Sixth Sense by Pattie Maes

SixthSense is a wearable gestural interface that augments the physical world around us with digital information and lets us use natural hand gestures to interact with that information.

We've evolved over millions of years to sense the world around us. When we encounter something, someone or some place, we use our five natural senses to perceive information about it; that information helps us make decisions and chose the right actions to take. But arguably the most useful information that can help us make the right decision is not naturally perceivable with our five senses, namely the data, information and knowledge that mankind has accumulated about everything and which is increasingly all available online. Although the miniaturization of computing devices allows us to carry computers in our pockets, keeping us continually connected to the digital world, there is no link between our digital devices and our interactions with the physical world. Information is confined traditionally on paper or digitally on a screen. SixthSense bridges this gap, bringing intangible, digital information out into the tangible world, and allowing us to interact with this information via natural hand gestures. ‘SixthSense’ frees information from its confines by seamlessly integrating it with reality, and thus making the entire world your computer.

The SixthSense prototype is comprised of a pocket projector, a mirror and a camera. The hardware components are coupled in a pendant like mobile wearable device. Both the projector and the camera are connected to the mobile computing device in the user’s pocket. The projector projects visual information enabling surfaces, walls and physical objects around us to be used as interfaces; while the camera recognizes and tracks user's hand gestures and physical objects using computer-vision based techniques. The software program processes the video stream data captured by the camera and tracks the locations of the colored markers (visual tracking fiducials) at the tip of the user’s fingers using simple computer-vision techniques. The movements and arrangements of these fiducials are interpreted into gestures that act as interaction instructions for the projected application interfaces. The maximum number of tracked fingers is only constrained by the number of unique fiducials, thus SixthSense also supports multi-touch and multi-user interaction.

The SixthSense prototype implements several applications that demonstrate the usefulness, viability and flexibility of the system. The map application lets the user navigate a map displayed on a nearby surface using hand gestures, similar to gestures supported by Multi-Touch based systems, letting the user zoom in, zoom out or pan using intuitive hand movements. The drawing application lets the user draw on any surface by tracking the fingertip movements of the user’s index finger. SixthSense also recognizes user’s freehand gestures (postures). For example, the SixthSense system implements a gestural camera that takes photos of the scene the user is looking at by detecting the ‘framing’ gesture. The user can stop by any surface or wall and flick through the photos he/she has taken. SixthSense also lets the user draw icons or symbols in the air using the movement of the index finger and recognizes those symbols as interaction instructions. For example, drawing a magnifying glass symbol takes the user to the map application or drawing an ‘@’ symbol lets the user check his mail. The SixthSense system also augments physical objects the user is interacting with by projecting more information about these objects projected on them. For example, a newspaper can show live video news or dynamic information can be provided on a regular piece of paper. The gesture of drawing a circle on the user’s wrist projects an analog watch.

The current prototype system costs approximate $350 to build.

Task Force Urges Broader Role for Nuclear Labs by Walter Pincus

The nation's nuclear weapons laboratories would be spun out of the Energy Department and become the center of an independent Agency for National Security Applications under a proposal to be released today by a bipartisan task force formed by the Stimson Center, a research organization devoted to security issues.

Changing the status of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories and making wider use of the labs for other research would help reestablish and assure "the nation's global science and technology leadership in the 21st century," said the task force report. At present, the labs are directed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semiautonomous part of the Energy Department.

"This action would enable the laboratories to remain trusted third party advisors as well as providers of capabilities, but it would initiate a full transformation from a Cold War, industrial age mindset and culture," according to the task force, which was chaired by Frances Fragos Townsend, who was an assistant to President George W. Bush for homeland security and counterterrorism, and retired Lt. Gen. Donald Kerrick, who was deputy national security adviser to President Bill Clinton.

The proposal comes at a time when the future of the nation's multibillion-dollar nuclear weapons complex is under review. Congress last year halted a Bush administration plan to develop a new nuclear warhead and delayed an expensive plan to reduce the size of the complex and modernize many of its 50-year-old facilities. Members held up these programs while awaiting development of a comprehensive nuclear strategy that would determine the future size of the nation's nuclear stockpile and the complex needed to build or refurbish it.

A congressionally mandated commission is studying that issue and is to report later this year. The Defense Department's approach to the stockpile's future also will be determined by year's end, when it completes its Nuclear Posture Review. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had ordered the Energy Department and the Defense Department to study the costs and potential benefits of transferring budget and management of NNSA or any of its components to Defense beginning in fiscal 2011.

Though still in its initial stage, the OMB idea of putting the nuclear complex under the Pentagon has already drawn widespread criticism from Capitol Hill and elsewhere. Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), who is chairman of the House Armed Services strategic subcommittee and whose district includes the Livermore laboratory, wrote to OMB Director Peter Orszag last month opposing the idea. Saying that moving the NNSA into the Defense Department had been rejected in the past, Tauscher wrote that "civilian control over our nuclear weapons laboratories and related facilities was established to ensure some independence from the military."

