WHAT'S BEING REPORTED:
Recent media reports have highlighted alleged tensions among U.S.-backed Sunni Awakening councils in Iraq as coalition forces prepare to transfer responsibility for the councils, also known as the Sons of Iraq program, to the Iraqi government. These tensions, according to reports, are undermining the U.S.'s attempts to sustain the security gains of the last year as it assesses downsizing its combat presence in Iraq.
EXAMPLE:
UPI reported on September 23: "Iraq's Sunni Arab Awakening Councils are showing signs of restiveness as their U.S.-paid leaders face major changes, military sources say.... There is infighting, finger-pointing and even violence within the ranks of the councils, [also] known as the Sons of Iraq, as commanders jockey for position and higher pay, the Times said. ‘What you have is essentially armed factions, like mini-gangs, that operate in a certain set of checkpoints in certain territories,' Lt. Erick Kuylman, a U.S. Army patrol commander, said, adding that while the Awakening Councils met their original purpose of battling terrorists, ‘they have outlived, I think, their service since then.'"
ANALYSIS:
WHAT IS MISSING?
These media reports tend to blur the distinction between two main Awakening initiatives, one Iraqi and the other American. Understanding the differences between the two, and their relationship with the Government of Iraq (GOI), is important to adequately assess their impact on security.
THE IRAQI AWAKENING
The Awakening credited for the decrease in violence in Iraq began as an Iraqi initiative that was supported by the GOI. In mid-2006 the Anbar Awakening, led by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, was an Iraqi attempt to create an emergency provincial government to replace the one that had been undermined by al-Qaeda and insurgents. In doing so, the Anbar Awakening promoted Iraqi police and Iraqi army recruitment, and worked closely with both Iraqi and coalition forces in bringing security to the province. While the Anbar Awakening did not succeed in creating an emergency government, it was partially integrated into the existing provincial government, and established a relationship with the GOI. As success in Anbar increased, Sunnis in other troubled areas of Iraq established contact with the Anbar Awakening leadership, and opened affiliate organizations outside of Anbar. During this process, the Awakening leadership strengthened its relationship with the government in Baghdad. The Anbar Awakening then evolved into different political parties (the main one being Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq, or the Iraqi Awakening) that are registered to compete in future provincial elections. As a result, the Iraqi Awakening has established a strong relationship with Baghdad.
THE SONS OF IRAQ
The other initiative, which is actually the group being discussed in a large portion of media coverage, was led by coalition forces in mid-2007 as an attempt to copy and paste the success of the Anbar Awakening into Sunni areas of Baghdad, Salahideen, and Diyala. This American initiative became known as the Sons of Iraq program-where basically marginalized Sunnis, including former insurgents, were recruited, equipped and paid by the Americans, and called Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs). CLCs manned security posts and worked with coalition forces in security operations. CLCs were basically coalition forces employees, and most had little contact with the Government of Iraq. Many of these CLCs informally organized themselves, and were later called Awakening councils. However, these Awakening councils were not necessarily affiliated with the Anbar Awakening. Some of these Awakening councils had no intention of reconciling with the GOI; as a result, the GOI has been cautious to fully integrate them into the Iraqi security forces.
IMPLICATIONS:
WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?
Saying that the GOI has bad relations with the Awakening, and that this threatens its successes, is misleading. While the Sons of Iraq program employs nearly 100,000 CLCs whose jobs may be in jeopardy once the GOI takes over the program, this has little bearing on the GOI's relationship with the Awakening. It is true that the Iraqi Awakening and other Sunni politicians are trying ensure that the CLCs be given adequate employment opportunities, whether in security or public service, as they transfer from the American to the Iraqi payroll. But the Iraqi Awakening and other Sunni parties are doing so largely out of a desire to gain constituents, rather trying to defend themselves from a GOI threat to the Awakening's existence.
WHAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THIS?
The Iraqi Awakening was the result of an Iraqi initiative supported by the GOI, and now is now a leading contender in the upcoming provincial elections. The Iraqi Awakening was integrated into the new Iraq because it was led by Iraqis who early on established a relationship with the GOI. The Sons of Iraq program, in contrast, was an American initiative that employed disparate Sunnis who were not linked to the GOI, and in some cases had no desire for such a relationship. It is important to distinguish between these two different initiatives when trying to understand the dynamic relationship between the Awakening movement and the GOI.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Identifying the Next National Security Threats by Michael Jacobson
In January 2009, the next administration will enter office facing a wide range of serious national security threats. At the top of this list will undoubtedly be Iran’s budding nuclear program, the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the unstable situation in Pakistan.
