Iraq's parliament on Thursday approved a landmark security pact with the United States that paves the way for U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of 2011.
Lawmakers in Iraq's 275-seat parliament passed the deal with a majority of 149 out of 198 present, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani said.
Following are some details about the pact:
Key Points:
* The pact is called "Agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and their activities during their temporary presence."
* U.S. forces should withdraw from Iraqi towns by the end of June 2009 and leave the country entirely by 31 December 2011.
* U.S. contractors will be subject to Iraqi law and can be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. U.S. troops and Defense Department civilian employees will be subject to American military law, but the pact provides a mechanism that allows them to be tried in Iraqi courts in cases of serious, premeditated crimes committed while off base and off duty.
* The United States, which now holds about 17,000 detainees in Iraq, will lose the power to hold prisoners indefinitely without charge. U.S. forces must obtain an Iraqi arrest warrant within 24 hours of capturing suspects. Those already held without charge when the pact takes effect, and who are not subject to an Iraqi arrest warrant, should be freed in an organized fashion.
* All fixed buildings used by U.S. forces become the property of Iraq. All U.S. military bases are to be turned over to Iraq when U.S. forces withdraw from them.
* All military operations must be approved by a joint U.S.-Iraqi Committee. U.S. forces cannot search Iraqi homes without Iraqi permission.
* The pact is valid for three years. Either party can terminate it with one year's notice. It can be changed only by mutual consent.
Referendum?
* Referendum must take place by the end of July 2009. The referendum will not delay implementation of the pact on January 1 2008, since it goes into effect until the vote is done. Parliament will have to pass new legislation for the referendum.
Thursday, November 27, 2008
Hezbollah Seeks to Marshal the Piety of the Young by Robert F. Worth
On a Bekaa Valley playing field gilded by late-afternoon sun, hundreds of young men wearing Boy Scout-style uniforms and kerchiefs stand rigidly at attention as a military band plays, its marchers bearing aloft the distinctive yellow banner of Hezbollah, the militant Shiite movement.
They are adolescents — 17 or 18 years old — but they have the stern faces of adult men, lightly bearded, some of them with dark spots in the center of their foreheads from bowing down in prayer. Each of them wears a tiny picture of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite cleric who led the Iranian revolution, on his chest.
“You are our leader!” the boys chant in unison, as a Hezbollah official walks to a podium and addresses them with a Koranic invocation. “We are your men!”
This is the vanguard of Hezbollah’s youth movement, the Mahdi Scouts. Some of the graduates gathered at this ceremony will go on to join Hezbollah’s guerrilla army, fighting Israel in the hills of southern Lebanon. Others will work in the party’s bureaucracy. The rest will probably join the fast-growing and passionately loyal base of support that has made Hezbollah the most powerful political, military and social force in Lebanon.
At a time of religious revival across the Islamic world, intense piety among the young is nothing unusual. But in Lebanon, Hezbollah — the name means the party of God — has marshaled these ambient energies for a highly political project: educating a younger generation to continue its military struggle against Israel. Hezbollah’s battlefield resilience has made it a model for other militant groups across the Middle East, including Hamas. And that success is due, in no small measure, to the party’s extraordinarily comprehensive array of religion-themed youth and recruitment programs.
There is a network of schools— some of them run by Hezbollah, others affiliated with or controlled by it — largely shielded from outsiders. There is a nationwide network of clerics who provide weekly religious lessons to young people on a neighborhood basis. There is a group for students at unaffiliated schools and colleges that presents Hezbollah to a wider audience. The party organizes non-Scout-related summer camps and field trips, and during Muslim religious holidays it arranges events to encourage young people to express their devotion in public and to perform charity work.
“It’s like a complete system, from primary school to university,” said Talal Atrissi, a political analyst at Lebanese University who has been studying Hezbollah for decades. “The goal is to prepare a generation that has deep religious faith and is also close to Hezbollah.”
Much of this activity is fueled by a broader Shiite religious resurgence in Lebanon that began after the Iranian revolution in 1979. But Hezbollah has gone further than any other organization in mobilizing this force, both to build its own support base and to immunize Shiite youths from the temptations of Lebanon’s diverse and mostly secular society.
Hezbollah’s influence on Lebanese youth is very difficult to quantify because of the party’s extreme secrecy and the general absence of reliable statistics in the country. It is clear that the Shiite religious schools, in which Hezbollah exercises a dominant influence, have grown over the past two decades from a mere handful into a major national network. Other, less visible avenues may be equally important, like the growing number of clerics associated with the movement.
Hezbollah and its allies have also adapted and expanded religious rituals involving children, starting at ever-earlier ages. Women, who play a more prominent role in Hezbollah than they do in most other radical Islamic groups, are especially important in creating what is often called “the jihad atmosphere” among children.
‘This Is Women’s Jihad’
As night fell in the southern Lebanese town of Jibchit, a lone woman in a black gown strode purposefully into the spotlight on a makeshift stage. Before her sat hundreds of Mahdi Scout parents, who had come to watch one of the central events of their young daughters’ lives.
“Welcome, welcome,” their host said. “We appreciate your presence here tonight. Your daughters are now putting on this angelic costume for the first time.”
Munira Halawi, a slim, 23-year-old Hezbollah member with the direct gaze and passionate manner of an evangelist, was the master of ceremonies at a ritual known as a Takleef Shara’ee, or the holy responsibility, in which some 300 female scouts ages 8 or 9 formally donned the hijab, or Islamic head scarf.
For the girls, the ritual was a moment of tremendous symbolic significance, marking the start of a deeper religious commitment and the approach of adulthood. These ceremonies, once rare, have become common in recent years.
It was a milestone as well for Ms. Halawi, who had been practicing with the girls for weeks: she was now a qa’ida, a young female leader who helps supervise the education of younger girls.
Born in 1985, Ms. Halawi is in some ways typical of the younger generation of female Hezbollah members. She grew up after Hezbollah and its allies had begun establishing what they called the hala islamiyya, or Islamic atmosphere, in Shiite Lebanon. She quickly became far more devout than her parents, who had grown up during an era when secular ideologies like pan-Arabism and Communism were popular in Lebanon. She married early and had the first of her two children before turning 17.
As Ms. Halawi finished her introduction, the girls began walking up the aisle toward the stage, dressed in silky white gowns with furry hoods. Bubbles descended from the wings. White smoke drifted up from a fog machine. A sound system played Hezbollah anthems — deep male voices booming to a marching band’s rhythm. The parents applauded wildly, the mothers ululating.
The two-and-a-half hour ceremony that followed — in which the girls performed a play about the meaning of the hijab and a bearded Hezbollah cleric delivered a long political speech — was a concentrated dose of Hezbollah ideology, seamlessly blending millenarian Shiite doctrine with furious diatribes against Israel.
Again and again, the girls were told that the hijab was an all-important emblem of Islamic virtue and that it was the secret power that allowed Hezbollah to liberate southern Lebanon. The struggle with Israel, they were told, is the same as the struggle of Shiite Islam’s founding figures, Ali and Hussein, against unjust rulers in their time.
Through it all, Ms. Halawi was the presiding figure on the stage, introducing each section of the evening and reciting Koranic verses and her own poetic homages to the veil.
“Our veil is a jewel-encrusted crown, dignified and lofty, that God made to make us blossom,” she said at one point, gazing out into the darkness with a look of passionate intensity. “He opened the door of obedience and contentment for us.”
A few days later, relaxing over tea at her sister’s house, Ms. Halawi, still dressed in a black abaya, an Islamic gown, expanded on the theme of the ceremony. Religious education now begins much earlier than it did in her parents’ time, she explained. Islamic schools, some run by Hezbollah, begin Koranic lessons at the age of 4, and it is common for girls to start fasting and wearing a hijab at 8. In all this, the mother’s guidance is the key.
“This is women’s jihad,” Ms. Halawi said.
Camp, With a Moral Portion
From a distance, it resembles any other Boy Scout camp in the world. Two rows of canvas tents face each other on the banks of the Litani River, the powder-blue stream that runs across southern Lebanon not far from the Israeli border. A hand-built wooden jungle gym stands near the camp entrance, where pine trees sway in the breeze and dry, brown hills are visible in the distance.
Then, planted on sticks in the river, two huge posters bearing the faces of Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, come into view.
“Since 1985 we have managed to raise a good generation,” said Muhammad al-Akhdar, 25, a scout leader, as he showed a visitor around the grounds. “We had 850 kids here this summer, ages 9 to 15.”
This camp is called Tyr fil Say, one of the sites in south Lebanon where the Mahdi Scouts train. Much of what they do is similar to the activities of scouts the world over: learning to swim, to build campfires, to tie knots and to play sports. Mr. Akhdar described some of the games the young scouts play, including one where they divide into two teams — Americans and the Resistance — and try to throw one another into the river.
The Mahdi Scouts also get visits from Hezbollah fighters, wearing camouflage and toting AK-47s, who talk about fighting Israel.
Mr. Akhdar led a visitor around the tents, where boys had been spelling out Koranic phrases like “the promise” and “the owner of time” using stones. There was also a meticulously arranged grave, complete with lettering and decoration. In place of the headstone was a small photograph of Imad Mugniyah, the Hezbollah commander who was killed in February and who was widely viewed in the West as the mastermind of decades of bombings, kidnappings and hijackings.
The Mahdi Scouts were founded in 1985, shortly after Hezbollah itself. Officially, the group is like any of the other 29 different scout groups in Lebanon, many of which belong to political parties and serve as feeders for them.
But the Mahdi Scouts are different. They are much larger; with an estimated 60,000 children and Scout leaders, they are six times the size of any other Lebanese scout group. Even their marching movements are more militaristic than the others, according to Mustafa Muhammad Abdel Rasoul, the head of the Lebanese Scouts’ Union. While the Mahdi Scouts fall under the umbrella of the Lebanese union, they have no direct affiliation with the international scouting body based in Switzerland. Because of the Scouts’ reputation as a feeder for Hezbollah’s armed force, the party has become extremely protective and rarely grants outsiders access to them.
Still, Hezbollah officials often casually mention the link between the Scouts and the guerrilla force.
“After age 16 the boys mostly go to resistance or military activities,” said Bilal Naim, who served as Hezbollah’s director for the Mahdi Scouts until last year.
Another difference from most scout groups lies in the program. Religious and moral instruction — rather than physical activity — occupy the vast bulk of the Mahdi Scouts’ curriculum, and the scout leaders adhere strictly to lessons outlined in books for each age group.
Those books, copies of which were provided to this reporter by a Hezbollah official, show an extraordinary focus on religious themes and a full-time preoccupation with Hezbollah’s military struggle against Israel. The chapter titles, for the 12- to 14-year-old age group, include “Love and Hate in God,” “Know Your Enemy,” “Loyalty to the Leader” and “Facts About Jews.” Jews are described as cruel, corrupt, cowardly and deceitful, and they are called the killers of prophets. The chapter on Jews states that “their Talmud says those outside the Jewish religion are animals.”