The Stimson task force recommendations stem primarily from concerns that reduced spending on nuclear weapons would result in a funding cut for the national laboratories at a time when their parent agency, the Energy Department, faces other growing financial demands.

For several decades, in order to draw some of the nation's best scientists, the laboratories have taken on work in addition to dealing with nuclear weapons. The task force said nuclear weapons funding in the lab budgets ranged from 43 percent at Sandia to 60 percent at Lawrence Livermore. But the remainder of the work they do, for the Pentagon, State Department, intelligence community and Department of Homeland Security, helps "to innovate new technologies to help address emerging national security threats."

As currently operated, however, the task force said, the NNSA has to work within "an excessively bureaucratic" Energy Department culture that "has infiltrated NNSA as well," with the laboratories the eventual losers.

'Jihadi penetration of Pakistan’s armed forces is at the center of all concerns in any new strategy' by Walid Phares

The deal between the Pakistan government and pro-Taliban forces in the Swat valley is an ominous portent of Pakistan’s slide into jihadism, with strategic implications for India and other countries, warns Walid Phares, a counter-terrorism expert and director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington. Excerpts from an interview he gave Venkatesan Vembu:

Vembu: How different is the Obama administration’s strategy (vis-à-vis the Bush administration’s) in pursuing the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Phares: As a matter of fact, the Obama administration hasn’t so far issued a strategic document outlining its difference with the Bush strategy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. People talk of a difference, but so far as we can analyse, there is no fundamental difference in the action to be taken or the general horizons of such a strategy. Regarding Afghanistan President Obama promised during his electoral campaign to send additional troops to Afghanistan when elected. But President Bush and candidate Senator McCain also committed themselves to send as many troops as needed to the battlefield. During the campaign, the Obama pledge to send additional forces to central Asia was in the framework of scoring a point that this was indeed the central front on the war on terror and that the US must withdraw its troops from Iraq. The pledge to increase forces in Afghanistan was intended to encourage the (American) public to accept the withdrawal from Iraq. The difference thus is that the Obama strategy doesn't believe that the US can and should fight on two fronts; its priority is Afghanistan. The Bush strategy, on the other hand, was that the US can sustain efforts on two fronts simultaneously. However after his inauguration, President Obama is now in charge of the war in Afghanistan and therefore he is consulting with US commanders, including with General David Petraeus, head of CENTCOM. So, one assumes that he is sending these additional troops to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda on the ground, inside Afghanistan. The real question is after this stage is performed, what comes next? One of the possibilities is that the Obama administration may think of opening a dialogue with a weakened Taliban. This will be a radical difference with the Bush/McCain strategy, which would call for defeating the Taliban and engaging alternatives to them.

With regards Pakistan, there are differences in the public stands between Obama and Bush's policies, but so far there is continuity in their methods. When President Obama was campaigning for office, he said he would order attacks inside Pakistan if needed to target al Qaeda infrastructure and membership. President Bush didn't take a public stand on this matter and relied on Pakistan President Musharraf to carry out the attacks. But in reality under both administrations, US military carried out and continues to strike inside Pakistan's borders, particularly in the northwest frontier areas. Will the Obama policy regarding fighting terrorism in Pakistan change in the future? We will have to wait and see how the strikes will evolve.

Vembu: In the past month, US drone attacks inside Pakistani territory appear to have escalated. Does this mark a continuation – and possibly even an extension - of the Bush administration’s strategy?

Phares: The attacks via drones are ordered by the US command proportionate to their perception of the rising threat coming from the Taliban and al Qaeda. The military escalation does not reflect a change from one administration to another; it signals the same strategy of engaging the Jihadi forces implicated in attacks against US and coalition inside Afghanistan. The question is: how will the US strategy evolve after the additional US and NATO forces deploy and begin engaging the Taliban and al Qaeda. The expectation is that Jihadi forces will also escalate their attacks and Taliban-dominated enclaves inside Pakistan will send more forces across the border. Hence, the current strikes inside Pakistan will have to mutate. Either into a massive campaign or, let's not be surprised, a future attempt to negotiate with the Taliban. It could go in two different directions.

Vembu: Are the Obama administration’s strategy more likely – or less – to succeed?

Phares: That depends not only on the military actions to be taken inside Afghanistan and across the border with Pakistan, but also and mainly on the regional strategy that the administration devises. An Obama strategy can be successful if it sends the needed support to Afghanistan and simultaneously crafts a campaign to isolate the Jihadists politically and broaden the coalition in the entire sub Indian continent.

Vembu: Or will Afghanistan prove to be, as some commentators have said, “Obama’s Vietnam”?

