Fighting New Terror - Theory and Israeli Experience by Isaac Ben-Israel

Ideology and Special Services
Materials of the Russian-Israeli Conference
Moscow, 15-16 June 2005
Kurginyan Centre

Sergey Kurginyan: Now I'd like to pass the floor to Isaac Ben-Israel, former Head of Research & Development Department, Ministry of Defense. His presentation is on theory and practice in fighting new terrorism in Israel. Mr. Ben-Israel is also a scholar, author of several interesting books on the philosophy of intelligence.

Isaac Ben-Israel: Good afternoon!

Before I start speaking on the topic, I would like to join my colleagues and thank Professor Kurginyan and his team, who have done their best to bring us here. And, if only some 15 years ago, when I was working for the military intelligence, someone had told me I would be walking along Red Square and visiting the Kremlin - I would have definitely sent this person to a mental institution.

Now, let us proceed with the topic. Theory and practice.

As to the theory, there is a model, which is mostly all maths and it takes some time to understand it. As to practice, I would like to describe Israeli very intensive anti-terrorism effort over the past 4-5 years.

As we are restricted by time, I am going to make the maths model description as short as possible. I will be mostly speaking about practice, of course, because I believe certain systems and practice of anti-terrorism wars, which are being elaborated in our region could be applied elsewhere.

Some words on the model.

A "system" is a finite set of components which function jointly for a certain goal. "System Information" is the information contained in the order and internal relations between the components. System Redundancy Hypothesis: a system cannot function without a certain measure of back-up.

Fig. 1. Theory of System Collapse

This is actually a "System Collapse Model". We all know that a military division, for example, cannot function as an organic unit having lost 25-30% of its heavy equipment. Why? Why cannot a 4 brigade division having lost one quarter of its forces be restructured into a 3 brigade one to carry on military operation even if it is on the smaller frontage? Why does this division just fall apart?

And this is true not only for military divisions, but for terrorist organizations as well, by the way. We have applied this model in the recent years. This is a thermodynamic model which analyzes the disorder inside the system.

Speakers before me have already talked about the "World Order" and the "World Disorder". I do not want to go too far into the theory depths. Generally, any system is defined by the amount of information within its components which ensures their interaction. Any system means order. Respectively, disorder emerges when the amount of relevant information inside the system is below some critical level.

Back in the 30's and 40's of the 20th century the US scientist Claude Shannon and later Kholmogorov in Russia developed a general maths model describing the functioning of such systems.

"Information" is measured by the minimal number of bits needed to describe the system in binary language. (Claude Shannon, Kholmogorov and Algorithmic Complexity). Original Function: M bits Back-up: ΔM bits Overall info: Mc=M+ΔM

Fig. 2. Information Measure

I am not going into the details now. In case anyone wants to discuss this specific issue, this could be done tomorrow within the framework of our planned discussion, I suppose.

In general, I can define any system as some structure consisting of various components which assure both the system's existence as a single whole and also have their own objectives. In a division, for example, there is a certain number of combat units, plus logistic systems ensuring the communication and interaction of those combat units. There are also some, so to speak, repair shops, as something always goes wrong, especially in a big and complicated system.

This implies that any division should have certain support services, a kind of "redundancy". At the same time they cannot be excessive. On the one hand, "the more the better", but on the other - you cannot carry all that on your own back, you know.

That is why the following optimal model is usually constructed: we take what we use most of all, something that we are sure or likely to need, and exclude everything we might not need at all (or are unlikely to use it).

So, look at the very last line.

For natural systems, the amound of required redundancy for full compensation of errors is close to the lower limit which is necessary for full back up, that is Rreq≈Q(q) where Q(q)=qlog2(1/q)+(1-q)log2[1/(1-q)]

Fig. 3. Natural Redundancy Efficiency Hypothesis

We are arriving at a formula, which states...

