Basic Definitions: Web 1.0, Web. 2.0, and Web 3.0 by Bryan Getting

"What do people mean when they talk about the Web 2.0?" is a query we receive repeatedly, and probably has as many answers as the number of people out there using the term. However, since talk about the Web 3.0 has surfaced in the last year or so, a whole new level of confusion seems to have set in. In an effort to help people understand the ideas behind buzzwords like Web 2.0 and Web 3.0, let's go through what exactly these terms mean (if anything), and how they apply to your ecommerce business.

A broad definition

I want to make it clear at the start that this article is meant to be a broad definition of the challenges that cause people to think in terms of Web 2.0 and Web 3.0. Since these are buzzwords and not clearly defined terms, think of this as an attempt to provide a bird's-eye view of the ever-changing lay of the land on the web. In an effort to create discreet "versions" of the web that can be compared, I will borrow from the W3C Director Tim Berners-Lee's notion of the read-write web, which is often used as a way of explaining what Web 2.0 means.

The first implementation of the web represents the Web 1.0, which, according to Berners-Lee, could be considered the "read-only web." In other words, the early web allowed us to search for information and read it. There was very little in the way of user interaction or content contribution. However, this is exactly what most website owners wanted: Their goal for a website was to establish an online presence and make their information available to anyone at any time. I like to call this "brick-and-mortar thinking applied to the web," and the web as a whole hasn't moved much beyond this stage yet.

Shopping carts are Web 1.0

Shopping cart applications, which most ecommerce website owners employ in some shape or form, basically fall under the category of Web 1.0. The overall goal is to present products to potential customers, much as a catalog or a brochure does — only, with a website, you can also provide a method for anyone in the world to purchase products. The web provided a vector for exposure, and removed the geographical restrictions associated with a brick-and-mortar business.

Currently, we are seeing the infancy of the Web 2.0, or the "read-write" web if we stick to Berners-Lee's method of describing it. The newly-introduced ability to contribute content and interact with other web users has dramatically changed the landscape of the web in a short time. It has even more potential that we have yet to see. For example, just look at YouTube and MySpace, which rely on user submissions, and the potential becomes more clear. The Web 2.0 appears to be a welcome response to a demand by web users that they be more involved in what information is available to them.

Many views of Web 2.0

Now, it's important to realize that there are a staggering number of definitions of what constitutes a "Web 2.0 application." For example, the perception exists that just because a website is built using a certain technology (like Ruby on Rails), or because it employs Ajax in its interface, it is a Web 2.0 application. From the general, bird's-eye view we are taking, this is not the case; our definition simply requires that users be able to interact with one another or contribute content. Developers, for example, have a much more rigid definition of Web 2.0 than average web users, and this can lead to confusion.

This in turn leads us to the rumblings and mumblings we have begun to hear about Web 3.0, which seems to provide us with a guarantee that vague web-versioning nomenclature is here to stay. By extending Tim Berners-Lee's explanations, the Web 3.0 would be something akin to a "read-write-execute" web. However, this is difficult to envision in its abstract form, so let's take a look at two things I predict will form the basis of the Web 3.0 — semantic markup and web services.

Semantic markup refers to the communication gap between human web users and computerized applications. One of the largest organizational challenges of presenting information on the web is that web applications aren't able to provide context to data, and, therefore, can't really understand what is relevant and what is not. Through the use of some sort of semantic markup, or data interchange formats, data could be put in a form not only accessible to humans via natural language, but able to be understood and interpreted by software applications as well.

While it is still evolving, this notion — formatting data to be understood by software agents — leads to the "execute" portion of our definition, and provides a way to discuss web services.

Web 3.0

A web service is a software system designed to support computer-to-computer interaction over the Internet. Web services are not new and usually take the form of an Application Programming Interface (API). The popular photography-sharing website Flickr provides a web service whereby developers can programmatically interface with Flickr to search for images. Currently, thousands of web services are available. However, in the context of Web 3.0, they take center stage. By combining a semantic markup and web services, the Web 3.0 promises the potential for applications that can speak to each other directly, and for broader searches for information through simpler interfaces.

What's important to understand, I think, is that the nomenclature with which we describe these differing philosophies should not be taken too seriously. Just because a website does not employ Web 2.0 features does not make it obsolete. After all, a small ecommerce website trying to sell niche products may not have any business need for users to submit content or to be able to interact with each other.

Most importantly, you don't need to upgrade anything, get new software or anything like that. These are abstract ideas used to contemplate the challenges developers face on the web in addition to theories about how to address them.

Web Proposed 20 Years Ago

The Imperative of Interagency Synergy by Matthew Levitt

On March 11, 2009, Matthew Levitt, director of the Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, testified before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconvential Threats and Capabilities. The following is an excerpt from his prepared remarks.

Chairman Smith, Ranking member Miller, committee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the imperative of interagency synergy to successfully track and disrupt terrorist financial networks.

I am honored to testify today along with senior leadership from the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) whose offices play a critical role in combating the financing of transnational threats. I have long enjoyed, both in an out of government, a valued working relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) elements focused on threat finance, including the OSD and combatant commands. In particular, USSOCOM's Transnational Threats Division, and within that division the Counter-Threat Finance Branch, is uniquely positioned to leverage its special talents against the transnational threats we face today. Under OSD's strategic and policy guidance, USSOCOM's analytical and operational contributions to combating threat finance have been and will continue to be critical to the continued success of our governmentwide efforts to combat the financing of transnational threats.

My comments today are drawn from The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances, a Washington Institute study I recently coauthored with my colleague Michael Jacobson, who is here with us today. The full study is available on The Washington Institute's website.

U.S. and international efforts to combat terrorist financing are a little-understood -- and often unappreciated -- aspect of global counterterrorism efforts.

For example, while unilateral or U.N. terrorist designations are public actions, they constitute only one of a broad set of tools available to governments, international bodies and their private and public-sector partners around the world. Pundits and the press alike show insufficient appreciation for the extent to which public designations are related to other equally productive ways of combating terrorist financing, such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and intelligence collection. Indeed, overt actions like designations and prosecutions are not the sum total of international efforts to combat terrorist financing -- they are only the most visible.