Phares: The argument about “Obama's Vietnam" is being advanced by the Jihadi propaganda machine. They used it under the Bush administration and want to use it under the Obama administration. That message was initially sent by al Qaeda's leader, including Osama bin laden and Zawahiri. In reality, Afghanistan will become a Vietnam if the Taliban wins the hearts and minds of a majority of Afghans and is supported by a Pakistan falling to the Jihadists. So far, that is not the case. To avoid a Vietnam-like situation, the US and NATO must make sure that a majority of Afghans reject the Taliban's ideology and that Pakistan doesn't fall into the hands of Jihadists.

Vembu: There are reports that the US is secretly training Pakistan military forces. Given that the ISI and the Pakistani military has been heavily infiltrated by Taliban and the jihadists, how effective will this strategy be? How should the Obama administration address the ISI/military complicity in sustaining the Taliban/Al Qaeda/Kashmir terrorists?

Phares: I believe that US assistance to Pakistan's military is not new, especially after 2001. The goal of such a support, however, is aimed at weakening al Qaeda and the Taliban. I am told it is very specific to the units and apparatuses that are engaged with the radicals in the Waziristan and other districts.

The fact that ISI and the Pakistan military has been inflitrated by Jihadists, not just al Qaeda and the Taliban, is well-known in the US and within the defence sectors. In my analysis, the penetration of Pakistan's armed forces is at the centre of all concerns in any strategy. Many Pakistani officials at very high levels, particularly those who view the Jihadi forces as a threat, know that many sectors have been penetrated, but say this situation has been inherited from previous years and decades. The Obama Administration must be very attentive to the internal threat coming from within Pakistan. In other words, the US must identify the elements that are already confronting the extremists and back them. In the end, it will be a political battle inside Pakistan between the Jihadists and secular forces who oppose them.

Vembu: What are the merits and demerits of the Pakistan government’s strategy in consenting to the imposition of Sharia law in the Swat valley as part of a deal with the Taliban?

Phares: It is regrettable that the Pakistan government had to authorise the signing of such an agreement allowing the imposition of Sharia law on some districts of the country. This is a setback to democracy and pluralism in a country where the progressive sectors of society are known to be looking forward to modernity and secularism. This also reflects the ground reality in some of these provinces: the power of the Jihadi movements. But at the same time one has to admit that the current government has inherited a situation from past years and decades. The spread of fundamentalism… is half a century old and it has increased thanks to the spread of a radical ideology. Hence, the current government has chosen –apparently - to accept the de facto situations in some spots of the country so that it can re-evaluate the situation, perhaps reform some institutions and undertake some restructuring of the military and intelligence sectors so that in the future, there would be a comprehensive strategy to isolate fundamentalism and eventually reverse it with a popular support. If the Swat valley agreement is a prelude to tackle the problem comprehensively later, this would be understandable; but if this was a prelude to a retreat in front of the Jihadists, then obviously the future will be dark.

Vembu: There is a perception that the US gave its tacit consent to this deal. What are the US’ gains and losses from this arrangement?

Phares: Yes, the perception exists, and many experts believe that Washington has given its okay for such a deal. But keep in mind that the US leadership is busy tackling the economic crisis and that its military commanders in charge of the Afghanistan battlefield haven't finished their plans yet. Perhaps at some diplomatic levels, a green light was provided to a Pakistani government inquiry for advice. Meaning, the idea is certainly Pakistani and it is possible that the new US diplomatic team dealing with the region may have consented to the move. But strategically, the US will lose from such a deal because the Jihadists will perceive the deal as a victory for them and will be emboldened to do the same elsewhere including in Afghanistan.

Vembu: The argument has been made that there is a ‘good’ Taliban and a ‘bad’ Taliban. Is it a mistake to make such a disctinction? Has such a distinction ever yielded results elsewhere?

Phares: The notion of a bad Taliban and good Taliban is a myth created by those in the West, and particularly in America, who advocate engagement with the Jihadists. This reflects a poor understanding of the ideology and the nature of the Taliban movement. It is not about good or bad but about an ideology which is totalitarian, and methods that do not recognize international law. The Jihadist ideology is one, although its supporters play many tactics, including manoeuvering their enemies into believing that they can do business with some instead of the others. The Jihadists always teach their followers "al Harbu Khid'aa" ("war is deception"). Unfortunately, many in the West and in the US fall into a trap of war of ideas and naively come to the conclusion that one can do business with the ‘good’ Taliban versus the ‘bad’ Taliban. For example, when the Pakistani government signed the deal of Malacand, the Movement for the Implementation of Sharia didn't declare that would be on the side of the government against the Taliban. Another counter-argument is that if indeed there are the ‘good’ Taliban (who will make peace), what would be the plan to deal with the ‘bad’ Taliban? This is the kind of trap that the Obama Administration must not fall into. Everything will depend on the influence of the new experts in charge of explaining it to the White House.

Vembu: What are the social and political implications for Pakistan of the imposition of Sharia law in the Swat valley?

