The recent attack on a military parade in central Kabul attended by President Karzai and Afghan and international dignitaries is a disturbing reminder that insurgents in Afghanistan are active, determined and dangerous. Unless the international community starts speaking with a single voice in pressing for an end to corruption and starts overcoming its own military command divisions, containing the insurgency is going to be even harder.
The Bush administration has increased the number of US troops to nearly 30,000, and NATO allies have deployed almost as many. But this is not just about numbers, too many countries have their own restrictions on where those troops can be deployed and what they can do once they get there. However, the idea that military might alone will turn back the tide of the Taliban -- the insurgent group in whose name most of the violence is carried out -- and their al Qaeda facilitators reflects the same false reading of the lessons of counter-insurgency that has persisted for the past six years.
Suicide bombings are up 600 per cent since 2005, a clear sign that the counter-insurgency strategy is failing. Even more critical, it is a sure sign that the state-building venture of the Karzai government is flawed. The reason? From the beginning there have been too few troops and too few resources to destroy al Qaeda at its roots and prevent Taliban remnants from reconstituting themselves. There has also been far too much corruption.
The U.S. instead opted for military and political "light" footprints, co-opting local -- and all too frequently corrupt -- factional leaders rather than deploying international troops. The Bush administration wanted to do Afghanistan reconstruction on the cheap while its leadership was obsessing with Iraq. And for six years, the failure of the Pakistan government to close down Taliban sanctuaries allowed them to recruit new cohorts, train them in terror tactics and provide weapons to attack in Afghanistan.
Security is critical to reconstruction -- but additional international military forces need to form part of a comprehensive civilian/military peacebuilding strategy that has both unity of command and unity of effort. U.S. military forces alone report to at least three different commands, in addition to NATO. The absence of a unified strategy with timetables, resource commitments and an end to caveats and conditions will simply lead to repeats of past errors.
The international civilian communities should stop sending conflicting messages about narcotics trafficking, police reform, and governance. While important initiatives such as replacing the corrupt police force have gotten underway, this must be ongoing with rigorous oversight if it is to be successful and sustainable. And nothing similar has been started for the judiciary or the prisons, which leaves the criminal justice system weak and dysfunctional. Nor has there been the kind of massive investment in rural infrastructure and reconstruction that is needed for a nation which is 70 per cent rural. The catch-22 in today's Afghanistan is that insecurity in the heartland of the insurgency means that reconstruction is haphazard and inconsistent. Outside the conflict zones, where reconstruction would be easier and help to prevent the spread of the insurgency, there has not been a comprehensive nationwide strategy for reconstruction. Hopefully, international donors will come together in Paris in a few weeks to review the record, and take the opportunity to make fundamental course corrections.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has found that those same insurgency battlegrounds produced the bulk of Afghanistan's 2007 poppy crops, which exported 93% of the world's opium. The UN found that nearly all poppy farmers in the southern and western regions were forced to pay taxes on opium to Taliban and local militia commanders.
Yet, the Afghan Government has not been held accountable to its own pledges on disarmament, transitional justice and anti-corruption. One example was the Special Consultative Board for Senior Government Appointments, which was created to vet senior level appointments to the central government, and judiciary, as well as provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security. Its members were appointed with much fanfare - as meeting the first benchmark of the Afghanistan Compact -- but the board has never properly functioned, has inadequate staff and is rarely consulted.
Despite the shortfalls, the courage and determination of many Afghans still give hope that stabilization and reconstruction can succeed. It will take time and it will take a new determination to require the Afghan government to show greater transparency, engage in institution-building and abide by the rule of law. The new democratic civilian Pakistan government, , is likely to be a better bet in the long term to keep Afghan Taliban command structures from operating quite so freely in Quetta and Peshawar. The international community must, however, ensure that military-led negotiations with militants in FATA do not empower home-grown extremists, and undermine efforts to place this region under state control. Long-term support for democratic institutions from the U.S. and the international community in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is essential.
The costs of failing to increase resources and invest new energy into rebuilding Afghanistan would be unacceptably high: a return to civil war with factions divided along regional and ethnic lines; a narco-state with institutions controlled by organized criminal gangs and terrorists; a Pashtun-dominated south largely abandoned to extremist lawlessness and increased intervention by regional powers.