Sergey Kurginyan: One comment here. As some people here know Stirling's approximation, and some don't, I would like to clarify that here Isaac Ben-Israel is seeking the minimal extraction of the system, under which the system collapses. If you just remove a sand grain, the system will not fall. But what if you remove a stone? How many stones and which stones are to be removed? The military can easily understand that, can't you? What part do we need to destroy so that the whole stops functioning. What minimal component will suffice.

And when he is coming to the question which elements can be withdrawn, he is doing that within Kholmogorov-Shannon theory and Stirling's approximation.

Here is an example for those of you who are not familiar with those approximations. Say, a person has had a stroke. With one type and scale of the impact his brain goes on functioning and the personality remains intact, but the do not in another case. Where is this critical impact resulting in system collapse?

Isaac Ben-Israel: In general, the underlying idea is: each system has its own critical point. If I know where it is, I hit this point and destroy the whole system. If I do not know this, I will have to go on hitting different components of the system until I accidentally hit the critical point. The more components I damage, even without hitting the critical point, the closer is the moment when the system disintegrates.

And there is a certain connection between "q" - which is the percentage of component interconnection - and "Q" which describes the probability of the whole system collapse.

When the rate of component failure q is 11%, the probability Q(q) for total system collapse is 50% When q=25%, Q=81% When q=50%, Q=100%

Fig. 4. The Probability of System Collapse

So what does this formula tell us? In case the damage level of the components (q) within the system is 50%, the system will definitely stop functioning. There are simply no systems capable to withstand the malfunctioning of half of its components. In case q is 25%, there is still an 80% probability of its falling apart.

For example, in the Middle Ages the Plague, or "Black Death" as they called it, in case the number of infected and sick got close to one fourth of the population, all the others would simply leave the city. There are many examples from various fields of systems' behavior in similar situations. I will not be discussing that in detail as we are short of time.

Let us better move on to practice. How is this model applied in Israeli practices, how does it work? Here we have a graph describing 4 years of terrorists' Intifada.

This is the number of casualties in Shahids' (suicide bombers) attacks only. I did not include war casualties and casualties outside the so-called "green line". I did this purposefully - not to dive into the depth of the problem about which there is still no international consensus: is it a guerrilla war or terrorism?

When a suicide bomber explodes in a bus - it is 100% terrorism, no one can claim it's a guerrilla war. In March 2002 we had a sad record: 140 killed. Then the numbers went down as you can see from the graph. They did not fall to zero, of course, because throughout the history of the State of Israel and living close to our neighbors we never had zero terrorism. It began even before our state had been created, in the early 20's last century. And during 1988-1999, what we call "years of peace" - still about 40 people were killed annually.

So what happened, what had to be done in order to break such kind of dynamics?

Triangles show the total number of terrorist attacks of Shahids. Diamonds - the "successful" acts: a Shahid was able to kill someone. Rectangles - the ones which were aborted. As you can see after March 2002 there was an abrupt decline in the number of casualties. This can be explained by the fact that we came back to Judea and Samaria, tha is, back to the territory between the Jordan and the "green line". We occupied this territory again and practically immediately we had an actual positive dynamics.

We mobilized or reinforced the intelligence sources we had there - both human sources and technological ones. We could employ those freely. We increased the scale of intelligence operations and respectively we started receiving ten times more information on those involved in the terrorist attacks conspiracy.

Then a query comes: did they decrease the number of attempts for terrorist attacks? Or did we get more successful in withstanding them?

You can see the following correlation: despite our losing fewer people, the number of attempts increased. There were twice as many of such attempts as we used to have in March 2002. So terrorists were building up their activities, but the result is racing to the lowest level.

2003 saw the drop even in the number of attempts. What happened? Why did the number of attempts go down to the number we had before the terrorist Intifada? Moreover, the rate of attempts is going down to the pre-Intifada one.

I must say that Israel changed its policy twice during this time interval. When Intifada started we had a different Prime Minister - Ehud Barak. He based his policy on the assumption that Mr. Arafat, the Palestinian leader at the time, was a true disciple of von Clausewitz.