Phares: It has tremendous implications. It will empower radical Islamists and the Jihadist movements to create a large pool of jihad-indoctrinated people. It is as if Islambad has conceded to the establishment of an Emirate in Swat. The Jihadists are unstoppable. Once they have Sharia control over a province, they will use it to spread their version of Jihad and thus levy a much larger body of youth to be recruited by the Taliban and other groups, such as Lashkar e Taiba. From there on, other provinces in the frontiers areas will follow. But beyond this, expect other districts in the far east, in the centre and the south (of Pakistan) to be impacted. If a movement is contracted to apply Sharia in one part of the country, it will spread till it eventually brings down the (Pakistan) government.

Vembu: Is there a risk from a “creeping Talibanisation” or the spread of the jihadi culture and the retreat of secular politics in Pakistan? How can this be reversed?

Phares: The Malacand agreement is the first step in the so-called “creeping Talibanisation” of Pakistan. President Musharraf himself warned of this “Talibanisation”: he knows what was happening on the ground and inside his own military and intelligence. President Zardari, I assume, knows all too well that this Talibanisation is under way. It all depends on whether he has a plan to counter it. The only way to reverse it is to have secular and democratic forces in Pakistan unleash an awareness campaign to expose the radical ideologies. It is going to boil down to the efforts deployed by Pakistan’s civil society which is opposed to the Talibanisation. It is a war of ideas. The reversal can’t be done only by counter-terrorism operations or political negotiations but by a democratic revolution waged by the forces of democracy inside Pakistan. It is going to be hard and long.

Vembu: The Pakistani government recently released from house arrest Dr A.Q. Khan, a confirmed nuclear proliferator. What message is being conveyed here, and why did not the US administration respond forcefully?

Phares: I would not want to speculate as I am not privy to the circumstances of the release. But my assumptions are as follow. First, there must have been some negotiations between the government and Dr A.Q. Khan about his future activities and a deal may have been reached. Second, whatever knowledge he had spread in the past in terms of nuclear secrets is not possessed by the circles who control these kinds of weapons inside Pakistan and North Korea, and even those who are rushing to build the Iranian bomb. Dramatically put, his knowledge is now bypassed by others. That may be the reason behind the US silence on the issue.

Vembu: Any discussion of the war on terror in Pakistan appears to focus only on the terror camps on the Afghan/Pakistan border areas. The terrorism infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, from where much of the terrorism targeted at India is planned and implemented, is never addressed. Is this a ‘blind zone’ for successive US administrations?

Phares: The US government has already designated a number of violent organisations operating on the eastern border of Pakistan as terrorist. In 2002 a Lashkar e Taiba cell that was dismantled in Virginia was tried in court for training to attack targets in India. Its members are serving sentences in the US. The same can be said about Jaish e Muhammed and others. These Jihadi terror organisations have been designated as terrorists and are monitored under international auspices. But when it comes to pressing the Pakistani Government to go after them as well, Washington’s priority is to help Islamabad in countering those operating on the western border first, not because of designation but because they can affect the whole situation in Afghanistan and turn it into a nasty one, leading to the fall of the Karzai government. Knowing that the Pakistani government can barely deal with one front at a time, priority is given to Taliban/al Qaeda first. Besides, India can defend itself with its own forces if attacked by terrorists. But Afghanistan is still weak and needs to be solidified first. In the long run, however, the US administration cannot consider these Jihadi forces as a “blind zone” because eventually these “zones” will be used against all countries involved, beginning with India and Afghanistan, the United States and eventually Pakistan itself.

Vembu: Pakistan has reluctantly acknowledged that the Mumbai terrorist attack was planned and executed from Pakistan. But there are lingering apprehensions about its earnestness in cracking down on the terrorism infrastructure within Pakistan. How should India respond?

Phares: First, I noticed that the architects of the Mumbai operations left all indicators on purpose to show that the road led to Pakistan. They could have mobilised Jihadists inside India to do it and they are available. The war room decided to use Pakistanis coming from the sea instead of Indian Jihadists coming from inland. This means that they wanted a clash to take place between India and Pakistan so that (Jihadists) can grab more power inside Pakistan. There is evidence to indicate that the terrorists had some sort of support in Pakistan from organisations, but also from people in the intelligence and defence apparatus. This brings us back to the realisation that Jihadi penetration exists in Pakistan. Hence, to be objective about it, perhaps one of the reasons the Pakistani Government didn’t unleash a massive crackdown on these circles (as India may have wished) is precisely the internal problem in Pakistan. If the infiltration was benign, I would have expected the Pakistan government to strike hard against the perpetrators’ backers. But because of this situation, one has to expect that the authorities won’t go full fledge in their measures. The bottomline is to understand the ability of the Pakistani Government to fight the Jihadists inside their country, particularly in light of a historic tension with India over Kashmir.

