreign policy. Third, Putin, who has privately expressed concern to Western visitors about Iran's nuclear program, hinted during a CNN interview in August 2008 that Russian cooperation on Iran is contingent on American cooperation on Georgia. As far as Moscow is concerned, Washington's continued support for Georgia (including the recent NATO military exercises there) demonstrates that the United States is not cooperating with Russia on this issue.
Even if Washington made the concessions Moscow seeks, what help can the United States reasonably expect Russia to provide on the Iranian nuclear issue? Russia will neither take part in any forceful action against Iran, nor damage its economic relationship with the country, especially since Moscow fears that Washington is trying to snatch the Iranian market away.
Some believe that Medvedev's reputed concern about Iran's nuclear program will lead to Russian support for tougher UN Security Council sanctions against the Iranian regime. But Medvedev's alarm is more rhetorical than real, and Moscow will most likely do what it has done in the past: work with China to delay and water down a resolution introduced by the United States or one of its allies, and then try to mitigate Iranian anger by claiming that Moscow had actually protected Iran from much harsher sanctions that the United States sought to impose.
Moving Forward Without Russia
The degree of effort necessary to secure Russia's limited help is not worth Washington's time or resources: if U.S.-Iranian relations improve, Washington would not need Moscow's help, and if they do not, Russia would not be willing or able to do anything significant to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Whether the Obama administration should attempt to improve relations with Tehran is open for debate, but the notion that "We need Russia to help us with Iran" is not.
The Need for Russian Help
While the Obama administration has been formulating its Iran strategy, Congress and many pundits have touted the need for Russian support. At the opening session of the hearing "Prospects for Engagement with Russia" held on March 19, Senator John Kerry (D-MA) observed that "Vital to our efforts toward a nuclear-free world will be a greater effort from Russia to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The president is right to open the door to direct engagement with Iran. But it is imperative that we back a strategy of engagement with a commitment to more effective multilateral sanctions if negotiations do not bring progress. To do this effectively, we need Russia on board."
In a speech on March 23, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) stated: "For some international security challenges, like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we need Russia's cooperation; we cannot do the job adequately without Russia." He went on to make clear that Iran was one of these issues.
In a May 1 Wall Street Journal interview, Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser to Republican presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, said with regard to "the looming Iranian nuclear danger" that "the only chance to dissuade Iran is if the United States and Russia are linked together on Iran."
Russia's Real Agenda
Like Europe, Israel, the United States, and most Arab governments, Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The expectation that this will lead to joint Russian-American cooperation, however, is seriously mistaken. Moscow does not want Iran to either voluntarily renounce or be forcefully prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if -- as Moscow fears -- this results in a diminution of Russia's value to Iran as a protector or partner. Even a nuclear-armed Iran would be preferable to Moscow than this prospect.
Moscow has little interest in working with Washington to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons for two important reasons: First, Moscow has reasonably good -- though not untroubled -- relations with Tehran. Russian firms profit from selling arms and nuclear technology to Iran, and Russian petroleum firms are actively seeking to invest in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. Moscow is also deeply appreciative that Tehran has not supported Chechen or other Muslim rebels in Russia, or challenged Moscow's influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Moscow does not want to jeopardize any of this by seriously cooperating with Washington against Tehran. What Moscow would prefer instead is that others -- the United States, Europe, Israel, or some combination -- take the lead in confronting Tehran on the nuclear issue. If they succeed in getting Iran to halt its efforts, then Russia gains by avoiding the strategic challenge of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. But if they fail to halt this activity, Moscow prefers that these actors -- and not Russia -- be the focus of Iran's ire. This is especially true if Iran actually acquires nuclear weapons.
Second, the Kremlin sees the Obama administration as asking Russia to risk harming its Iranian ties while Washington is openly attempting to improve Iranian-American relations. Moscow has long feared that if U.S.-Iranian ties improve, Russia's importance to Iran will diminish. Many Russian observers are convinced that Tehran would much prefer to purchase weapons, nuclear reactors, and virtually everything else from America and the West rather than from Russia. Although Moscow does not want to see open conflict between the United States and Iran (especially if it leads to greater American influence in the region), it certainly has no interest in facilitating an improvement in American-Iranian relations that the Kremlin fears will diminish Russian influence over Iran.
Medvedev's False Reassurances
Some observers dismiss these concerns, citing reports that Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told President Obama that Russia is increasingly concerned about Iran's nuclear program and wants to increase cooperation with the United States. Yet even if such reports are accurate, they should not be taken at face value.
First, Medvedev's alleged desire for greater cooperation with the United States does not mean that he will follow through. He knows Washington wants Russia's help, and he may hold out the prospect of collaboration to see what concessions the Obama administration might make to secure Moscow's support. Second, the Russian president's cool response to Obama's letter -- stating that there would be no need for U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic (something Moscow vociferously opposes) if there were no Iranian threat -- indicates that this concession is not enough for Moscow. Even if Medvedev meant what he reportedly told Obama, it is Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, not Medvedev, who has the final say on Russian foreign policy. Third, Putin, who has privately expressed concern to Western visitors about Iran's nuclear program, hinted during a CNN interview in August 2008 that Russian cooperation on Iran is contingent on American cooperation on Georgia. As far as Moscow is concerned, Washington's continued support for Georgia (including the recent NATO military exercises there) demonstrates that the United States is not cooperating with Russia on this issue.
Even if Washington made the concessions Moscow seeks, what help can the United States reasonably expect Russia to provide on the Iranian nuclear issue? Russia will neither take part in any forceful action against Iran, nor damage its economic relationship with the country, especially since Moscow fears that Washington is trying to snatch the Iranian market away.
Some believe that Medvedev's reputed concern about Iran's nuclear program will lead to Russian support for tougher UN Security Council sanctions against the Iranian regime. But Medvedev's alarm is more rhetorical than real, and Moscow will most likely do what it has done in the past: work with China to delay and water down a resolution introduced by the United States or one of its allies, and then try to mitigate Iranian anger by claiming that Moscow had actually protected Iran from much harsher sanctions that the United States sought to impose.
Moving Forward Without Russia
The degree of effort necessary to secure Russia's limited help is not worth Washington's time or resources: if U.S.-Iranian relations improve, Washington would not need Moscow's help, and if they do not, Russia would not be willing or able to do anything significant to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Whether the Obama administration should attempt to improve relations with Tehran is open for debate, but the notion that "We need Russia to help us with Iran" is not.
Peace through Security: America's Role in the Development of the Palestinian Authority Security Services by Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton
On May 7, 2009, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton delivered the Michael Stein Address on U.S. Middle East Policy at The Washington Institute's 2009 Soref Symposium. General Dayton currently serves as U.S. security coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a position he has held since 2005. He recently accepted his appointment to the post for another two-year term.
The following is a selection of excerpts from General Dayton's address. Download a complete transcript of his remarks (PDF).