In every chapter, the children are required to write down or recite Koranic verses that illustrate the theme in question. They are taught to venerate Ayatollah Khomeini — Iran has been a longtime supporter of Hezbollah, providing it with money, weapons and training — and the leaders of Hezbollah. They are told to hate Israel and to avoid people who are not devout. Questions at the ends of chapters encourage the children to “watch your heart” and “assess your heart” to check wrong impulses and encourage virtuous ones. One note to the instructors reminds them that young scouts are in a sensitive phase of development that should be considered “a launching toward commitment.”
Secular Influences
In the West, the image of Hezbollah is often that of its bearded, young guerrilla fighters, dressed in military camouflage and clutching AK-47s. But Hezbollah’s inner core of fighters and employees — its full-time members — is a far smaller group than its supporters. This broader category, covering the better part of Lebanon’s roughly one million Shiites, includes reservists, who will fight if needed; doctors and engineers, who contribute their skills; and mere sympathizers.
In that sense, a more representative figure of the party’s young following might be someone like Ali al-Sayyed. A quiet, clean-cut 24-year-old, Mr. Sayyed grew up in south Lebanon and now works as an accountant in Beirut. Hezbollah has offered him jobs, but he prefers to maintain his independence.
But his entire life has been lived in the shadow of Hezbollah. He attended a Mustafa high school, one of a national network of schools affiliated with the party, where he spent at least five class hours every week studying religion and listening to his teachers pray for Hezbollah’s fighters and Ayatollah Khomeini. After school and during the summers, he was with the Mahdi Scouts. Later he became a Scout leader.
He is extremely devout — he will not shake hands with women — and mentions his willingness to fight and die for Hezbollah as though it were a matter of course.
“They made us, so of course I would sacrifice my life for them,” he said as he sat gazing through the glass wall of a Beirut cafe on an autumn evening. “Before, the Shiites were in a wretched condition.”
Yet Mr. Sayyed’s generation is also in many ways more exposed to the temptations of Lebanon’s secular and often decadent society than its predecessors.
That shift is apparent even in the Dahiya, or Suburb, the vast enclave on the southern edge of Beirut where most of Lebanon’s Shiites live and where Hezbollah has its headquarters.
Once an austere ghetto where bearded men would chastise women who dared to appear in public without an Islamic head scarf, the Dahiya is now a far more open place. There are Internet cafes, music and DVD shops, Chinese restaurants and an amusement park called Fantasy World. There is no public consumption of alcohol, but the streets are thick with satellite dishes and open-air television sets. Lingerie shops display posters of scantily-clad models in their windows, and young women walk past in tight jeans, their hair uncovered.
The cafe where Mr. Sayyed was sitting, on the outskirts of Dahiya, was typical. Hezbollah banners were visible on the street outside, but on the inside young people sat at aluminum tables sipping cappuccinos, eating doughnuts and listening to their iPods.
“Hezbollah tries to keep the youth living in a religious atmosphere, but they can’t force them,” he said, gazing uneasily at the street outside.
Mr. Sayyed mentioned Rami Olaik, a former Hezbollah firebrand who left the party and this year published a book about his indoctrination and gradual disenchantment. The book recounts Mr. Olaik’s struggle to reconcile his sexual yearnings with the party’s discipline, and his disgust at the way party members manipulated religious doctrine to justify their encounters with prostitutes. Some unmarried Hezbollah members engage in “temporary marriage” to have sexual relationships, an arrangement allowed by some Shiite religious authorities.
Hezbollah officials say they cannot coerce young people, because it would only create rebels like Mr. Olaik. Instead, they leave them largely free in Lebanon’s pluralistic maze, trusting in the power of their religious training.
But there is a limit to Hezbollah’s flexibility. All young members and supporters are encouraged to develop a hiss amni, or security sense, and are warned to beware of curious outsiders, who may be spies.
After Mr. Sayyed had been talking to a foreign journalist in the coffee shop for more than an hour, a hard-looking young man at a neighboring table began staring at him. Suddenly looking nervous, Mr. Sayyed agreed to continue the conversation on the cafe’s second floor. But he seemed agitated, and later he repeatedly postponed another meeting planned for the next week.
Finally, he sent an apologetic e-mail message explaining that he would not be able to meet again.
“As you know, we live in a war with Israel and America,” he wrote in stumbling English, “and they want to war us (destroy) in all the way.”
They are adolescents — 17 or 18 years old — but they have the stern faces of adult men, lightly bearded, some of them with dark spots in the center of their foreheads from bowing down in prayer. Each of them wears a tiny picture of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite cleric who led the Iranian revolution, on his chest.
“You are our leader!” the boys chant in unison, as a Hezbollah official walks to a podium and addresses them with a Koranic invocation. “We are your men!”
This is the vanguard of Hezbollah’s youth movement, the Mahdi Scouts. Some of the graduates gathered at this ceremony will go on to join Hezbollah’s guerrilla army, fighting Israel in the hills of southern Lebanon. Others will work in the party’s bureaucracy. The rest will probably join the fast-growing and passionately loyal base of support that has made Hezbollah the most powerful political, military and social force in Lebanon.
At a time of religious revival across the Islamic world, intense piety among the young is nothing unusual. But in Lebanon, Hezbollah — the name means the party of God — has marshaled these ambient energies for a highly political project: educating a younger generation to continue its military struggle against Israel. Hezbollah’s battlefield resilience has made it a model for other militant groups across the Middle East, including Hamas. And that success is due, in no small measure, to the party’s extraordinarily comprehensive array of religion-themed youth and recruitment programs.
There is a network of schools— some of them run by Hezbollah, others affiliated with or controlled by it — largely shielded from outsiders. There is a nationwide network of clerics who provide weekly religious lessons to young people on a neighborhood basis. There is a group for students at unaffiliated schools and colleges that presents Hezbollah to a wider audience. The party organizes non-Scout-related summer camps and field trips, and during Muslim religious holidays it arranges events to encourage young people to express their devotion in public and to perform charity work.
“It’s like a complete system, from primary school to university,” said Talal Atrissi, a political analyst at Lebanese University who has been studying Hezbollah for decades. “The goal is to prepare a generation that has deep religious faith and is also close to Hezbollah.”
Much of this activity is fueled by a broader Shiite religious resurgence in Lebanon that began after the Iranian revolution in 1979. But Hezbollah has gone further than any other organization in mobilizing this force, both to build its own support base and to immunize Shiite youths from the temptations of Lebanon’s diverse and mostly secular society.
Hezbollah’s influence on Lebanese youth is very difficult to quantify because of the party’s extreme secrecy and the general absence of reliable statistics in the country. It is clear that the Shiite religious schools, in which Hezbollah exercises a dominant influence, have grown over the past two decades from a mere handful into a major national network. Other, less visible avenues may be equally important, like the growing number of clerics associated with the movement.
Hezbollah and its allies have also adapted and expanded religious rituals involving children, starting at ever-earlier ages. Women, who play a more prominent role in Hezbollah than they do in most other radical Islamic groups, are especially important in creating what is often called “the jihad atmosphere” among children.
‘This Is Women’s Jihad’
As night fell in the southern Lebanese town of Jibchit, a lone woman in a black gown strode purposefully into the spotlight on a makeshift stage. Before her sat hundreds of Mahdi Scout parents, who had come to watch one of the central events of their young daughters’ lives.
“Welcome, welcome,” their host said. “We appreciate your presence here tonight. Your daughters are now putting on this angelic costume for the first time.”
Munira Halawi, a slim, 23-year-old Hezbollah member with the direct gaze and passionate manner of an evangelist, was the master of ceremonies at a ritual known as a Takleef Shara’ee, or the holy responsibility, in which some 300 female scouts ages 8 or 9 formally donned the hijab, or Islamic head scarf.
For the girls, the ritual was a moment of tremendous symbolic significance, marking the start of a deeper religious commitment and the approach of adulthood. These ceremonies, once rare, have become common in recent years.
It was a milestone as well for Ms. Halawi, who had been practicing with the girls for weeks: she was now a qa’ida, a young female leader who helps supervise the education of younger girls.
Born in 1985, Ms. Halawi is in some ways typical of the younger generation of female Hezbollah members. She grew up after Hezbollah and its allies had begun establishing what they called the hala islamiyya, or Islamic atmosphere, in Shiite Lebanon. She quickly became far more devout than her parents, who had grown up during an era when secular ideologies like pan-Arabism and Communism were popular in Lebanon. She married early and had the first of her two children before turning 17.
As Ms. Halawi finished her introduction, the girls began walking up the aisle toward the stage, dressed in silky white gowns with furry hoods. Bubbles descended from the wings. White smoke drifted up from a fog machine. A sound system played Hezbollah anthems — deep male voices booming to a marching band’s rhythm. The parents applauded wildly, the mothers ululating.
The two-and-a-half hour ceremony that followed — in which the girls performed a play about the meaning of the hijab and a bearded Hezbollah cleric delivered a long political speech — was a concentrated dose of Hezbollah ideology, seamlessly blending millenarian Shiite doctrine with furious diatribes against Israel.
Again and again, the girls were told that the hijab was an all-important emblem of Islamic virtue and that it was the secret power that allowed Hezbollah to liberate southern Lebanon. The struggle with Israel, they were told, is the same as the struggle of Shiite Islam’s founding figures, Ali and Hussein, against unjust rulers in their time.
Through it all, Ms. Halawi was the presiding figure on the stage, introducing each section of the evening and reciting Koranic verses and her own poetic homages to the veil.
“Our veil is a jewel-encrusted crown, dignified and lofty, that God made to make us blossom,” she said at one point, gazing out into the darkness with a look of passionate intensity. “He opened the door of obedience and contentment for us.”
A few days later, relaxing over tea at her sister’s house, Ms. Halawi, still dressed in a black abaya, an Islamic gown, expanded on the theme of the ceremony. Religious education now begins much earlier than it did in her parents’ time, she explained. Islamic schools, some run by Hezbollah, begin Koranic lessons at the age of 4, and it is common for girls to start fasting and wearing a hijab at 8. In all this, the mother’s guidance is the key.
“This is women’s jihad,” Ms. Halawi said.
Camp, With a Moral Portion
From a distance, it resembles any other Boy Scout camp in the world. Two rows of canvas tents face each other on the banks of the Litani River, the powder-blue stream that runs across southern Lebanon not far from the Israeli border. A hand-built wooden jungle gym stands near the camp entrance, where pine trees sway in the breeze and dry, brown hills are visible in the distance.
Then, planted on sticks in the river, two huge posters bearing the faces of Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, come into view.