As for India, it can and should escalate its own campaign against Jihadi terrorists inside its own borders and internationally. After Mumbai, the international community is standing in solidarity with the Indian people. This is an opportunity for India to reach out to all anti-Jihadi forces in the world and form a coalition against the terrorists. A few will argue that this is a local feud over Kashmir, but most others will extend their hand to India in this particular fight. So, the best way ahead is for New Delhi to build a vast coalition worldwide: it will need it later when a bigger confrontation with Jihadists inevitably occurs. Regarding Pakistan, my advice to India is to be patient regarding the internal situation in Pakistan. It is more important for India to get a world consensus against terrorists, including from the US, the West, Russia and India, and many moderates in the Arab world, than to expect higher results from counter-terrorism operations inside Pakistan. For now, India should allow and encourage the counter-Jihadi movement in Pakistan to grow.

Vembu: General elections in India are due soon. In the event of the right-wing BJP coming to power – either by itself or as the head of a coalition – it will likely take a more forceful approach against Pakistan, perhaps even launch pre-emptive strikes against camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. What are the implications of such an approach for the broader war on terror? Will they advance or undermine the Obama administration’s approach in Afghanistan/Pakistan?

Phares: To be candid about it, if India strikes inside Pakistan in retaliation against terror acts launched by Jihadists coming from across the borders, it will lead to a takeover by the Jihadists inside Pakistan and the country will be seized by Taliban forces with access to nuclear weapons. If the attacks are launched by the Pakistan government, no one can tell India what to do. But as long as the Jihadists aim is to drag the two countries into confrontation, the international community and India must not grant them that wish and engage in military activities on the terms of the Jihadi terrorists. Surely, India can and will evaluate its own national security situation but there are strategic matters to consider. The Jihadi war room in the region wants to strike India so that it will strike back at Pakistan at the timing of the Jihadists. If that happens, the Pakistan military, probably incited by radical elements, will remove its forces from the Waziristan areas and the border with Afghanistan and move them to the border with India. Besides, the moderates inside Pakistan will be isolated. Thus this will unleash the Taliban and free them to operate against the US and NATO in Afghanistan. The Jihadi strategy is clear. India – under any government - can and should act smartly by mobilising against Jihadists first inside its own borders. This will be the best answer to the war room and will create divisions among Jihadists. Second, India has great possibilities to wage a war of ideas with broadcasts and on the Internet in languages that the West has little skills in. Last but not the least, India should convene an international conference against the spread of the Jihadi ideology, inviting Muslim moderates, the US, Russia and the rest of the international community. This is a strategic response to the attacks in Mumbai. Keeping in mind that India will always have the military option open – but only after a strong international coalition is up and running.

Are Acts of Staged Controversy an Islamist Strategic Tactic? by Madeleine Gruen and Edward Sloan

Through careful study of terrorist incidents and investigations and study of the histories of the terrorist groups, U.S. law enforcement officers, security officials, and intelligence analysts have developed an understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures used by terrorists preparing for and conducting attacks. Professionals can usually distinguish between a truly suspicious incident and benign behavior. However, there is a third category of non-violent activities that is more difficult to identify, which we will refer to as "acts of staged controversy."

There are some cases where witnesses describe actors' behavior as "odd" yet very overt—behavior apparently designed to attract attention. Viewed under differing prisms, the behavior could be classified as either benign or as some type of terrorist activity. Decision makers and practitioners should consider the possibility that certain incidents are staged or that they are escalated by manipulation of the media and the legal system to create controversy and to provoke a response to serve strategic purposes.

It is very difficult to prove ulterior intentions behind what we are referring to as "acts of staged controversy." Perhaps these acts are deliberately provocative. Or, it is possible these are innocent events that may be seized upon by advocacy groups for political gain. We present this hypothesis to provide an alternative way of analyzing these types of incidents.

Strategic Motivations of Islamist Groups

Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, do not necessarily intend to engage in violence (though some branches of the Muslim Brotherhood are very violent). Nevertheless, they share the same long-term goal as violent jihadist groups: to establish an Islamic society. Part of their strategy is to weaken and dismantle democratic regimes.[1] They endeavor to "Islamize" society using a bottom up approach[2] so that eventually their doctrines are accepted as the norm rather than considered extreme or marginal.

This article offers two cases, both involving the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which describes itself as a Muslim advocacy organization. These cases are meant to be illustrative of how acts of staged controversy may be implemented by groups with an Islamist agenda.

Many of CAIR's founding members were members of the Muslim Brotherhood[3] and of a support network created by the Brotherhood to benefit Hamas. Some experts believe that CAIR continues to be deeply involved with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and supports their objectives.[4],[5] The Muslim Brotherhood is not considered a monolithic organization, and its various branches may disagree on specific tactics, but all are consistent in their commitment to its core ideological principles, including the adoption of their political version of Islam as a governing standard for all Muslims around the world.[6]

In 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a memorandum outlining its strategic goal in North America.[7] It reads, in part:

"The [Muslim Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and Allah's religion is made victorious over all other religions."

