ARTICLE: Tour de France - An Applauded Army About to be Downsized, By Joris Janssen Lok, Ares, 4/17/2008
Here's where our limited success in articulating a grand strategy that says, "Our Leviathan/SysAdmin force allows for connectivity at various stages along the conflict spectrum, and you (here, France) complete us here," can haunt us. A France that doesn't see its military contribution recognized and appreciated by the Core as a whole can choose to lose that capability, and once lost, end up being de facto "retired" from that tier of activity, meaning we degrade the Core's overall capacity for SysAdmin the longer we signal we're good at the first half but the second half is too complex and too hard for us or any combination of us and them.
That's why to me, it's use it (SysAdmin) or lose it (both the Core's aggregate SysAdmin capacity and our own self-deterred Leviathan).
In short, time is not on our side.
Saturday, May 03, 2008
Author John Robb: The Resilient Community
What am I doing? I've been hard at work on my next book: The Resilient Community.
Recent thoughts? While I was writing this morning, I was surprised at how much Brave New War's (BNW) exploration of the future of warfare informs the new book on:
a) the nature of the emerging threats that will be faced and
b) how a Resilient Community can defend itself.
As a result, I think that people that liked BNW will find the chapter on warfare in the RC book very interesting indeed.
My goal with this book? I hope this book will provide readers with a useful eschatology for the current global system and a conceptual blueprint for the DIY (do-it-yourself) efforts necessary to build a Resilient Community.
The reaction the book will get? For those that completely tied to or immersed in the legacy system, this book will be a very scary read. For those that are fearless and willing to adapt in order to progress, it will become a go to reference.
Recent thoughts? While I was writing this morning, I was surprised at how much Brave New War's (BNW) exploration of the future of warfare informs the new book on:
a) the nature of the emerging threats that will be faced and
b) how a Resilient Community can defend itself.
As a result, I think that people that liked BNW will find the chapter on warfare in the RC book very interesting indeed.
My goal with this book? I hope this book will provide readers with a useful eschatology for the current global system and a conceptual blueprint for the DIY (do-it-yourself) efforts necessary to build a Resilient Community.
The reaction the book will get? For those that completely tied to or immersed in the legacy system, this book will be a very scary read. For those that are fearless and willing to adapt in order to progress, it will become a go to reference.
Worry about the Daemon not Grand Theft Auto by Roderick Jones
The release of Grand Theft Auto IV accompanied as usual by howls of protest from certain quarters of the media about declining moral standards. For the uninitiated Grand Theft Auto is a video game where the player takes on the guise of a criminal character in Liberty city, which is modeled to look like New York City. Whatever the protests the game is set to break opening week sales figures of over $400M, arguably making video games the most dominant of all media forms. This fact, rather than the predictable tut-tutting of assorted commentators is a trend, which is worth examining from a security and intelligence perspective. There are a number of ideas flying around at the moment that don’t fall under a single banner but which taken as a whole can be thought of as suggesting a new way of considering terrorism or counter-terrorism, particularly through the lens of gaming and other immersive environments. The two categories that roughly coalesce are the application of gaming logic to real-life scenarios and the projects that have emerged from the ‘human terrain mapping’ initiated by the Pentagon. Putting these two modules together allows for a peek over the horizon at what might be next.
There is little doubt that gaming culture is becoming a powerful and pervasive part of society, especially the compelling nature of Massive Multiplayer games. The way these games are designed-- the intricate procedural architecture of earning points for completing certain tasks in certain ways, is a template that can be applied to real-life; especially if one were to overlay a gaming template onto real-life activities. One group that has been active in this realm is 42 Entertainment that produce Alternative Reality Games 42 Entertainment. The ‘AI’ game involved millions of people across the planet collectively solving a series of puzzles both online and in the real world and became known as 'the Beast'. ARG game tasks are too complicated for any one person but the Internet allows for a collective intelligence to emerge and assemble the pieces and solve the puzzles. (ARGs) in order to market products. The first such ARG was tied to the Steven Spielberg movie, ‘AI: Artificial Intelligence’ and was developed by Jordan Weisman, then a Microsoft executive.