"I will talk about opportunities and I will touch on challenges. And all of us on the security coordinator's team share the conviction that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the national interests of our respective nations, and for that matter, of the world. Let me state at the outset a few bedrock principles that guide me in my work. First, as I just said, I profoundly believe that it is in the national security interest of the United States to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
"Second, I am one of those who firmly believes in a two-state solution: a Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside the state of Israel is the only solution that will meet the long-term needs of Israel and the aspirations of the Palestinian people. This has long been the policy of our national leadership, and I share it.
"The third principle, let me state very clearly my deep conviction -- and I tell this to my Israeli friends all the time -- that as President Obama said last year, the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, it is unbreakable tomorrow, and it is unbreakable forever. . . .
"The idea in forming the USSC was to create an entity to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve. . . .
"Another strong point is that we were given permission from the outset to work with all sides to this conflict except the terrorists. That means we work on a daily basis with both Palestinians and Israelis -- something that is unique in the region, believe it or not. My team and I frequently visit Jordan and Egypt and we've even been granted permission to coordinate with the Gulf States. We are also networked with all the other missions in the region work the Arab-Israeli conflict. And we meet with a variety of other international actors in the region in the course of our coordination, ranging from individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, or officials of the United Nations. But perhaps the most important thing about who we are is that we live in the region. We do not parachute in for a few days and then go home. We stay there. In a region where understanding the reality on the ground while building relationships is the cornerstone of getting something done, you have to invest the time, and we've done that. . . .
"We don't give any guns or bullets. The equipment ranges from vehicles to socks. We have also graduated, now, three battalions -- an average of five hundred men each -- from JIPTC and another battalion is currently in training. The graduates have also been extensively schooled by the Jordanians, who have really stepped up to this task, on loyalty to the Palestinian flag and the Palestinian people. And what we have created -- and I say this in humility -- but what we have created are new men. The average age of the graduates is twenty to twenty-two years, and these young men, when they graduate, and their officers believe that their mission is to build a Palestinian state. So if you don't like the idea of a Palestinian state, you won't like the rest of this talk. But if you like the idea of a Palestinian state, listen on. . . .
"The second area we focused on has been capacity building in the Ministry of Interior. That may seem like a mundane task, but it is absolutely vital, because we are trying to form a normal government. In the Palestinian Authority, the minister of interior is responsible for all the security forces to the prime minister and president. In the last eighteen months, we have invested considerable funds and personnel into making the ministry a leading arm of the Palestinian government with a capacity to budget, to think strategically, and operationally plan. As I said, it's the key to normalcy for Palestine. Security decisions in Palestine are no longer made by one man in the middle of the night. In this we have come a very long way. . . .
"The USSC security partnership with the Palestinians and Jordanians and the Israelis is now in its eighteenth month. The results are beyond our most optimistic expectations and they relate directly to the title of this talk, 'Peace through Security.' The facts on the ground have changed, and will continue to change. The situation may be fragile; there are many challenges ahead. But this is real progress in changing facts on the ground.
"Do we have a long way to go? You bet we do, and the challenges along the way are formidable. Time may not be on our side. Very serious work needs to be done on terrorism, and we are actively exploring options with the Palestinians, with the Jordanians, and with the Israelis. If we are to have a Palestinian state, there is also serious work ahead on borders and crossings management, something which the Canadians on my team are in the lead. And then of course there's Gaza and the armed formations of Hamas that present an enormous challenge to the future of a Palestinian state.
"So again, the theme of this talk, 'Peace through Security' -- the road to peace in this region is a very difficult one. All of you know that. I would say it goes through forests of misunderstanding, lack of trust, old wounds, political and institutional weakness, and spoilers who would like to see us all fail. And there are dangers every step of the way. But compared with past years, we are now on that road, and we can make out the outlines of the destination ahead. We are moving forward. Peace through security is no longer an impossible dream. I think it was Herzl who said, 'If you will it, it is not a dream.'"
The following is a selection of excerpts from General Dayton's address. Download a complete transcript of his remarks (PDF).
"I will talk about opportunities and I will touch on challenges. And all of us on the security coordinator's team share the conviction that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the national interests of our respective nations, and for that matter, of the world. Let me state at the outset a few bedrock principles that guide me in my work. First, as I just said, I profoundly believe that it is in the national security interest of the United States to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
"Second, I am one of those who firmly believes in a two-state solution: a Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside the state of Israel is the only solution that will meet the long-term needs of Israel and the aspirations of the Palestinian people. This has long been the policy of our national leadership, and I share it.
"The third principle, let me state very clearly my deep conviction -- and I tell this to my Israeli friends all the time -- that as President Obama said last year, the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable today, it is unbreakable tomorrow, and it is unbreakable forever. . . .
"The idea in forming the USSC was to create an entity to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort. It was to mobilize additional resources and to allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the Palestinian security forces. The USSC was to help the Palestinian Authority to right-size its force and advise them on the restructuring and training necessary to improve their ability, to enforce the rule of law, and make them accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve. . . .
"Another strong point is that we were given permission from the outset to work with all sides to this conflict except the terrorists. That means we work on a daily basis with both Palestinians and Israelis -- something that is unique in the region, believe it or not. My team and I frequently visit Jordan and Egypt and we've even been granted permission to coordinate with the Gulf States. We are also networked with all the other missions in the region work the Arab-Israeli conflict. And we meet with a variety of other international actors in the region in the course of our coordination, ranging from individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, or officials of the United Nations. But perhaps the most important thing about who we are is that we live in the region. We do not parachute in for a few days and then go home. We stay there. In a region where understanding the reality on the ground while building relationships is the cornerstone of getting something done, you have to invest the time, and we've done that. . . .
"We don't give any guns or bullets. The equipment ranges from vehicles to socks. We have also graduated, now, three battalions -- an average of five hundred men each -- from JIPTC and another battalion is currently in training. The graduates have also been extensively schooled by the Jordanians, who have really stepped up to this task, on loyalty to the Palestinian flag and the Palestinian people. And what we have created -- and I say this in humility -- but what we have created are new men. The average age of the graduates is twenty to twenty-two years, and these young men, when they graduate, and their officers believe that their mission is to build a Palestinian state. So if you don't like the idea of a Palestinian state, you won't like the rest of this talk. But if you like the idea of a Palestinian state, listen on. . . .
"The second area we focused on has been capacity building in the Ministry of Interior. That may seem like a mundane task, but it is absolutely vital, because we are trying to form a normal government. In the Palestinian Authority, the minister of interior is responsible for all the security forces to the prime minister and president. In the last eighteen months, we have invested considerable funds and personnel into making the ministry a leading arm of the Palestinian government with a capacity to budget, to think strategically, and operationally plan. As I said, it's the key to normalcy for Palestine. Security decisions in Palestine are no longer made by one man in the middle of the night. In this we have come a very long way. . . .
"The USSC security partnership with the Palestinians and Jordanians and the Israelis is now in its eighteenth month. The results are beyond our most optimistic expectations and they relate directly to the title of this talk, 'Peace through Security.' The facts on the ground have changed, and will continue to change. The situation may be fragile; there are many challenges ahead. But this is real progress in changing facts on the ground.