“Since 1985 we have managed to raise a good generation,” said Muhammad al-Akhdar, 25, a scout leader, as he showed a visitor around the grounds. “We had 850 kids here this summer, ages 9 to 15.”
This camp is called Tyr fil Say, one of the sites in south Lebanon where the Mahdi Scouts train. Much of what they do is similar to the activities of scouts the world over: learning to swim, to build campfires, to tie knots and to play sports. Mr. Akhdar described some of the games the young scouts play, including one where they divide into two teams — Americans and the Resistance — and try to throw one another into the river.
The Mahdi Scouts also get visits from Hezbollah fighters, wearing camouflage and toting AK-47s, who talk about fighting Israel.
Mr. Akhdar led a visitor around the tents, where boys had been spelling out Koranic phrases like “the promise” and “the owner of time” using stones. There was also a meticulously arranged grave, complete with lettering and decoration. In place of the headstone was a small photograph of Imad Mugniyah, the Hezbollah commander who was killed in February and who was widely viewed in the West as the mastermind of decades of bombings, kidnappings and hijackings.
The Mahdi Scouts were founded in 1985, shortly after Hezbollah itself. Officially, the group is like any of the other 29 different scout groups in Lebanon, many of which belong to political parties and serve as feeders for them.
But the Mahdi Scouts are different. They are much larger; with an estimated 60,000 children and Scout leaders, they are six times the size of any other Lebanese scout group. Even their marching movements are more militaristic than the others, according to Mustafa Muhammad Abdel Rasoul, the head of the Lebanese Scouts’ Union. While the Mahdi Scouts fall under the umbrella of the Lebanese union, they have no direct affiliation with the international scouting body based in Switzerland. Because of the Scouts’ reputation as a feeder for Hezbollah’s armed force, the party has become extremely protective and rarely grants outsiders access to them.
Still, Hezbollah officials often casually mention the link between the Scouts and the guerrilla force.
“After age 16 the boys mostly go to resistance or military activities,” said Bilal Naim, who served as Hezbollah’s director for the Mahdi Scouts until last year.
Another difference from most scout groups lies in the program. Religious and moral instruction — rather than physical activity — occupy the vast bulk of the Mahdi Scouts’ curriculum, and the scout leaders adhere strictly to lessons outlined in books for each age group.
Those books, copies of which were provided to this reporter by a Hezbollah official, show an extraordinary focus on religious themes and a full-time preoccupation with Hezbollah’s military struggle against Israel. The chapter titles, for the 12- to 14-year-old age group, include “Love and Hate in God,” “Know Your Enemy,” “Loyalty to the Leader” and “Facts About Jews.” Jews are described as cruel, corrupt, cowardly and deceitful, and they are called the killers of prophets. The chapter on Jews states that “their Talmud says those outside the Jewish religion are animals.”
In every chapter, the children are required to write down or recite Koranic verses that illustrate the theme in question. They are taught to venerate Ayatollah Khomeini — Iran has been a longtime supporter of Hezbollah, providing it with money, weapons and training — and the leaders of Hezbollah. They are told to hate Israel and to avoid people who are not devout. Questions at the ends of chapters encourage the children to “watch your heart” and “assess your heart” to check wrong impulses and encourage virtuous ones. One note to the instructors reminds them that young scouts are in a sensitive phase of development that should be considered “a launching toward commitment.”
Secular Influences
In the West, the image of Hezbollah is often that of its bearded, young guerrilla fighters, dressed in military camouflage and clutching AK-47s. But Hezbollah’s inner core of fighters and employees — its full-time members — is a far smaller group than its supporters. This broader category, covering the better part of Lebanon’s roughly one million Shiites, includes reservists, who will fight if needed; doctors and engineers, who contribute their skills; and mere sympathizers.
In that sense, a more representative figure of the party’s young following might be someone like Ali al-Sayyed. A quiet, clean-cut 24-year-old, Mr. Sayyed grew up in south Lebanon and now works as an accountant in Beirut. Hezbollah has offered him jobs, but he prefers to maintain his independence.
But his entire life has been lived in the shadow of Hezbollah. He attended a Mustafa high school, one of a national network of schools affiliated with the party, where he spent at least five class hours every week studying religion and listening to his teachers pray for Hezbollah’s fighters and Ayatollah Khomeini. After school and during the summers, he was with the Mahdi Scouts. Later he became a Scout leader.
He is extremely devout — he will not shake hands with women — and mentions his willingness to fight and die for Hezbollah as though it were a matter of course.
“They made us, so of course I would sacrifice my life for them,” he said as he sat gazing through the glass wall of a Beirut cafe on an autumn evening. “Before, the Shiites were in a wretched condition.”
Yet Mr. Sayyed’s generation is also in many ways more exposed to the temptations of Lebanon’s secular and often decadent society than its predecessors.
That shift is apparent even in the Dahiya, or Suburb, the vast enclave on the southern edge of Beirut where most of Lebanon’s Shiites live and where Hezbollah has its headquarters.
Once an austere ghetto where bearded men would chastise women who dared to appear in public without an Islamic head scarf, the Dahiya is now a far more open place. There are Internet cafes, music and DVD shops, Chinese restaurants and an amusement park called Fantasy World. There is no public consumption of alcohol, but the streets are thick with satellite dishes and open-air television sets. Lingerie shops display posters of scantily-clad models in their windows, and young women walk past in tight jeans, their hair uncovered.
The cafe where Mr. Sayyed was sitting, on the outskirts of Dahiya, was typical. Hezbollah banners were visible on the street outside, but on the inside young people sat at aluminum tables sipping cappuccinos, eating doughnuts and listening to their iPods.
“Hezbollah tries to keep the youth living in a religious atmosphere, but they can’t force them,” he said, gazing uneasily at the street outside.
Mr. Sayyed mentioned Rami Olaik, a former Hezbollah firebrand who left the party and this year published a book about his indoctrination and gradual disenchantment. The book recounts Mr. Olaik’s struggle to reconcile his sexual yearnings with the party’s discipline, and his disgust at the way party members manipulated religious doctrine to justify their encounters with prostitutes. Some unmarried Hezbollah members engage in “temporary marriage” to have sexual relationships, an arrangement allowed by some Shiite religious authorities.
Hezbollah officials say they cannot coerce young people, because it would only create rebels like Mr. Olaik. Instead, they leave them largely free in Lebanon’s pluralistic maze, trusting in the power of their religious training.
But there is a limit to Hezbollah’s flexibility. All young members and supporters are encouraged to develop a hiss amni, or security sense, and are warned to beware of curious outsiders, who may be spies.
After Mr. Sayyed had been talking to a foreign journalist in the coffee shop for more than an hour, a hard-looking young man at a neighboring table began staring at him. Suddenly looking nervous, Mr. Sayyed agreed to continue the conversation on the cafe’s second floor. But he seemed agitated, and later he repeatedly postponed another meeting planned for the next week.
Finally, he sent an apologetic e-mail message explaining that he would not be able to meet again.
“As you know, we live in a war with Israel and America,” he wrote in stumbling English, “and they want to war us (destroy) in all the way.”
Thanksgiving 2008
"Go on, then, in your generous enterprise with gratitude to Heaven for past success, and confidence of it in the future. For my own part, I ask no greater blessing than to share with you the common danger and common glory ... that these American States may never cease to be free and independent."
- Samuel Adams
Pilgrims Regress by Mark Alexander
In the aftermath of a momentous election, an election sure to change the course of our nation, it is tempting to despair. On this Thanksgiving, though, let us resist that powerful temptation and instead take stock of the blessings of liberty.
President Ronald Reagan often cited the Pilgrims who celebrated the first Thanksgiving as our forebears who charted the path of American freedom. He made frequent reference to John Winthrop's "shining city upon a hill."
As Reagan explained, "The phrase comes from John Winthrop, who wrote it to describe the America he imagined. What he imagined was important because he was an early Pilgrim, an early freedom man. He journeyed here on what today we'd call a little wooden boat; and like the other Pilgrims, he was looking for a home that would be free."
Who were these "freedom men," and how did they eventually blaze the path of true liberty? They were Calvinist Protestants who rejected the institutional Church of England, believing that worshipping God must originate freely in the individual soul, without coercion. Suffering persecution and imprisonment in England for their beliefs, a group of these separatists fled to Holland in 1608. There, they found spiritual liberty in the midst of a disjointed economy that failed to provide adequate compensation for their labors, and a dissolute, degraded, corrupt culture that tempted their children to stray from faith.
Determined to protect their families from such spiritual and cultural dangers, the Pilgrims left Plymouth, England, on 6 September 1620, sailing for a new world that offered the promise of both civil and religious liberty. After an arduous journey, they dropped anchor off the coast of what is now Massachusetts.
On 11 December 1620, prior to disembarking at Plymouth Rock, they signed the Mayflower Compact, America's original document of civil government. It was the first to introduce self-government, and the foundation on which the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were built. Governor William Bradford described the Compact as "a combination ... that when they came a shore they would use their owne libertie; for none had power to command them."
Upon landing, the Pilgrims conducted a prayer service and quickly turned to building shelters. Under harrowing conditions, the colonists persisted through prayer and hard work, reaping a bountiful summer harvest. But their material prosperity soon evaporated, for the Pilgrims had erred in acquiescing to their European investors' demands for a financial arrangement holding all crops and property in common, in order to return an agreed-to half to their overseas backers.
By 1623, however, Plymouth Colony was near failure as a result of famine, blight and drought, as well as excessive taxation and what amounted to forced collectivization.
In desperation, the Pilgrims set a day for prayers of repentance; God answered, delivering a gentle rainfall by evening. Bradford's diary recounts how the colonists repented in action: "At length, after much debate of things, the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) gave way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to themselves; in all other things to go in the general way as before. And so assigned to every family a parcel of land, according to the proportion of their number."
Property ownership and families freely laboring on their own behalf replaced the "common store," but only after their ill-advised experiment with communism nearly wiped out the entire settlement.
In their simple representative government, born out of dedication to religious freedom, the Pilgrims replaced the rule of men -- with its arbitrary justice administered capriciously at the whim of rulers who favor some at the expense of others -- with the rule of law, treating individuals equally. Yet even these "freedom men" strayed under straits. So could we, if we revert to materialistic government reliance instead of grateful obedience to God. Sadly, we're a long way down that path already.
Closing his farewell address in 1989, Ronald Reagan asked, "And how stands the city on this winter night?" Contemplating our blessings of liberty this Thanksgiving, nearly 20 years after President Reagan left office and 20 generations past the Pilgrims' experience, how stands the city on our watch?
- Samuel Adams
Pilgrims Regress by Mark Alexander
In the aftermath of a momentous election, an election sure to change the course of our nation, it is tempting to despair. On this Thanksgiving, though, let us resist that powerful temptation and instead take stock of the blessings of liberty.