One consequence of this misunderstanding is that the metrics most often used to assess efforts against terrorist financing -- the total amount of money seized and the overall number of designations -- are both inadequate and misleading. The Achilles heel of terrorism financiers is not at the fundraising end, but rather at the choke points critical to laundering and transferring funds. It is impossible to "dry the swamp" of funds available for illicit purposes, but by targeting key nodes in the financing network, we can constrict the operating environment to the point that terrorists will not be able to get funds where and when they need them. It is not uncommon for a potential designation target to remain unnamed due to diplomatic or intelligence issues, policy considerations, or ongoing investigations. Designation may not be the most appropriate tool for every case of terror financing.

In a nutshell, that explains why an integrated, coordinated, interagency approach to countering the financing of transnational threats is so critical. The Treasury Department, where I served as deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis, brings to the table a powerful set of tools to protect the U.S. financial system from abuse, deny illicit actors easy access to the U.S. and international financial systems, and to follow the money as a means of identifying terrorist financiers and operators up and down the financial pipeline. But these are only some of the tools available in the CFT toolkit, and they cannot be fully leveraged without the full participation of interagency partners. A successful strategy to combat the financing of transnational threats must leverage all elements of national power -- including designations, prosecutions, intelligence and law enforcement operations, diplomacy, technical assistance and capacity building, military power, and more.

Terrorists Need Money

Efforts to combat terror financing may be little understood, but they are both necessary and important. Terrorist groups need money. Although mounting an individual terrorist attack is relatively inexpensive, the cost of maintaining the infrastructure to support terrorist activities is high. Terrorist networks need cash to train, equip, and pay operatives; to secure materials; to bribe officials; and to promote their cause. To eliminate or reduce a cell's means of raising and transferring funds is to significantly degrade that cell's capabilities. Additionally, by forcing them to abandon formal financial channels in favor of informal transfers in smaller denominations, the use of targeted measures has the cumulative effect of making the funds-transfer process slower, more cumbersome, and less reliable.

Our adversaries incur significant costs to maintain their infrastructure and to plot attacks, such that targeting their financial pipelines is an effective means of disrupting their ability to go about business as usual. Seized al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) records, for example, indicate the facilitation network operating in the Sinjar area of western Iraq incurred significant costs related to salaries and family support. Recruiting, training, traveling, planning operations, bribing corrupt officials, and other such activities also cost money. All of these expenses can add up quickly. For example, prior to September 11, al-Qaeda's annual budget was approximately $30 million, according to the findings of the 9/11 Commission. One of AQI's branches recorded expenditures of approximately $175,000 over a four-month period in 2007 -- with about half of this funding going to purchase weapons. As such, eliminating or reducing an organization's means of raising and transferring funds is to significantly degrade its capabilities.

Illustrating the importance that al-Qaeda attached to funding-related issues prior to September 11, the organization had a finance committee and Usama bin Laden himself reportedly paid close attention to financial matters. Shaikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. "Shaikh Said"), the head of the committee, took his responsibilities very seriously and was "notoriously tightfisted" with al-Qaeda's money. For example, he vetoed an expense for an al-Qaeda member to travel from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia to obtain a U.S. visa, which the operative was seeking in preparation for the September 11 plot. Bin Laden himself was forced to step in and overrule Shaikh Said (although it is not clear that Said knew about the September 11 plot when he rejected the expense).

Documents seized later by the United States demonstrate AQI managers' concern when they were unable to account for every dollar in their control. Given this context, the highly detailed nature of the group's financial records hardly come as a surprise. For example, the Sinjar documents show that the AQI's border emirate spent $727 on food during a two-month period, in addition to tracking a number of other different subcategories for expenditures, including salaries, weapons, document forgeries, and smuggling costs. Given the operational and security risks associated with maintaining such an extensive paper trail, these details help illustrate the importance that AQI's senior leaders have attached to the organization's financial state.

Disrupting financial flows have other benefits as well, such as exacerbating fissures within adversary networks. For example, some terrorists have interpreted inadequate compensation as a sign that they are being treated unfairly. Jamal al-Fadl, one of al-Qaeda's first operatives, began embezzling funds from the group during its years in Sudan, because of his displeasure with his salary -- stealing approximately $100,000 in all. When bin Laden learned of al-Fadl's actions, he ordered him to repay the money. Al-Fadl repaid about $30,000 before fleeing, fearing retribution if he did not refund the full amount.

Al-Qaeda's L'Houssaine Kertchou, for another example, became bitter after one of bin Laden's aides turned down his request for $500 to cover the costs of his wife's cesarean section. His anger level increased when al-Qaeda covered the expenses for a group of Egyptians who were sent to Yemen to renew their passports. "If I had a gun," Kertchou later testified, "I would [have shot bin Laden] at that time."

A Moving Target

As the terrorist threat has evolved, the means by which terrorist groups raise, store, and move funds has changed as well -- often in ways that have hindered government efforts to thwart their progress. Studies have long shown that terrorist groups learn from one another, exchange information on new technologies, and share innovations. Little attention, however, has been given to innovations and evolutionary change as related to terrorist financing. Consider just a few examples:

• As the director of national intelligence highlighted in testimony before this committee earlier this week, the international financial crisis is already having far reaching consequences for a variety of key U.S. foreign policy and security concerns. While the financial crisis may dry up some sources of funds for terrorists, proliferators, and insurgents, it will also impact governments' ability to finance efforts to counter illicit finance. It is my sincere hope that successful efforts like the Iraq and Afghanistan Threat Finance Cells continue to receive the necessary funding to fulfill their critical missions in those respective theatres.

• Both globalization and technological improvements have had major impacts on terrorist financing. Consider the sharp increase in the volume of funds flowing internationally. In 2000, foreign workers sent $113 billion back to their home countries. By 2006, remittances more than doubled to $255 billion, giving a sense of the scale of the international flows. Mirroring the broader shift toward the use of technology in global commerce, shifts have occurred in how funds are actually transferred, using new technology. M-payments, where cell phones are utilized to transfer money electronically, are growing in importance, as is the transfer and storage of funds via online entities such as cashU or e-gold. In countries where the formal financial sector is less than robust -- such as in many African countries -- using cell phones is a far more attractive option for transferring funds.

• In several cases, terrorists are suspected of using the internet to obtain logistical and financial support for their operations. Overall, the internet has had a major impact on terrorist financing. It provides a cheap, fast, efficient, and relatively secure means of communication, effectively creating a conveyor belt for self-radicalized foot soldiers who connect and communicate with like-minded jihadists through chat rooms and online message boards. For example, a 2006 U.S. government report assessed that "groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to obtain logistical and financial support." The report noted, more generally, that technology and globalization have also enabled small groups of alienated people not only to connect but to raise resources for attacks without need for an established terrorist organization.