Before the start of the Intifada Barak and Arafat had talks about some peace treaty. Arafat wrecked the negotiations and Intifada blew up three months later. And then Barak decided Arafat was using terrorism as a continuation of policy. In other words the negotiations failed, and Arafat used the weapon of terror.

Therefore Israeli policy was "allegedly containment". "Let us try to yield some more to Arafat; let us start negotiations; let us find out what he wants. Maybe we could persuade him to get back to other, peaceful means".

Nothing came of it: terrorism was growing, probably even at a higher rate. Then the Cabinet fell and Sharon came to power.

Sharon's course was different: To put up with nothing! We must knock the teeth off Palestinians! However, his main concept was similar to that of Barak: Arafat was the main engine of terrorism, so he (Arafat) was able to put an end to terrorism, which he (Arafat) currently employed to reach some goals. The underlying ideas of Barak and Sharon were the same, only Barak wanted to give Arafat "a carrot" to pacify him and Sharon planned to use "a stick" to scare him.

Neither was a success. Then we returned to that territory and decided to see for ourselves what was going on.

And we did find out quite a few things. We did find out that Arafat was indeed doing nothing to stop terrorism. And even more, he was supporting terrorism in certain cases.

But this terror was not Arafat's terror. Most of the attacks were organized by Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and not by organizations controlled by Arafat. They were not fighting "for Palestine", they were fighting "for Islam in Palestine" and they had far more ambitious long-term plans.

They were organizations which did not want just to build a Palestinian state, and even not just to build it instead of Israel - they wanted to build a Great Islamic Empire. Consequently, they were not committing terrorist attacks because Arafat instructed them, but because they believed that if they committed more attacks they would stop Arafat from reaching any agreement with Israel. They believed that was exactly what Arafat wanted.

So Mr. Kurginyan is absolutely right saying that the key issue is to define your true enemy. For a very long time we were convinced that the main terrorist enemies were organizations controlled by Arafat. And now they turn out to be quite different people and groups. So, a different objective appears: to neutralize the members of these other groups - either to arrest or liquidate them.

Actually, there were three organizations of such kind: Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and Arafat's radicals (various Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of the Tanzim). It was them who sent suicide bombers.

Neutralizing suicide bombers... What is the point? It is not a problem to recruit a volunteer. In any case, they are people ready to kill themselves for the sake of killing some of us. So there is no point in killing suicide bombers. Their leaders will always be able to recruit others.

Therefore we looked for the persons involved in organizing terrorist attacks. It never happens that one morning an Islamic extremist wakes up and says to himself: "Why don't I explode myself in a bus today!" No, there is a system, a factory behind it! Such a suicide bomber is to be trained, the explosive belt is to be produced, the belt and the bomber are to be cleared at all the check-points. In general, there should exist a serious organization aimed at reaching one single target:

At the end, the mission is a terrorist attack. Each of such attacks involves several hundred people starting from those giving orders. In the case of Hamas it was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. He was liquidated and then there was Abdel Aziz Rantissi. He also was liquidated. And so on...

This is a system of "top-down" 'impulse of terrorism' - orders, instructions - until it finally reaches the shahid.

Naturally, we tried to arrest the poeple in teh critical points of the system. We could easily do it, in Judea and Samaria, because we controlled the area. From the point of view of the intelligence, we preferred arresting to liquidation, because the terrorists were sources of information. We could not arrest them in Gaza Strip, because we did not enter the territory. We had no other choice in this territory but to destroy them.

I will get back to the problem of liquidation. But first some words about the results... During the four years of Intifada we were able to get back to the pre-Intifada rate of terrorism.

Why did it take us the long four years for that? In our previous wars with Syria, Egypt, Lebanon two weeks, a month at maximum were enough. But this time it was different. We faced a different type of war you can see it yourselves in Chechnya. Hence, the problems are quite different.

There are four factors which differentiate a traditional war and a war against terror.