While it’s hard to argue that these should be the top priorities, as the last eight years have made clear, in today’s world, the threats to the US can evolve rapidly. New threats can emerge quickly and top-tier threats can fade.
The next administration’s success in the national security arena will certainly be judged in part by its ability to tackle the most obvious threats confronting the US. Equally important, however, will be its ability to accurately identify and appropriately respond to those threats that are emerging as well as those which are in decline. This is not an easy task, particularly for a large, plodding bureaucracy such as the US government, which is often slow to adapt.
The possibilities of what the next serious threat could be are almost endless. Will the threat of a crippling cyber-attack grow, as some experts are predicting? Will a new rogue regime or terrorist group appear on the scene which has the capability to inflict major damage to the US? Will terrorist groups move closer to acquiring WMD capabilities? Could climate change have far reaching national security consequences in the years ahead? And on the flip side, could, as some senior US government officials are predicting, al Qaeda be defeated within a matter of years?
The primary responsibility for getting this right will likely fall to the US intelligence community, as the US national intelligence strategy of 2005 makes clear. One of the five key pillars of the strategy is “anticipating developments of strategic concern,” in part through the newly created strategic analytic unit in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The strategy also states that to succeed in this effort, the IC must have expertise on “every region, every transnational security issue and every threat to the American people.”
For the intelligence community, anticipating the emerging threats - while challenging -- may be easier than mobilizing to address them. The primary responsibility for driving and focusing the sprawling IC against new threats and away from declining threats will fall to the Director of National Intelligence. This will not be an easy task.
If the DNI, for example, becomes convinced that an entirely new threat looms large on the horizon, will he or she be able to order the 16 agencies of the IC, including the Department of Defense agencies, to make the necessary changes in focus and prioritization? And if the DNI determines that an intelligence community agency has essentially ignored his instructions, will he or she take aggressive action to bring the agency into line?
While the DNI possesses far more powers over the IC agencies than his predecessor in that position, the Director of Central Intelligence, the authorities are still limited in scope. This is particularly the case because most of the intelligence offices, such as State, Treasury, and Department of Homeland Security, are located within Cabinet agencies and their primary reporting lines are to a Cabinet secretary, not to the DNI (though a new executive order does give the DNI some additional power over all intelligence agency heads).
Furthermore, mobilizing the IC may be the easy part in comparison to persuading policymakers to dramatically shift course. The resistance that the IC would likely encounter from policymakers would not be without reason. Intelligence is hardly a science, and is often vague, contradictory, difficult to interpret, and sometimes wrong. Making significant policy changes based on this type of incomplete intelligence picture is risky. Devoting resources and time to a threat which turns out to be overstated will divert focus away from the many serious threats facing the US. But not doing so can present even greater risks, as the September 11 story made clear.
So how can the next administration try to get this difficult balance right and make sure that it’s prioritizing the most serious threats, whether existing or emerging? There are a few keys to success. First, the IC must make sure it’s well positioned to identify new threats. As the intelligence strategy outlines, this requires having broad expertise across the board, including personnel with the necessary language abilities and cultural understanding. Beyond the difficulties in finding and obtaining security clearances for people with these unique backgrounds, the IC’s task will likely be made even harder by policymakers pushing the IC to devote additional resources to their respective priorities. Pushing back against this pressure will often be difficult, but necessary.
Second, it is critical for the IC to explain to the policymakers in great detail what they know and what they don’t know - not just on the National Intelligence Estimates, but when presenting any intelligence picture to policymakers. It can sometimes be difficult for the IC to admit its gaps, but this is key for decision-makers to know and understand as they engage in their policy deliberations.
Third, the next administration should resist the urge to centralize intelligence analysis further. While some of the intelligence analysis taking place at the various IC agencies may appear to be redundant or overlapping, it is important for policymakers to hear divergent views and perspectives. The “Groupthink” phenonemenon is much less likely to occur with this set-up in place.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the IC must maintain its independence from policymakers. This will undoubtedly be difficult, particularly since the DNI reports to the President and is his chief intelligence advisor. It is a tough balancing act for the IC leadership, trying to satisfy policymakers’ demands and needs for intelligence support while at the same time providing them with an unvarnished intelligence picture. Difficult though it may be, it is a balance that must be struck.
One way to make this more achievable might be to make the intelligence leaderships more obviously non-political. Giving the DNI and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center 10 years terms, similar to the FBI Director, specifically so that they are not tied to the Presidential cycles, might be one good step towards achieving that important goal.