• Terrorist groups are increasingly resorting to acts of crime to finance their activities. In some cases, acts of petty crime, such as welfare fraud and credit card bust-out schemes, raise limited amounts of money for small operations. In others, aspiring terrorists raise significant sums through brazen crimes. One cell in France netted about one million Euros when a member whose job was to restock ATMs enacted robberies on several.

• The nexus of drugs and terrorism is particularly strong for a variety of reasons. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), nineteen of the forty-three designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) are linked definitively to the global drug trade, and up to 60 percent of terrorist organizations are connected in some fashion with the illegal narcotics trade.

• According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "the misuse of non-profit organizations for the financing of terrorism is coming to be recognized as a crucial weak point in the global struggle to stop such funding at its source." British officials concur. According to a British government report, a "significant proportion" of terror finance investigations in Britain in 2006 included analysis of links to charities. The report found that "the risk of exploitation of charities is a significant aspect of the terrorist finance threat."

• Trade-based money laundering is a particularly effective method of hiding illicit transactions under the cover of legitimate business. Instead of actually transferring funds, one simply purchases and transfers commodities, such as food or other goods. Such goods can be sent even to internationally sanctioned countries under the guise of humanitarian support. Once they have entered the country, the goods can either be sold directly for cash or transported to a third country for sale.

• Illicit actors have not only taken advantage of technology to finance their activities; they have also reverted to older, less sophisticated methods to avoid official banking systems. This includes the growing use of cash couriers, bulk cash smuggling, and hawala brokers (an informal remittance system for transferring money) to transfer funds, along with the use of alternative commodities. Reacting to counterterrorism efforts, terrorists have begun transferring funds through their members' personal accounts and those of their families, sometimes directly, sometimes through charities, in an effort to evade the scrutiny given to organizational accounts.

Keeping pace with the evolutionary nature of the transnational threats we face today, and the means of financing these threats in particular, demands close interagency cooperation and timely and actionable intelligence.

What CFT is Intended to Achieve

It is important to recognize, however, that combating the financing of transnational threats will not, in and of itself, defeat these threats -- nor is it intended to do so. Freezing funds will constrict the operating environment for illicit actors and disrupt their activities, and following the money trail will expose donors and operators up and down the financial pipelines of terrorists and insurgents alike. However, these tools must be part of a broader strategy that leverages all elements of national power to successfully confront and eliminate the international security threats facing us today.

As intelligence agencies improve their capacity to collect and exploit financial intelligence for preemptive action, they are sure to rely on the experience of law enforcement agencies, which have long employed financial tools to solve crimes and build cases for prosecution. With nearly every recent terrorist attack, the post-blast utility of financial investigative tools has been reaffirmed. Financial data provided investigators with critical and early leads immediately following the attacks on September 11, as they did following the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid and the July 7, 2005, attacks in London, among others. Focusing on the financing of transnational threats has other benefits as well:

• Deterrent effect. As difficult as it may be to deter a suicide bomber, terrorist designations can deter nondesignated parties, who might otherwise be willing to finance terrorist activity. Major donors inclined to finance extremist causes -- who may be heavily involved in business activity throughout the world -- may think twice before putting their personal fortunes and their reputations at risk.

• Preventive intelligence. Unlike information derived from human sources or satellite intercepts, which require vetting to determine their authenticity, a financial transfer is a matter of fact. Raising, storing, and transferring money leaves a financial trail investigators can follow. Definitively linking people with numbered accounts or specific money changers is a powerful preemptive tool, often leading authorities to conduits between terrorist organizations and individual cells.

• Disruptive tools. According to terrorists themselves, while following the money will not stop all plots, it will likely frustrate some of these activities. Back in 1995, captured World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef was flown over the twin towers on his way to a New York jail. When an FBI agent pointed out that the towers were still standing, Yousef replied, "They wouldn't be if I had enough money and explosives."

At a minimum, tracking terrorists' financial transactions will make it harder for them to travel, procure materials, provide for their own families, and radicalize others. Denying terrorists -- as well as insurgents and proliferators -- easy access to financial tools forces them to use more costly, less efficient, and often less reliable means of financing.

Keeping financiers on the defensive and denying them the luxury of time and space puts them under stress, deters donors, restricts the flow of funds, and helps constrict their operating environment.

With more activities out of the public eye than in it, counterterrorism efforts are, by their very nature, difficult to assess and easy to criticize. That said, financial measures in particular have proven quite successful, and those who follow the money are increasingly being called on to use their skills and tools against the hardest targets.

Beyond its tactical advantages, combating the financing of terrorist threats presents opportunities in the broader, and no less important, battle of ideas regarding the ideology of radical extremism. Although targeted financial measures are commonly presumed to have negative diplomatic consequences, they also provide an opportunity to clearly relay international intentions. For example, the information made public by the United States and United Nations in the course of designations of individuals, groups and charities found to have funded Lashkar-e-Taibah, the group responsible for the Mumbai attacks, laid the groundwork not only for effective counterterrorism measures following the attacks in Mumbai but also for a strategic communication strategy that exposed some of Lashkar-e-Taibah's terrorist facilitation and financing networks.

Following up on terrorist designations with robust public diplomacy initiatives offers a salient opportunity to support international counterterrorism and counterradicalization objectives and offer a counternarrative to the radical global narrative proffered by ideological radicalizers and terrorist recruiters.

While the international community faces some difficult challenges in its efforts to combat terrorist financing, an examination of the record to date indicates positive results.

Despite the challenges, there are clear signs of success in our collective efforts both to deny terrorists access to funds and to follow the money for intelligence purposes.

Speaking before Congress in February 2008, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Michael McConnell commented that over the previous twelve to eighteen months the U.S. intelligence community noticed that "al-Qaeda has had difficulty in raising funds and sustaining themselves."

In early April, Undersecretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey echoed the DNI's assessment, adding that the government's efforts to combat terrorist financing "are more integrated than ever before" and have enabled the government to disrupt or deter some sources of al-Qaeda finance and make "significant progress mapping terrorist networks."