"Do we have a long way to go? You bet we do, and the challenges along the way are formidable. Time may not be on our side. Very serious work needs to be done on terrorism, and we are actively exploring options with the Palestinians, with the Jordanians, and with the Israelis. If we are to have a Palestinian state, there is also serious work ahead on borders and crossings management, something which the Canadians on my team are in the lead. And then of course there's Gaza and the armed formations of Hamas that present an enormous challenge to the future of a Palestinian state.
"So again, the theme of this talk, 'Peace through Security' -- the road to peace in this region is a very difficult one. All of you know that. I would say it goes through forests of misunderstanding, lack of trust, old wounds, political and institutional weakness, and spoilers who would like to see us all fail. And there are dangers every step of the way. But compared with past years, we are now on that road, and we can make out the outlines of the destination ahead. We are moving forward. Peace through security is no longer an impossible dream. I think it was Herzl who said, 'If you will it, it is not a dream.'"
Hezbollah, Hamas-and the Muslim Brotherhood? by Douglas Farah
A senior Hezbollah official has now stated publicly for the first time that his organization has been providing Hamas with “every type of support” for a long period of time.
“We have always said that we supported the resistance in Palestine, but we have not mentioned how or given details of such support,” Naim Qassem, the deputy leader of the Lebanese organization, said in an interview published by the Financial Times on Wednesday.
“But Egypt has now revealed that we have given military support to Palestine. We have done so for a while, but we have not talked about it,” he continued.
It is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don’t talk about the details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them every type of support that could help the Palestinian resistance. Every type that is possible,” he said.
The statements are the clearest yet of the ability and desirability of Shiite Muslim armed groups (Hezbollah) to tactically ally themselves with armed Sunni groups (Hamas). This means the transfer of technology, lessons learned, tactics, intelligence etc. is well advanced among groups that have long and valuable experience in terrorism and irregular warfare.
While the intelligence community for years denied such alliances were possible, they have long been operative. One of the key bridges between the Sunni and Shiite world has been the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood has mediated or attempted to mediate a host of disputes between Shiite and Sunnis, including the unsuccessful efforts by the International Muslim Brotherhood’s Yousef Nada to negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
One of the biggest bones on contention between the MB in Iraq and the al Qaeda groups of Zarqawi was the latter’s insistence on targeting Shiite groups, while the MB units viewed that as a far lower priority than targeting the Americans.
The understanding of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has often been misunderstood in the United States, where it is often viewed as Egyptian organization. The international structure is largely ignored. It is also worth remembering (although it seldom is) that Hamas is, according to its own statutes-article 2-an organic part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That means that Hamas cannot be acting in this regard without the knowledge of its “mother ship,” the MB. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report has an interesting piece on the recent and rare public acknowledgement by a senior Brotherhood leader that such an international structure exists.
According to the GMBDR:
In a recent interview with London Al-Quds al-Arabi Online, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef provided some new details about the composition of it’s so-called “International Organization.” In the interview, Mr. Akef discusses the International Shura Council as well as the International Guidance Bureau:
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Murshid-General (Guide), Muhammad Mahdi Akif, said that it is likely that his successor would be a non-Egyptian, but that depends on the internal elections in the Shura Council of the International Organization of the Brotherhood. He added in exclusive statement to Al-Quds al-Arabi that “the International Shura Council consists of 90 members from inside Egypt and 40 from outside, and it is they who elect the ‘murshid-general’.” As to whether the future ‘murshid-general’ can be a non-Egyptian, he said: “The brothers abroad have always preferred an Egyptian candidate out of politeness and love of Egypt.”With regard to the MB’s ‘international guidance bureau’, he said: “it consists of eight Egyptians and five non-Egyptians; whereas the Egyptian guidance bureau consists of 17 members, all of whom are Egyptians.”…With regard to the international organization, Dr Al-Halabawi said: “Representation on the Shura Council is for the countries with more members such as Jordan, Syria, the Gulf, Malaysia, Indonesia and Europe, and the candidate should be a prominent person.”
It is important to note that Sunni-Shiite interests diverge and the alliance is tactical, and likely not long term. Still, it shows how networks and pipelines connect when the circumstances are right, and that is dangerous.
“We have always said that we supported the resistance in Palestine, but we have not mentioned how or given details of such support,” Naim Qassem, the deputy leader of the Lebanese organization, said in an interview published by the Financial Times on Wednesday.
“But Egypt has now revealed that we have given military support to Palestine. We have done so for a while, but we have not talked about it,” he continued.
It is one of the secrets of the resistance that we don’t talk about the details of our support, but suffice to say that we are giving them every type of support that could help the Palestinian resistance. Every type that is possible,” he said.
The statements are the clearest yet of the ability and desirability of Shiite Muslim armed groups (Hezbollah) to tactically ally themselves with armed Sunni groups (Hamas). This means the transfer of technology, lessons learned, tactics, intelligence etc. is well advanced among groups that have long and valuable experience in terrorism and irregular warfare.
While the intelligence community for years denied such alliances were possible, they have long been operative. One of the key bridges between the Sunni and Shiite world has been the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood has mediated or attempted to mediate a host of disputes between Shiite and Sunnis, including the unsuccessful efforts by the International Muslim Brotherhood’s Yousef Nada to negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
One of the biggest bones on contention between the MB in Iraq and the al Qaeda groups of Zarqawi was the latter’s insistence on targeting Shiite groups, while the MB units viewed that as a far lower priority than targeting the Americans.
The understanding of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has often been misunderstood in the United States, where it is often viewed as Egyptian organization. The international structure is largely ignored. It is also worth remembering (although it seldom is) that Hamas is, according to its own statutes-article 2-an organic part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
That means that Hamas cannot be acting in this regard without the knowledge of its “mother ship,” the MB. The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report has an interesting piece on the recent and rare public acknowledgement by a senior Brotherhood leader that such an international structure exists.
According to the GMBDR:
In a recent interview with London Al-Quds al-Arabi Online, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef provided some new details about the composition of it’s so-called “International Organization.” In the interview, Mr. Akef discusses the International Shura Council as well as the International Guidance Bureau:
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Murshid-General (Guide), Muhammad Mahdi Akif, said that it is likely that his successor would be a non-Egyptian, but that depends on the internal elections in the Shura Council of the International Organization of the Brotherhood. He added in exclusive statement to Al-Quds al-Arabi that “the International Shura Council consists of 90 members from inside Egypt and 40 from outside, and it is they who elect the ‘murshid-general’.” As to whether the future ‘murshid-general’ can be a non-Egyptian, he said: “The brothers abroad have always preferred an Egyptian candidate out of politeness and love of Egypt.”With regard to the MB’s ‘international guidance bureau’, he said: “it consists of eight Egyptians and five non-Egyptians; whereas the Egyptian guidance bureau consists of 17 members, all of whom are Egyptians.”…With regard to the international organization, Dr Al-Halabawi said: “Representation on the Shura Council is for the countries with more members such as Jordan, Syria, the Gulf, Malaysia, Indonesia and Europe, and the candidate should be a prominent person.”