No one can afford any of those outcomes.
Friday, May 23, 2008
Special Ops Command No Longer Acts Alone by Thom Shanker
The military’s elite Special Operations Command has stepped back from a controversial plan that gave it the authority to carry out secret counterterrorism missions on its own around the world.
The decision culminates four years of misgivings within the military that the command, with its expertise in commando missions and unconventional war, would use its broader mandate too aggressively, by carrying out operations that hadn’t been reviewed or approved by regional commanders.
A new Special Operations commander, Adm. Eric Olson of the Navy SEALs special force, has now said publicly that he intends to play a different role, and will instead continue the command’s new mission as coordinator of the military’s counterterrorism efforts around the world.
The shift reverses what Donald Rumsfeld put into place as defense secretary in 2004, when he said he wanted the Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, Fla., to operate unilaterally. He believed that it would be more aggressive in hunting down terrorists than the regional commanders, who are tied most closely to conventional forces.
Roger Carstens, a 20-year veteran of Special Operations missions who is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington, D.C., policy institute, said the Special Operations Command finally “came to the conclusion that its role is not to be that of a global Lone Ranger who shows up at the last second to dispatch the bad guys.”
“That just can’t be done,” Carstens said, “or rather, it should not be done.”
The change is the latest rejection of initiatives that Rumsfeld set forth during almost six years as defense secretary, before stepping down in 2006.
His successor, Robert Gates, has increased the size of the ground forces, a move Rumsfeld resisted; signed off on a plan to keep more troops in Europe than Rumsfeld had envisioned; and called for future budgets to focus on the weapons needed to fight insurgents and terrorists today, rather than on investments in next-generation technology advocated by Rumsfeld.
Gates, a former director of central intelligence, has also reined in some Pentagon intelligence operations and has otherwise sought to ease tensions caused by what intelligence officials saw as Rumsfeld’s attempts to give the Pentagon a more dominant role in American spying efforts.
In many ways, Rumsfeld’s goals for the Special Operations Command are being carried out by a subordinate unit, the Joint Special Operations Command.
That command is in charge of the armed forces’ most secretive counter-terrorism units, and is credited with capturing or killing many of the most wanted terrorist or insurgent leaders, including Saddam Hussein. This elite command operates in full coordination with the regional commanders in the Middle East, East Asia and other parts of the world.
The decision culminates four years of misgivings within the military that the command, with its expertise in commando missions and unconventional war, would use its broader mandate too aggressively, by carrying out operations that hadn’t been reviewed or approved by regional commanders.
A new Special Operations commander, Adm. Eric Olson of the Navy SEALs special force, has now said publicly that he intends to play a different role, and will instead continue the command’s new mission as coordinator of the military’s counterterrorism efforts around the world.
The shift reverses what Donald Rumsfeld put into place as defense secretary in 2004, when he said he wanted the Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, Fla., to operate unilaterally. He believed that it would be more aggressive in hunting down terrorists than the regional commanders, who are tied most closely to conventional forces.
Roger Carstens, a 20-year veteran of Special Operations missions who is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington, D.C., policy institute, said the Special Operations Command finally “came to the conclusion that its role is not to be that of a global Lone Ranger who shows up at the last second to dispatch the bad guys.”
“That just can’t be done,” Carstens said, “or rather, it should not be done.”
The change is the latest rejection of initiatives that Rumsfeld set forth during almost six years as defense secretary, before stepping down in 2006.
His successor, Robert Gates, has increased the size of the ground forces, a move Rumsfeld resisted; signed off on a plan to keep more troops in Europe than Rumsfeld had envisioned; and called for future budgets to focus on the weapons needed to fight insurgents and terrorists today, rather than on investments in next-generation technology advocated by Rumsfeld.
Gates, a former director of central intelligence, has also reined in some Pentagon intelligence operations and has otherwise sought to ease tensions caused by what intelligence officials saw as Rumsfeld’s attempts to give the Pentagon a more dominant role in American spying efforts.
In many ways, Rumsfeld’s goals for the Special Operations Command are being carried out by a subordinate unit, the Joint Special Operations Command.