Low Intensity Asymmetry Urban Environment Networked Threat

Fig. 9. The New Paradigm: War on Terror

First of all, we have a low intensity war, of course. It is very lengthy. That implies a lot of circumstances which regular armies are not used to and dislike very much.

If a war lasts two or three weeks, it's not enough time for public opinion against this war to materialize. There is no trouble-making TV all the time. If a war lasts two or three weeks - it is just a battle: whatever will be, will be, and all means and forces are employed.

But if a war goes on for several years the whole world watches, sends TV teams. And what they show from any battlefield at any war is something the public doesn't like! Consequently, you face problems you never had before.

The second factor is asymmetry. This is not a "country to country" war, when it is enough to defeat the armed forces. This time you have to deal with some amorphous formation which you still need to understand, to understand its inner structure, and, respectively - its weak points. It took us two years to do that. We had an absolute advantage in military equipment, but it takes time to find out who confronts us, time goes by, and you strike in vain. Your advantages turn into disadvantages.

Further, Such wars go on intensely built territories with a huge civilian population (non-combatants). Up till then we had been fighting in Sinai, on Golan Heights. It was clear that we did not have to take into account the threat of massive casualties among civilians - there were none. And here terrorists emerge from civilian communities, and hide among civilians. So when you try to shoot at someone you are to your best no civilians are hurt.

And this is not because of the international public opinion. In fact it does not hurt us. In principle, we go to the end without any reservation. But such wars have an impact on our military men! And when they drop a bomb from a plane and see that together with terrorist they also killed 5 children, it creates disastrous moral problems. In the long-term perspective we can suffer serious losses. That is why we need to develop the ultra-precision means of destruction and equipment (precision guided munitions - PGM), which could guarantee the liquidation of those we want to destroy without damaging those around them.

And finally, the last factor which makes this new type of wars absolutely different. As a rule, during a war we believe that the enemy has strict hierarchies: if a division commander is killed he is replaced by his deputy only and by no one else. So by neutralizing a rather thin commanding layer we could assure paralysis of the whole system.

But here we deal with small organizations, which operate on a network principle. So it is much more difficult to find any 'critical points' in them.

Now I would like to get back to the system of surgical liquidations.

Real time intelligence targeting Precision guided munitions (PGMs) Shortest loop of "sensor-to-shooter" Minimizing collateral damage Develop technological capabilities (by intelligence as well as by weapons) to track individuals

Fig. 10. Surgical Capabilities (Targeted Killing, Elimination, Focused Abortion, Personal Preemptive Strike)

As I have already mentioned, the number of casualties from our side went down drastically as soon as we entered Judea and Samaria. And we witnessed a significant decrease of planned terrorist attacks starting from early 2003. This was even before Arafat died, so it had nothing to do either with him or his policy. But what was the actual reason?

When we talk about pinpoint liquidation, what preconditions are required? First of all, you need good intelligence capable to locate a certain person. You need to know who is this person driving a car, the one entering a mosque, yet another one going out of a house - it is Sheikh Yassin himself and not someone just looking like him.

Then you need the kind of weapon that leaves nothing of Sheikh Yassin and his wheelchair, but does not hit anyone else, if possible. These are rather sophisticated technologies, and not many countries have them at their disposal. Fortunately enough, we happen to be one of such nations.

Now, look here.

Here you see monthly data starting from the beginning of Intifada till 4 years later: the line of diamonds show the number of people killed by terrorists monthly; the line of squares shows the number of pinpoint liquidations (our actions against the key figures). Without any maths you can witness a direct correlation here.

At first we used such liquidations as our response to terrorist attacks: they start - we respond, then they respond again. But starting from February 2003 the liquidation practice was not in any way linked with their attacks. We just have a list of the key figures - the list of organization leaders, of the so-called "field commanders", etc. So we started neutralizing them according to our list: we arrested those we could and liquidated those we could not.