Minnesota Imams

On November 20, 2006, six imams boarded a US Airways jet that was about to depart from Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport for Phoenix, Arizona. They had attended a three-day conference of the North American Imams Federation. Three only had one-way tickets and no checked luggage.[8] Various witnesses reported observing the group praying in an unusually loud way in the waiting area prior to boarding.[9] One of the witnesses, a clergyman who was familiar with Islamic practices, described their behavior at the gate as "atypical."[10] This same witness was later seated next to one of the imams on the plane and intentionally engaged him in conversation. The imam initially expressed to the witness that he was in the United States to do work related to his Ph.D. Later in the discussion, he admitted he was not doing academic work but instead intended to "represent Muslims in the United States" by generating support for Shari'a law.[11]

Upon boarding the plane, the imams dispersed. Two sat in the front of the plane, two in the middle, and two in the rear.[12] The flight crew and passengers observed them changing seats, and several of the men requested seat-belt extenders.[13] Crew members thought the request was odd, as none of the imams appeared overweight.[14] Although the extenders were provided, they were never used and were left on floor of the plane.[15] One passenger stated that she believed that the imams deliberately acted out as a part of an attempt to intimidate airline employees.[16] Another passenger said, "I can't explain it, but it was like they were definitely trying to raise suspicion."[17] The flight was delayed and the imams were removed from the plane by the airport police, questioned, and released after their plane had already departed.

CAIR filed a complaint with the Department of Transportation, and a separate civil suit in federal court on behalf of the imams against US Airways and the Metropolitan Airports Commission, citing civil rights violations. CAIR also sued the "John Does" who alerted the aircrew and authorities after becoming alarmed by the imam's behavior in the terminal and on the plane.[18] While the "John Doe" provision of a bill (designed to protect citizens who report possible terrorist-related behavior from being sued, and to protect officers acting in an official capacity to prevent terrorist attacks) was moving through Congress, CAIR persisted with its lawsuit, claiming the right to discover whether the complaints were actually made "in good faith" or if they were racially motivated.[19]

President George W. Bush signed the "John Doe" provision[20] into law on August 3, 2007 and CAIR dropped its claims against the "Does."[21] There may be a residual "chilling effect," however, that would prevent concerned citizens from reporting suspicious incidents for fear of getting sued.[22] Causing reluctance to report suspicious incidents in which Muslims are involved may be an aspect of Islamist strategy to reduce resistance to the Islamization of society.

In January 2009, the U.S. Department of Transportation ruled that US Airways did not discriminate against the imams and that the airline's actions were reasonable. The civil suit is scheduled to go to trial in August, 2009.[23]

Giants Stadium

During a football game September 19, 2005 at Giants Stadium, five Muslim men were questioned by FBI agents after they prayed near the stadium's main air intake duct located in a sensitive area.[24] Former President George H.W. Bush attended the game and security was high. After approximately 20 minutes of questioning, FBI agents determined that the group did not pose a threat and allowed them to return to the game.

This group may have acted completely innocently. The issue, however, was not dropped by the men, and a few weeks later, on November 2, 2005, the group joined forces with the New Jersey-based American Muslim Union and the New York City chapter of CAIR for a joint press conference concerning the incident. At the conference, the men complained that they had been humiliated at Giants Stadium, and that their "main aim [in publicizing the episode] was to bring to light and educate people about what it is we're supposed to do."[25] They also took the opportunity to promote a campaign called "Pray for Understanding,"[26] which the executive director of the New York office of CAIR described as a way to teach people about Islam. The tie-in to the "Pray for Understanding" campaign at the press conference suggests the possibility that the incident at Giants Stadium may have been staged to create a platform to promote an ulterior public relations agenda.

What Islamists Might Gain from "Acts of Staged Controversy"

The Minnesota Imams and Giants Stadium incidents are just two examples where unusual but overt behavior has been investigated, dropped (because there was no clear indication of wrongdoing), and subsequently taken up and intensified by CAIR or by other Muslim groups. Due to the involvement of Islamist advocacy groups, news stories are generated and controversy stirred.

If the objective of Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, is to establish Islam as the dominant global societal doctrine, then how would creating acts of controversy - or seizing on opportunities to create controversy - further their strategy to achieve their objective? If they intend to achieve their objective through non-violent means then it is logical to conclude that they would want Muslims to embrace their perspective and to eschew democratic principles..

For example, acts of staged controversy could be used to:

Cause Muslims to feel disaffection for the democratic system by promoting feelings of betrayal and abandonment.

Convince Muslim Americans that they are not accepted as Americans. Acts of staged controversy provoke a response from authorities that can foment an "us vs. them" rift between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Incite political divides that may ultimately cause political instability.

Influence legislators to call for laws to outlaw profiling and/or repeal existing laws such as the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Patriot Act.