That command is in charge of the armed forces’ most secretive counter-terrorism units, and is credited with capturing or killing many of the most wanted terrorist or insurgent leaders, including Saddam Hussein. This elite command operates in full coordination with the regional commanders in the Middle East, East Asia and other parts of the world.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Army Planning to Adapt and Transform by Jacqueline M. Hames
The Army's top uniformed budget officer stressed the importance of transforming the service to a capability-focused Army Enterprise during the Army Leader Forum at the Pentagon Tuesday.
Lt. Gen. David Melcher, military deputy for budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), illustrated why it is necessary to adapt and transform the Institutional Army during his presentation Tuesday.
The Army should run more like an enterprise to better develop and maintain a force in a period of extended conflict, he said, in which demands exceed sustainable resources. He predicted even tighter resources over the next few years, especially with a trend of smaller supplemental budget bills to finance the war on terror.
"We have enjoyed levels of spending over the last few years that are unprecedented in the Army's history...and may be the high-watermark for the Army's budget," he said.
Melcher said an Enterprise Management Task Force has been proposed to help implement business transformation across the Army. Though still being conceptualized, he said the task force may be managed by a three-star general and a senior executive service deputy.
It is necessary for an "enterprise approach" to counteract consumption-driven behaviors present in today's Army, Melcher explained. Efforts to adapt the Army's current structure focus on continuous process improvement through programs like Lean Six Sigma, Enterprise Resource Planning, leadership training in enterprise management, and the revision of General Order #3.
General Order #3 assigns functions and responsibilities to organizations in Headquarters, Department of the Army. Though still in revision, the order is predicted to guide the Army Enterprise, Melcher said, and will support the Army's transformation.
The Army will grow from the business transformation stage to a Lean Six Sigma-centered institution before reaching the enterprise end-state. Lean Six Sigma is a process improvement program which helps to eliminate unnecessary steps while improving output quality, and Melcher said it has a key role in transforming the Army into an enterprise.
"Lean Six Sigma is as much common sense as anything else," Melcher said.
The process will be "evolutionary rather than revolutionary," taking place over an extended period of time, he said.
By the spring of 2011, Melcher expects the Army will have established accountability metrics and mechanisms, instilled stewardship of resources as an Army value, and have established an effective governance structure and culture that supports the capability-focused Army Enterprise, he said.
"This is about thinking things through in a proactive and meaningful way," he said.
Lt. Gen. David Melcher, military deputy for budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), illustrated why it is necessary to adapt and transform the Institutional Army during his presentation Tuesday.
The Army should run more like an enterprise to better develop and maintain a force in a period of extended conflict, he said, in which demands exceed sustainable resources. He predicted even tighter resources over the next few years, especially with a trend of smaller supplemental budget bills to finance the war on terror.
"We have enjoyed levels of spending over the last few years that are unprecedented in the Army's history...and may be the high-watermark for the Army's budget," he said.
Melcher said an Enterprise Management Task Force has been proposed to help implement business transformation across the Army. Though still being conceptualized, he said the task force may be managed by a three-star general and a senior executive service deputy.
It is necessary for an "enterprise approach" to counteract consumption-driven behaviors present in today's Army, Melcher explained. Efforts to adapt the Army's current structure focus on continuous process improvement through programs like Lean Six Sigma, Enterprise Resource Planning, leadership training in enterprise management, and the revision of General Order #3.
General Order #3 assigns functions and responsibilities to organizations in Headquarters, Department of the Army. Though still in revision, the order is predicted to guide the Army Enterprise, Melcher said, and will support the Army's transformation.
The Army will grow from the business transformation stage to a Lean Six Sigma-centered institution before reaching the enterprise end-state. Lean Six Sigma is a process improvement program which helps to eliminate unnecessary steps while improving output quality, and Melcher said it has a key role in transforming the Army into an enterprise.
"Lean Six Sigma is as much common sense as anything else," Melcher said.
The process will be "evolutionary rather than revolutionary," taking place over an extended period of time, he said.
By the spring of 2011, Melcher expects the Army will have established accountability metrics and mechanisms, instilled stewardship of resources as an Army value, and have established an effective governance structure and culture that supports the capability-focused Army Enterprise, he said.
"This is about thinking things through in a proactive and meaningful way," he said.