Additionally, while there is evidence that the al-Qaeda core is resurgent, funding difficulties may be preventing the organization from growing even stronger. In his July 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri humbly asked the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) if he could spare "a payment of approximately one hundred thousand" because "many of the lines have been cut off." Similarly, in May 2007 al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan Sheikh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Shaikh Said) highlighted the group's desperate needs for funds:

"As for the needs of the Jihad in Afghanistan, the first of them is financial. The Mujahideen of the Taliban number in the thousands, but they lack funds. And there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can't find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of Jihad."

Other recent cases suggest al-Qaeda's senior leadership is indeed lacking funds. Consider a recent case in Bahrain. According to Bahraini investigators, members of an al-Qaeda affiliated cell tried and convicted in Bahraini courts twice delivered funds to al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. The funds appear to have been self-generated, totaled only a few thousand dollars, and were sent not from al-Qaeda leadership to a terrorist cell abroad but from a budding terrorist cell to al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.

In a recent case in Saudi Arabia, a taped message from Ayman al-Zawahiri distributed via cell phones asked for "donations for hundreds of the families of captives and martyrs in Pakistan and Afghanistan." Saudi authorities subsequently arrested some fifty-six individuals suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda and using the recording to raise funds.

Investigations in Europe and Asia offer other examples of local cells raising funds for themselves as well as sending funds to Pakistan. In Spain, for example, authorities have seen Pakistani terrorists involved in petty crime through which they not only finance their activities in Spain but also send millions of dollars back home, some of which, it is suspected, finances extremist groups there. In Singapore, a "self-radicalized" cell leader collected contributions from fellow cell members with the intent of sending the money as a donation to support violent causes abroad.

And this lack of funds has frustrated terrorists' capabilities. Philippine police reported that plans by Abu Sayyaf Group to set off bombs in Manila and target a chemical plant in 2006 were never executed due to a lack of funds.

Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI), al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate, has also suffered from major financial setbacks due to the international efforts to combat terrorist financing. According to one study, JI has not received significant external funding since 2003. Not surprisingly, then, the group is facing financial shortfalls. As evidence, in late 2007, JI told members planning to participate in one of the organization's projects that they would have to cover their own expenses.

Several other cases highlight how the international community has been able to use financial intelligence to disrupt plots and prevent attacks.

• According to the U.S. Treasury Department, financial intelligence played an important role in individual operations, such as the investigation that led to the capture of Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin), the JI operations chief who masterminded the Bali bombings in 2002.

• British authorities foiled the summer 2006 liquid explosive aviation plot thanks in large part to critical financial intelligence.

• Four different terrorist attacks abroad have been disrupted, according to the FBI, based in part on their investigations of the financial activities of terrorist supporters in the United States.

• The U.S. Treasury Department reported that a financial intelligence collection program supplied a key piece of evidence confirming the identity of a major Iraqi terrorist facilitator and financier.

The transnational threats facing the United States and its allies today in terrorism, proliferation, insurgencies and more are not static threats; rather, they are constantly evolving in response to events on the ground -- including our efforts to combat them. Our response to these threats will be as successful as it is coordinated internally across our own interagency and more broadly among the U.S. and its allies.

The Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), based in Baghdad, is perfect example of one such interagency effort that works. Co-led by the DoD and Treasury, it was established in 2005 with the purpose of enhancing the collection, analysis and dissemination of timely financial intelligence on the Iraqi insurgency. It has become a key component of interagency and MNF-I efforts to detect, identify, and disrupt financial networks supporting insurgent and terrorist elements operating in Iraq. The new Afghan Threat Finance Cell builds on the demonstrated success of the ITFC.

We have undoubtedly made great strides in our counterterrorism efforts in general, as well as in counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, and our measures to combat the financing of such threats in particular, even as we have far to go. Interagency efforts like threat finance cells in Iraq and Afghanistan are one reason for these successes.

Still, when it comes to financing transnational threats like al-Qaeda, its affiliated franchises and homegrown cells, much has changed even as much has stayed the same. Consider a recently declassified August 1993 intelligence report written by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The report describes several trends that remain issues of serious concern today, including some of the same streams of financial support that fund today's terrorist groups. To the present-day reader, who will digest this 1993 report with an eye toward the conflict in Iraq, perhaps the most disturbing analytical judgment (which could have been pulled out of a current intelligence assessment) is this:

The war-era network of state sponsors and private patrons which continues to support the mujahidin has no rigid structure and no clearly defined command center, but receives guidance from several popular Islamic leaders and financial support from charitable Islamic organizations and wealthy individuals. Key figures who have emerged as the mentors of the mujahidin provide one another with the contacts and conduits needed to keep the militant groups they support in business.

The network circa 1993 is not an exact parallel to today's combination of al-Qaeda operatives and like-minded followers of a virtually networked, leaderless network of terrorists and their supporters. But the 1993 warning about an unstructured network of terrorists moving from their current area of operations to other battlefronts could have been written today. What remains to be seen is if al-Qaeda senior leadership's lack of funds degrades the core group's power to control activities and direct operations. Without the power of the purse, would local terrorist cells still need the al-Qaeda core as much as that core would need these cells? According to some experts, part of what drew the GSPC in Algeria into the al-Qaeda fold was the financial dividend offered by such a relationship. Should the current trend continue, it could lead to the further degeneration of the al-Qaeda core and the devolution of al-Qaeda's organized global insurgency into a more localized -- and controllable -- terrorist threat. Toward that end, and in light of recent successes disrupting and deterring al-Qaeda's financial activity, constricting the terrorist operating environment -- with an eye toward al-Qaeda's financial streams in particular -- should remain a strategic interagency priority.

Thank you.

Pulling the Curtain Back on Counterthreat Finance Initiative... Finally by Andrew Cochran

Today, in a hearing room before (maybe) 50 people and with no "media elite" reporters present, a Congressional subcommittee finally pulled the curtain back on the single most effective counterfinancing measure in this decade, the joint Defense-Treasury counterthreat financing initiative. After covering this issue for 18 months, I was beginning to think that the success of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell, and the close coordination between Defense, Treasury, financial institutions, and payment system experts would never receive the attention and funding they deserve. Hopefully this hearing and the December 2 memorandum institutionalizing the concept at DoD are just a beginning to more funding, more personnel, and more success at stopping the financing of the most dangerous terrorists.