Draw attention from foreign media in an attempt to show that the U.S. rhetoric about acceptance is hollow.
Acts of staged controversy could also be exploited by groups who seek to use violence. For example, acts of staged controversy could be used to:

Desensitize security personnel by making activity that common sense would deem suspicious instead seem routine and not worth any special effort.

Intimidate security personnel and citizens by threatening lawsuits; making them reluctant to report suspicious behavior.

Handling Acts of Staged Controversy

Unfortunately, hatred, bigotry, and mistrust exist in the United States, and it is the role of civil rights groups to respond appropriately when acts of hatred do occur. It is the duty of responsible officials to monitor political, religious, and social tensions so that violent acts motivated by hatred can be prevented. The long view for homeland security, however, cannot be compromised by hasty responses to ambiguous situations. It is possible that some Islamist groups may exaggerate the occurrence of anti-Islamic discrimination in order to validate the premise that "Islamophobia" is rampant. According to FBI statistics, out of a total 7,624 hate crimes reported in the United States in 2007, 115 were motivated by anti-Islamic bias.[27] By contrast, 2,658 were motivated by bias against blacks, 749 were anti-white, 1,265 targeted people based on sexual orientation and 969 of the hate crimes reported were motivated by bias against Jews.[28]

Law enforcement and security personnel, airline and airport managers, legislators, politicians, media, and private citizens all have roles to play to prevent the spread of extremist ideology, which could lead to radicalization and, ultimately, a possible terrorist event.

Response at the Federal, Law Enforcement and Media Levels

Politicians must acknowledge Islamist ideology is being promoted in the United States, recognize who is promoting it, and understand the subtle tactics used by the Islamist groups before they can introduce effective counter-measures against terrorism. Politicians must realize that Islamist groups are competing for hearts and minds in the United States, so commitment to democratic values cannot be taken for granted.

How does law enforcement play a role in acts of staged controversy if there is no apparent crime committed? It is unlawful to conspire and to deliberately disrupt or interfere with the legitimate activities of law enforcement and security personnel. Engaging in deliberately suspicious behavior in order to distract security and law enforcement authorities is a tactic that has been discussed on Islamist message boards.[29] Of course, in ambiguous situations it is hard to prove the actual intent of the actors. Difficult though it may be, investigations should be conducted and cooperating witnesses sought and developed. The stakes are high, especially when the results of these incidents are considered in the aggregate and not individually.

Associations with terrorists or terrorist groups are not evidence of a crime, but are valuable data points in evaluating the true nature of an incident. If there are nefarious or questionable associations or prior activities that could shed light on possible motivations for ambiguous acts, they should be made known as much as possible. For example, one of the six imams involved in the Minnesota airport case, Omar Shahin, raised money for the Holy Land Foundation and for the Illinois-based KindHearts Foundation, which the government shut down last year for alleged support of Hamas."[30]

Additionally, the media should be aware of the possibility that it is being used to further an Islamist agenda. Media cooperation and extensive coverage is a key element of successful acts of staged controversy. Historically, global political Islamist groups have skillfully manipulated the media as part of their effort to circulate their message.[31] Statements made by spokespeople representing Islamist groups are often taken at face value by the media, and past involvements and associations often go unmentioned. Just as it is for law enforcement, it is important for the media to consider incidents in the aggregate.

Conclusion

It could be that individuals or groups unintentionally behave in a way that is deemed suspicious, and that official response may cause embarrassment. It also is true that innocent events create opportunities for groups like CAIR to influence the public's view of Islam, both politically and ideologically.

Acts of staged controversy or public relations campaigns manipulating otherwise innocent events may be an aspect of Islamist group strategy to Islamize society. Authorities dealing with such incidents should assess the behavior as an aggregate. Their responses should address the root of the problem, rather than potentially allowing such incidents to compel a response that supports the Islamist agenda.

(Madeleine Gruen is a Senior Analyst for the NEFA Foundation. She is also a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Mike Stapleton Associates and is a contributor to the Counterterrorism Blog. Previously, she was an intelligence analyst for the New York Police Department's Counterterrorism Division.)

(Edward Sloan is a detective in the New York Police Department with 35 years of service. He is a Navy Reserve Officer and since 2001 has deployed several times to Afghanistan and the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His views are not necessarily those of the NYPD or the Navy.)

[1] Stephen Coughlin, Analysis of Muslim Brotherhood's General Strategic Goals for North America, Statement entered as evidence in U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, September 7, 2007.

[2] Zeyno Baran, The Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. Network, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 6, Hudson Institute, 2008.

[3] Douglas Farah, Ron Sandee, and Josh Lefkowitz, The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History, NEFA Foundation, October 26, 2007, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaikhwan1007.pdf (last accessed February 26, 2009)

[4] See: "Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Council on American-Islamic Relations' Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Instanter and Amicus Brief in Support of the Unindicted Co-Conspirators' First and Fifth Amendment Rights," USA v. Holy Land Foundation, 3:04cr240 (TXND September 4, 2007) in which prosecutors say "CAIR has been identified by the Government at trial as a participant in an ongoing and ultimately unlawful conspiracy to support a designated terrorist organization, a conspiracy from which CAIR never withdrew."