Secretive Canadian spy agency to get $62-million HQ by Stewart Ball
Ottawa is spending $62-million to expand the country's ultrasecret electronic spy agency, Defence Minister Peter MacKay announced Thursday.
The money will pay for construction of a new building in Ottawa for the Communications Security Establishment, the most secretive branch of Canada's intelligence community.
The security branch operates an electronic eavesdropping system that collects signals intelligence. It works closely with allied agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
The announcement indicates the CSE has been growing since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Hundreds of employees have been hired since then and the existing campus was "no longer able to support the agency's day-to-day operations," the agency said in a press release.
The new 6,000-square-metre facility will open in 2011 and house up to 250 employees.
"A safe and secure Canada is one of the government's top priorities and CSE performs vital functions in safeguarding Canada's security," the minister said in a statement.
Exactly what the CSE does to protect security is one of the most closely guarded secrets in government. From its nondescript headquarters in south Ottawa, the CSE intercepts, decodes, translates and analyzes the phone calls and e-mails of Canada's adversaries. It also safeguards government computer systems.
Although the CSE operates under strict secrecy, signals teams are known to have played a role in the March 23, 2006, rescue of one British and two Canadian hostages in Iraq. The agency has also said it has listened to Taliban communications in Afghanistan. But most of its work is never publicized.
The expansion of CSE is a result of new powers it acquired following 9-11, changes in technology and the evolving nature of the international terrorism. Canada's mission in Afghanistan has also likely put additional strains on the agency, which said last year that a quarter of its intelligence reports related to the mission.
The agency originated after the Second World War when Ottawa merged two of its intelligence units to form what was then called the Communications Branch of the National Research Council. In 1975 it was renamed and placed under the wing of the Armed Forces. Following 9/11, terrorism replaced Soviet espionage as Canada's No. 1 national security threat and the branch shifted priorities accordingly.
At the time of the Sept. 11 attacks, the CSE was not allowed to listen in on any talk that originated or terminated in Canada. That changed in December, 2001, when Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, which allowed the CSE to eavesdrop on foreign intelligence targets, even if those communications had one foot in Canada.
The money will pay for construction of a new building in Ottawa for the Communications Security Establishment, the most secretive branch of Canada's intelligence community.
The security branch operates an electronic eavesdropping system that collects signals intelligence. It works closely with allied agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
The announcement indicates the CSE has been growing since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Hundreds of employees have been hired since then and the existing campus was "no longer able to support the agency's day-to-day operations," the agency said in a press release.
The new 6,000-square-metre facility will open in 2011 and house up to 250 employees.
"A safe and secure Canada is one of the government's top priorities and CSE performs vital functions in safeguarding Canada's security," the minister said in a statement.
Exactly what the CSE does to protect security is one of the most closely guarded secrets in government. From its nondescript headquarters in south Ottawa, the CSE intercepts, decodes, translates and analyzes the phone calls and e-mails of Canada's adversaries. It also safeguards government computer systems.
Although the CSE operates under strict secrecy, signals teams are known to have played a role in the March 23, 2006, rescue of one British and two Canadian hostages in Iraq. The agency has also said it has listened to Taliban communications in Afghanistan. But most of its work is never publicized.
The expansion of CSE is a result of new powers it acquired following 9-11, changes in technology and the evolving nature of the international terrorism. Canada's mission in Afghanistan has also likely put additional strains on the agency, which said last year that a quarter of its intelligence reports related to the mission.
The agency originated after the Second World War when Ottawa merged two of its intelligence units to form what was then called the Communications Branch of the National Research Council. In 1975 it was renamed and placed under the wing of the Armed Forces. Following 9/11, terrorism replaced Soviet espionage as Canada's No. 1 national security threat and the branch shifted priorities accordingly.
At the time of the Sept. 11 attacks, the CSE was not allowed to listen in on any talk that originated or terminated in Canada. That changed in December, 2001, when Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, which allowed the CSE to eavesdrop on foreign intelligence targets, even if those communications had one foot in Canada.
Europe Must Better Coordinate Defense: Experts by Antonie Boessenkool
European countries will need more interdependence in their defense spending habits to get to an optimal level of capability, as individual countries don't have the budgets to meet the costs of developing the necessary capabilities, a senior official from the European Defence Agency said May 21 at a discussion on European defense spending trends.