The testimony from Lt. Gen. Fridovich, the director of the SOCOM Center for Special Operations, includes illuminating details of the coordination mechanism, some of which I have not seen before in public statements. For instance, the testimony indicates that Threat Finance cell concept is being developed and/or deployed widely against a number of asymmetric threats. Gen. Fridovich also discussed some of the meetings with the private and nonprofit sector, in which a number of Contributing Experts here have been involved, and touched on the emerging technologies which are a focus of discussion in these meetings. Key excerpts from that testimony:

"(S)emi-annually, in April and October, we convene a Threat Finance Working Group as part of our Global Synchronization Conference. This brings together roughly 100 Counterthreat Finance analysts, investigators, and case agents from all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Commands like Strategic Command and Joint Forces Command, the Combat Support Agencies, the InterAgency, most notably Treasury, State, FBI, DEA, and DHS/ICE, our British, Australian and Canadian colleagues, and various representatives of the private sector. This has become the premier forum for US Government Threat Finance exchange. Exchange with the coalition, and the private sector has been especially informative as we learn how better to deal with the rapidly developing cutting edge financial technologies like internet and cellphone money transfers.

I have studied testimony on this subject presented in 2005, and can see that this Threat Finance working group has become what was then envisioned by bringing community together and operationalizing each agency’s unique knowledge, skills and authorities to maximize impact on financial facilitators. (Editor's Note: here is the 2005 testimony.)

.....

We are posting Threat Finance analysts, very carefully selected threat finance analysts, at several of the Combatant Commands, and we are working hard within the DoD community to develop Threat Finance analyst training. This highlights a simple key to fostering interagency success, which is to add value to other’s efforts.

.....

We then share our expertise on these target sets with any and all InterAgency members, most especially Treasury and law enforcement, looking to operationalize results on targets DoD cannot currently reach via kinetic means. Right now these target sets include Al Qaida’s External Facilitation Network, by which we mean those gentlemen operating in places like Kuwait and Pakistan, Europe and Asia to move money for IEDs, suicide-bombers and the like into Iraq and Afghanistan. We are also working against Al Shabaab, Lebanese Hezbollah and certain Iranian elements as they continue to develop a global financial facilitation infrastructure to rival that of Hezbollah and sometimes linked thereto."

Opposition in Syria Dying with a Dissident by David Schenker

Reports from Damascus say Syria's leading dissident is on his deathbed. Riad Seif, 62 and suffering from prostate cancer, has spent the last year in Adra prison as punishment for attending a meeting of pro-democracy groups in Damascus. Syrian President Bashar Assad has prohibited him from seeking treatment abroad, a restriction Seif once called "a slow death sentence."

Seif is the most respected member of Syria's dwindling secular, democratic opposition to the iron-fisted rule of Assad and his Alawite clan. As the Obama administration prepares to resume diplomatic engagement with Damascus, Seif's plight is a poignant reminder of the abysmal state of human rights in Syria. His biography illustrates why it would be a mistake for Washington to sweep human rights under the rug.

A former member of parliament, Seif devoted much of the last two decades to criticizing the Assad regime. A garment trader by profession -- at one time he held the license to manufacture Adidas in Syria -- his fortunes changed after he was elected to parliament in 1994 and, in contrast to virtually all of his colleagues, embarked on a public campaign against corruption and for political and economic reforms.

His efforts to change Syria cost him personally and professionally. In 1996, two years after his election, Seif's 21-year-old son, Iyad, died under what Seif later described as "mysterious circumstances." Then, after Seif published a high-profile study on economic stagnation in Syria, the regime charged him with tax evasion and levied fines in excess of $2 million, leaving him bankrupt. Refusing to bow to pressure, Seif ran for parliament again in 1998. Remarkably, he won.

During his second term, Seif wrote and distributed a scathing report on the common practice in Syria of granting mobile-phone monopolies to regime cronies, implicating, most notably, Assad's cousin, Rami Makhlouf. Then in 2000, Seif gave a speech demanding an end to Assad's "political monopoly." In response, the government arranged to strip him of his parliamentary immunity. He was tried and sentenced to five years in prison. Amnesty International calls him a prisoner of conscience.

Even behind bars, Seif was undeterred. In 2005, he coauthored the Damascus Declaration, which called for political pluralism, an end to the hated Emergency Law and a new Syrian constitution limiting the powers of the president. Seif eventually was released but had been out of prison for less than two years when he was sent back to Adra in February 2008.

Seif's case offers the Obama administration an opportunity to connect directly with the cause of human rights, which resonates deeply in Syria and throughout the Middle East. During the George W. Bush era, the White House devoted at least rhetorical importance to the cause: Bush publicly mentioned Seif at least three times. Today, some suggest that sidelining human rights may be the sort of "confidence-building measure" toward Damascus that helps create an environment conducive to Israel-Syria peace talks. That would be a mistake. In its most recent annual assessment, Freedom House gave Syria its worst rating on political liberties. The trend, its report said, was getting worse.

Pressing for peace over human rights is a false choice. To the contrary, Washington might be able to demand respect for human rights in exchange for playing a role in negotiations with Israel over the return of the Golan Heights and a permanent peace deal with Israel.

During his inaugural address, President Obama said his administration sought a "new way forward" with the Muslim world, "based on mutual interest and mutual respect." If Washington is really committed to change, this formulation should apply not only to Middle Eastern leaders, but to people such as Riad Seif, who share our values and reside in authoritarian states like Syria.

The Attack on Syria's al-Kibar Nuclear Facility by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Joshua D. Goodman

Israel's September 6, 2007, attack on Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility surprised the world—Syria most of all. The operation, executed by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), was reminiscent of Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor, but with two noticeable differences. First, Israel remained silent following the al-Kibar bombing, while in 1981 it boasted publicly about the Iraq strike even before the pilots had returned. Second, whereas the international community knew of Saddam Hussein's nuclear plans in 1981, few were aware of the extent of Syria's nuclear program in 2007.

The IAF's attack raises two important questions: What was Syria hiding? Why did Israel feel compelled to launch a military strike? Subsequent investigations have painted a clearer picture of what took place at al-Kibar.

Early Indicators

In hindsight, there were several warnings in recent years that Syria might be pursuing nuclear weapons. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, focusing on foreign missile development, noted the U.S. intelligence community's concerns about "Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons." An unclassified 2004 report by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis stated that Pakistani investigators had confirmed that Abdul Qadeer Khan—the Pakistani nuclear scientist who ran a clandestine black market network—offered "nuclear technology and hardware to Syria." The report expressed concern "that expertise or technology could have been transferred."