While it’s hard to argue that these should be the top priorities, as the last eight years have made clear, in today’s world, the threats to the US can evolve rapidly. New threats can emerge quickly and top-tier threats can fade.
The next administration’s success in the national security arena will certainly be judged in part by its ability to tackle the most obvious threats confronting the US. Equally important, however, will be its ability to accurately identify and appropriately respond to those threats that are emerging as well as those which are in decline. This is not an easy task, particularly for a large, plodding bureaucracy such as the US government, which is often slow to adapt.
The possibilities of what the next serious threat could be are almost endless. Will the threat of a crippling cyber-attack grow, as some experts are predicting? Will a new rogue regime or terrorist group appear on the scene which has the capability to inflict major damage to the US? Will terrorist groups move closer to acquiring WMD capabilities? Could climate change have far reaching national security consequences in the years ahead? And on the flip side, could, as some senior US government officials are predicting, al Qaeda be defeated within a matter of years?
The primary responsibility for getting this right will likely fall to the US intelligence community, as the US national intelligence strategy of 2005 makes clear. One of the five key pillars of the strategy is “anticipating developments of strategic concern,” in part through the newly created strategic analytic unit in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The strategy also states that to succeed in this effort, the IC must have expertise on “every region, every transnational security issue and every threat to the American people.”
For the intelligence community, anticipating the emerging threats - while challenging -- may be easier than mobilizing to address them. The primary responsibility for driving and focusing the sprawling IC against new threats and away from declining threats will fall to the Director of National Intelligence. This will not be an easy task.
If the DNI, for example, becomes convinced that an entirely new threat looms large on the horizon, will he or she be able to order the 16 agencies of the IC, including the Department of Defense agencies, to make the necessary changes in focus and prioritization? And if the DNI determines that an intelligence community agency has essentially ignored his instructions, will he or she take aggressive action to bring the agency into line?
While the DNI possesses far more powers over the IC agencies than his predecessor in that position, the Director of Central Intelligence, the authorities are still limited in scope. This is particularly the case because most of the intelligence offices, such as State, Treasury, and Department of Homeland Security, are located within Cabinet agencies and their primary reporting lines are to a Cabinet secretary, not to the DNI (though a new executive order does give the DNI some additional power over all intelligence agency heads).
Furthermore, mobilizing the IC may be the easy part in comparison to persuading policymakers to dramatically shift course. The resistance that the IC would likely encounter from policymakers would not be without reason. Intelligence is hardly a science, and is often vague, contradictory, difficult to interpret, and sometimes wrong. Making significant policy changes based on this type of incomplete intelligence picture is risky. Devoting resources and time to a threat which turns out to be overstated will divert focus away from the many serious threats facing the US. But not doing so can present even greater risks, as the September 11 story made clear.
So how can the next administration try to get this difficult balance right and make sure that it’s prioritizing the most serious threats, whether existing or emerging? There are a few keys to success. First, the IC must make sure it’s well positioned to identify new threats. As the intelligence strategy outlines, this requires having broad expertise across the board, including personnel with the necessary language abilities and cultural understanding. Beyond the difficulties in finding and obtaining security clearances for people with these unique backgrounds, the IC’s task will likely be made even harder by policymakers pushing the IC to devote additional resources to their respective priorities. Pushing back against this pressure will often be difficult, but necessary.
Second, it is critical for the IC to explain to the policymakers in great detail what they know and what they don’t know - not just on the National Intelligence Estimates, but when presenting any intelligence picture to policymakers. It can sometimes be difficult for the IC to admit its gaps, but this is key for decision-makers to know and understand as they engage in their policy deliberations.
Third, the next administration should resist the urge to centralize intelligence analysis further. While some of the intelligence analysis taking place at the various IC agencies may appear to be redundant or overlapping, it is important for policymakers to hear divergent views and perspectives. The “Groupthink” phenonemenon is much less likely to occur with this set-up in place.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the IC must maintain its independence from policymakers. This will undoubtedly be difficult, particularly since the DNI reports to the President and is his chief intelligence advisor. It is a tough balancing act for the IC leadership, trying to satisfy policymakers’ demands and needs for intelligence support while at the same time providing them with an unvarnished intelligence picture. Difficult though it may be, it is a balance that must be struck.