Defense spending in European countries is "too fragmented," said Ulf Hammarstrom, director for Industry and Market at the European Defense Agency. "We go so much to the same operations with very different equipment, and we have to have our own logistical and maintenance chains."
Hammarstrom and others spoke at a Washington presentation of a Center for Strategic and International Studies report on European defense spending trends. CSIS researchers found that European nations' defense spending has increased only slightly from 2001 to 2006, outpaced in most European countries by economic growth.
Yet spending on defense procurement, research and development has gone up 26 percent. The total number of European troops deployed overseas, not counting those at permanent overseas bases, increased from 65,000 to 80,000, but total troop levels among European countries decreased by 12 percent from 2001 to 2006. If those trends continue, future European forces could be smaller and better equipped than they currently are, CSIS reported.
But to better equip and protect their forces, European countries need to better coordinate their defense spending, said Jim Townsend, one of the speakers and director of the Program on International Security at The Atlantic Council.
"We will never get the capabilities we want … unless we do it in a collaborative, transparent way," Townsend said, speaking of capabilities for NATO member countries.
More coordination of European defense outlays means countries will have to look outside their borders for their defense needs, according to Hammarstrom.
"Traditionally, not only in Europe but around the world … countries try as much as possible to be self-sufficient in providing equipment for their forces," Hammarstrom said. "This does not have a future in Europe."
Stronger European capabilities for operations, be it EU-, NATO-, or UN-led, will only come through a stronger European security and defense policy, he said. "The basis of the nations is too small for that. Therefore, we need a more common market for the defense industries to be able to develop within."
Most member nations of the EDA have agreed to take part in a relatively new initiative by the EDA to publish their defense contracting opportunities on an electronic bulletin board for other European nations to see and promising fair competition for those contracts, Hammarstrom said. Under the initiative, started a year and a half ago, countries have published contracts totaling 10 billion euros. One fifth of those contracts have now been awarded, and one third of the awarded contracts have gone to non-European countries.
"To ensure that we have a competent and competitive industrial base for the future, we should also try to seek less dependency on non-European sources of supply, and this of course means less dependence through more effective programs and industrial strategy," Hammarstrom said.
"It does not mean fortress Europe or non-dependent," he added. "We will always cooperate outside of Europe." The EDA has started to identify "key technologies which we want to preserve or develop within Europe." A list is to be developed soon on these areas.
The defense trade relationship between the United States and Europe is undergoing "tectonic shifts right now," Townsend said, and Northrop Grumman's and EADS' partnership on the Air Force refueling tanker competition is a prime example of that shift.
"Usually, industry is way ahead of the government in these kinds of things," he said. "I hope that we are able on an industrial basis to be in collaboration as well."
Defense spending in European countries is "too fragmented," said Ulf Hammarstrom, director for Industry and Market at the European Defense Agency. "We go so much to the same operations with very different equipment, and we have to have our own logistical and maintenance chains."
Hammarstrom and others spoke at a Washington presentation of a Center for Strategic and International Studies report on European defense spending trends. CSIS researchers found that European nations' defense spending has increased only slightly from 2001 to 2006, outpaced in most European countries by economic growth.
Yet spending on defense procurement, research and development has gone up 26 percent. The total number of European troops deployed overseas, not counting those at permanent overseas bases, increased from 65,000 to 80,000, but total troop levels among European countries decreased by 12 percent from 2001 to 2006. If those trends continue, future European forces could be smaller and better equipped than they currently are, CSIS reported.
But to better equip and protect their forces, European countries need to better coordinate their defense spending, said Jim Townsend, one of the speakers and director of the Program on International Security at The Atlantic Council.
"We will never get the capabilities we want … unless we do it in a collaborative, transparent way," Townsend said, speaking of capabilities for NATO member countries.
More coordination of European defense outlays means countries will have to look outside their borders for their defense needs, according to Hammarstrom.
"Traditionally, not only in Europe but around the world … countries try as much as possible to be self-sufficient in providing equipment for their forces," Hammarstrom said. "This does not have a future in Europe."