It is important to note that Sunni-Shiite interests diverge and the alliance is tactical, and likely not long term. Still, it shows how networks and pipelines connect when the circumstances are right, and that is dangerous.
iRobot Corp: Developed a New Microbot for Military Applications iRobot Ember
Ember is a prototype and was developed under Phase 1 of DARPA’s ongong LANdroids program.
LANdroids Program Goal:
To provide warfighters operating in dense urban environments with tools to deploy and maintain an ad-hoc communication infrastructure.
Ember’s Statistics & Capabilities:
-- Approximately one pound
-- Unprecedented mobility for vehicles of similar size
-- Uses a flipper mechanism for self righting and obstacle climbing
-- Accepts USB and SDIO based payload modules, including radios and sensors
One single warfighter will be able to carry and deploy multiple robots:
-- Ultimately, these robots will be inexpensive to the point of being disposable
-- They will be robust enough to allow the warfighter to drop and throw them into position
-- They will be smart enough to detect and avoid obstacles while navigating its environment
Are Obama and Netanyahu Destined to Clash? by David Makovsky
On Monday, May 18, U.S. president Barack Obama will host Israeli prime minister and Likud leader Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu at the White House for their first meeting since the new Israeli government was formed six weeks ago. Some observers predict that, sooner or later, the two are bound to collide; however, a candid exchange of their priorities could build trust and avoid a clash.
The Collision Narrative
Recent public statements and history, both, suggest the possibility of collision. Historically, two of the last three Likud leaders got off to a poor start in their first Oval Office meetings with the U.S. president and the relationships never fully recovered. When Yitzhak Shamir first met with George H.W. Bush in April 1989, the president said he had a problem with Jewish settlements. Shamir's responded that settlements were an internal Israeli matter, followed by: "Don't worry, they won't be a problem." Bush took this to mean that Shamir would not expand settlements, and consequently felt aggrieved when expansion did continue. Their relationship remained frosty. In a similar vein, after the first White House meeting between Bill Clinton and Netanyahu during his previous tenure in 1996, Clinton told gathered aides after a very confident Bibi left the room: "He thinks he is the superpower." Their ensuing relationship proved to be very rocky.
At the rhetorical level, the United States and Israel have been engaging in verbal ping-pong. Three examples come to mind: First, in the coalition negotiations leading to the formation of his government, Netanyahu refused to say that his government's policy guidelines would be based on a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Meanwhile senior U.S. officials say publicly that the only way out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a two-state solution. Second, new Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman referred to the 2007 Annapolis peace conference, which sought to define the contours of an agreement and create a basis for Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations, as invalid. Yet President Obama said in an Ankara speech that Annapolis was a basis for moving forward. Third, when Israel stated that its ability to move ahead on the Palestinian issue depended on U.S. progress on Iran, a U.S. official responded that success in Iran hinged on progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace. Each side invoked their own form of linkage.
Two-State Solution and Linkage
To American officials and observers, Netanyahu's reluctance to embrace the two-state solution has been an irritant because it suggests relitigating the past. The Middle East Quartet Roadmap, adopted by the Israeli government by a 12-7 vote on May 25, 2003 -- although with reservations -- says at the very outset that it is "a performance-based roadmap toward a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." Even Lieberman, who voted against the roadmap at the time, says it binds Israel today. Not rehashing the past is critical, because the United States seeks to ensure that the Quartet conditions remain valid, including the proviso that Hamas accept past Israeli-Palestinian agreements.
Senior Israeli officials hint that Netanyahu may tell Obama privately that he accepts the two-state solution if accompanied by the same restrictions on Palestinian sovereignty -- such as nonmilitarization -- that Labor and Kadima leaders espouse, but will not do so publicly for fear that it would create a perception of domestic weakness so soon after his election. However, Netanyahu may find it is advantageous to defuse the issue by making a statement backing the two-state solution now, since there could be domestic political fallout if he makes such a statement only after a rising international chorus in the coming months. On a related note, Netanyahu will likely find support in the United States for his belief that a goal of negotiations should be recognition by all parties of a Palestinian state as the Palestinian homeland just as Israel is the Jewish homeland. Vice President Biden made a speech mentioning Israel as a "secure Jewish state" just two weeks ago.
A public debate over the issue of linkage, namely, whether Iran is the key to resolving the Palestinian issue or vice versa, should be avoided. The Iran and the Palestinian issues need to be addressed in parallel, without administration assertions of linkage. Top Arab officials quietly admit that their inability to be forceful on the Iran issue are unrelated to Israel: Arab fears of Iran are sincere and not a favor to Israel. Even the acerbic head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, no fan of Israel, made it clear publicly this week that these are distinct issues. Moreover, given that Iran has threatened the existence of Israel, it is problematic to say that U.S. efforts to curb Iran are conditional. It runs counter to President Obama's repeated public commitment to Israel's security.
For its part, Israel cannot put its peace efforts on hold either. To the contrary, it needs to address the Palestinian issue, given the demographic challenges that it faces.
Trust Building
So, even assuming the two leaders exhibit outward smiles and project friendship at their press conference on Monday, is the Obama-Bibi relationship headed for trouble? Not necessarily, but the two sides must work hard to build trust. Underlying the anxiety on both sides is a fear that each is not truly committed to addressing the other's top priority. Netanyahu believes that history has called on him to be in power at this time to prevent another Holocaust. He has said this in private to his senior aides, not just to the public. Therefore, Netanyahu wants to know what Obama will do if U.S.-Iranian diplomacy fails and Iran continues its march toward nuclear weapons. It is facile to believe that Netanyahu would press Obama to attack Iran in the event that diplomacy fails. Many other options exist, ranging from increased sanctions to an Israeli military strike. Nonetheless, at a time when the United States is seeking to maximize its leverage before engaging with Iran, Netanyahu will likely be angered that some senior U.S. officials have publicly -- rather than privately -- warned Israel about attacking Iran. He will worry about what Iran will glean from such public messaging by the Obama administration.
For Obama's part, he will want to hear clearly from Netanyahu his plans for the Palestinians. How will Israel's approach to the Palestinians work if Israel does not curb settlement activity? Obama will appreciate a recent public statement by Netanyahu that economic progress is insufficient, and that such improvement must be accompanied by political progress. Moving forward on this issue is important to Obama, who sees it as evocative -- albeit not linked to resolutions of other conflicts -- in a region where he is seeking to improve U.S. standing. To that end, Obama is likely to tell Netanyahu about U.S. efforts to have Arab states take preliminary steps toward Israel as it moves toward the Palestinians by curbing settlement activity.