President Ronald Reagan often cited the Pilgrims who celebrated the first Thanksgiving as our forebears who charted the path of American freedom. He made frequent reference to John Winthrop's "shining city upon a hill."
As Reagan explained, "The phrase comes from John Winthrop, who wrote it to describe the America he imagined. What he imagined was important because he was an early Pilgrim, an early freedom man. He journeyed here on what today we'd call a little wooden boat; and like the other Pilgrims, he was looking for a home that would be free."
Who were these "freedom men," and how did they eventually blaze the path of true liberty? They were Calvinist Protestants who rejected the institutional Church of England, believing that worshipping God must originate freely in the individual soul, without coercion. Suffering persecution and imprisonment in England for their beliefs, a group of these separatists fled to Holland in 1608. There, they found spiritual liberty in the midst of a disjointed economy that failed to provide adequate compensation for their labors, and a dissolute, degraded, corrupt culture that tempted their children to stray from faith.
Determined to protect their families from such spiritual and cultural dangers, the Pilgrims left Plymouth, England, on 6 September 1620, sailing for a new world that offered the promise of both civil and religious liberty. After an arduous journey, they dropped anchor off the coast of what is now Massachusetts.
On 11 December 1620, prior to disembarking at Plymouth Rock, they signed the Mayflower Compact, America's original document of civil government. It was the first to introduce self-government, and the foundation on which the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were built. Governor William Bradford described the Compact as "a combination ... that when they came a shore they would use their owne libertie; for none had power to command them."
Upon landing, the Pilgrims conducted a prayer service and quickly turned to building shelters. Under harrowing conditions, the colonists persisted through prayer and hard work, reaping a bountiful summer harvest. But their material prosperity soon evaporated, for the Pilgrims had erred in acquiescing to their European investors' demands for a financial arrangement holding all crops and property in common, in order to return an agreed-to half to their overseas backers.
By 1623, however, Plymouth Colony was near failure as a result of famine, blight and drought, as well as excessive taxation and what amounted to forced collectivization.
In desperation, the Pilgrims set a day for prayers of repentance; God answered, delivering a gentle rainfall by evening. Bradford's diary recounts how the colonists repented in action: "At length, after much debate of things, the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) gave way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to themselves; in all other things to go in the general way as before. And so assigned to every family a parcel of land, according to the proportion of their number."
Property ownership and families freely laboring on their own behalf replaced the "common store," but only after their ill-advised experiment with communism nearly wiped out the entire settlement.
In their simple representative government, born out of dedication to religious freedom, the Pilgrims replaced the rule of men -- with its arbitrary justice administered capriciously at the whim of rulers who favor some at the expense of others -- with the rule of law, treating individuals equally. Yet even these "freedom men" strayed under straits. So could we, if we revert to materialistic government reliance instead of grateful obedience to God. Sadly, we're a long way down that path already.
Closing his farewell address in 1989, Ronald Reagan asked, "And how stands the city on this winter night?" Contemplating our blessings of liberty this Thanksgiving, nearly 20 years after President Reagan left office and 20 generations past the Pilgrims' experience, how stands the city on our watch?
Twitter comes of age reporting on Mumbai attacks by Roderick Jones
The micro-blogging service Twitter has been providing updates to the attacks in Mumbai.
Link to Twitter feed.
Some of the commentary and links are off-base but it is a fascinating view into how the 'crowd' can monitor and report on real-time events. For example, there is a link posted to a 'google doc' spreadsheet listing known casualties. Link here.
Terrorist attacks may remain disturbingly similar but the way they are reported and examined changes in step with the rapid pace of virtualization.
Link to Twitter feed.
Some of the commentary and links are off-base but it is a fascinating view into how the 'crowd' can monitor and report on real-time events. For example, there is a link posted to a 'google doc' spreadsheet listing known casualties. Link here.
Terrorist attacks may remain disturbingly similar but the way they are reported and examined changes in step with the rapid pace of virtualization.
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Danger Room Debrief: How to do Defense, When the Money's Gone
This is the fifth of our Wired Danger Room Debriefs, where we ask smart folks in the military, intelligence, and homeland defense fields to outline some under-the-radar security issues -- and point the way towards potential, often-unorthodox solutions.
John Robb, a software entrepreneur and former Air Force special operations pilot. He is the author of Brave New War.
The current global economic and financial meltdown may yet become something worse: a protracted global depression. As with the last century's Depression, which spawned fascism and WWII, it could recast the world at a fundamental level. As such, it may soon represent our biggest security challenge in over 50 years. Here's what a global depression means:
* A proliferation of hollow nation-states globally. Rampant financial bankruptcy -- the double digit percentage growth in the U.S. national debt late this year bode danger here. Entrenched corruption -- think government employees unused to financial deprivation not getting paid except by graft. An inability to govern territory and a general loss of legitimacy. A global swiss cheese effect from Mexico to Pakistan, where thousands of small holes in the global security system appear with rapidity.
* A rapid increase in the number and power of criminal guerilla groups that will challenge nation-states. These groups will flourish within the ungoverned spaces that emerge, particularly in urban areas and even within the U.S. The combination of access to global markets, rapidly improving technology, and new methods of warfare mean that these groups will be ascendant militarily until successful strategies emerge to counter them.
* Worst of all, these criminal guerrilla groups (collectively known as global guerrillas) will be able to generate wealth via transnational criminal networks and control political services to local populations (through both disruption and parasitically draining national infrastructures), gaining legitimacy that nation-states will not be able to provide. This means that these groups will not only emerge quickly, they will grow stronger over time.
Unfortunately, the U.S. will be forced to navigate this dangerous environment with a small fraction of its former resources. The endless defense budgets of the last century are gone. Which means the development of the new strategies -- not new gear -- to fight this chaotic and complex panoply of non-state foes will become the seminal security challenge of our time.
Can it be accomplished? It remains to be seen whether a transition from the legacy mindset of 20th Century defense to the new environment can be accomplished. The array of financial incentives, political interests, and bureaucratic inertia arrayed against it are staggering.
Signs that we are on the right track include:
1. A radical reduction in hideously-expensive weapons systems and dreams of automated warfare (i.e. the Future Combat System), geared towards fighting an increasingly-unikely great power war.
2. A rapid increase in investments geared towards improving nation-state legitimacy. We need an array of technologies and processes that both support the construction of resilient communities. And we need the means to train, manage, and control (or punish, if the need arises) the militias/paramilitaries that will blanket the global landscape.
3. A move towards much more flexible military platforms and systems that can be rapidly configured to provide tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.
What does a flexible military platform mean? Due to budget constraints, we are going to see a much greater reliance on civilian hardware, software, and standards of interconnectivity. To prevent chaos from the influx of off the shelf hardware and software, the military will need to develop platforms that enable all of this externally derived hardware/software to interconnect and act synergistically. Further, with this platform in place, these technologies can be rapidly and inexpensively stitched together through ad hoc systems design to precisely meets the needs of the emerging situation to generate success.
Here's an example of ad hoc systems design. Let's say there's a perceived need by a deployed unit to track interactions with local militias (dozens are operating in its area). Rather than wait years for a centralized solution, the unit builds a simple Web application that operates in a way similar to a civilian sales tracking application (in fact, many of the components used are from the civilian sector). This new system is quick to deploy and it allows the unit to capture data on every interaction with militia members and track progress. If the system used simple Internet standards for data sharing, the system can be updated, connected, extended, and shared very easily. In an age of scarcity, that's the approach we have to take.
John Robb, a software entrepreneur and former Air Force special operations pilot. He is the author of Brave New War.
The current global economic and financial meltdown may yet become something worse: a protracted global depression. As with the last century's Depression, which spawned fascism and WWII, it could recast the world at a fundamental level. As such, it may soon represent our biggest security challenge in over 50 years. Here's what a global depression means:
* A proliferation of hollow nation-states globally. Rampant financial bankruptcy -- the double digit percentage growth in the U.S. national debt late this year bode danger here. Entrenched corruption -- think government employees unused to financial deprivation not getting paid except by graft. An inability to govern territory and a general loss of legitimacy. A global swiss cheese effect from Mexico to Pakistan, where thousands of small holes in the global security system appear with rapidity.
* A rapid increase in the number and power of criminal guerilla groups that will challenge nation-states. These groups will flourish within the ungoverned spaces that emerge, particularly in urban areas and even within the U.S. The combination of access to global markets, rapidly improving technology, and new methods of warfare mean that these groups will be ascendant militarily until successful strategies emerge to counter them.
* Worst of all, these criminal guerrilla groups (collectively known as global guerrillas) will be able to generate wealth via transnational criminal networks and control political services to local populations (through both disruption and parasitically draining national infrastructures), gaining legitimacy that nation-states will not be able to provide. This means that these groups will not only emerge quickly, they will grow stronger over time.
Unfortunately, the U.S. will be forced to navigate this dangerous environment with a small fraction of its former resources. The endless defense budgets of the last century are gone. Which means the development of the new strategies -- not new gear -- to fight this chaotic and complex panoply of non-state foes will become the seminal security challenge of our time.
Can it be accomplished? It remains to be seen whether a transition from the legacy mindset of 20th Century defense to the new environment can be accomplished. The array of financial incentives, political interests, and bureaucratic inertia arrayed against it are staggering.
Signs that we are on the right track include:
1. A radical reduction in hideously-expensive weapons systems and dreams of automated warfare (i.e. the Future Combat System), geared towards fighting an increasingly-unikely great power war.
2. A rapid increase in investments geared towards improving nation-state legitimacy. We need an array of technologies and processes that both support the construction of resilient communities. And we need the means to train, manage, and control (or punish, if the need arises) the militias/paramilitaries that will blanket the global landscape.
3. A move towards much more flexible military platforms and systems that can be rapidly configured to provide tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.
What does a flexible military platform mean? Due to budget constraints, we are going to see a much greater reliance on civilian hardware, software, and standards of interconnectivity. To prevent chaos from the influx of off the shelf hardware and software, the military will need to develop platforms that enable all of this externally derived hardware/software to interconnect and act synergistically. Further, with this platform in place, these technologies can be rapidly and inexpensively stitched together through ad hoc systems design to precisely meets the needs of the emerging situation to generate success.
Here's an example of ad hoc systems design. Let's say there's a perceived need by a deployed unit to track interactions with local militias (dozens are operating in its area). Rather than wait years for a centralized solution, the unit builds a simple Web application that operates in a way similar to a civilian sales tracking application (in fact, many of the components used are from the civilian sector). This new system is quick to deploy and it allows the unit to capture data on every interaction with militia members and track progress. If the system used simple Internet standards for data sharing, the system can be updated, connected, extended, and shared very easily. In an age of scarcity, that's the approach we have to take.