Stronger European capabilities for operations, be it EU-, NATO-, or UN-led, will only come through a stronger European security and defense policy, he said. "The basis of the nations is too small for that. Therefore, we need a more common market for the defense industries to be able to develop within."
Most member nations of the EDA have agreed to take part in a relatively new initiative by the EDA to publish their defense contracting opportunities on an electronic bulletin board for other European nations to see and promising fair competition for those contracts, Hammarstrom said. Under the initiative, started a year and a half ago, countries have published contracts totaling 10 billion euros. One fifth of those contracts have now been awarded, and one third of the awarded contracts have gone to non-European countries.
"To ensure that we have a competent and competitive industrial base for the future, we should also try to seek less dependency on non-European sources of supply, and this of course means less dependence through more effective programs and industrial strategy," Hammarstrom said.
"It does not mean fortress Europe or non-dependent," he added. "We will always cooperate outside of Europe." The EDA has started to identify "key technologies which we want to preserve or develop within Europe." A list is to be developed soon on these areas.
The defense trade relationship between the United States and Europe is undergoing "tectonic shifts right now," Townsend said, and Northrop Grumman's and EADS' partnership on the Air Force refueling tanker competition is a prime example of that shift.
"Usually, industry is way ahead of the government in these kinds of things," he said. "I hope that we are able on an industrial basis to be in collaboration as well."
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
Defense's Realist Rebel: Gates Doctrine by Michael Gerson
When he was told that some in the Army were dismissive of press reports on the mistreatment of patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to one witness, grew "very, very quiet." Within two weeks, the Walter Reed commander was out of a job.
This kind of decisive silence has been employed by Gates to good effect in scandals ranging from misdirected nuclear parts to the cremation of fallen American soldiers and pets at the same facility.
To those who know this Eagle Scout with 28 years of experience in government, his subdued efficiency is not surprising. To those of us who haven't had the pleasure, his transformational ambitions and strategic boldness are surprising indeed.
When Gates was nominated in late 2006, conservative suspicions and liberal hopes coincided. Gates, then a member of the Iraq Study Group, was expected to ease the American retreat from Iraq and begin the American engagement with Iran. Foreign policy realism was back. When asked at his confirmation hearing if America was winning in Iraq, Gates replied, "No, sir" -- a candor that foretold change. But since Gates was the opposite of an ideologue, it was difficult to predict what form that change would take.
In the 17 months of his tenure, some of this transition has been stylistic. One Pentagon source (who didn't want to be identified for fear of sounding like a suck-up) calls Gates "extraordinarily quick and extraordinarily even" and praises his "sense of humor and candor behind closed doors."
But the most important shift has been substantive. Donald Rumsfeld -- along with the early President George W. Bush -- set out an ambitious vision of military transformation. The Pentagon would use a period of relative international calm to make bold leaps in military capabilities so America would be unmatched in future wars. That calm ended on Sept. 11, 2001, but the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were still generally seen as temporary distractions from this great transformational purpose.
Far from treating Iraq as a distraction, Gates has posed the question: Why not concentrate on winning the wars our soldiers are currently fighting? In a series of groundbreaking speeches, Gates has argued that asymmetrical conflicts in the "long war" against "violent jihadist networks" will remain the likely face of battle for decades to come, that "procurement and training have to focus on that reality," and that shaping civilian attitudes in these conflicts will be just as important as winning battles.
There have been at least three practical outcomes of the nicely rhymed Gates Doctrine -- "the war we are in . . . is the war we must win" -- in Iraq and beyond.
First, Gates has pushed to deploy technologies immediately useful in low-intensity conflict, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles. "Three armed Predators over Sadr City," says my military contact, "have hammered anyone challenging our forces. They help account for the eagerness for a cease-fire."
Second, Gates is institutionalizing the teaching of counterinsurgency strategy. The old theory, says my contact, went: "If we could do the big stuff -- major combat operations -- we could take care of the little stuff, the asymmetrical stuff. But the little stuff turned out to be more prolonged and difficult." So the Army's new manual on "Full Spectrum Operations" trains new officers to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive and "stability operations" -- things such as political reconciliation, providing basic services, promoting local government. "The human terrain," says my source, "is the decisive terrain, and Gates gets it."