And in a short while, from mid-2003, the rate of terrorist attacks started decreasing - not only the rate of their successful attacks, but of the plotted attacks as well. After we first liquidated Sheikh Yassin and then his successor Rantissi, Hamas has not given up terrorism, of course. Quite the contrary - they have started planning a mega-attack, some kind of "Mother of All Terrorist Attacks" as they call it. But up to now, they haven't accomplished anything over the past two years.

It's not that Hamas suddenly rejected the idea of the caliphate and not that it suddenly joined the Zionist Organization. The fact is, that starting from mid-2003 Hamas just has had no chances for successful mass terror. Now let's get back to our initial graph. (fig. 6).

You can see on this slide, when this happened, when the decline began. Here you can see total figures of those liquidated and those arrested. And you can see for yourselves that the dramatic decline of the number of planned terrorist attacks started when we were able to neutralize approximately one fourth of the activists from the list of militants from the three fighting organizations: Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Arafat's radicals (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades).

Thank you very much for your attention.

Shades of Green by Chris Pummer

For one of the nastiest substances on earth, crude oil has an amazing grip on the globe. We all know the stuff's poison, yet we're as dependent on it as our air and water supplies -- which, of course, is what oil is poisoning.

Shouldn't we be technologically advanced enough here in the 21st Century to quit siphoning off the pus of the Earth? Regardless whether you believe global warming is threatening the planet's future, you must admit crude is passé.

Americans should be celebrating rather than shuddering over the arrival of $4-a-gallon gasoline. We lived on cheap gas too long, failed to innovate and now face the consequences of competing for a finite resource amid fast-expanding global demand.

A further price rise as in Europe to $8 a gallon -- or $200 and more to fill a large SUV's tank -- would be a catalyst for economic, political and social change of profound national and global impact. We could face an economic squeeze, but it would be the pain before the gain.

The U.S. economy absorbed a tripling in gas prices in the last six years without falling into recession, at least through March. Ravenous demand from China and India could see prices further double in the next few years -- and jump start the overdue process of weaning ourselves off fossil fuels. Consider the world of good that would come of pricing crude oil and gasoline at levels that would strain our finances as much as they're straining international relations and the planet's long-term health:

1. RIP for the internal-combustion engine.

They may contain computer chips, but the power source for today's cars is little different than that which drove the first Model T 100 years ago. That we're still harnessed to this antiquated technology is testament to Big Oil's influence in Washington and success in squelching advances in fuel efficiency and alternative energy.

Given our achievement in getting a giant mainframe's computing power into a handheld device in just a few decades, we should be able to do likewise with these dirty, little rolling power plants that served us well but are overdue for the scrap heap of history.

2. Economic stimulus.

Necessity being the mother of invention, $8 gas would trigger all manner of investment sure to lead to groundbreaking advances. Job creation wouldn't be limited to research labs; it would rapidly spill over into lucrative manufacturing jobs that could help restore America's industrial base and make us a world leader in a critical realm.

The most groundbreaking discoveries might still be 25 or more years off, but we won't see massive public and corporate funding of research initiatives until escalating oil costs threaten our national security and global stability -- a time that's fast approaching.

3. Wither the Middle East's clout.

This region that's contributed little to modern civilization exercises inordinate sway over the world because of its one significant contribution -- crude extraction. Aside from ensuring Israel's security, the U.S. would have virtually no strategic or business interest in this volatile, desolate region were it not for oil -- and its radical element wouldn't be able to demonize us as the exploiters of its people.

In the near term, breaking our dependence on Middle Eastern oil may well require the acceptance of drilling in the Alaskan wilderness -- with the understanding that costly environmental protections could easily be built into the price of $8 gas.

4. Deflating oil potentates.

On a similar note, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad recently gained a platform on the world stage because of their nations' sudden oil wealth. Without it, they would face the difficult task of building fair and just economies and societies on some other basis.