Two authors have recently expertly explored these themes in two quite stunning books. The first and most far-reaching is Daemon by Leniad Zeraus (Daniel Suarez). The book explores the overlaying of a gaming system onto real-life by a deceased computer game designer. This book is as intellectually expansive as Snow Crash, which is widely credited with inspiring today’s virtual worlds. The books suggestion of a world controlled by techniques directly adapted from gaming procedures is provocative and compelling. The second and more focused book is Halting State by Charles Stross, which explores a robbery at a virtual bank and again the overlaying of gaming architecture onto real-life. This theme of applying gaming logic over real life doesn’t as yet have a snappy title, although ARG comes close (perhaps Daemon is better though). Whatever you call the system it does rely, at heart, on the fact that human behavior is becoming more predictable through the collection of data about our online lives. What is remarkable at The Daemon is how much the novel relies on human social engineering as well as advanced software to make its case.
The data being collected on users by technology companies, ISP’s and a host of other entities allows for the creation of models that with a built in level of error can somewhat predict future human behavior. One such researcher in this area is Paul Torrens who has programmed avatars to replicate certain human physical behaviors, and then by placing them in crowd situations predications can be made on the direction of the crowd. This is the fruit of the human terrain mapping projects coming out of DARPA. Nobody is quite clear as yet what the models can be used for other than obvious areas such as, the design of buildings or crowd control but this research could be combined with the gaming architectures to produce real-life gaming parameters where human responses are predictable within a range of options. By now you may be wondering what has this all got to do with national security? Well these systems may be very good ways of organizing distributed groups to complete complex tasks -- for good or ill. The first advantage is the built in level of security as participants would not be required to know who else was involved in the wider platform or what the end result was supposed to be. The best way to highlight this is to think about the 9/11 terrorist attacks in gaming terms. By considering the desired end result the terrorist-designer of the real-life game could work backwards to gather the necessary resources and skills. Entry level gamers would (in real life) score points for learning English, becoming familiar with airport security (again tested online), radicalization (their zeal could be ranked using online quizzes and interviews and scored accordingly) and of course their capability on flight simulator software. This ‘game’ could be offered to numerous people without any of them being aware of what the purpose was. Those who score the highest could be sent the actual funds to carryout the operation. This is of course looking backwards an ARG (or Daemon) system such as this could be constructed by any radical or even mainstream organization in order to develop recruits or conduct a wide variety of distributed small tasks that collectively add-up to a significant whole. What works for one side also works for the other. Intelligence agencies around the world are currently asking themselves what their response should be to virtual worlds and gaming in general. One answer is certainly to adapt the underlying systems of these games to conduct some national security functions - training agents and organizing individuals to act as part of a massively distributed project are two such possibilities. Drawing the larger lessons from gaming architecture is the strategic response to rise of gaming and virtual worlds.
The adoption of gaming culture and platforms into real-life is a realistic scenario and one with potential benefits as well as pitfalls. The lesson from Grand Theft Auto IV’s expected success isn’t that we should be worried about declining moral standards, it is that gaming culture is now pervasive and as with all technology innovations it can be adapted by anyone for fair means or foul.
The Continuing Debate Over "Jihadists" As The Enemy by Jeffrey Imm
Last week, the Associated Press reported that the State Department approved National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) guidelines for terminology in defining the enemy created by NCTC's Extremist Messaging Branch, based on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report "Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims". In these new guidelines, the term "jihadist" (among others) was not to be used in defining the enemy or its actions.
But this week, it is apparent that these new guidelines are not being reflected in the State Department annual terrorist report and in comments from President Bush.
In the April 2008 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 released today, anyone can clearly see the use of the terms "jihad", "jihadist", "jihadi", "mujahedin / mujahadin", "caliphate", "Islamist" -- as nouns describing enemy terrorist activity and ideology (not just in the titles of Jihadist groups' names).
Such usage can been easily found in the Microsoft Word version of the State Department report:
- "jihad": pages 63, 75, 81, 107, 126, 127, 174, 187, 272
- "jihadi(s)": pages 10, 93, 94, 103, 107, 122
- "jihadist": pages 116, 117, 120, 121
- "Islamist": pages 17, 52, 62, 75, 87, 93, 95, 122, 188, 271, 291
These references are clearly describing State Department counterterrorist analyst descriptions of enemy terrorist individuals, activity, and ideology. For example, such phrases in the annual State Department terror report as: "promoting jihad and recruiting potential suicide bombers" (p. 75), "a recruitment network for foreign jihadis" (p. 93), "recruiting jihadists to fight" (p. 117), "numerous cells dedicated to sending Jihadi fighters" (p. 122), "AQ leadership has called for jihad against UN forces" (p. 174) -- don't sound like a view of "jihad" as a "spiritual struggle".