Frustrated Claims of Pro-Obama Media Bias... This Time From Al-Qaida by Evan Kohlmann
Global reactions to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's controversial condemnation of U.S. President-Elect Barack Obama as a "House Slave" (or, alternatively, "House Negro") have begun to pour in -- including via the top jihad web forums used by Al-Qaida to disseminate its propaganda. Though hardcore Al-Qaida supporters have predictably dismissed any criticism of Dr. al-Zawahiri and are fiercely backing his choice of words, there is a rather ironic (if not entirely unfamiliar) twist to this issue. After observing international press reporting on the incident, these same supporters are now bitterly attacking the media for its "unfair" pro-Obama bias and for deliberately "confusing" the meaning of al-Zawahiri's message.
In related news, Zawahiri's audio statement also appears to have created a palpable, tense confrontation between Al-Qaida and a significant cross-section of African-American Muslims. Several U.S.-based Muslim organizations immediately held press conferences or issued statements to strongly criticize al-Zawahiri and his manipulation of the words of the late Malcolm X. Conversely, these conferences and statements of response have not gone over well within the jihadi community, with some Arabic-speaking commentators issuing angry rants about the apparent treachery of American Muslims, including specifically the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). One Al-Qaida supporter cautioned his quarrelsome online colleagues, "Brothers, this does not apply to all American Muslims. Do not forget our brother [Adam] Yehiye Gadahn, a naturalized Muslim and U.S. citizen."
In related news, Zawahiri's audio statement also appears to have created a palpable, tense confrontation between Al-Qaida and a significant cross-section of African-American Muslims. Several U.S.-based Muslim organizations immediately held press conferences or issued statements to strongly criticize al-Zawahiri and his manipulation of the words of the late Malcolm X. Conversely, these conferences and statements of response have not gone over well within the jihadi community, with some Arabic-speaking commentators issuing angry rants about the apparent treachery of American Muslims, including specifically the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). One Al-Qaida supporter cautioned his quarrelsome online colleagues, "Brothers, this does not apply to all American Muslims. Do not forget our brother [Adam] Yehiye Gadahn, a naturalized Muslim and U.S. citizen."
Violence by Extremists in the Jewish Settler Movement: A Rising Challenge by Matthew Levitt and Becca Wasser
Thirteen years after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli security officials are expressing heightened concern that a new wave of violent extremism among fringe elements in the Jewish settler movement threatens not only Palestinian civilians, but also Israeli national security and the future of any potential peace diplomacy.
Recent Trends in Violence by a Settler Fringe
The vast majority of the approximately 300,000 Israelis living in West Bank settlements are law-abiding citizens. An extremist fringe element within the settler movement, however, has been responsible for a substantial increase in violent incidents. According to a November 2008 report by Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot, security officials recorded 675 cases of violent activity perpetrated by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and Israeli security forces from January to November 2008. These incidents include assault, causing damage to property, trespassing, violating orders, using a weapon, and "causing death."
Prosecutors opened 515 of these criminal cases so far this year, an increase of 11 percent from 2007. Of these, 13 involved what the newspaper termed "left wing anarchists," while 502 involved "right wing radicals." The majority of alleged perpetrators were adults with no prior criminal record and were not, as widely assumed, teenagers. Of these, 197 people were jailed and 105 indictments filed, compared to 61 in 2007. Israeli officials are disturbed by the focus on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel involved in dismantling settlement outposts; at times, they are being attacked or held at knifepoint.
This violence appears to be part of a deliberate campaign by a committed core of fringe settlers to prevent the dismantlement of settlements and outposts. They are using a strategy called the "price tag," which is a retaliation for government efforts challenging the settlement enterprise in the West Bank. Largely perpetrated by members of the "hilltop youth" -- a loosely organized group of belligerent young settlers -- this tactic attempts to pin down troops in various locations by blocking traffic, setting fields on fire, throwing rocks, and other acts of small-scale violence against local Palestinians and members of the Israeli security forces.
The price-tag strategy concerns Israeli authorities, since it encourages the radical fringe to take the law into its own hands, as demonstrated by the reprisal on the Palestinian village of Asira al-Qibliya on September 13. Riled by the stabbing of a young boy during a botched robbery in their settlement, about 150 Jewish settlers from Yitzhar stormed the village, damaged and set fire to property, and shot Palestinian residents. The raid's violence and lawlessness shocked Israeli leaders; Prime Minister Ehud Olmert condemned the attack as a "pogrom." More ominously, Israeli Security Agency (ISA or Shin Bet) chief Yuval Diskin has warned the cabinet that the radical fringe perceives the price-tag policy as successful and that the group is threatening to expand the use of violence outside the West Bank.
Pipe Bomb Attack
The September 25 pipe bomb attack on Israeli professor and prominent peace activist Zeev Sternhell outside his Jerusalem home suggests that some extremists may already be engaging in price-tag attacks in Israel proper. Although Rabin's assassin was a lone gunman acting on the extremist ideology of unorganized fellow travelers, the Sternhell attack appears to have been the result of an organized group of right-wing extremists seeking to incite like-minded individuals to action.
According to Israeli public security minister Avi Dichter, the bombing was believed to be an ideologically motivated terrorist act perpetrated by radical Jewish extremists intent on killing Sternhell. In Sternhell's neighborhood, investigators found pamphlets, signed the "Army of Liberators," offering 1.1 million shekels (roughly $320,000) to anyone who kills a member of Peace Now, a left-wing Israeli group. The pamphlet stated, "The State of Israel, our 2000-year-old dream, has become a nightmare. This country is ruled by a mob of wicked people, haters of the Torah who want to erase the laws of God. . . The state of Israel has become our enemy. . . The time has come to set up a state of Jewish law in Judea and Samaria. The time has come for the Kingdom of Judea."
The pamphlet echoes long-stated fringe propaganda, but Israeli security officials fear it represents an extremist threat that has evolved since the days of the Temple Mount Underground (a Jewish terrorist group that plotted to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque in the early 1980s). Although the perpetrators of this attack have not been identified, security forces state that a new, organized Jewish underground may be responsible for the bombing and could be planning additional strikes.
A Rising Threat
The threat of violent extremism among the fringes of the settler movement tends to be cyclical, based closely on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and unilateral Israeli government efforts to dismantle settlements and outposts. For example, the Yediot Aharonot article noted that the ISA recorded 300 strands of intelligence relating to extremist threats on people or public institutions during the July 2000 peace talks at Camp David, when Jerusalem was a centerpiece of negotiations. The number of such threats fell to 100 in the year after the Camp David talks, but in 2005, with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza looming, the number rose again to 150. Authorities have not indicated how many possible threats they face today, but Diskin has assessed that the fringe elements are "preparing for war."
While violent extremism among the fringe of the settler movement is not a new phenomenon, Israeli authorities state that the most recent threat represents a new dynamic. According to Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, head of the IDF Central Command, the number of settlers willing to use violence against the state has grown exponentially, from a handful to hundreds. According to General Shamni, "In the past, only a few dozen individuals were implicated in [attacks against Palestinians and Israeli soldiers]. Today, we are talking about several hundred people -- a very significant change." General Shamni warns that "an extreme incident could happen at any time. These people are conspiring against the Palestinians and against the [Israeli] security forces."
Following the experience of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip -- Hamas's subsequent electoral victory, its military takeover of Gaza, and its use of northern Gaza as a launchpad for mortar and rocket attacks against southern Israel -- Israeli officials fear that the lesson learned by these fringe extremists in the settler movement is that withdrawal from any West Bank hilltop or community must bear a significant cost, or price tag, for Israeli security forces, decisionmakers, and those, like Sternhell, who support such policies. Shamni, for example, cited recent cases in which the radicals sicced a dog on an Israeli reserve commander, broke a deputy battalion commander's arm, and slashed the tires of reservist vehicles.
The outgoing Israeli government has recently spoken out against the rising violence, with Olmert stating, "An evil wind of extremism, of hate, of maliciousness, of violence, of losing control, of lawbreaking, of contempt for the institutions of state, is passing through certain sections of the Israeli public." Although the extent to which this violence represents the beginning of a new Jewish extremist underground is uncertain, the Shin Bet found "a very high willingness [among radicals]. . . to use violence -- not just stones, but live weapons -- in order to prevent or halt a diplomatic process."
Conclusion
In relative terms, the violence perpetrated by radical elements among the Jewish settler movement pales in comparison to the well-orchestrated, highly public, popularly supported lethal attacks of radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This fringe group of Jewish extremists has so far not carried out a fatal terrorist attack, while Islamist groups have killed hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians. Perhaps most importantly, the leaders of Israel's government and society repudiate these Jewish extremists, whereas Islamist groups are celebrated in popular media, supported by official institutions, and funded by governments throughout the Middle East.
This sense of proportionality, however, does not obscure the fact that Israeli security officials are increasingly concerned about the trajectory of recent events. This concern points to the substantial increase in the organization of the extremist elements within the settler movement and their willingness to use force to advance their goals. With the likelihood of Israeli-Palestinian reengagement in early 2009, Israeli security officials will surely devote additional attention and much-needed manpower to this potential threat.
Recent Trends in Violence by a Settler Fringe
The vast majority of the approximately 300,000 Israelis living in West Bank settlements are law-abiding citizens. An extremist fringe element within the settler movement, however, has been responsible for a substantial increase in violent incidents. According to a November 2008 report by Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot, security officials recorded 675 cases of violent activity perpetrated by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and Israeli security forces from January to November 2008. These incidents include assault, causing damage to property, trespassing, violating orders, using a weapon, and "causing death."
Prosecutors opened 515 of these criminal cases so far this year, an increase of 11 percent from 2007. Of these, 13 involved what the newspaper termed "left wing anarchists," while 502 involved "right wing radicals." The majority of alleged perpetrators were adults with no prior criminal record and were not, as widely assumed, teenagers. Of these, 197 people were jailed and 105 indictments filed, compared to 61 in 2007. Israeli officials are disturbed by the focus on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel involved in dismantling settlement outposts; at times, they are being attacked or held at knifepoint.
This violence appears to be part of a deliberate campaign by a committed core of fringe settlers to prevent the dismantlement of settlements and outposts. They are using a strategy called the "price tag," which is a retaliation for government efforts challenging the settlement enterprise in the West Bank. Largely perpetrated by members of the "hilltop youth" -- a loosely organized group of belligerent young settlers -- this tactic attempts to pin down troops in various locations by blocking traffic, setting fields on fire, throwing rocks, and other acts of small-scale violence against local Palestinians and members of the Israeli security forces.
The price-tag strategy concerns Israeli authorities, since it encourages the radical fringe to take the law into its own hands, as demonstrated by the reprisal on the Palestinian village of Asira al-Qibliya on September 13. Riled by the stabbing of a young boy during a botched robbery in their settlement, about 150 Jewish settlers from Yitzhar stormed the village, damaged and set fire to property, and shot Palestinian residents. The raid's violence and lawlessness shocked Israeli leaders; Prime Minister Ehud Olmert condemned the attack as a "pogrom." More ominously, Israeli Security Agency (ISA or Shin Bet) chief Yuval Diskin has warned the cabinet that the radical fringe perceives the price-tag policy as successful and that the group is threatening to expand the use of violence outside the West Bank.