How far would their message resonate -- and how long would they even stay in power -- if they were unable to buy off the temporary allegiance of their people with vast oil revenues?

5. Mass-transit development.

Anyone accustomed to taking mass transit to work knows the joy of a car-free commute. Yet there have been few major additions or improvements to our mass-transit systems in the last 30 years because cheap gas kept us in our cars.

Confronted with $8 gas, millions of Americans would board buses, trains, ferries and bicycles and minimize the pollution, congestion and anxiety spawned by rush-hour traffic jams. More convenient routes and scheduling would accomplish that.

6. An antidote to sprawl.

The recent housing boom sparked further development of antiseptic, strip-mall communities in distant outlying areas. Making 100-mile-plus round trip commutes costlier will spur construction of more space-efficient housing closer to city centers, including cluster developments to accommodate the millions of baby boomers who will no longer need their big empty-nest suburban homes.

Sure, there's plenty of land left to develop across our fruited plains, but building more housing around city and town centers will enhance the sense of community lacking in cookie-cutter developments slapped up in the hinterlands.

7. Restoration of financial discipline.

Far too many Americans live beyond their means and nowhere is that more apparent than with our car payments. Enabled by eager lenders, many middle-income families carry two monthly payments of $400 or more on $20,000-plus vehicles that consume upwards of $15,000 of their annual take-home pay factoring in insurance, maintenance and gas.

The sting of forking over $100 per fill-up would force all of us to look hard at how much of our precious income we blow on a transport vehicle that sits idle most of the time, and spur demand for the less-costly and more fuel-efficient small sedans and hatchbacks that Europeans have been driving for decades.

8. Easing global tensions

Unfortunately, we human beings aren't so far evolved that we won't resort to annihilating each other over energy resources. The existence of weapons of mass destruction aside, the present Iraq War could be the first of many sparked by competition for oil supplies.

Steep prices will not only chill demand in the U.S., they will more importantly slow China and India's headlong rush to make the same mistakes we did in rapidly industrializing -- like selling $2,500 Tata cars to countless millions of Indians with little concern for the environmental consequences. If we succeed in developing viable energy alternatives, they could be a key export in helping us improve our balance of trade with consumer-goods producers.

Additional Considerations

Weaning ourselves off crude will hopefully be the crowning achievement that marks the progress of humankind in the 21st Century. With it may come development of oil-free products to replace the chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, fertilizers and pesticides that now consume 16% of the world's crude oil output and are likely culprits in fast rising cancer rates.

By its very definition, oil is crude. It's time we develop more refined energy sources and that will not happen without a cost driven shift in demand.

Crossing the Energy Chasm by John Robb

The EIA (Energy Information Administration) announced that it is now in the process of radically lowering its estimates for future oil production. So, here's a brief that put this news into context.

In tech and marketing literature, "crossing the chasm" is a popular tag for describing how a company crosses the gap between the early adopters of its products to the start of mainstream acceptance. It's also a good description for the energy situation we find ourselves in today.

What the Situation Looks Like

Our current global energy burn rate is 16 TW (terawatts), which is up from 0.7 TW at the turn of the 20th Century. This rate is growing at 0.5 TW a year (and accelerating), driven by three major sources of demand (China, India, and the energy exporting 14). It's very likely, given a judicious evaluation of the data, that this demand will double to 32 TW by 2025 (even with a global 1-2% decline in usage per $ of GDP due to efficiency improvements).

From Stored Solar to Active Solar

The bulk of the energy we feed this burn rate with is from stored solar -- essentially, energy delivered from the sun millions of years ago and stored inside the earth's crust. The problem we face with stored solar is that it is reaching production limits (particularly crude oil). In combination with this rapidly increasing demand, we will face a never ending series of price increases (occasionally mitigated by demand destruction) for stored solar energy as oil, natural gas, and coal deplete in series.