One way to make this more achievable might be to make the intelligence leaderships more obviously non-political. Giving the DNI and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center 10 years terms, similar to the FBI Director, specifically so that they are not tied to the Presidential cycles, might be one good step towards achieving that important goal.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
As Crime Increases in Kabul, So Does Nostalgia for Taliban by Pamela Constable
Mirza Kunduzai, 58, a slight man with a short white goatee, had almost reached his house after a day of trading in the capital's open-air currency market when his taxi was forced to stop by six heavily armed men dressed in Afghan National Army uniforms.
For the next week, Kunduzai recounted, he endured one horror after another -- beaten unconscious, hooded and handcuffed, strung up by his wrists and ankles, dumped in a filthy latrine -- while his family frantically tried to raise the kidnappers' astronomical ransom demand of $2 million.
"I was 95 percent sure I was a dead man," Kunduzai said last week. "They said if my family went to the police, they would chop off my fingers and send them to my wife. I begged them to be reasonable. I offered them my house and my farmland back home. Finally, they agreed to settle for $500,000 and released me. I am poor again, but I am thankful to be alive."
While Taliban insurgents stage increasing attacks in the Afghan countryside, equally fast-expanding violent crime -- kidnappings, carjackings, drug-related killings and highway robberies -- is plaguing the capital of 5 million and the vital truck and bus routes that connect the country's major cities. It is making some Afghans nostalgic for the low-crime days before 2001, when the Taliban sternly ruled most of the country.
Today's problem, which experts say is intertwined with widespread official corruption, opium trafficking and the get-rich-quick boom of postwar aid and reconstruction, is threatening to destroy public confidence in the government of President Hamid Karzai and drive away what little investment the desperately poor country is attracting.
Police and soldiers are everywhere in Kabul -- patrolling traffic circles and markets, cruising in open pickup trucks. Armed private guards stand outside newly built glass offices and wedding salons. Every week, more streets are blocked by massive concrete barricades to shelter embassies, official buildings and compounds used by U.S. and NATO forces.
"The security situation is normal. Our police are honest and patriotic, and they are getting stronger day by day," Gen. Ali Shah Paktiawol, chief of criminal investigations for the Kabul police, said in a brief interview Tuesday. He dismissed concerns about growing urban insecurity as "enemy propaganda" and said many so-called kidnappings turn out to be romantic elopements.
But on Wednesday morning, Paktiawol narrowly escaped assassination when a remote-controlled bomb exploded under his vehicle on the outskirts of Kabul, where he had gone to investigate the late-night shooting of three policemen. The general escaped with minor injuries, but his three bodyguards were killed. Officials blamed the Taliban.
In the streets and shops of this sprawling city, many residents say they have virtually stopped going out at night. Wealthy families and traders such as Kunduzai have reported dozens of kidnappings for ransom this year -- often by gangs they believe to be members of the security forces.
The burgeoning drug trade, by which Afghan opium reaches international markets and provides more than 75 percent of the world's heroin, has brought ever-more weapons and wealth into the criminal orbit, corrupting cooperative officials and eliminating scrupulous ones.
Two weeks ago, Alim Hanif, the chief judge of the country's Central Narcotics Tribunal and a man known for rare honesty in a graft-ridden system, was assassinated in Kabul. Officials said he had received numerous phone and text messages warning him to acquit a suspected drug dealer or face death.
Another problem is the continued sway of militia bosses who fought Soviet troops in the 1980s and still command groups of armed loyalists in the capital and other cities. According to diplomatic reports, some of these groups are involved in private security forces that extort money from wealthy businesspeople; others are police or other public security officers who use their uniforms and weapons to abet a variety of crimes.
"The government is weak, and it has an enormously high level of tolerance for crime, abuse and corruption," said Nader Nadery, an official of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. "If you have power and money, you don't have to account for your actions. Instead of the rule of law, there is a state of impunity, which is one of the factors contributing to the growth of the Taliban."
Although Taliban fighters routinely hang and behead people in rural areas, the growth of crime and the lack of justice are the reasons most frequently cited by Afghans who support the reconstituted Islamist militia. More and more, people here look back to the era of harsh Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, describing it as a time of security and peace.
One group whose lives and livelihoods now face constant danger from armed criminals are the truckers and bus drivers who ply the highways between Kabul and the major provincial cities of Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Although vulnerable to Taliban attack, the drivers say they are just as often ambushed and robbed by well-armed thieves.
Mohammed Hussain, 40, was driving one of two passenger buses traveling together on a lonely stretch of highway from Herat to Kabul last week when heavily armed men attacked about 4 a.m. The gang shot at Hussain's fleeing bus, leaving bullet holes in the windows, and stopped the second bus, forcing it off the road and into a village. There they searched every passenger at gunpoint, confiscating money and jewelry.