Pipe Bomb Attack
The September 25 pipe bomb attack on Israeli professor and prominent peace activist Zeev Sternhell outside his Jerusalem home suggests that some extremists may already be engaging in price-tag attacks in Israel proper. Although Rabin's assassin was a lone gunman acting on the extremist ideology of unorganized fellow travelers, the Sternhell attack appears to have been the result of an organized group of right-wing extremists seeking to incite like-minded individuals to action.
According to Israeli public security minister Avi Dichter, the bombing was believed to be an ideologically motivated terrorist act perpetrated by radical Jewish extremists intent on killing Sternhell. In Sternhell's neighborhood, investigators found pamphlets, signed the "Army of Liberators," offering 1.1 million shekels (roughly $320,000) to anyone who kills a member of Peace Now, a left-wing Israeli group. The pamphlet stated, "The State of Israel, our 2000-year-old dream, has become a nightmare. This country is ruled by a mob of wicked people, haters of the Torah who want to erase the laws of God. . . The state of Israel has become our enemy. . . The time has come to set up a state of Jewish law in Judea and Samaria. The time has come for the Kingdom of Judea."
The pamphlet echoes long-stated fringe propaganda, but Israeli security officials fear it represents an extremist threat that has evolved since the days of the Temple Mount Underground (a Jewish terrorist group that plotted to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque in the early 1980s). Although the perpetrators of this attack have not been identified, security forces state that a new, organized Jewish underground may be responsible for the bombing and could be planning additional strikes.
A Rising Threat
The threat of violent extremism among the fringes of the settler movement tends to be cyclical, based closely on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and unilateral Israeli government efforts to dismantle settlements and outposts. For example, the Yediot Aharonot article noted that the ISA recorded 300 strands of intelligence relating to extremist threats on people or public institutions during the July 2000 peace talks at Camp David, when Jerusalem was a centerpiece of negotiations. The number of such threats fell to 100 in the year after the Camp David talks, but in 2005, with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza looming, the number rose again to 150. Authorities have not indicated how many possible threats they face today, but Diskin has assessed that the fringe elements are "preparing for war."
While violent extremism among the fringe of the settler movement is not a new phenomenon, Israeli authorities state that the most recent threat represents a new dynamic. According to Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, head of the IDF Central Command, the number of settlers willing to use violence against the state has grown exponentially, from a handful to hundreds. According to General Shamni, "In the past, only a few dozen individuals were implicated in [attacks against Palestinians and Israeli soldiers]. Today, we are talking about several hundred people -- a very significant change." General Shamni warns that "an extreme incident could happen at any time. These people are conspiring against the Palestinians and against the [Israeli] security forces."
Following the experience of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip -- Hamas's subsequent electoral victory, its military takeover of Gaza, and its use of northern Gaza as a launchpad for mortar and rocket attacks against southern Israel -- Israeli officials fear that the lesson learned by these fringe extremists in the settler movement is that withdrawal from any West Bank hilltop or community must bear a significant cost, or price tag, for Israeli security forces, decisionmakers, and those, like Sternhell, who support such policies. Shamni, for example, cited recent cases in which the radicals sicced a dog on an Israeli reserve commander, broke a deputy battalion commander's arm, and slashed the tires of reservist vehicles.
The outgoing Israeli government has recently spoken out against the rising violence, with Olmert stating, "An evil wind of extremism, of hate, of maliciousness, of violence, of losing control, of lawbreaking, of contempt for the institutions of state, is passing through certain sections of the Israeli public." Although the extent to which this violence represents the beginning of a new Jewish extremist underground is uncertain, the Shin Bet found "a very high willingness [among radicals]. . . to use violence -- not just stones, but live weapons -- in order to prevent or halt a diplomatic process."
Conclusion
In relative terms, the violence perpetrated by radical elements among the Jewish settler movement pales in comparison to the well-orchestrated, highly public, popularly supported lethal attacks of radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This fringe group of Jewish extremists has so far not carried out a fatal terrorist attack, while Islamist groups have killed hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians. Perhaps most importantly, the leaders of Israel's government and society repudiate these Jewish extremists, whereas Islamist groups are celebrated in popular media, supported by official institutions, and funded by governments throughout the Middle East.
This sense of proportionality, however, does not obscure the fact that Israeli security officials are increasingly concerned about the trajectory of recent events. This concern points to the substantial increase in the organization of the extremist elements within the settler movement and their willingness to use force to advance their goals. With the likelihood of Israeli-Palestinian reengagement in early 2009, Israeli security officials will surely devote additional attention and much-needed manpower to this potential threat.
Sunday, November 23, 2008
Will Demand for Solar Homes Pick Up? by Adam Aston
As global financial markets melted down in October, Congress handed a gift to America's green energy industry: It renewed and broadened a set of tax credits for wind and solar power, geothermal, tidal energy, and more. The move did little to prop up eco-energy stocks, which have followed oil prices down. But the news did send a positive jolt to one of the economy's darkest sectors: homebuilding. Or, more specifically, solar-powered homes. Consumers recognize that green homes "save money month in, month out," says Rick Andreen, president of Shea Homes Active Lifestyles Communities in Scottsdale, Ariz.
Most of the sweeteners Congress conjured up will go to big projects such as wind farms. But aspiring buyers of green homes will benefit, too. The revised 30% one-time investment credit for solar means that a buyer who installs a typical $25,000 solar panel system on his roof will get $7,500 in income tax credits, up from $2,000 under the old standard. How long that investment takes to pay off will depend on local rules and utility rates. In markets with the most costly power, such as California, Connecticut, and New Jersey, the pretax compound rate of return on a typical home solar system will be better than 15% per year, says Andy Black, chief executive of OnGrid Solar, an industry research firm.
The fresh credits may mark a turning point for solar-powered homes. During the housing boom, when mortgages and energy were both cheap, green power was not a hot option; typical home buyers preferred granite countertops to solar panels. But even before the subprime crash, builders began to see rising interest in sun-powered dwellings. Ryness Co., which compiles sales data for homebuilders, found in a recent survey that homes with solar systems were outselling others by as much as 2:1 in 13 California communities.
Today there are about 40,000 solar homes in the U.S., but that number is set to spike. Shea is adding solar to communities planned for Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington State. And, responding to a shift in buyers' attitudes, big builders such as Centex (CTX), Lennar (LEN), Pulte Homes (PHM), and Woodside Homes are following suit. Consider Whitney Ranch, a development south of Sacramento. Sales there softened in the housing downturn, says Kathryn Boyce, an executive at Hanley Wood Market Intelligence. But when Standard Pacific Homes (SPF) put solar systems on a group of new models in the development, they sold out. The builder then decided to install panels on all 304 of the homes.
The appeal of solar homes could grow as the economic outlook worsens. The more utility bills cut into household reserves, "the more consumers recognize the value of efficiency," says Robert W. Hammon, principal of ConSol, a green building consulting firm. And there's growing consumer awareness that solar homes appreciate faster than ordinary dwellings. They also resell for a premium of up to 5%.
According to Ben Hoen, a researcher at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory who studies the effects of eco-features on real estate values, more homeowners now see solar panels as a long-term asset. Mortgage lenders, however, have been slow to make that link. The loan processes at Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) don't give special treatment to buyers who make improvements to lower utility bills, says Shea's Andreen. Builders wish lenders would start to take stock of eco-features. "Solar panels free up household cash flow," Andreen says. "Lenders should recognize that.
Most of the sweeteners Congress conjured up will go to big projects such as wind farms. But aspiring buyers of green homes will benefit, too. The revised 30% one-time investment credit for solar means that a buyer who installs a typical $25,000 solar panel system on his roof will get $7,500 in income tax credits, up from $2,000 under the old standard. How long that investment takes to pay off will depend on local rules and utility rates. In markets with the most costly power, such as California, Connecticut, and New Jersey, the pretax compound rate of return on a typical home solar system will be better than 15% per year, says Andy Black, chief executive of OnGrid Solar, an industry research firm.
The fresh credits may mark a turning point for solar-powered homes. During the housing boom, when mortgages and energy were both cheap, green power was not a hot option; typical home buyers preferred granite countertops to solar panels. But even before the subprime crash, builders began to see rising interest in sun-powered dwellings. Ryness Co., which compiles sales data for homebuilders, found in a recent survey that homes with solar systems were outselling others by as much as 2:1 in 13 California communities.
Today there are about 40,000 solar homes in the U.S., but that number is set to spike. Shea is adding solar to communities planned for Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington State. And, responding to a shift in buyers' attitudes, big builders such as Centex (CTX), Lennar (LEN), Pulte Homes (PHM), and Woodside Homes are following suit. Consider Whitney Ranch, a development south of Sacramento. Sales there softened in the housing downturn, says Kathryn Boyce, an executive at Hanley Wood Market Intelligence. But when Standard Pacific Homes (SPF) put solar systems on a group of new models in the development, they sold out. The builder then decided to install panels on all 304 of the homes.
The appeal of solar homes could grow as the economic outlook worsens. The more utility bills cut into household reserves, "the more consumers recognize the value of efficiency," says Robert W. Hammon, principal of ConSol, a green building consulting firm. And there's growing consumer awareness that solar homes appreciate faster than ordinary dwellings. They also resell for a premium of up to 5%.
According to Ben Hoen, a researcher at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory who studies the effects of eco-features on real estate values, more homeowners now see solar panels as a long-term asset. Mortgage lenders, however, have been slow to make that link. The loan processes at Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) don't give special treatment to buyers who make improvements to lower utility bills, says Shea's Andreen. Builders wish lenders would start to take stock of eco-features. "Solar panels free up household cash flow," Andreen says. "Lenders should recognize that.
Investigative Project and Senator Pushes DOJ on Islamists
The Department of Justice (DOJ) should cut off outreach efforts with organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist extremist groups, a report from a ranking Senate subcommittee member recommends.
"Justice Denied: Waste & Mismanagement at the Department of Justice," is an 86-page report issued in October by the office of U.S. Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), the ranking Republican on the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security.
The report generated attention for its criticism of the millions of dollars spent annually to send DOJ officials on junkets in luxury resorts such as Palm Springs, Cal. and Hawaii. And it noted that law enforcement officials routinely advise Hollywood producers in television and film projects without seeking compensation for their agencies.
But just as important is its detailing of DOJ outreach with questionable Islamist organizations, including two which are unindicted co-conspirators in a major Hamas support investigation. Those efforts should stop, the report said:
"It is the legal right and obligation of DOJ to bar, withhold or rescind funding for or collaboration with any entities that do not advance the mission of the Department, which is the security and stability of the United States, including its culture, its people, and its form of government."