Press reports also began to circulate in 2004 that Khan had visited Syria on several occasions, and had met with senior Syrian officials in Iran. While Syria denied this, Bashar al-Assad acknowledged in a 2007 interview with an Austrian newspaper that he had received a letter from Khan in 2001. He claimed that he rebuffed the overture, unsure "if it was an Israeli trap."

Still, a generalized assessment of Syria's nuclear intentions could not be gleaned from these early warnings. Indeed, Western intelligence agencies were unaware of the purpose of the al-Kibar facility until the summer of 2007. According to an ABC News report, Israel's Mossad learned that Syria was building a covert nuclear facility that summer, and proceeded to either place a mole inside the plant or convince a worker to provide Israel with intelligence. Through this source, Israel obtained important video footage, as well as photographs, providing evidence that al-Kibar was indeed a nuclear facility (with a large cylindrical structure, a pumping station, etc).

Israel approached the Central Intelligence Agency with this evidence, and, according to the Jerusalem Post, the U.S. "looked up satellite coordinates for the site" and "helped Israel pinpoint possible 'drop sites'." The two countries discussed the possibility of the U.S. carrying out the strike; American officials even examined options for doing so. Eventually, the White House conveyed the message "that the U.S. preferred not to attack." In fact, "U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates attempted to convince Israel 'to confront, not attack'."

What Was Syria Hiding?

Syria's response in the wake of Israel's bombing was curious. The regime sought no retaliatory measures. It did not even ask the U.N. Security Council to discuss or condemn the incident. Rather, satellite photos show Syria's efforts to scrub the site of any traces of the nuclear reactor that Syria denied having. Reuters reported that Syria bulldozed the area, "removed debris and erected a new building in a possible cover-up." Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright, president of the prestigious Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), told the New York Times, "It looks like Syria is trying to hide something and destroy the evidence of some activity. But it won't work. Syria has got to answer questions about what it was doing."

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director Mohammed ElBaradei condemned the U.S. and Israel for their "shoot first and ask questions later" approach. Nonetheless, the IAEA began probing Syrian nuclear activity, and Syria gave its inspectors access to the al-Kibar site in June 2008. (Syria later refused IAEA requests to revisit al-Kibar and examine three other related sites.)

The IAEA released a report on November 19, 2008, containing a number of relevant data points. The report establishes that construction of the al-Kibar facility began between April 26 and August 4, 2001. Based on analysis of satellite imagery, the IAEA also notes:

Imagery taken prior to and immediately after the bombing indicates that the destroyed box-shaped building may have had underground levels. Its containment structure appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged.

The IAEA's on-the-ground evaluation also found a water pump and other adequate infrastructure to support a reactor. Environmental samples from the site also yielded a "significant number of natural uranium particles" that were of anthropogenic origin. (Syria claimed that the particles came from the missiles Israel used to destroy the facility.)

Consistent with the caution for which the IAEA is known, its report did not conclusively state that the Syrian site was a nuclear reactor—but the implication was strong.

North Korea's Connection

Post-attack analysis also highlighted North Korea's connection to al-Kibar. Shortly after Israel's strike, press reports suggested that the characteristics of the Syrian facility were similar to North Korea's reactor in Yongbyon. David Albright and Paul Brannan of ISIS confirmed this in April 2008. Specifically, they "measured the footprint of the Yongbyon reactor building and compared it to that of the suspected reactor building in Syria and found the two footprints were approximately the same." Prior to Syria's construction of al-Kibar, the Yongbyon model had been the only one of its type built in 35 years.

Video from inside the Syrian facility has also been described as "very, very damning" by a nuclear weapons specialist who spoke to the Washington Post. The video demonstrates that al-Kibar's core design was the same as the Yongbyon reactor, "including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods." The video also shows North Korean personnel inside the site.

Subsequent investigations have revealed that key materials for al-Kibar were smuggled from China and possibly Europe into Syria by Namchongang Trading, a North Korean firm.

Why Did Israel Attack?

There are several explanations for why Israel elected to launch a strike against the Syrian facility. The most obvious is that Israel feared the prospect of having a nuclear neighbor—particularly one with which Israel has been in a constant state of war since the Jewish state's independence in 1948. The two countries have clashed several times since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, including a major engagement in the 1982 Lebanon war and occasional skirmishes at their shared border. Moreover, Syria threatens Israel by proxy—through its support of such terrorist groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

A second possible motivation is Israel's desire to re-establish deterrence in the Arab world. Israel's failures in its 2006 war with Hezbollah weakened the perceived deterrent that it held over its neighbors. The al-Kibar strike may have been an attempt to reestablish the supremacy of Israel's military apparatus in its enemies' eyes. Christopher Pang, head of the Middle East and North Africa program at the Royal United Services Institute in London, told the Associated Press, "In terms of deterrence, the effect was clear by invading Syrian airspace, by showing that Israel is not only able, but willing, to still launch strikes against Syrian targets."

The IAF's strike may also have been intended as a warning to Iran—or even a practice run on an eventual bombing raid on Iranian nuclear facilities. Obviously, al-Kibar differed greatly from the primary nuclear targets in Iran. Indeed, al-Kibar was at least partially located above ground, and was within Israeli warplanes' striking range. Nonetheless, al-Kibar was protected by the same Russian-built Tor-M1 air defense system used to protect Iranian facilities. Thus, Israel's strike may have been a test run to find flaws in Iran's air defenses.

If indeed Israel's strategy was to diagnose Iran's air defense weaknesses, the strategy appeared to backfire. The apparent failure of these systems prompted Iran in December 2007 to purchase the more advanced S-300 system from Russia. (Both Russia and Iran insist the deal had been in the works well before then.)

In the end, however, the Israeli operation seems to have been motivated by necessity; the pictures collected by Israel's mole depicted a nearly complete facility. Albright and Brannan argue that the late detection of the reactor, coupled with the perception of a nearly operational facility, compelled Israel to choose the military option as a measure of first resort. They write that Israel's "analysis, which in hindsight must be viewed as a worst-case assessment, was that Syria could soon load uranium fuel and start the reactor." Israel did not want to attack after the reactor was fully operational, because doing so would run the risk of spreading radioactive material.