"I was lucky. I had 57 passengers, including women and children," Hussain said. "The thieves wait for us in the dark, and they have powerful weapons. If we go to the police for help, they are either scared or involved in crime themselves. In the Taliban time, the roads were totally safe. You could drive anywhere in the country, 24 hours a day. Now, you take your life in your hands every time you leave on a trip."
For the next week, Kunduzai recounted, he endured one horror after another -- beaten unconscious, hooded and handcuffed, strung up by his wrists and ankles, dumped in a filthy latrine -- while his family frantically tried to raise the kidnappers' astronomical ransom demand of $2 million.
"I was 95 percent sure I was a dead man," Kunduzai said last week. "They said if my family went to the police, they would chop off my fingers and send them to my wife. I begged them to be reasonable. I offered them my house and my farmland back home. Finally, they agreed to settle for $500,000 and released me. I am poor again, but I am thankful to be alive."
While Taliban insurgents stage increasing attacks in the Afghan countryside, equally fast-expanding violent crime -- kidnappings, carjackings, drug-related killings and highway robberies -- is plaguing the capital of 5 million and the vital truck and bus routes that connect the country's major cities. It is making some Afghans nostalgic for the low-crime days before 2001, when the Taliban sternly ruled most of the country.
Today's problem, which experts say is intertwined with widespread official corruption, opium trafficking and the get-rich-quick boom of postwar aid and reconstruction, is threatening to destroy public confidence in the government of President Hamid Karzai and drive away what little investment the desperately poor country is attracting.
Police and soldiers are everywhere in Kabul -- patrolling traffic circles and markets, cruising in open pickup trucks. Armed private guards stand outside newly built glass offices and wedding salons. Every week, more streets are blocked by massive concrete barricades to shelter embassies, official buildings and compounds used by U.S. and NATO forces.
"The security situation is normal. Our police are honest and patriotic, and they are getting stronger day by day," Gen. Ali Shah Paktiawol, chief of criminal investigations for the Kabul police, said in a brief interview Tuesday. He dismissed concerns about growing urban insecurity as "enemy propaganda" and said many so-called kidnappings turn out to be romantic elopements.
But on Wednesday morning, Paktiawol narrowly escaped assassination when a remote-controlled bomb exploded under his vehicle on the outskirts of Kabul, where he had gone to investigate the late-night shooting of three policemen. The general escaped with minor injuries, but his three bodyguards were killed. Officials blamed the Taliban.
In the streets and shops of this sprawling city, many residents say they have virtually stopped going out at night. Wealthy families and traders such as Kunduzai have reported dozens of kidnappings for ransom this year -- often by gangs they believe to be members of the security forces.
The burgeoning drug trade, by which Afghan opium reaches international markets and provides more than 75 percent of the world's heroin, has brought ever-more weapons and wealth into the criminal orbit, corrupting cooperative officials and eliminating scrupulous ones.
Two weeks ago, Alim Hanif, the chief judge of the country's Central Narcotics Tribunal and a man known for rare honesty in a graft-ridden system, was assassinated in Kabul. Officials said he had received numerous phone and text messages warning him to acquit a suspected drug dealer or face death.
Another problem is the continued sway of militia bosses who fought Soviet troops in the 1980s and still command groups of armed loyalists in the capital and other cities. According to diplomatic reports, some of these groups are involved in private security forces that extort money from wealthy businesspeople; others are police or other public security officers who use their uniforms and weapons to abet a variety of crimes.
"The government is weak, and it has an enormously high level of tolerance for crime, abuse and corruption," said Nader Nadery, an official of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. "If you have power and money, you don't have to account for your actions. Instead of the rule of law, there is a state of impunity, which is one of the factors contributing to the growth of the Taliban."
Although Taliban fighters routinely hang and behead people in rural areas, the growth of crime and the lack of justice are the reasons most frequently cited by Afghans who support the reconstituted Islamist militia. More and more, people here look back to the era of harsh Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, describing it as a time of security and peace.
One group whose lives and livelihoods now face constant danger from armed criminals are the truckers and bus drivers who ply the highways between Kabul and the major provincial cities of Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Although vulnerable to Taliban attack, the drivers say they are just as often ambushed and robbed by well-armed thieves.