In a letter contained in the report, Coburn said the investigation was not meant to target DOJ employees, but rather to identify problems for Department leaders to address:
"This report highlights numerous instances of millions of taxpayer dollars thrown at duplicative programs marred by waste, abuse, and lack of accountability. If this problem is ignored, the safety of our nation will be placed further in serious peril as we continue to spend recklessly without demanding results, while failing to support programs with demonstrated and effective outcomes."
Coburn has been focused on issues of Islamist outreach. In July, he and Arizona U.S. Sen. Jon Kyl wrote to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, asking that State set a deadline for cutting off funding to organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The letter also asked that procedures be created to prevent future funding of such groups.
In 2007, Coburn pushed an amendment to the FY 2008 Commerce, Justice and Science Appropriations bill which barred DOJ from underwriting any conferences with organizations identified "as an unindicted co-conspirator by the federal government in any criminal prosecution." The Senate passed the provision but when the Senate and House of Representatives met to create one final bill, it was taken out.
The Coburn report on DOJ singles out the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Both are unindicted co-conspirators in the Hamas support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five former officials. CAIR and ISNA appear in prosecution exhibits involving the Palestine Committee, a group created by the Muslim Brotherhood to help Hamas. CAIR actually is listed as a committee member, as are the group's co-founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad. ISNA is listed among friendly organizations.
The report notes what it calls an "alarming" agenda for the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. It was written by another Palestine Committee member, Mohamed Akram, in 1991 in a document called "the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America." In the memo, Akram defined the group's role in America as "a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions."
CAIR officials appear in other exhibits, adding to the concern, the report said:
"According to court documents, CAIR chairman Omar Ahmad mediated a financial dispute involving the HLF over funding for Hamas founder Sheik Jamil Hamami. CAIR was co-founded by Rafeeq Jaber who was also the president of the American Muslim Society, a group listed in the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood memorandum to carry out the 'civilization jihad' against the U.S.
Despite these concerns, DOJ has funded and supported CAIR on a number of occasions..."
DOJ's involvement with ISNA was deeper, including its 2007 co-sponsorship of ISNA's national convention. DOJ participated over the objections of some of its own lawyers, the report said. The Labor Day weekend gathering came just a few months after the release of the HLF unindicted co-conspirator list that includes ISNA. DOJ has declined to disclose how much the sponsorship cost. It does acknowledge having staff present at informational booths at past ISNA conventions.
It cited an e-mail from Susana Lorenzo-Giguere, acting deputy chief of DOJ's Voting Rights Division, who touted the event as "an important outreach opportunity, and a chance to reach a community that is at once very much discriminated against, and very wary of the national government and its willingness to protect them."
Participating in the convention represented "a great step forward to break through those barriers. And Chicago is lovely this time of year," Lorenzo-Giguere wrote.
But the report notes DOJ officials put themselves in an awkward position in participating in a convention in which one session was entitled "Ending U.S. Sponsored Torture: A Concern for All People of Faith:"
"The Justice Department is responsible for enforcing the federal law against torture and for signing off on the legality and constitutionality of interrogation techniques, and yet the Department sponsored an event that was accusing the U.S. of having an official government policy of abuse and ‘sponsored torture.'"
The report notes that DOJ stayed away from ISNA's 2008 convention. DOJ has not responded to the recommendations concerning Islamist outreach efforts.
Read the relevant excerpts here. Or, you can read the full report here.
"Justice Denied: Waste & Mismanagement at the Department of Justice," is an 86-page report issued in October by the office of U.S. Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), the ranking Republican on the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security.
The report generated attention for its criticism of the millions of dollars spent annually to send DOJ officials on junkets in luxury resorts such as Palm Springs, Cal. and Hawaii. And it noted that law enforcement officials routinely advise Hollywood producers in television and film projects without seeking compensation for their agencies.
But just as important is its detailing of DOJ outreach with questionable Islamist organizations, including two which are unindicted co-conspirators in a major Hamas support investigation. Those efforts should stop, the report said:
"It is the legal right and obligation of DOJ to bar, withhold or rescind funding for or collaboration with any entities that do not advance the mission of the Department, which is the security and stability of the United States, including its culture, its people, and its form of government."
In a letter contained in the report, Coburn said the investigation was not meant to target DOJ employees, but rather to identify problems for Department leaders to address:
"This report highlights numerous instances of millions of taxpayer dollars thrown at duplicative programs marred by waste, abuse, and lack of accountability. If this problem is ignored, the safety of our nation will be placed further in serious peril as we continue to spend recklessly without demanding results, while failing to support programs with demonstrated and effective outcomes."
Coburn has been focused on issues of Islamist outreach. In July, he and Arizona U.S. Sen. Jon Kyl wrote to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, asking that State set a deadline for cutting off funding to organizations with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The letter also asked that procedures be created to prevent future funding of such groups.
In 2007, Coburn pushed an amendment to the FY 2008 Commerce, Justice and Science Appropriations bill which barred DOJ from underwriting any conferences with organizations identified "as an unindicted co-conspirator by the federal government in any criminal prosecution." The Senate passed the provision but when the Senate and House of Representatives met to create one final bill, it was taken out.
The Coburn report on DOJ singles out the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Both are unindicted co-conspirators in the Hamas support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five former officials. CAIR and ISNA appear in prosecution exhibits involving the Palestine Committee, a group created by the Muslim Brotherhood to help Hamas. CAIR actually is listed as a committee member, as are the group's co-founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad. ISNA is listed among friendly organizations.
The report notes what it calls an "alarming" agenda for the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. It was written by another Palestine Committee member, Mohamed Akram, in 1991 in a document called "the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America." In the memo, Akram defined the group's role in America as "a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging' its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions."
CAIR officials appear in other exhibits, adding to the concern, the report said:
"According to court documents, CAIR chairman Omar Ahmad mediated a financial dispute involving the HLF over funding for Hamas founder Sheik Jamil Hamami. CAIR was co-founded by Rafeeq Jaber who was also the president of the American Muslim Society, a group listed in the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood memorandum to carry out the 'civilization jihad' against the U.S.
Despite these concerns, DOJ has funded and supported CAIR on a number of occasions..."
DOJ's involvement with ISNA was deeper, including its 2007 co-sponsorship of ISNA's national convention. DOJ participated over the objections of some of its own lawyers, the report said. The Labor Day weekend gathering came just a few months after the release of the HLF unindicted co-conspirator list that includes ISNA. DOJ has declined to disclose how much the sponsorship cost. It does acknowledge having staff present at informational booths at past ISNA conventions.
It cited an e-mail from Susana Lorenzo-Giguere, acting deputy chief of DOJ's Voting Rights Division, who touted the event as "an important outreach opportunity, and a chance to reach a community that is at once very much discriminated against, and very wary of the national government and its willingness to protect them."
Participating in the convention represented "a great step forward to break through those barriers. And Chicago is lovely this time of year," Lorenzo-Giguere wrote.
But the report notes DOJ officials put themselves in an awkward position in participating in a convention in which one session was entitled "Ending U.S. Sponsored Torture: A Concern for All People of Faith:"
"The Justice Department is responsible for enforcing the federal law against torture and for signing off on the legality and constitutionality of interrogation techniques, and yet the Department sponsored an event that was accusing the U.S. of having an official government policy of abuse and ‘sponsored torture.'"
The report notes that DOJ stayed away from ISNA's 2008 convention. DOJ has not responded to the recommendations concerning Islamist outreach efforts.
Read the relevant excerpts here. Or, you can read the full report here.
CAIR: Big on the Gimmes by Investigative Project
When a golfer has a putt of a foot or less, it's considered can't miss - a "gimme" - in the parlance of the game.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations took a gimme Wednesday when it issued a statement condemning remarks from Al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In an 11-minute video, Zawahiri slurs President-Elect Barack Obama as a "House Negro."
CAIR's statement was out within hours, saying the organization "condemned threatening rhetoric and racial slurs contained in a new video by Ayman al-Zawahri and said Al-Qaeda's second-in-command does not speak for Muslims in this country or worldwide."
The statement continued:
"As Muslims and as Americans, we will never let terrorist groups or terror leaders falsely claim to represent us or our faith. The legitimate grievances of Muslims in many areas of the world can never serve as an excuse or a justification for attacks on civilian populations. We once again repudiate Al-Qaida's actions, rhetoric and worldview and re-state our condemnation of all forms of terrorism and religious extremism."
No reasonable person would quarrel with that. But it's not exactly going out on a limb. And it raises some key questions that are central to understanding what CAIR stands for.
For starters, just what are the "legitimate grievances" referenced in the release? How many of those grievances conflict with U.S. policies in Iran, Lebanon and Israel, including those that are expected to be continued by the President-elect?
And, if CAIR is so eager to condemn a statement from Al Qaeda, what meaning should be drawn from its stubborn refusal to condemn terrorism from the likes of Hizballah and Hamas or fatwas sanctioning attacks on American soldiers from a Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader?
CAIR has yet to utter a critical word about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, who has called suicide bombings "heroic martyrdom operations."
He issued a fatwa stating that Muslims killed fighting American forces in Iraq are martyrs. "Those killed fighting the American forces are martyrs given their good intentions since they consider these invading troops an enemy within their territories but without their will."
Britain won't let Qaradawi into the country due to his extremist rhetoric. But to CAIR officials, he is a scholar. That's what Hussam Ayloush said at a 2002 Orange County CAIR fundraiser:
"Several people were asking about the eligibility claim for CAIR. And according to many scholars including Yusuf Qaradawi, basically this is one of the venues of Zakat (charity) for your money as vis a vis basically educating about Islam in America and the West."
Over the years, CAIR officials have established a consistent pattern of providing squirrelly answers when challenged to condemn terrorist groups other than Al Qaeda:
* In a 2002 interview with the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, CAIR spokesman Ibrahim Hooper said questions about his organization's opinions about Hamas and Hizballah were part of "a game" pushed by "the extremist wing of the pro-Israel lobby." Hooper made it clear he wasn't playing: "We're not in the business of condemning."
* Asked in a May 27, 2003 deposition, "Do you support Hamas?" CAIR co-founder and Chairman Emeritus Omar Ahmad answered, "It depends. Qualify ‘support.'" Asked whether he had "ever taken a position with respect to… [Hamas'] ‘martyrdom attacks.'" Ahmad responded, "No."
* In 2005, then-CAIR Tampa spokesman Ahmed Bedier was asked about his organization's position toward the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. "We haven't published one," he said.