A Warning For The Future

As primary energy grows more expensive, many countries are turning to nuclear power. The expansion of "civilian nuclear programs" highlights the need for a more robust non-proliferation regime; the Middle East alone has about a dozen states with at least nascent nuclear programs. The existence of al-Kibar, however fleeting, should serve as a serious warning about the current non-proliferation regime, as well as U.S. engagement of Syria.

If Washington does attempt to engage Syria, it cannot simply ignore al-Kibar. Syria's apparent nuclear development and subsequent deception reinforce pre-existing concerns about the country's interest in regional peace and stability. Pretending that the al-Kibar incident did not occur would send the wrong signal to Syria and other potentially dangerous proliferators in the Middle East.

Dealing with Hamas: Future Pathways for Britain by Matthew Levitt

On March 3, 2009, Matthew Levitt addressed the Quilliam Foundation in London, England, regarding Hamas and other related topics. The following is an edited version of what was said.

The new Obama administration has placed a renewed focus on trying to move forward the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process. The biggest problem is the nature of Hamas and its control of Gaza. I believe Hamas is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

Should we engage with or recognize Hamas?

The three wings of Hamas are not disparate. Hence we don't just have the problem of having Hamas continuing to engage in violence, but also that they have not decided who they want to be: Do they want to be an Islamist political party that pursues its goals through legitimate political means or do they want to be a group engaged in terrorism and political violence while also pursuing their goals through political activity? Moreover, does it want to be a political party responsible for and to its constituency or a social movement responsible only to its members?

There is a huge cost in allowing parties that use violence to engage in the political process at the same time. We need to make demands of them if they are to be accepted by the international community. The US made a colossal error in encouraging political elections that involved Hamas before there was proper civil society set up in the territories. Civil society, not elections, is the bedrock of democracy.

The other issue, which is more fundamental, is that Hamas is expressly against a two-state solution. FBI material used in Holy Land Foundation trial in the U.S. demonstrated that Hamas was in fact very disturbed at the prospect of a two state solution.

Perhaps most disturbing is not Hamas' acts of violence targeting civilians, but their strategic and successful radicalization of Palestinian society. They are engaged in a broad-based radicalization campaign that seeks to shift the Israeli-Palestinian conflict away from an ethno-nationalist conflict over how to compromise over disputed land, to one based on demonization of the "other" and mutually exclusive religious principles. To the extent Hamas succeeds in this radicalization, peace-making becomes infinitely more difficult.

Hamas is part of the problem because of its commitment to violence and an extremist ideology that refuses to accept the "other" and rejects a two-state solution. That said, the problem is with Hamas, not with religiously observant or even conservative Palestinians. Indeed, Hamas is not monolithic; there are splits and fissures within the movement which should be exploited. For example, in 2003 Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip debated whether or not to 'go Muslim Brotherhood' -- that is, to cease engaging (overtly at least) in violence and to become more of an Islamist party. This debate was shouted down quite vociferously, but even the fact that they did have this debate is telling.

The difference between the moderates and extremists in Hamas is really one over tactical flexibility rather than strategic change. In the immediate we have a big problem not just because Hamas is in control of Gaza, but because it is the most extreme and militaristic part of Hamas that is in control of Gaza. In the wake of shura council elections in Gaza last summer, for example, the relative moderates within Hamas were pushed out by people affiliated with or members of the Qassam brigades in Gaza, reportedly including Brigades chief Ahmed Jabari.

The international community just held an aid conference in Sham al-Sheikh, but no one has any practical ideas about how to get this money effectively to those people in Gaza who desperately need it without empowering Hamas. Having taken over the Gaza Strip by force, turned its weapons against fellow Palestinians, and illicitly smuggled into Gaza not food and medical supplies but some 100 tons of weapons, Hamas has proved itself an unworthy and untrustworthy partner.

The answer is not to reward Hamas' shelling of Israeli civilian population centres with political dividends. Instead, choices have to be forced upon Hamas. It has to choose between being a movement or a political party, committed to the movement's best interests or bound to the interests of its purported constituency, respectively. It has to choose whether to insist on the trappings of legitimacy as a movement by refusing to agree to the 2005 international agreement by which border crossings could be opened immediately so long as Hamas does not control them. It must choose whether it will only allow international aid to enter Gaza if it controls such aid or if it will enable the international community to engage in independent reconstruction of Gaza. More generally, Hamas has to decide who is going to make the choices in Gaza: the duly elected members, or those harder-line members in Damascus who today are responsible for Egyptian-mediated negotiations.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs the full commitment and attention of the international community and needs be to solved for all the right reasons: Palestinians deserve a sovereign state and Israelis deserve security. But we cannot pretend that realities on the ground are not there. Where we have failed to achieve realistically achievable goals is in making the West Bank more of a success, even if this is just on the economic front for now. We need to demonstrate in the West Bank that peace can bring dividends and that prosperity and hope are immediate not long-term goals. Economic development in the West Bank might be the only area of convergence with Hamas in control in Gaza.

The Q&A Session

There are increasing calls to recognize Hamas. What implications do you think that this has for the legitimacy of the PLO?

It cuts them off at the knees -- and more than that. We are not legitimizing Iran by gracing them with our presence, but this is not the case with Hamas. We give Hamas tremendous legitimacy even when individual parliamentary members meet members of the group in their individual capacities. All relations provide Hamas with further legitimacy, which comes at the expense of Palestinian moderates.

There are a whole range of Muslim organizations -- including zakat committees -- who are being systematically closed down. These organizations were aimed at providing social welfare when the PA was totally corrupt. Instead, we now have a destroyed social welfare network.

For all of us who care about getting aid to the Palestinians, such aid needs to be provided through organizations that are completely disassociated from violence. Not all zakat (charity) committees in the West Bank and Gaza are tainted by ties to militants and violence, but those that are should not be considered viable partners for the disbursement of aid and development funds. It is critical that aid be provided to needy Palestinians, and no less critical that it not be delivered through entities that not only provide aid (often earmarked to members of their own groups, like Hamas) but also engage in less charitable and more violent activities as well.

Any Israeli government must have a strong partner if they are to achieve a two-state solution. Fatah is a weak partner and Hamas, whether you like it or not, is a strong one. Rather than wish Hamas away, we should encourage unity talks again between Hamas and Fatah so that we have a broad-based Palestinian movement to deal with. You said

Hamas is not the solution, it's the problem. But if that is the case, how do you intend on getting rid of them?