Mohammed Hussain, 40, was driving one of two passenger buses traveling together on a lonely stretch of highway from Herat to Kabul last week when heavily armed men attacked about 4 a.m. The gang shot at Hussain's fleeing bus, leaving bullet holes in the windows, and stopped the second bus, forcing it off the road and into a village. There they searched every passenger at gunpoint, confiscating money and jewelry.
"I was lucky. I had 57 passengers, including women and children," Hussain said. "The thieves wait for us in the dark, and they have powerful weapons. If we go to the police for help, they are either scared or involved in crime themselves. In the Taliban time, the roads were totally safe. You could drive anywhere in the country, 24 hours a day. Now, you take your life in your hands every time you leave on a trip."
Sunday, September 21, 2008
Wi-Fi Network Launched For U.S. Soldiers In Iraq by W. David Gardner
Aruba Networks reported Tuesday that it has installed a secure Wi-Fi network in Iraq to provide Internet access for U.S. soldiers.
The mesh-based network provides Internet service to 20,000 U.S. soldiers serving at Joint Base Balad, the largest U.S. military base in the region. For the first time, soldiers can surf the Net securely from their laptops around the sprawling base. In the past, there was no individual access for the soldiers; they could get on the Internet only if they found a hard-wired access point.
The Aruba network was installed by Babylon Telecommunications, which has been providing service for foreign contractors and government entities in Iraq since 2003. The U.S. Army & Air Force Exchange Services awarded the contract to Babtel.
The Aruba-based mesh network has several advantages, including its capability to self-heal if access points are lost or rendered unworkable in the harsh Iraqi environment, according to the company.
"Since the mesh nodes work wirelessly, an Aruba mesh network can be quickly moved, expanded, or otherwise changed, making it inherently rapidly deployable," said Dave Logan, Aruba's general manager of federal solutions, in an e-mail Tuesday. "It is self-healing and features a highly redundant design for reliability and supportability.
"With both the embedded user-based firewall and WIDS [wireless intrusion detection system] in the Aruba architecture, the network is logically protected from both inside and outside attacks and rogue devices. So the network is encrypted and authenticated to protect it," said Logan.
The network features ruggedized outdoor access points, which can be moved about the base easily without installing data cabling. The configuration works well for the soldiers, who can access the network in clusters. Dozens of soldiers e-mailing home, gaming, or surfing the Web can be served by each individual access point, most of which are located so the soldiers can use their laptops in their living quarters.
"This approach is much more convenient than previous approaches," said Lt. Col. William (Dean) Thurmond of AAFES, who noted that the soldiers previously had to rely on hard-wired solutions in Internet cafes.
Chris Catranis, Babtel's CEO, said the first soldiers using the system were using it for voice calls and to send and receive e-mails, photos, and videos.
The mesh-based network provides Internet service to 20,000 U.S. soldiers serving at Joint Base Balad, the largest U.S. military base in the region. For the first time, soldiers can surf the Net securely from their laptops around the sprawling base. In the past, there was no individual access for the soldiers; they could get on the Internet only if they found a hard-wired access point.
The Aruba network was installed by Babylon Telecommunications, which has been providing service for foreign contractors and government entities in Iraq since 2003. The U.S. Army & Air Force Exchange Services awarded the contract to Babtel.
The Aruba-based mesh network has several advantages, including its capability to self-heal if access points are lost or rendered unworkable in the harsh Iraqi environment, according to the company.
"Since the mesh nodes work wirelessly, an Aruba mesh network can be quickly moved, expanded, or otherwise changed, making it inherently rapidly deployable," said Dave Logan, Aruba's general manager of federal solutions, in an e-mail Tuesday. "It is self-healing and features a highly redundant design for reliability and supportability.
"With both the embedded user-based firewall and WIDS [wireless intrusion detection system] in the Aruba architecture, the network is logically protected from both inside and outside attacks and rogue devices. So the network is encrypted and authenticated to protect it," said Logan.
The network features ruggedized outdoor access points, which can be moved about the base easily without installing data cabling. The configuration works well for the soldiers, who can access the network in clusters. Dozens of soldiers e-mailing home, gaming, or surfing the Web can be served by each individual access point, most of which are located so the soldiers can use their laptops in their living quarters.
"This approach is much more convenient than previous approaches," said Lt. Col. William (Dean) Thurmond of AAFES, who noted that the soldiers previously had to rely on hard-wired solutions in Internet cafes.
Chris Catranis, Babtel's CEO, said the first soldiers using the system were using it for voice calls and to send and receive e-mails, photos, and videos.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)