* This past August, CAIR spokesman Corey Saylor was pressed by David Lee Miller of Fox News to condemn Hamas and Hizballah. He wouldn't: Saylor: "I'm telling you in a very clear fashion – CAIR condemns terrorist acts, whoever commits them, wherever they commit them, whenever they commit them." Miller: "That's not the same thing as saying you condemn Hamas and you condemn Hizballah." Saylor: "Well I recognize that you don't like my answer to the question, but that's the answer to the question." Miller: "It's not no, it's not whether I like it or dislike it. I was asking whether or not you can sit here now and say - CAIR condemns Hamas or Hezbollah. If you don't want to, just say that. If that is a position your group doesn't take, I certainly accept that. I just want to understand what your answer is." Saylor: "The position that my group takes is that we condemn terrorism on a consistent, persistent basis, wherever it happens, whenever it happens."
The record makes it clear that this is not the case. CAIR makes sweeping statements about condemning the deaths of innocent civilians, but does not define what it considers innocent. It's a tone set from the top, as evidence from the Hamas - support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) shows.
Exhibits in evidence show CAIR is listed among members of the Palestine Committee, a group created by the Muslim Brotherhood to help Hamas. Omar Ahmad and fellow CAIR founder and Executive Director Nihad Awad appear as numbers 25 and 32 in this Palestine Committee telephone list. Ahmad is identified by his pseudonym of "Omar Yehya."
Awad publicly stated his support for Hamas over the secular PLO in 1994, six months after the Oslo Accords made the PLO the governing party in the new Palestinian Authority. His endorsement also came after he and Ahmad participated in a secret meeting of Hamas supporters in Philadelphia called to discuss ways to derail the peace initiative.
The Hamas charter calls for the destruction of Israel through terrorism and other violence. It also rejects out of hand any peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At a rally in New York six years later, Awad said "Our final destination is Palestine. They [the Jews] have been saying ‘next year to Jerusalem,' we say ‘next year to all Palestine.'
Consistent with that is Omar Ahmad's declaration during the Philadelphia meeting that the group's goal had to be kept secret from Americans:
"We've always demanded the 1948 territories," he said.
"Yes," replied an unidentified speaker. "But we don't say that publicly. You cannot say that publicly, in front of the Americans."
"No," Ahmad agreed, "We didn't say that to the Americans."
As noted, Ahmad and Awad remain prominent voices in CAIR leadership. So kudos to CAIR for condemning violence and offensive statements by Al Qaeda. Stretch that moral stand to other terrorist groups and people might take notice.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations took a gimme Wednesday when it issued a statement condemning remarks from Al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In an 11-minute video, Zawahiri slurs President-Elect Barack Obama as a "House Negro."
CAIR's statement was out within hours, saying the organization "condemned threatening rhetoric and racial slurs contained in a new video by Ayman al-Zawahri and said Al-Qaeda's second-in-command does not speak for Muslims in this country or worldwide."
The statement continued:
"As Muslims and as Americans, we will never let terrorist groups or terror leaders falsely claim to represent us or our faith. The legitimate grievances of Muslims in many areas of the world can never serve as an excuse or a justification for attacks on civilian populations. We once again repudiate Al-Qaida's actions, rhetoric and worldview and re-state our condemnation of all forms of terrorism and religious extremism."
No reasonable person would quarrel with that. But it's not exactly going out on a limb. And it raises some key questions that are central to understanding what CAIR stands for.
For starters, just what are the "legitimate grievances" referenced in the release? How many of those grievances conflict with U.S. policies in Iran, Lebanon and Israel, including those that are expected to be continued by the President-elect?
And, if CAIR is so eager to condemn a statement from Al Qaeda, what meaning should be drawn from its stubborn refusal to condemn terrorism from the likes of Hizballah and Hamas or fatwas sanctioning attacks on American soldiers from a Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader?
CAIR has yet to utter a critical word about Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, who has called suicide bombings "heroic martyrdom operations."
He issued a fatwa stating that Muslims killed fighting American forces in Iraq are martyrs. "Those killed fighting the American forces are martyrs given their good intentions since they consider these invading troops an enemy within their territories but without their will."
Britain won't let Qaradawi into the country due to his extremist rhetoric. But to CAIR officials, he is a scholar. That's what Hussam Ayloush said at a 2002 Orange County CAIR fundraiser:
"Several people were asking about the eligibility claim for CAIR. And according to many scholars including Yusuf Qaradawi, basically this is one of the venues of Zakat (charity) for your money as vis a vis basically educating about Islam in America and the West."
Over the years, CAIR officials have established a consistent pattern of providing squirrelly answers when challenged to condemn terrorist groups other than Al Qaeda:
* In a 2002 interview with the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, CAIR spokesman Ibrahim Hooper said questions about his organization's opinions about Hamas and Hizballah were part of "a game" pushed by "the extremist wing of the pro-Israel lobby." Hooper made it clear he wasn't playing: "We're not in the business of condemning."
* Asked in a May 27, 2003 deposition, "Do you support Hamas?" CAIR co-founder and Chairman Emeritus Omar Ahmad answered, "It depends. Qualify ‘support.'" Asked whether he had "ever taken a position with respect to… [Hamas'] ‘martyrdom attacks.'" Ahmad responded, "No."
* In 2005, then-CAIR Tampa spokesman Ahmed Bedier was asked about his organization's position toward the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. "We haven't published one," he said.
* This past August, CAIR spokesman Corey Saylor was pressed by David Lee Miller of Fox News to condemn Hamas and Hizballah. He wouldn't: Saylor: "I'm telling you in a very clear fashion – CAIR condemns terrorist acts, whoever commits them, wherever they commit them, whenever they commit them." Miller: "That's not the same thing as saying you condemn Hamas and you condemn Hizballah." Saylor: "Well I recognize that you don't like my answer to the question, but that's the answer to the question." Miller: "It's not no, it's not whether I like it or dislike it. I was asking whether or not you can sit here now and say - CAIR condemns Hamas or Hezbollah. If you don't want to, just say that. If that is a position your group doesn't take, I certainly accept that. I just want to understand what your answer is." Saylor: "The position that my group takes is that we condemn terrorism on a consistent, persistent basis, wherever it happens, whenever it happens."
The record makes it clear that this is not the case. CAIR makes sweeping statements about condemning the deaths of innocent civilians, but does not define what it considers innocent. It's a tone set from the top, as evidence from the Hamas - support trial of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) shows.
Exhibits in evidence show CAIR is listed among members of the Palestine Committee, a group created by the Muslim Brotherhood to help Hamas. Omar Ahmad and fellow CAIR founder and Executive Director Nihad Awad appear as numbers 25 and 32 in this Palestine Committee telephone list. Ahmad is identified by his pseudonym of "Omar Yehya."
Awad publicly stated his support for Hamas over the secular PLO in 1994, six months after the Oslo Accords made the PLO the governing party in the new Palestinian Authority. His endorsement also came after he and Ahmad participated in a secret meeting of Hamas supporters in Philadelphia called to discuss ways to derail the peace initiative.
The Hamas charter calls for the destruction of Israel through terrorism and other violence. It also rejects out of hand any peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At a rally in New York six years later, Awad said "Our final destination is Palestine. They [the Jews] have been saying ‘next year to Jerusalem,' we say ‘next year to all Palestine.'
Consistent with that is Omar Ahmad's declaration during the Philadelphia meeting that the group's goal had to be kept secret from Americans:
"We've always demanded the 1948 territories," he said.
"Yes," replied an unidentified speaker. "But we don't say that publicly. You cannot say that publicly, in front of the Americans."
"No," Ahmad agreed, "We didn't say that to the Americans."
As noted, Ahmad and Awad remain prominent voices in CAIR leadership. So kudos to CAIR for condemning violence and offensive statements by Al Qaeda. Stretch that moral stand to other terrorist groups and people might take notice.
Launching Appopedia, A Directory of Reviews of 2.0 (Web 2.0) Apps by Hylton Jolliffe
We’re excited to announce the launch of a new section of The AppGap: Appopedia. The section, located at www.theappgap.com/reviews, brings together the growing number of reviews (nearly 150 to date) that Bill Ives and his colleagues here have done of Web-based apps that help individuals as well as large and small businesses work together more efficiently and effectively.
As you know if you’ve been tuning in to Bill’s reviews, he spends considerable time talking to the companies’ product managers and assessing the apps for a hard look at how these 2.0 tools can help individuals and organizations better communicate and collaborate, catalog and share knowledge, engage users and customers, manage projects and further support existing business processes.
And while other directories of 2.0 apps exist, we believe Appopedia serves a particular purpose, focusing specifically on work-related tools that help you manage and grow your business rather than every Web 2.0 app under the sun (in fact, AppGap contributor Anita Campbell called for just such a resource before she knew we were toying with the idea of it). We’ve been developing the new section over the past month or two and hope you’ll check it out and provide input on what admittedly is a work in progress (we’ve already got a few tweaks on the way).
As you’ll see we’ve organized the reviews by various criteria, e.g., product category, we hope you’ll find useful. If you’ve used any of the tools please feel free to weigh in with any feedback in the comments of the respective reviews.
(For vendors: if you’re a company with a tool that’s already been reviewed, we encourage you to visit the review and provide any information on updates in the comments or contact us if you think your tool could be better classified by product category or function. For those that are interested in having your app reviewed, please visit our contact page where you’ll be prompted for information that’ll help us add you to the queue.)
Again, we hope you find Appopedia a valuable resource. It builds on the The AppGap’s mission - to help individuals, large organizations and small businesses better understand how work and our tools for working are changing - and aims to provide a practical destination for those looking to assess which apps can help them better manage and grow their businesses.
As you know if you’ve been tuning in to Bill’s reviews, he spends considerable time talking to the companies’ product managers and assessing the apps for a hard look at how these 2.0 tools can help individuals and organizations better communicate and collaborate, catalog and share knowledge, engage users and customers, manage projects and further support existing business processes.
And while other directories of 2.0 apps exist, we believe Appopedia serves a particular purpose, focusing specifically on work-related tools that help you manage and grow your business rather than every Web 2.0 app under the sun (in fact, AppGap contributor Anita Campbell called for just such a resource before she knew we were toying with the idea of it). We’ve been developing the new section over the past month or two and hope you’ll check it out and provide input on what admittedly is a work in progress (we’ve already got a few tweaks on the way).
As you’ll see we’ve organized the reviews by various criteria, e.g., product category, we hope you’ll find useful. If you’ve used any of the tools please feel free to weigh in with any feedback in the comments of the respective reviews.
(For vendors: if you’re a company with a tool that’s already been reviewed, we encourage you to visit the review and provide any information on updates in the comments or contact us if you think your tool could be better classified by product category or function. For those that are interested in having your app reviewed, please visit our contact page where you’ll be prompted for information that’ll help us add you to the queue.)
Again, we hope you find Appopedia a valuable resource. It builds on the The AppGap’s mission - to help individuals, large organizations and small businesses better understand how work and our tools for working are changing - and aims to provide a practical destination for those looking to assess which apps can help them better manage and grow their businesses.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)