The only plentiful and scalable source of energy for continued growth of our civilization (as a dissipative system) is active solar, estimated to be in excess of 600++ TW per (recoverable). The problem is, when compared to liquid stored solar fuels, active solar energy is still 25-40 times more expensive (remember, electricity is a premium energy source when compared to liquid fuels) and must scale from a VERY low base (we are only in the "playground" stage of active solar). Further, by most optimistic technical estimates, we will only see equivalents to today's pricing and scale in 2050 and beyond.

The span in years between now and 2040 or so, is the CHASM we need to cross. Big money projects in the short term won't solve the problem (due to step function economics in an uncertain environment). In contrast, resilient communities provide a way to cross it organically.

Memorial Day 2008

“Of our three national holidays, for me, Memorial Day is the most significant. The Fourth of July celebrates our independence. Harkening back to our beginnings, Thanksgiving recalls our religious roots. But it’s the blood and guts (the suffering and sacrifice) symbolized by Memorial Day that made America possible. To make ideals real - and to protect and preserve them - requires payment in the coin of strife and death.” - Don Feder

Millions of American Patriots still reserve Memorial Day to honor the service and sacrifice of our fallen countrymen, who donned the uniforms of our Armed Forces with honor and under oath to defend of our Constitution and the cherished liberties it embodies. On 7 August 1782, General George Washington instituted the first formal military award of recognition for "any singularly meritorious action." It was a purple cloth heart, the predecessor of the now-familiar Purple Heart, which is awarded to any member of our Armed Services who is wounded or killed in combat or combat-related actions. For this reason, the decoration carries the profile of George Washington.

But our nation's supreme military award was instituted in 1861. That award is the Medal of Honor.

Some 3,400 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen have been awarded the Medal of Honor "for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty." Most have received this award posthumously.

On this Memorial Day, four young men who served in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be at the malls, nor will they be at the family barbecue.

These young men are not much different from others who have served in the past or those serving today in our nation's Armed Forces but for the fact that they responded to extraordinary circumstances with extraordinary courage.

They are Corporal Jason L. Dunham, USMC; Master-at-Arms Second Class Michael A. Monsoor, USN; Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith, USA; and Lieutenant Michael P. Murphy, USN.

Their Medal of Honor citations read:

DUNHAM, JASON L. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Rifle Squad Leader, 4th Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines (Reinforced), Regimental Combat Team 7, First Marine Division (Reinforced), on 14 April 2004. Corporal Dunham's squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission in the town of Karabilah, Iraq, when they heard rocket-propelled grenade and small arms fire erupt approximately two kilometers to the west. Corporal Dunham led his Combined Anti-Armor Team towards the engagement to provide fire support to their Battalion Commander's convoy, which had been ambushed as it was traveling to Camp Husaybah. As Corporal Dunham and his Marines advanced, they quickly began to receive enemy fire. Corporal Dunham ordered his squad to dismount their vehicles and led one of his fire teams on foot several blocks south of the ambushed convoy. Discovering seven Iraqi vehicles in a column attempting to depart, Corporal Dunham and his team stopped the vehicles to search them for weapons. As they approached the vehicles, an insurgent leaped out and attacked Corporal Dunham. Corporal Dunham wrestled the insurgent to the ground and in the ensuing struggle saw the insurgent release a grenade. Corporal Dunham immediately alerted his fellow Marines to the threat. Aware of the imminent danger and without hesitation, Corporal Dunham covered the grenade with his helmet and body, bearing the brunt of the explosion and shielding his Marines from the blast. In an ultimate and selfless act of bravery in which he was mortally wounded, he saved the lives of at least two fellow Marines. By his undaunted courage, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty, Corporal Dunham gallantly gave his life for his country, thereby reflecting great credit upon himself and upholding the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