[5] "Beware of CAIR" letter from U.S. Reps. Sue Myrick, Pete Hoekstra, John Shadegg, Paul Broun and Trent Franks to other House members. January 30, 2009. It says "There are indications that this group has connections to HAMAS." And, letter from U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf to Michael Heimback, FBI Assistant Director, Counter Terrorism Division, February 2, 2009. Wolf asks about news reports that the FBI has cut off communication with CAIR "amid mounting evidence that it has links to a support network for Hamas."

[6] See The Muslim Brotherhood's English-language web site, http://ikhwanweb.com/index.asp.

[7] The Muslim Brotherhood's document outlining their strategy in North America and analysis of the document can be found on the NEFA Foundation web site: http://www.nefafoundation.org/hlfdocs.html. See Exhibit GX 4-21 (last accessed February 26, 2009).

[8] Minnesota Airport Police Incident Report, OCA # 06004536, November 20, 2006.

[9] Katherine Kersten, Ordering Imams Off Flight Was Reasonable Act, Minneapolis-St. Paul Star-Tribune, December 7, 2006.

[10] Minnesota Airport Police Incident Report, OCA # 06004536, November 20, 2006.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid

[18] Steven Huntley, Travelers Need Shield From Lawsuit, Chicago Sun-Times, July 29, 2007.

[19] Ibrahim Hooper, National Communications Director for CAIR, appearance on "Tucker," MSNBC, July 29, 2007.

[20] The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (H.R.1)

[21] Audrey Hudson, Imams Drop Lawsuit Against Doe Passengers, Washington Times, August 23, 2007.

[22] See Congressman Peter King appearance on Fox News Channel, July 20, 2007, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYbev9SDMtc (last accessed February 24, 2009).

[23] David Hanners, Feds Refute Imams' Bias Case Against US Airways, Twin Cities Pioneer Press, February 18, 2009.

[24] A Place to Pray During Games, New York Times, November 23, 2005.

[25] Jeff Diamant and Russell Ben-Ali, Meadowlands to Add Worship Area, Newark Star Ledger, November 22, 2005.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2007 Hate Crime Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2007/incidents.htm (last accessed on February 24, 2009).

[28] Ibid.

[29] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSIA 04-0042, September 2, 2004.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Madeleine Gruen interview with former high-ranking member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, December 8, 2008. Also see Habib's Get Rich Quick Schemes, Manchester Evening News, December 18, 2008.

Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization by Matthew Levitt

"As the U.S. government has come slowly to the realization that military force alone cannot defeat radical Islamist extremism, a precise strategy to effectively counter this extremism and empower mainstream alternatives has proved challenging."

A strong investment in counterradicalization -- with special focus on helping mainstream Muslims provide hopeful and practical alternatives to jihadist ideology -- should be a critical element of the Obama administration's counterterrorism strategy, a high-level Washington Institute task force urged today.

Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization is the final report of the Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism, a bipartisan, blue-ribbon commission of diplomats, legislators, strategists, scholars, and experts. A joint project of two Institute programs -- Project FIKRA and the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence -- the task force has been meeting since June 2008 to devise a comprehensive strategy to counter the growing radicalization of Muslim populations, particularly youth, worldwide.

The report provides analysis and recommendations on a spectrum of discrete policy issues -- democracy promotion, political reform, public diplomacy, strategic communications, and counterradicalization -- offering an integrated approach to staunching the spread of Islamist extremism. The extensive recommendations suggest an array of policy instruments, from creating a Counterradicalization Forum that draws on "best practices" of friends and partners in Europe and the Middle East, to infusing with renewed mission, urgency, and creativity U.S. international broadcasting to Arab and Muslim societies.

Rewriting the Narrative is endorsed by a distinguished group of policy practitioners: members of Congress Jane Harman (D-CA); Sue Myrick (R-NC), and Adam Smith (D-WA); former 9/11 commissioner Timothy J. Roemer; former U.S. ambassador to Morocco Marc Ginsberg; former deputy assistant to the president for homeland security Frank J. Cilluffo; the presidents of the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute Kenneth Wollack and Lorne W. Craner, respectively; prominent scholars Bruce Hoffman and Mohammed M. Hafez; former Kennedy School dean and Clinton administration official Joseph S. Nye, Jr.; former Bush administration officials Randa Fahmy Hudome and M. C. Andrews; president of the Henry L. Stimson Center Ellen Laipson; Freedom House executive director Jennifer Windsor; Hudson Institute vice president S. Enders Wimbush; president of the Progressive Policy Institute Will Marshall; Johns Hopkins SAIS adjunct professor Joshua Muravchik; and Washington Institute executive director Robert Satloff.