Third, Gates argues that while American military power can be a prerequisite for stability, winning asymmetrical wars requires other elements of American power. So he calls for "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security -- diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development."
The Gates Doctrine has helped right a listing Iraq war -- and has met opposition. Getting the Air Force to deploy unmanned vehicles instead of concentrating on expensive, manned aircraft has been, Gates says, like "pulling teeth." Elements of the defense establishment, he charges, have been "preoccupied with future capabilities and procurement programs, wedded to lumbering peacetime process and procedures, stuck in bureaucratic low-gear." Recently -- almost seven years after Sept. 11, five years after the Iraq war began -- Gates noted that portions of the military are still not on a "war footing."
With Americans engaged in a war, this scandal dwarfs any that Gates has faced. In confronting it, the "realist" has become genuinely transformational.
This kind of decisive silence has been employed by Gates to good effect in scandals ranging from misdirected nuclear parts to the cremation of fallen American soldiers and pets at the same facility.
To those who know this Eagle Scout with 28 years of experience in government, his subdued efficiency is not surprising. To those of us who haven't had the pleasure, his transformational ambitions and strategic boldness are surprising indeed.
When Gates was nominated in late 2006, conservative suspicions and liberal hopes coincided. Gates, then a member of the Iraq Study Group, was expected to ease the American retreat from Iraq and begin the American engagement with Iran. Foreign policy realism was back. When asked at his confirmation hearing if America was winning in Iraq, Gates replied, "No, sir" -- a candor that foretold change. But since Gates was the opposite of an ideologue, it was difficult to predict what form that change would take.
In the 17 months of his tenure, some of this transition has been stylistic. One Pentagon source (who didn't want to be identified for fear of sounding like a suck-up) calls Gates "extraordinarily quick and extraordinarily even" and praises his "sense of humor and candor behind closed doors."
But the most important shift has been substantive. Donald Rumsfeld -- along with the early President George W. Bush -- set out an ambitious vision of military transformation. The Pentagon would use a period of relative international calm to make bold leaps in military capabilities so America would be unmatched in future wars. That calm ended on Sept. 11, 2001, but the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were still generally seen as temporary distractions from this great transformational purpose.
Far from treating Iraq as a distraction, Gates has posed the question: Why not concentrate on winning the wars our soldiers are currently fighting? In a series of groundbreaking speeches, Gates has argued that asymmetrical conflicts in the "long war" against "violent jihadist networks" will remain the likely face of battle for decades to come, that "procurement and training have to focus on that reality," and that shaping civilian attitudes in these conflicts will be just as important as winning battles.
There have been at least three practical outcomes of the nicely rhymed Gates Doctrine -- "the war we are in . . . is the war we must win" -- in Iraq and beyond.
First, Gates has pushed to deploy technologies immediately useful in low-intensity conflict, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles. "Three armed Predators over Sadr City," says my military contact, "have hammered anyone challenging our forces. They help account for the eagerness for a cease-fire."
Second, Gates is institutionalizing the teaching of counterinsurgency strategy. The old theory, says my contact, went: "If we could do the big stuff -- major combat operations -- we could take care of the little stuff, the asymmetrical stuff. But the little stuff turned out to be more prolonged and difficult." So the Army's new manual on "Full Spectrum Operations" trains new officers to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive and "stability operations" -- things such as political reconciliation, providing basic services, promoting local government. "The human terrain," says my source, "is the decisive terrain, and Gates gets it."
Third, Gates argues that while American military power can be a prerequisite for stability, winning asymmetrical wars requires other elements of American power. So he calls for "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security -- diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development."
The Gates Doctrine has helped right a listing Iraq war -- and has met opposition. Getting the Air Force to deploy unmanned vehicles instead of concentrating on expensive, manned aircraft has been, Gates says, like "pulling teeth." Elements of the defense establishment, he charges, have been "preoccupied with future capabilities and procurement programs, wedded to lumbering peacetime process and procedures, stuck in bureaucratic low-gear." Recently -- almost seven years after Sept. 11, five years after the Iraq war began -- Gates noted that portions of the military are still not on a "war footing."
With Americans engaged in a war, this scandal dwarfs any that Gates has faced. In confronting it, the "realist" has become genuinely transformational.
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