MONSOOR, MICHAEL, A. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as automatic weapons gunner for Naval Special Warfare Task Group Arabian Peninsula, in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 29 September 2006. As a member of a combined SEAL and Iraqi Army Sniper Overwatch Element, tasked with providing early warning and stand-off protection from a rooftop in an insurgent held sector of Ar Ramadi, Iraq, Petty Officer Monsoor distinguished himself by his exceptional bravery in the face of grave danger. In the early morning, insurgents prepared to execute a coordinated attack by reconnoitering the area around the element's position. Element snipers thwarted the enemy's initial attempt by eliminating two insurgents. The enemy continued to assault the element, engaging them with a rocket-propelled grenade and small arms fire. As enemy activity increased, Petty Officer Monsoor took position with his machine gun between two teammates on an outcropping of the roof. While the SEALs vigilantly watched for enemy activity, an insurgent threw a hand grenade from an unseen location, which bounced off Petty Officer Monsoor's chest and landed in front of him. Although only he could have escaped the blast, Petty Officer Monsoor chose instead to protect his teammates. Instantly and without regard for his own safety, he threw himself onto the grenade to absorb the force of the explosion with his body, saving the lives of his two teammates. By his undaunted courage, fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of certain death, Petty Officer Monsoor gallantly gave his life for his country, thereby reflecting great credit upon himself and upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SMITH, PAUL R. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty: Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with an armed enemy near Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad, Iraq on 4 April 2003. On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of over 100 fellow soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly organized a hasty defense consisting of two platoons of soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle and three armored personnel carriers. As the fight developed, Sergeant First Class Smith braved hostile enemy fire to personally engage the enemy with hand grenades and anti-tank weapons, and organized the evacuation of three wounded soldiers from an armored personnel carrier struck by a rocket propelled grenade and a 60mm mortar round. Fearing the enemy would overrun their defenses, Sergeant First Class Smith moved under withering enemy fire to man a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on a damaged armored personnel carrier. In total disregard for his own life, he maintained his exposed position in order to engage the attacking enemy force. During this action, he was mortally wounded. His courageous actions helped defeat the enemy attack, and resulted in as many as 50 enemy soldiers killed, while allowing the safe withdrawal of numerous wounded soldiers. Sergeant First Class Smith's extraordinary heroism and uncommon valor are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the Third Infantry Division "Rock of the Marne," and the United States Army.

MURPHY, MICHAEL P. For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as the leader of a special reconnaissance element with Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Afghanistan on 27 and 28 June 2005. While leading a mission to locate a high-level anti-coalition militia leader, Lieutenant Murphy demonstrated extraordinary heroism in the face of grave danger in the vicinity of Asadabad, Konar Province, Afghanistan. On 28 June 2005, operating in an extremely rugged enemy-controlled area, Lieutenant Murphy's team was discovered by anti-coalition militia sympathizers, who revealed their position to Taliban fighters. As a result, between 30 and 40 enemy fighters besieged his four-member team. Demonstrating exceptional resolve, Lieutenant Murphy valiantly led his men in engaging the large enemy force. The ensuing fierce firefight resulted in numerous enemy casualties, as well as the wounding of all four members of the team. Ignoring his own wounds and demonstrating exceptional composure, Lieutenant Murphy continued to lead and encourage his men. When the primary communicator fell mortally wounded, Lieutenant Murphy repeatedly attempted to call for assistance for his beleaguered teammates. Realizing the impossibility of communicating in the extreme terrain, and in the face of almost certain death, he fought his way into open terrain to gain a better position to transmit a call. This deliberate, heroic act deprived him of cover, exposing him to direct enemy fire. Finally achieving contact with his Headquarters, Lieutenant Murphy maintained his exposed position while he provided his location and requested immediate support for his team. In his final act of bravery, he continued to engage the enemy until he was mortally wounded, gallantly giving his life for his country and for the cause of freedom. By his selfless leadership, courageous actions, and extraordinary devotion to duty, Lieutenant Murphy reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

To a man, they are among the most humble Patriots. To a man, they have told others that they did nothing more than the men next to them would have done, but for fate, it was their turn to act. All four of those men are now in the company of their Creator. Each of them could claim 2 Timothy 4:7: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith."