Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates implored the U.S. military Tuesday to prepare more for fighting future wars against insurgents and militias such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than spending so much time and money preparing for conventional conflicts.
In unusually strong language, Gates warned against what he described as a tendency in the Pentagon to fall back on Cold War mentalities and said he feared that lessons from the U.S. struggle against insurgencies in Iraq could fade unless military commanders understand that today's enemies are the foes of the future.
Gates said there must be a balance between meeting today's demands and tomorrow's contingencies, but he expressed concern that the defense establishment is not concentrating hard enough on what might be needed in future conflicts. He said the armed services and their corporate counterparts should steer technology and resources toward battling insurgencies.
"Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today," Gates said at a Heritage Foundation conference in the shadow of the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Cheyenne Mountain compound. "What we must guard against is the kind of backsliding that has occurred in the past, where if nature takes its course, these kinds of capabilities -- that is, counterinsurgency -- tend to wither on the vine."
Gates also criticized the tendency of armed services to fund technologies that could deal with future threats while current needs go unmet. He pointed to the lapses at Walter Reed Army Medical Center -- where the reluctance to spend money on a facility slated to close led to substandard conditions for service members returning from war.
He also mentioned the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected truck, a $1 million vehicle designed to protect U.S. troops from improvised bombs that Gates said met resistance because some officials said it would not be useful after the war in Iraq. He said that in more than 150 attacks on MRAPs, only six soldiers died, citing it as an example of a system that troops need now but that is "competing with the funding for future weapons systems with strong constituencies inside and outside the Pentagon."
Gates has raised this issue before, particularly in discussions of the Air Force's F-22 fighter jet, which that service covets for its speed, agility and ability to battle advanced fighters from countries such as China, but which has not made a single combat sortie over Iraq or Afghanistan.
"I believe that any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to the kind of irregular campaigns that, as I mentioned, are most likely to engage America's military in coming decades," Gates said. "Without a fundamental change to this dynamic, it will be difficult to sustain support for these kinds of weapons programs in the future."
He also criticized the Pentagon's procurement cycle, which, he said, adds cost and complexity.
Gates said the wars of the past quarter-century point to a need for counterinsurgency strength, including conflicts involving the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon and Americans in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
"Smaller, irregular forces -- insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists -- will find ways, as they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular militaries," Gates said. "And even nation-states will try to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric way, rather than play to our inherent strengths."
Gates said the U.S. military "would be hard-pressed to launch a major conventional ground operation elsewhere in the world at this time," but he added: "Where would we sensibly do that? The United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any, repeat any, adversary who committed an act of aggression, whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Straits of Taiwan. There is a risk, but it is a prudent and manageable one."
But Gates said that if the U.S. were to give up on Iraq -- to lose there -- it would send a message that the Army is broken, and that such a failure could cripple the all-volunteer force as an institution.
"That is the war we are in," Gates said. "That is the war we must win."
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Monday, May 12, 2008
Increasing domestic turmoil in Iran by Olivier Guitta
To many observers Iran is the big winner in the Middle East. While the end result remains to be seen, what seems certain is that the Islamic republic appears to be faring better geopolitically than domestically. And although uncensored information regarding the country's internal problems is scarce and tough to find, reports of increasing trouble in the country are starting to filter out.
The situation in some provinces inhabited by minorities is far from ideal for Tehran. The Kurdish province has seen regular violent clashes between Kurds and Iranian forces. Consequently, Tehran has recently stepped-up its repression of the Kurdish population.
Unrest, however, is not limited to the Kurds; the Baluch minority is cause of great concern to the regime. In fact, the newsletter TheCroissant.com reported that Iran is discreetly leading a violent military campaign in the Kerman province, bordering Baluchistan.
The latest clashes have claimed dozens of deaths in the ranks of Iranian forces and many civilian casualties. According to the usually well informed Internet web site Elaph, "Jund Allah," a faction of the Iranian Sunni opposition in Baluchistan, claimed responsibility for the April 25 abduction in the town of Fahraj of Jawad Tahiri, supreme leader, Ali Khamenei's representative in the Kerman province.
According to the Baluch opposition, Tehran has increased its operations since Tahiri's kidnapping. Despite the violent skirmishes between government forces and Sunni militias, the Revolutionary Guards involved in these operations have not managed to liberate Tahiri.
Also on April 27, Hassan Bijari, a close ally of Tehran and the Shiite imam of a Zahedan mosque (in the Baluchistan province), was shot thrice while in his car.
The situation of the economy is far from brilliant. One would think with the barrel of oil at about $115, and Iran sitting on the second-largest gas and oil reserves in the world, the country's economy would be thriving.
But economic statistics show a bleak picture: officially, inflation stands at about 20 percent, and unemployment around 15 percent (while many estimate this rate to be around 30 percent). GDP's growth for 2007 could reach 4.5 percent instead of the 6 percent expected. Iran's economy is quite frail: indeed 85 percent of Iran's revenue comes from the sale of oil abroad but at the same time, Iran imports an important chunk of the refined products it uses, like gasoline (about 40 percent).
Furthermore, it looks like not only the U.N. sanctions against Iran, but more importantly, the financial pressures imposed by the U.S. Treasury are having a significant impact on the economy.
A recent French government report notes how dire the situation is for the Iranian economy. Because of a drying of foreign investment, vital to the survival of the economy especially in the oil and gas sector, Iran could become a net importer of oil within 15 years.
In fact, about 18 months ago, a report prepared by the foreign affairs and defense commission of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), acknowledged that an embargo would destabilize Iran's economy and weaken its rate of exchange, while discouraging private investment. As a result, the report says, Iran "would be forced to modify its national priorities, and to devote the bulk of its resources to preventing major social upheaval, which could cause a deterioration of living standards for an important part of the population." Already, UNICEF considers that close to 25 percent of Iran's population lives under the relative poverty line; other estimates are much higher.
That leads to the third and potentially most threatening danger for the mullah's regime: the malaise within Iranian society. Poverty and unemployment are not the only ills eating up Iran. Oppression and clamping down on civil society add to that explosive mix.
A clear indication of souring times; Iranian authorities have executed 357 people in 2007, almost one person a day, 40 percent more than in 2006. Repression has not only targeted minorities and other religions but also feminists and students asking for additional rights.
In a country where 60 percent of the population is under 25, the regime is having a hard time keeping its young people happy. Some statistics do not bode well for the mullahs.
Iran has at the same time one of the highest suicide rates among youngsters in the world, one of the highest drug consumption rate in the world and the fastest growing HIV infected population in the world. Suicide is the second leading cause of death in Iran and affects mostly young women who use self-immolation to commit suicide. There are close to 4 million drug addicts in the country and a recent official study revealed that at least 15 percent of the nine- to 25-year-old population bracket is using hard drugs.
Needless to say that in light of the chaos in some provinces, a bleak economy and an increasing malaise in the society, the mullahs are facing a very tough domestic situation. Interestingly, the Majlis report previously cited stated: "the members of the regime who were interviewed by the commission indicated that any deterioration of the economic situation could cause social disturbances that would weaken domestic stability." Are these the rumblings of a potential popular uprising against the mullahs?
The internal dynamics tend to indicate that Iran's current regime might not have such a long shelf life after all. Especially if the CIA thinks there is no chance whatsoever of a domestic uprising. Indeed if history is any indication, the day the CIA will bluntly state that there is no chance of a revolution happening in Iran, might turn out to be the day it will actually take place. At least that is what happened in 1979.
The situation in some provinces inhabited by minorities is far from ideal for Tehran. The Kurdish province has seen regular violent clashes between Kurds and Iranian forces. Consequently, Tehran has recently stepped-up its repression of the Kurdish population.
Unrest, however, is not limited to the Kurds; the Baluch minority is cause of great concern to the regime. In fact, the newsletter TheCroissant.com reported that Iran is discreetly leading a violent military campaign in the Kerman province, bordering Baluchistan.
The latest clashes have claimed dozens of deaths in the ranks of Iranian forces and many civilian casualties. According to the usually well informed Internet web site Elaph, "Jund Allah," a faction of the Iranian Sunni opposition in Baluchistan, claimed responsibility for the April 25 abduction in the town of Fahraj of Jawad Tahiri, supreme leader, Ali Khamenei's representative in the Kerman province.
According to the Baluch opposition, Tehran has increased its operations since Tahiri's kidnapping. Despite the violent skirmishes between government forces and Sunni militias, the Revolutionary Guards involved in these operations have not managed to liberate Tahiri.
Also on April 27, Hassan Bijari, a close ally of Tehran and the Shiite imam of a Zahedan mosque (in the Baluchistan province), was shot thrice while in his car.
The situation of the economy is far from brilliant. One would think with the barrel of oil at about $115, and Iran sitting on the second-largest gas and oil reserves in the world, the country's economy would be thriving.
But economic statistics show a bleak picture: officially, inflation stands at about 20 percent, and unemployment around 15 percent (while many estimate this rate to be around 30 percent). GDP's growth for 2007 could reach 4.5 percent instead of the 6 percent expected. Iran's economy is quite frail: indeed 85 percent of Iran's revenue comes from the sale of oil abroad but at the same time, Iran imports an important chunk of the refined products it uses, like gasoline (about 40 percent).
Furthermore, it looks like not only the U.N. sanctions against Iran, but more importantly, the financial pressures imposed by the U.S. Treasury are having a significant impact on the economy.
A recent French government report notes how dire the situation is for the Iranian economy. Because of a drying of foreign investment, vital to the survival of the economy especially in the oil and gas sector, Iran could become a net importer of oil within 15 years.
In fact, about 18 months ago, a report prepared by the foreign affairs and defense commission of the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), acknowledged that an embargo would destabilize Iran's economy and weaken its rate of exchange, while discouraging private investment. As a result, the report says, Iran "would be forced to modify its national priorities, and to devote the bulk of its resources to preventing major social upheaval, which could cause a deterioration of living standards for an important part of the population." Already, UNICEF considers that close to 25 percent of Iran's population lives under the relative poverty line; other estimates are much higher.
That leads to the third and potentially most threatening danger for the mullah's regime: the malaise within Iranian society. Poverty and unemployment are not the only ills eating up Iran. Oppression and clamping down on civil society add to that explosive mix.
A clear indication of souring times; Iranian authorities have executed 357 people in 2007, almost one person a day, 40 percent more than in 2006. Repression has not only targeted minorities and other religions but also feminists and students asking for additional rights.
In a country where 60 percent of the population is under 25, the regime is having a hard time keeping its young people happy. Some statistics do not bode well for the mullahs.
Iran has at the same time one of the highest suicide rates among youngsters in the world, one of the highest drug consumption rate in the world and the fastest growing HIV infected population in the world. Suicide is the second leading cause of death in Iran and affects mostly young women who use self-immolation to commit suicide. There are close to 4 million drug addicts in the country and a recent official study revealed that at least 15 percent of the nine- to 25-year-old population bracket is using hard drugs.
Needless to say that in light of the chaos in some provinces, a bleak economy and an increasing malaise in the society, the mullahs are facing a very tough domestic situation. Interestingly, the Majlis report previously cited stated: "the members of the regime who were interviewed by the commission indicated that any deterioration of the economic situation could cause social disturbances that would weaken domestic stability." Are these the rumblings of a potential popular uprising against the mullahs?
The internal dynamics tend to indicate that Iran's current regime might not have such a long shelf life after all. Especially if the CIA thinks there is no chance whatsoever of a domestic uprising. Indeed if history is any indication, the day the CIA will bluntly state that there is no chance of a revolution happening in Iran, might turn out to be the day it will actually take place. At least that is what happened in 1979.
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Highlighting al-Qaeda's Bankrupt Ideology by Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson
According to recent U.S. government reports and senior U.S. counterterrorism officials, contesting al-Qaeda's message is no less important than capturing or killing the group's operatives. And as the administration prioritizes its agenda for the last eight months in office, recognizing the need for a refocused communication plan to highlight the bankruptcy of al-Qaeda's ideology is a critical -- albeit overdue -- part of a reengineered counterterrorism strategy.
"All Elements of National Power"
The State Department's 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism and recent speeches by senior officials indicate that the U.S. government's communication strategy for combating al-Qaeda's ideology has shifted considerably in two respects. First, there is increased recognition that communication must be an integral part of counterterrorism strategy. As Ambassador Dell Dailey, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, recently noted, "Communication should...be used by the United States and its allies to shape perceptions, build allies, and dissuade potential terrorists. This must be a central component in U.S. strategy because it influences attitudes and behavior."
According to Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, this is particularly true when it comes to al-Qaeda, whose leaders are "sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of both their actions and their ideology. They care about their image because it has real-world effects on recruitment, donations, and support in Muslim and religious communities."
While the U.S. government paid attention to its communication strategy in the first few years following the September 11 attacks, counterterrorism officials were far more focused on capturing or killing terrorists. Today contesting al-Qaeda's ideology is an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
Focus on Terrorists
Although the "struggle of ideas in the Islamic world" section of the State Department report still focuses on the U.S. government's attempts to explain its policies and values, its message has undergone a serious overhaul. The initial U.S. approach in the wake of the September 11 attacks was to try and sell the United States to overseas audiences, an approach widely regarded as ineffective in stemming the tide of radicalization. Efforts now concentrate on discrediting the terrorists.
The United States has gone about this using a two-fold approach. As National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) director Michael Leiter suggests, the United States is trying to point out "how bankrupt" al-Qaeda's ideology is, and demonstrate that "it is al-Qaeda, and not the West, that is truly at war with Islam" by highlighting the extent to which Muslims are victims of the organization's attacks. At a press conference releasing the State Department report, both Ambassador Dailey and NCTC deputy director Russ Travers emphasized that more than 50 percent of the victims of al-Qaeda attacks last year were Muslim, in addition to the approximately 100 targeted mosques.
In general, the United States is trying to highlight the fact that al-Qaeda is a merciless and cruel organization whose tactics -- such as deploying mentally deficient people as suicide bombers -- are repugnant. As Leiter argued, "showing the barbarism of groups like al-Qaeda in the light of truth is, ultimately, our strongest weapon." The United States is now even using this approach to try and give al-Qaeda second thoughts about using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Leiter pointed out that people in the Muslim world are already turning against al-Qaeda, and "no barbarism could be greater than the use of WMD." While the early results of this new approach are promising, as Department of Homeland Security undersecretary Charles Allen noted, at this point, "no Western state has effectively countered the al-Qaeda narrative."
Shrinking al-Qaeda Down to Size
After years of emphasizing the seriousness of the terrorist threat, the United States is now concerned that the widespread view of a resurgent al-Qaeda may be helping the organization recruit new members. As Ambassador Dailey stated, one of al-Qaeda's goals is to "create a perception of a worldwide movement more powerful than it actually is." Consequently, the United States seems to be making a concerted effort to avoid contributing to this phenomenon. In fact, while acknowledging that the organization is resurgent in its safe haven along Pakistan's Afghan border, a number of senior administration officials have begun to predict victory. Zarate, for example, cited a number of "important signs that mark progress and point to the eventual demise of al-Qaeda." In an April speech at Chatham House in London, FBI Director Robert Mueller suggested that al-Qaeda would be destroyed within a matter of years, not decades.
An International -- Not Just American -- Problem
While the report makes clear that American targets remain a high priority for al-Qaeda, it also highlights the fact that the United States is not alone atop the target list. The 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2005 London attacks, and the recently thwarted plots in Germany, England, and Scotland demonstrate that Europe faces an equally serious threat. In fact, a review of the State Department report and the European Union's 2007 terrorism report (issued by Europol, the EU's law enforcement organization) reveals that Americans and Europeans now see the nature of the threat in similar terms.
For example, both reports focus on the danger posed by al-Qaeda's resurgence in Pakistan's tribal areas. According to the EU report, al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells were uncovered in Denmark and Germany in 2007. As a result, the Europol report explains that the EU no longer views al-Qaeda as merely a threat to the UK, with its large expatriate Pakistani community, but to other European countries as well. More recently, a suspected terrorist network comprised almost entirely of Pakistanis was discovered in Spain. After the cell was arrested, a Spanish judge commented that, "In my opinion, the jihadi threat from Pakistan is the biggest emerging threat we are facing in Europe."
Conclusion
Refocusing U.S. efforts to include a robust strategic communication blueprint is a critical component of an overall counterterrorism strategy. Arresting and killing operatives alone does little to counter the disturbingly effective radicalization campaign through which al-Qaeda and like-minded groups build both physical and virtual support networks.
To effectively engage in this transnational battle of ideas, the U.S. and allied governments will have to work in concert -- something easier said than done. Despite their shared views of the terrorist threat, U.S. officials worry that the United States and Europe still approach counterterrorism in fundamentally different ways. In a speech at Kansas State University in April, CIA Director Michael Hayden referred to a "transatlantic divide" between the United States and Europe on counterterrorism issues. In Hayden's opinion, the Europeans "tend not to view terrorism as we do, as an overwhelming international challenge. Or if they do, we often differ on what would be effective and appropriate to counter it." Europeans, meanwhile, describe cyberspace as one of the most critical battlefields in the war on terror, and note with significant frustration that many of the worst offending terrorist propaganda websites are still hosted in the United States.
America's new strategic communication battle plan is a strong step in the right direction. Finding ways to get this new message out to the right audiences in Europe, America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East will require a renewed dedication to transnational cooperation in a war that will be increasingly fought on a virtual battlefield.
"All Elements of National Power"
The State Department's 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism and recent speeches by senior officials indicate that the U.S. government's communication strategy for combating al-Qaeda's ideology has shifted considerably in two respects. First, there is increased recognition that communication must be an integral part of counterterrorism strategy. As Ambassador Dell Dailey, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, recently noted, "Communication should...be used by the United States and its allies to shape perceptions, build allies, and dissuade potential terrorists. This must be a central component in U.S. strategy because it influences attitudes and behavior."
According to Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, this is particularly true when it comes to al-Qaeda, whose leaders are "sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of both their actions and their ideology. They care about their image because it has real-world effects on recruitment, donations, and support in Muslim and religious communities."
While the U.S. government paid attention to its communication strategy in the first few years following the September 11 attacks, counterterrorism officials were far more focused on capturing or killing terrorists. Today contesting al-Qaeda's ideology is an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
Focus on Terrorists
Although the "struggle of ideas in the Islamic world" section of the State Department report still focuses on the U.S. government's attempts to explain its policies and values, its message has undergone a serious overhaul. The initial U.S. approach in the wake of the September 11 attacks was to try and sell the United States to overseas audiences, an approach widely regarded as ineffective in stemming the tide of radicalization. Efforts now concentrate on discrediting the terrorists.
The United States has gone about this using a two-fold approach. As National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) director Michael Leiter suggests, the United States is trying to point out "how bankrupt" al-Qaeda's ideology is, and demonstrate that "it is al-Qaeda, and not the West, that is truly at war with Islam" by highlighting the extent to which Muslims are victims of the organization's attacks. At a press conference releasing the State Department report, both Ambassador Dailey and NCTC deputy director Russ Travers emphasized that more than 50 percent of the victims of al-Qaeda attacks last year were Muslim, in addition to the approximately 100 targeted mosques.
In general, the United States is trying to highlight the fact that al-Qaeda is a merciless and cruel organization whose tactics -- such as deploying mentally deficient people as suicide bombers -- are repugnant. As Leiter argued, "showing the barbarism of groups like al-Qaeda in the light of truth is, ultimately, our strongest weapon." The United States is now even using this approach to try and give al-Qaeda second thoughts about using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Leiter pointed out that people in the Muslim world are already turning against al-Qaeda, and "no barbarism could be greater than the use of WMD." While the early results of this new approach are promising, as Department of Homeland Security undersecretary Charles Allen noted, at this point, "no Western state has effectively countered the al-Qaeda narrative."
Shrinking al-Qaeda Down to Size
After years of emphasizing the seriousness of the terrorist threat, the United States is now concerned that the widespread view of a resurgent al-Qaeda may be helping the organization recruit new members. As Ambassador Dailey stated, one of al-Qaeda's goals is to "create a perception of a worldwide movement more powerful than it actually is." Consequently, the United States seems to be making a concerted effort to avoid contributing to this phenomenon. In fact, while acknowledging that the organization is resurgent in its safe haven along Pakistan's Afghan border, a number of senior administration officials have begun to predict victory. Zarate, for example, cited a number of "important signs that mark progress and point to the eventual demise of al-Qaeda." In an April speech at Chatham House in London, FBI Director Robert Mueller suggested that al-Qaeda would be destroyed within a matter of years, not decades.
An International -- Not Just American -- Problem
While the report makes clear that American targets remain a high priority for al-Qaeda, it also highlights the fact that the United States is not alone atop the target list. The 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2005 London attacks, and the recently thwarted plots in Germany, England, and Scotland demonstrate that Europe faces an equally serious threat. In fact, a review of the State Department report and the European Union's 2007 terrorism report (issued by Europol, the EU's law enforcement organization) reveals that Americans and Europeans now see the nature of the threat in similar terms.
For example, both reports focus on the danger posed by al-Qaeda's resurgence in Pakistan's tribal areas. According to the EU report, al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells were uncovered in Denmark and Germany in 2007. As a result, the Europol report explains that the EU no longer views al-Qaeda as merely a threat to the UK, with its large expatriate Pakistani community, but to other European countries as well. More recently, a suspected terrorist network comprised almost entirely of Pakistanis was discovered in Spain. After the cell was arrested, a Spanish judge commented that, "In my opinion, the jihadi threat from Pakistan is the biggest emerging threat we are facing in Europe."
Conclusion
Refocusing U.S. efforts to include a robust strategic communication blueprint is a critical component of an overall counterterrorism strategy. Arresting and killing operatives alone does little to counter the disturbingly effective radicalization campaign through which al-Qaeda and like-minded groups build both physical and virtual support networks.
To effectively engage in this transnational battle of ideas, the U.S. and allied governments will have to work in concert -- something easier said than done. Despite their shared views of the terrorist threat, U.S. officials worry that the United States and Europe still approach counterterrorism in fundamentally different ways. In a speech at Kansas State University in April, CIA Director Michael Hayden referred to a "transatlantic divide" between the United States and Europe on counterterrorism issues. In Hayden's opinion, the Europeans "tend not to view terrorism as we do, as an overwhelming international challenge. Or if they do, we often differ on what would be effective and appropriate to counter it." Europeans, meanwhile, describe cyberspace as one of the most critical battlefields in the war on terror, and note with significant frustration that many of the worst offending terrorist propaganda websites are still hosted in the United States.
America's new strategic communication battle plan is a strong step in the right direction. Finding ways to get this new message out to the right audiences in Europe, America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East will require a renewed dedication to transnational cooperation in a war that will be increasingly fought on a virtual battlefield.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)