Conclusion
If the two leaders' priorities are not tackled head on, there could be trouble ahead. Given the past problems between the two countries, there is no substitute for Obama and Netanyahu emptying the room and beginning a very candid discussion of bottom lines. Netanyahu aides insist that this is not the 1990s and that he is willing to be more forthcoming on Palestinian issues if he is convinced that Iran, the paymaster of Hamas and Hezbollah, will not pose a nuclear threat to Israel. Yet, vagueness of intentions will only feed mistrust. In short, Netanyahu needs to be explicit about which direction he is headed on the Palestinian issue, and Obama needs to level with Netanyahu on how he views U.S. policy toward Iran in the event that diplomacy fails. Trust building harbors no shortcuts: each side needs to share his bottom line. And is this lies the hope for a relationship that stays on track, without derailment.
The Collision Narrative
Recent public statements and history, both, suggest the possibility of collision. Historically, two of the last three Likud leaders got off to a poor start in their first Oval Office meetings with the U.S. president and the relationships never fully recovered. When Yitzhak Shamir first met with George H.W. Bush in April 1989, the president said he had a problem with Jewish settlements. Shamir's responded that settlements were an internal Israeli matter, followed by: "Don't worry, they won't be a problem." Bush took this to mean that Shamir would not expand settlements, and consequently felt aggrieved when expansion did continue. Their relationship remained frosty. In a similar vein, after the first White House meeting between Bill Clinton and Netanyahu during his previous tenure in 1996, Clinton told gathered aides after a very confident Bibi left the room: "He thinks he is the superpower." Their ensuing relationship proved to be very rocky.
At the rhetorical level, the United States and Israel have been engaging in verbal ping-pong. Three examples come to mind: First, in the coalition negotiations leading to the formation of his government, Netanyahu refused to say that his government's policy guidelines would be based on a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Meanwhile senior U.S. officials say publicly that the only way out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a two-state solution. Second, new Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman referred to the 2007 Annapolis peace conference, which sought to define the contours of an agreement and create a basis for Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations, as invalid. Yet President Obama said in an Ankara speech that Annapolis was a basis for moving forward. Third, when Israel stated that its ability to move ahead on the Palestinian issue depended on U.S. progress on Iran, a U.S. official responded that success in Iran hinged on progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace. Each side invoked their own form of linkage.
Two-State Solution and Linkage
To American officials and observers, Netanyahu's reluctance to embrace the two-state solution has been an irritant because it suggests relitigating the past. The Middle East Quartet Roadmap, adopted by the Israeli government by a 12-7 vote on May 25, 2003 -- although with reservations -- says at the very outset that it is "a performance-based roadmap toward a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." Even Lieberman, who voted against the roadmap at the time, says it binds Israel today. Not rehashing the past is critical, because the United States seeks to ensure that the Quartet conditions remain valid, including the proviso that Hamas accept past Israeli-Palestinian agreements.
Senior Israeli officials hint that Netanyahu may tell Obama privately that he accepts the two-state solution if accompanied by the same restrictions on Palestinian sovereignty -- such as nonmilitarization -- that Labor and Kadima leaders espouse, but will not do so publicly for fear that it would create a perception of domestic weakness so soon after his election. However, Netanyahu may find it is advantageous to defuse the issue by making a statement backing the two-state solution now, since there could be domestic political fallout if he makes such a statement only after a rising international chorus in the coming months. On a related note, Netanyahu will likely find support in the United States for his belief that a goal of negotiations should be recognition by all parties of a Palestinian state as the Palestinian homeland just as Israel is the Jewish homeland. Vice President Biden made a speech mentioning Israel as a "secure Jewish state" just two weeks ago.
A public debate over the issue of linkage, namely, whether Iran is the key to resolving the Palestinian issue or vice versa, should be avoided. The Iran and the Palestinian issues need to be addressed in parallel, without administration assertions of linkage. Top Arab officials quietly admit that their inability to be forceful on the Iran issue are unrelated to Israel: Arab fears of Iran are sincere and not a favor to Israel. Even the acerbic head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, no fan of Israel, made it clear publicly this week that these are distinct issues. Moreover, given that Iran has threatened the existence of Israel, it is problematic to say that U.S. efforts to curb Iran are conditional. It runs counter to President Obama's repeated public commitment to Israel's security.
For its part, Israel cannot put its peace efforts on hold either. To the contrary, it needs to address the Palestinian issue, given the demographic challenges that it faces.
Trust Building
So, even assuming the two leaders exhibit outward smiles and project friendship at their press conference on Monday, is the Obama-Bibi relationship headed for trouble? Not necessarily, but the two sides must work hard to build trust. Underlying the anxiety on both sides is a fear that each is not truly committed to addressing the other's top priority. Netanyahu believes that history has called on him to be in power at this time to prevent another Holocaust. He has said this in private to his senior aides, not just to the public. Therefore, Netanyahu wants to know what Obama will do if U.S.-Iranian diplomacy fails and Iran continues its march toward nuclear weapons. It is facile to believe that Netanyahu would press Obama to attack Iran in the event that diplomacy fails. Many other options exist, ranging from increased sanctions to an Israeli military strike. Nonetheless, at a time when the United States is seeking to maximize its leverage before engaging with Iran, Netanyahu will likely be angered that some senior U.S. officials have publicly -- rather than privately -- warned Israel about attacking Iran. He will worry about what Iran will glean from such public messaging by the Obama administration.
For Obama's part, he will want to hear clearly from Netanyahu his plans for the Palestinians. How will Israel's approach to the Palestinians work if Israel does not curb settlement activity? Obama will appreciate a recent public statement by Netanyahu that economic progress is insufficient, and that such improvement must be accompanied by political progress. Moving forward on this issue is important to Obama, who sees it as evocative -- albeit not linked to resolutions of other conflicts -- in a region where he is seeking to improve U.S. standing. To that end, Obama is likely to tell Netanyahu about U.S. efforts to have Arab states take preliminary steps toward Israel as it moves toward the Palestinians by curbing settlement activity.
Conclusion
If the two leaders' priorities are not tackled head on, there could be trouble ahead. Given the past problems between the two countries, there is no substitute for Obama and Netanyahu emptying the room and beginning a very candid discussion of bottom lines. Netanyahu aides insist that this is not the 1990s and that he is willing to be more forthcoming on Palestinian issues if he is convinced that Iran, the paymaster of Hamas and Hezbollah, will not pose a nuclear threat to Israel. Yet, vagueness of intentions will only feed mistrust. In short, Netanyahu needs to be explicit about which direction he is headed on the Palestinian issue, and Obama needs to level with Netanyahu on how he views U.S. policy toward Iran in the event that diplomacy fails. Trust building harbors no shortcuts: each side needs to share his bottom line. And is this lies the hope for a relationship that stays on track, without derailment.
Cost a Factor in Military Malpractice Bill (Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009 Alerts)
A law professor says he isn't optimistic about Congress's latest attempt to overturn the laws shielding the U.S. military from medical malpractice lawsuits.
Jonathan Turley of George Washington University says the cost of upgrading the armed forces' healthcare system is a major impediment.
"It would cost a huge amount of money to upgrade the military medical system to meet basic civilian standards," Turley told The (Norfolk) Virginian-Pilot. "Congress simply doesn't want to spend the money."