I think there is more convergence here than you assume. There are plenty of ways to engage parties without doing so directly. The Israelis have been communicating with Hamas through the Egyptians for some time now. But we don't need to legitimise them by making them fully acceptable partners in the international system without their having to live up to acceptable standards. This is a choice Hamas has to make.

Do they need to meet all three conditions -- the Quartet principles?

There are a lot of ways Hamas could fudge either recognizing Israel or past agreements. It says a lot about Hamas that they are not willing to do that. There are ways that they could easily save face and but Hamas' refusal to do so speaks volumes about its commitment to violence and its opposition to a two-state solution.

But they did fudge around them, that is the point.

What happened in Mecca was not negotiated with the Quartet, it was between Fatah and Hamas and so they did not even need to fudge around the Quarter principles.

They moved towards meeting all three conditions, even on violence. And we cannot just wish Hamas away.

I would question that, especially on the violence point -- note the events of June 2007 when Hamas turned its guns on fellow Palestinians and took over the Gaza Strip by force. Note also Hamas' continued weapons smuggling throughout this period. Hamas continuing to engage in acts of violence, no words can hide that. But you asked a second important question -- how to get rid of Hamas. You're right -- you can't wish them away. There are solutions, more so for Hamas than Hezbollah. You get rid of Hamas by out-doing them at their own game: competing with Hamas's social welfare infrastructure by empowering the moderates to do so. It's not so much that Hamas won the January 2006 elections but that Fatah lost them; they won by default because Fatah were busy tearing themselves apart internally and fielding multiple candidates who diluted the Fatah vote. Instead of embracing Hamas- even as it embraces violence- we should work to reform and promote democratic alternatives.

What would constitute an acceptable renunciation of the violence? Were Hamas to agree to a hudna, but the violence continued by an element that broke with Hamas, would that be sufficient?

This is an unanswered question because to date the myth that the political, charitable and military wings of Hamas are disparate is just that, a myth. What would happen if, theoretically, Hamas as an organization truly ceased engaging in violence? First, that would have to be verifiable and believable. Then, if Hamas remained in control of territory, consideration would have to be given to whether Hamas was supporting or allowing others to carry out attacks from territory under its control and responsibility. But again, this is all hypothetical given that Hamas clearly remains committed to violence targeting Israelis and even fellow Palestinians. Hamas continues to hold an Israeli hostage; continues to fire rockets at Israeli civilian population centres within Israel proper; and continues to smuggle weapons into Gaza.

Do you really believe that Palestinian unity is possible?

This is a very serious question, given Hamas attacks -- some particularly heinous -- against fellow Palestinians. The West may desire a unity government as a means of moving forward, but there is a very deep fissure within Palestinian society now. It very much depends on who is in charge. A national unity is not necessarily going to be easily achievable, however logical it may seem to some- or even desirable -- if it empowers Hamas without Hamas having to renounce violence. In any event, it behoves reminding that it was Hamas that walked away from the Egyptian facilitated national reconciliation negotiations between Hamas and Fatah in December, and Hamas that refused to renew the ceasefire with Israel later that month.

There is much talk about the only solution for a national unity government being a technocratic government. What do you think the probability of this is, and how it would happen?

There have been, in the past, members of PA governments who were Hamas in all but name, mostly technocrats. That might be a way to bridge some of this divide, but even some of the technocrats are among those who are deeply scarred by recent violence.

You alluded to a change in leadership being central for the PA and Fatah in order to achieve some sort of unity with Hamas. Is this you subtly referring to Marwan Barguti's release?

I am not making allusions to any one leader or another. I imagine Marwan Barguti may well be released at some point. However, members of his inner circle often make it clear that he is a Palestinian leader and that just because he is not an Islamist and doesn't like Hamas does not mean he should be expected to take on Hamas. More generally, I do not know of any one individual who would be a panacea to the crisis of Palestinian leadership.

How do you get around the fact that you cannot deliver unless you have control on the ground and that Hamas controls Gaza today? You cannot do so without a lot of soldiers -- and we have seen that this doesn't work.

When I speak about beating Hamas at its own game and facilitating the provision of much-needed social-welfare and charity support by moderates, not Hamas, I am talking about doing so today in the West Bank. Unfortunately you are correct, Hamas controls the ground in Gaza. The newly trained Palestinian battalions now being deployed in the West Bank -- those already there and those soon to be deployed on completion of their training -- should suffice. Indeed, they have already instituted significant law and order on the streets of the West Bank.

You touch on the fact that Hamas is a religious as well as a political movement. Isn't that a huge source of strength for its support base in Western Europe? Won't this make it even more difficult to compete with it?

It certainly makes it more difficult to deal with Hamas, because it moves things beyond politics and gives Hamas additional legitimacy and the means to radicalize society. But I would hope that most of the money collected here in the West would not end up in Hamas' coffers because a lot of strictures have been put in place to prevent international aid -- which is inherently fungible -- from being diverted by groups like Hamas.

You seem confident that the Obama administration will hold a specific line of non-negotiation with Hamas, but there are important people within it who seem to take a very different view. Will there not be a shift?

I think that there is certainly going to be a greater push to meet with Hamas, if not to recognize them, by some academics and journalists in particular. I find it highly unlikely the Obama administration will go down that route and think it would be very unwise to do so. It is interesting, however, to see what fissures exist within Hamas that could be extrapolated. I do think that we are not going to see as hard-line rhetoric coming from the Obama administration, and this is not just a semantic difference. The US is going to demonstrate -- in deeds, not only in words -- that it absolutely cares about resolving this conflict. Moreover, it will articulate its desire to resolve this conflict for all the right reasons: not just out of its own self-interest, like removing a powerful propaganda tool from al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups, but because Israelis and Palestinians deserve to live in peace, side by side, in secure and sovereign states. Perhaps most important, I think this administration will continue to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace even if circumstances make that difficult. There is not going to be the type of overt outreach to Hamas that there will be with Syria and likely with Iran as well, but this does not mean there will not be the effort to reach out through third parties. We need to think creatively to resolve a very difficult problem. This administration is going to try and push things forward in ways that we have not seen over the past few years, but it will do so primarily by leveling the playing field by boosting and prioritizing support for an array of moderate groups.