Turley's pessimism was directed toward the Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, which would repeal the Feres Doctrine. The Feres Doctrine is based on a 1950 U.S. Supreme Court decision that effectively bars military personnel from suing for malpractice committed by military doctors.
The Virginian-Pilot said Sunday that the act, named after a Marine Corps sergeant who died of cancer, has supporters who want to see military healthcare held to the same standards as the civilian system; however, opponents in Congress say the answer to improving medical care is not litigation.
Jonathan Turley of George Washington University says the cost of upgrading the armed forces' healthcare system is a major impediment.
"It would cost a huge amount of money to upgrade the military medical system to meet basic civilian standards," Turley told The (Norfolk) Virginian-Pilot. "Congress simply doesn't want to spend the money."
Turley's pessimism was directed toward the Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, which would repeal the Feres Doctrine. The Feres Doctrine is based on a 1950 U.S. Supreme Court decision that effectively bars military personnel from suing for malpractice committed by military doctors.
The Virginian-Pilot said Sunday that the act, named after a Marine Corps sergeant who died of cancer, has supporters who want to see military healthcare held to the same standards as the civilian system; however, opponents in Congress say the answer to improving medical care is not litigation.
When Combat Stress Kills (Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009 Alerts)
Americans received a grim reminder this week that, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan drag on, death doesn't always come at the hands of an enemy. On Monday, Sergeant John M. Russell shot and killed five fellow servicemen at a mental health clinic at Camp Liberty in Iraq after his commanding officer recommended that he receive psychological counseling and confiscated his weapon.
Russell directed violence at others, but more and more often service members aim weapons at themselves. In 2008, over 140 service members committed suicide, far more than in any year since the statistic has been tracked. This internal wave of violence is a signal that the emotional and mental costs of war are taking a severe toll on American soldiers.
To reduce effects of combat stress, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he would consider increasing time between deployments. This must be tied with an effort to decrease the number of deployments, particularly since the Army's mental health assessment found that soldiers on a third deployment were at much higher risk of mental health issues.
But the stigma of mental health problems prevents too many soldiers from getting help. According to his father, Russell was concerned that by sending him to the clinic, his commanding officer was "setting him up" for discharge. Accessing mental health services must not be seen as a reason for demotion. Already, some leaders are taking initiative to change this. General Carter Ham, the commanding general for the Army in Europe, admitted that he sought counseling after his return from Iraq and told soldiers that he believed he was "a better general because I got some help." These messages from leaders signal that vulnerability to combat stress is part of the job.
Combating stigma must also involve better access to resources. All soldiers get a health assessment after their deployment, but most soldiers only fill out questionnaires. An experimental model at Fort Lewis in Washington called the Soldier Wellness Assessment Pilot Program gives returning soldiers a minimum of a 15-minute face-to-face mental health interview. Doctoral-level medical providers and other services are immediately available for those with symptoms of stress. However, this program is funded not by the Department of Defense, but by a grant from the surgeon general's office. The Pentagon ought to adopt the model more widely.
Until regular care becomes part of the regimen, the burden of identifying service members in mental distress falls on their colleagues and loved ones. This just isn't enough. The profound psychic wounds of those we send to war must be identified and treated in a systematic way.
Russell directed violence at others, but more and more often service members aim weapons at themselves. In 2008, over 140 service members committed suicide, far more than in any year since the statistic has been tracked. This internal wave of violence is a signal that the emotional and mental costs of war are taking a severe toll on American soldiers.
To reduce effects of combat stress, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he would consider increasing time between deployments. This must be tied with an effort to decrease the number of deployments, particularly since the Army's mental health assessment found that soldiers on a third deployment were at much higher risk of mental health issues.
But the stigma of mental health problems prevents too many soldiers from getting help. According to his father, Russell was concerned that by sending him to the clinic, his commanding officer was "setting him up" for discharge. Accessing mental health services must not be seen as a reason for demotion. Already, some leaders are taking initiative to change this. General Carter Ham, the commanding general for the Army in Europe, admitted that he sought counseling after his return from Iraq and told soldiers that he believed he was "a better general because I got some help." These messages from leaders signal that vulnerability to combat stress is part of the job.
Combating stigma must also involve better access to resources. All soldiers get a health assessment after their deployment, but most soldiers only fill out questionnaires. An experimental model at Fort Lewis in Washington called the Soldier Wellness Assessment Pilot Program gives returning soldiers a minimum of a 15-minute face-to-face mental health interview. Doctoral-level medical providers and other services are immediately available for those with symptoms of stress. However, this program is funded not by the Department of Defense, but by a grant from the surgeon general's office. The Pentagon ought to adopt the model more widely.
Until regular care becomes part of the regimen, the burden of identifying service members in mental distress falls on their colleagues and loved ones. This just isn't enough. The profound psychic wounds of those we send to war must be identified and treated in a systematic way.
Military Medical Malpractice: Seeking Recourse by Liz O. Baylen and Walter F. Roche
Dean Witt’s widow, Alexis, holds their son, Noah, 4, with daughter Hannah, 5. She is determined to challenge the Feres doctrine — a 1950 Supreme Court ruling that prevents the bereaved family from suing for malpractice — in court.
Outrage over a recent spate of incidents spurs fresh efforts to overturn the Feres doctrine, a 1950 Supreme Court decision denying active-duty service members the right to sue over medical errors.
Minutes after routine surgery for acute appendicitis in October 2003, Staff Sgt. Dean Witt, 25, was being moved to a recovery room at a Northern California military hospital when he gasped and stopped breathing.
A student nurse assisting an understaffed anesthesia team tried to resuscitate Witt and failed. Inexplicably, Witt's gurney was wheeled into a pediatric area. Lifesaving devices sized for children, not a 175-pound adult, proved useless, according to an internal report on the incident.
Medical personnel at David Grant Medical Center at Travis Air Force Base screamed at each other. A double dose of a powerful stimulant was mistakenly administered. When a breathing tube was finally inserted, it was misdirected, uselessly pumping air into the patient's stomach. Errors compounded errors and delays multiplied.
By the time a breathing tube finally was inserted correctly, Witt had devastating brain damage. Three months later, he was removed from life support and died. Witt, who grew up in Oroville, Calif., left behind a wife and two children, including a 4-month-old son.
"This medical incident was due to an avoidable error," concluded an unpublished internal report, a copy of which was reviewed by The Times.
Despite questionable medical care criticized in the report, the bereaved family could not sue for malpractice because Witt was an active-duty airman. Under limits stemming from a Supreme Court ruling nearly 60 years old, military hospitals and their staffs are immune from malpractice claims -- even for the most egregious lapses -- if the victim is an enlisted member on active duty.
A series of court rulings since 1950 have upheld the original decision, known as Feres vs. United States, denying members of the military the right to sue for damages over medical errors or even deliberate wrongs.
Barbara Cragnotti of Medford, Ore., learned of the Feres case after her son Joseph suffered lung and neurological injuries from undiagnosed pneumonia while under a military doctor's care. Joseph Cragnotti was in the Navy and had nearly completed training for submarine duty when he was stricken.
Military medical personnel failed to provide antibiotics, and her son ended up having multiple surgeries. He lost part of a lung. His mother said his condition deteriorated further after doctors at the naval hospital in Bremerton, Wash., took the sailor off a needed drug, causing seizures and permanent neurological damage.
Joseph Cragnotti, now 28, has left the military but still needs treatment for his medical conditions.
His mother joined VERPA -- Veterans Equal Rights Protection Advocacy -- a nonprofit group determined "to expose and remedy" what it calls "the un-American Feres doctrine."
Barbara Cragnotti, now head of the organization, foresees more trouble as wounded troops from Iraq and Afghanistan strain a taxed military health system. "Congress is not going to act until the public forces them to," she said. The military medical establishment is "hiding behind the Feres doctrine."
Christine Lemp, whose husband, James, 35, died after receiving questionable medical care at Missouri's Ft. Leonard Wood, said accountability was lacking. "One of the most disturbing things is that these medical personal, NCOs, and Chain of Command can do anything and nothing happens," she said.
Army Capt. James Lemp was diagnosed with a stomach virus in 2003. Hours later, he was brain-dead from a stroke-like condition called vertebral artery dissection. Experts hired by his wife said that with proper treatment, he would have had a 90% chance of recovery.
Defending the Doctrine
Feres supporters say the doctrine is necessary to protect the military from costly, time-consuming trials that could compromise military discipline. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and a former fighter pilot, called Feres "a reasonable approach to ensuring that litigation does not interfere with the objectives and readiness of our nation's military."
For years, the Department of Justice and the Pentagon have joined forces to fend off legal and legislative challenges to Feres.
"Nobody wants some judge meddling in military matters," Paul Harris, then a deputy associate attorney general, told a Senate committee in 2002. "It would have dire implications."
Harris, now in private practice, said he stood by his position that "it would be unconscionable to subject the military to an adversarial civil trial process."
But fresh attempts to repeal Feres are in the works, spurred in part by the case of Marine Sgt. Carmelo Rodriguez. In January, a CBS News TV crew had just arrived to interview him when Rodriguez -- holding the hand of his 7-year-old son -- died. Rodriguez, 29, an Iraq war veteran from New York, had been ravaged by cancer that he and his family blamed on years of misdiagnoses.
Military doctors had mistaken a deadly melanoma for a wart.
His case prompted Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey (D-N.Y.) to promise renewed efforts to overturn Feres. Previous bills have passed easily in the House but died in the Senate.
"No service member should ever become sick or die as the result of poor military medical care," Hinchey said. "I believe our military has outstanding doctors, but if those doctors fail our men and women in uniform, then there must be some system of accountability."
Military is "Sole Remedy"
One former military doctor told The Times that military medical staffs, NCOs, and Chain of Command were well aware that Feres shielded them from malpractice claims by active-duty patients or their survivors.
The doctor, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, served on the medical staff at Travis Air Force Base. He said staff shortages were chronic there and at other Air Force installations where he worked.
Under such circumstances, he said, "they'll take anyone."
James B. Smith, a New Jersey lawyer who served as a military trial judge during a 30-year service career, said the theory behind Feres was that since the military provided full medical care for members and lifelong veterans benefits, there was little practical need for financial damages for malpractice. "The military is already providing for you, and that's your sole remedy," Smith said.
The 1950 Feres decision encompassed three separate cases. One involved a soldier named Rudolph J. Feres who died in a fire caused by a faulty barracks heating system. The others were the victims of medical malpractice. One had sued after a towel nearly 3 feet long was discovered in his abdomen, left there by military surgeons.
The court was interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act, which gives citizens a limited right to sue the government for wrongs resulting from the actions of federal employees or agencies.
But the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Robert H. Jackson, reasoned that active-duty members of the military could seek other remedies for such wrongs, including Veterans Administration benefits. "The compensation system, which normally requires no litigation, is not negligible," Jackson wrote.
The Supreme Court came within a single vote of overturning Feres in 1987. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the dissenting opinion for the four-member minority: "Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received."
Among the curious aspects of Feres is that it bars malpractice suits by active-duty military personnel but not by their spouses or other family members, who also are entitled to treatment at military hospitals.
"It doesn't make any sense," said Washington-based lawyer Eugene Fidell. "If a doctor malpractices on a dependent on one day, the family can sue. But if he commits the same malpractice the next day on a GI, they can't."
An investigative panel convened by the Air Force shortly after Witt's surgery concluded in its still-unreleased report that "due to assignments, deployments and recent ill health," the anesthesia unit at the Travis Air Force Base hospital was badly understaffed.
"There is insufficient manning to support operational tempo and the teaching mission of the hospital," the report said. It found that the authorized complement of seven anesthesiologists was down to four available for duty.
"This medical incident was due to an avoidable error," the report said. "The practice of anesthesia at a medical center should not rely on the minimum standard."
In response, Travis officials said the hospital could increase its anesthesia unit only if the Pentagon provided additional personnel. Base officials declined to comment on any aspect of the Witt case, citing privacy restrictions.
Legal Challenge
Despite the long legal odds, Witt's widow, Alexis, is determined to challenge Feres in court. This month she was formally notified that her administrative claim against the Air Force had been declined, an expected rejection that exhausted all options but litigation.
"As a family," said her sister Carmen Voegeli, a Marine veteran, "we have a right to know what happened. How dare the military use these men and take away their rights."
One haunting coincidence that could be a factor in the Witt family's challenge of Feres involves a nurse anesthetist who helped treat the airman. After Witt's death, her license was revoked by the state of California for "negligence and/or incompetence."
The same anesthetist had been on duty a year earlier when 22-year-old Texas airman Christopher White died after routine surgery on his shoulder. As in the Witt case, post-surgery care of White was criticized by the state nursing board.
White's family did not try to take legal action. If it had, that might have brought attention sooner to problems in the anesthesia unit.
His father, Harris White, said lawyers had advised him that he could not sue because of the Feres doctrine.
Outrage over a recent spate of incidents spurs fresh efforts to overturn the Feres doctrine, a 1950 Supreme Court decision denying active-duty service members the right to sue over medical errors.
Minutes after routine surgery for acute appendicitis in October 2003, Staff Sgt. Dean Witt, 25, was being moved to a recovery room at a Northern California military hospital when he gasped and stopped breathing.
A student nurse assisting an understaffed anesthesia team tried to resuscitate Witt and failed. Inexplicably, Witt's gurney was wheeled into a pediatric area. Lifesaving devices sized for children, not a 175-pound adult, proved useless, according to an internal report on the incident.
Medical personnel at David Grant Medical Center at Travis Air Force Base screamed at each other. A double dose of a powerful stimulant was mistakenly administered. When a breathing tube was finally inserted, it was misdirected, uselessly pumping air into the patient's stomach. Errors compounded errors and delays multiplied.
By the time a breathing tube finally was inserted correctly, Witt had devastating brain damage. Three months later, he was removed from life support and died. Witt, who grew up in Oroville, Calif., left behind a wife and two children, including a 4-month-old son.
"This medical incident was due to an avoidable error," concluded an unpublished internal report, a copy of which was reviewed by The Times.
Despite questionable medical care criticized in the report, the bereaved family could not sue for malpractice because Witt was an active-duty airman. Under limits stemming from a Supreme Court ruling nearly 60 years old, military hospitals and their staffs are immune from malpractice claims -- even for the most egregious lapses -- if the victim is an enlisted member on active duty.
A series of court rulings since 1950 have upheld the original decision, known as Feres vs. United States, denying members of the military the right to sue for damages over medical errors or even deliberate wrongs.
Barbara Cragnotti of Medford, Ore., learned of the Feres case after her son Joseph suffered lung and neurological injuries from undiagnosed pneumonia while under a military doctor's care. Joseph Cragnotti was in the Navy and had nearly completed training for submarine duty when he was stricken.
Military medical personnel failed to provide antibiotics, and her son ended up having multiple surgeries. He lost part of a lung. His mother said his condition deteriorated further after doctors at the naval hospital in Bremerton, Wash., took the sailor off a needed drug, causing seizures and permanent neurological damage.
Joseph Cragnotti, now 28, has left the military but still needs treatment for his medical conditions.
His mother joined VERPA -- Veterans Equal Rights Protection Advocacy -- a nonprofit group determined "to expose and remedy" what it calls "the un-American Feres doctrine."
Barbara Cragnotti, now head of the organization, foresees more trouble as wounded troops from Iraq and Afghanistan strain a taxed military health system. "Congress is not going to act until the public forces them to," she said. The military medical establishment is "hiding behind the Feres doctrine."
Christine Lemp, whose husband, James, 35, died after receiving questionable medical care at Missouri's Ft. Leonard Wood, said accountability was lacking. "One of the most disturbing things is that these medical personal, NCOs, and Chain of Command can do anything and nothing happens," she said.
Army Capt. James Lemp was diagnosed with a stomach virus in 2003. Hours later, he was brain-dead from a stroke-like condition called vertebral artery dissection. Experts hired by his wife said that with proper treatment, he would have had a 90% chance of recovery.
Defending the Doctrine
Feres supporters say the doctrine is necessary to protect the military from costly, time-consuming trials that could compromise military discipline. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and a former fighter pilot, called Feres "a reasonable approach to ensuring that litigation does not interfere with the objectives and readiness of our nation's military."
For years, the Department of Justice and the Pentagon have joined forces to fend off legal and legislative challenges to Feres.
"Nobody wants some judge meddling in military matters," Paul Harris, then a deputy associate attorney general, told a Senate committee in 2002. "It would have dire implications."
Harris, now in private practice, said he stood by his position that "it would be unconscionable to subject the military to an adversarial civil trial process."
But fresh attempts to repeal Feres are in the works, spurred in part by the case of Marine Sgt. Carmelo Rodriguez. In January, a CBS News TV crew had just arrived to interview him when Rodriguez -- holding the hand of his 7-year-old son -- died. Rodriguez, 29, an Iraq war veteran from New York, had been ravaged by cancer that he and his family blamed on years of misdiagnoses.
Military doctors had mistaken a deadly melanoma for a wart.
His case prompted Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey (D-N.Y.) to promise renewed efforts to overturn Feres. Previous bills have passed easily in the House but died in the Senate.
"No service member should ever become sick or die as the result of poor military medical care," Hinchey said. "I believe our military has outstanding doctors, but if those doctors fail our men and women in uniform, then there must be some system of accountability."
Military is "Sole Remedy"
One former military doctor told The Times that military medical staffs, NCOs, and Chain of Command were well aware that Feres shielded them from malpractice claims by active-duty patients or their survivors.
The doctor, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, served on the medical staff at Travis Air Force Base. He said staff shortages were chronic there and at other Air Force installations where he worked.
Under such circumstances, he said, "they'll take anyone."
James B. Smith, a New Jersey lawyer who served as a military trial judge during a 30-year service career, said the theory behind Feres was that since the military provided full medical care for members and lifelong veterans benefits, there was little practical need for financial damages for malpractice. "The military is already providing for you, and that's your sole remedy," Smith said.
The 1950 Feres decision encompassed three separate cases. One involved a soldier named Rudolph J. Feres who died in a fire caused by a faulty barracks heating system. The others were the victims of medical malpractice. One had sued after a towel nearly 3 feet long was discovered in his abdomen, left there by military surgeons.
The court was interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act, which gives citizens a limited right to sue the government for wrongs resulting from the actions of federal employees or agencies.
But the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Robert H. Jackson, reasoned that active-duty members of the military could seek other remedies for such wrongs, including Veterans Administration benefits. "The compensation system, which normally requires no litigation, is not negligible," Jackson wrote.
The Supreme Court came within a single vote of overturning Feres in 1987. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the dissenting opinion for the four-member minority: "Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received."
Among the curious aspects of Feres is that it bars malpractice suits by active-duty military personnel but not by their spouses or other family members, who also are entitled to treatment at military hospitals.
"It doesn't make any sense," said Washington-based lawyer Eugene Fidell. "If a doctor malpractices on a dependent on one day, the family can sue. But if he commits the same malpractice the next day on a GI, they can't."
An investigative panel convened by the Air Force shortly after Witt's surgery concluded in its still-unreleased report that "due to assignments, deployments and recent ill health," the anesthesia unit at the Travis Air Force Base hospital was badly understaffed.
"There is insufficient manning to support operational tempo and the teaching mission of the hospital," the report said. It found that the authorized complement of seven anesthesiologists was down to four available for duty.
"This medical incident was due to an avoidable error," the report said. "The practice of anesthesia at a medical center should not rely on the minimum standard."
In response, Travis officials said the hospital could increase its anesthesia unit only if the Pentagon provided additional personnel. Base officials declined to comment on any aspect of the Witt case, citing privacy restrictions.
Legal Challenge
Despite the long legal odds, Witt's widow, Alexis, is determined to challenge Feres in court. This month she was formally notified that her administrative claim against the Air Force had been declined, an expected rejection that exhausted all options but litigation.
"As a family," said her sister Carmen Voegeli, a Marine veteran, "we have a right to know what happened. How dare the military use these men and take away their rights."
One haunting coincidence that could be a factor in the Witt family's challenge of Feres involves a nurse anesthetist who helped treat the airman. After Witt's death, her license was revoked by the state of California for "negligence and/or incompetence."
The same anesthetist had been on duty a year earlier when 22-year-old Texas airman Christopher White died after routine surgery on his shoulder. As in the Witt case, post-surgery care of White was criticized by the state nursing board.
White's family did not try to take legal action. If it had, that might have brought attention sooner to problems in the anesthesia unit.
His father, Harris White, said lawyers had advised him that he could not sue because of the Feres doctrine.
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