Moreover, in President Bush's April 28 press conference, he referred to the enemy as "jihadists" - to an assembled press corps that never asked him a single question about the remark.
In last week's reported NCTC memorandum and DHS report on the proper terminology in describing the enemy, the NCTC is quoted stating that "[n]ever use the terms 'jihadist' or 'mujahedeen' in conversation to describe the terrorists...calling our enemies 'jihadis' and their movement a global 'jihad' unintentionally legitimizes their actions." As described in last week's article on this subject, I pointed out that this viewpoint challenges many of the key passages in the 9/11 Commission Report.
Does the NCTC and DHS now think that the State Department and President Bush are "legitimizing" the actions of the enemy by using such terms?
War on Extremism (W.O.E) versus War on Jihad
In President Bush's April 28 press conference where he defined the enemy as "jihadists", the President also referred to the war with them as an "ideological struggle". But what ideology are we struggling against, Mr. President? "Jihad" or "Extremism"? Or is the newspeak of the War on Extremism (W.O.E.) just too hard for our leadership to remember?
It seems that the administration cannot decide on this critical, defining issue in this global war. This is the result of a reactive, tactical-centric approach to global war with an undefined enemy. The effectiveness of America's global war efforts are dependent on such agreed-upon definitions and clear identification of the enemy. Yet within the past week, one part of the government is stating "never use the terms 'jihadist' or 'mujahedeen'", while another part of the government is using precisely such terms in policy speeches to the nation and in documentation on the ongoing threat.
In the very visible debate over the Iraq war, Defense Secretary Gates made a similar "gaffe" in the past two weeks. On April 13, Secretary Gates appeared on CBS's "Face the Nation" and clearly communicated his views that "the enemy is extremism in Iraq". Yet a week later, on April 21, when speaking at West Point U.S. Military Academy, Secretary Gates warned of "the threat posed by violent jihadist networks"; this same speech does not once refer to "extremists". Once again, Secretary Gates needs to clarify - who is the enemy - "extremists" or "jihadists"? Surely, the Secretary of Defense can consistently define the global enemy we are fighting.
The State Department's annual report clearly states that Americans are fighting Jihadists in Iraq, and is concerned over such issues as: a "network for foreign jihadis in Iraq" (p. 93), the "travel of jihadists to Iraq" (p. 116), "recruiting jihadists to fight in Iraq" (p. 117), and "cells dedicated to sending Jihadi fighters to Iraq" (p. 122). Or does the State Department really mean "extremists"?
Advocates of a War on Extremism (W.O.E.) and NCTC / DHS Guidelines
As I pointed out in last week's article in the national drift towards a War on Extremism (W.O.E.), the trend towards redefining the war as one of fighting "extremism" and in accommodating Islamists has been growing -- both in the United States and internationally. The NCTC / DHS terminology guidelines represent another worrisome milestone on this dangerous path.
But there are advocates of such a strategy of W.O.E. who have welcomed the NCTC and DHS terminology recommendations to ban the use of terms such as "jihadist".
For example, the NCTC/DHS guidelines were warmly received by the Muslim Brotherhood-founded Muslim American Society (MAS). (Perhaps the NCTC and DHS should ask if they are going in the right direction when a Muslim Brotherhood-founded organization applauds their actions.)
On April 27, the Muslim American Society posted an article from "Think Progress" on the MAS website titled "Homeland Security Report Sharply Rebukes McCain's 'Islamic Extremism' Rhetoric". The article references the efforts by unindicted HLF terror trial co-conspirator, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), in launching "a campaign to persuade Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) to drop the adjective 'Islamic' when describing terrorists and extremists". Other political blogs have sought to link the two issues, mockingly challenging the McCain campaign if it thinks "the Bush administration's State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and National Counter Terrorism Center should be ignored, too?"
The political blog "The Carpetbagger Report" believes that the NCTC/DHS guidelines demonstrate that "officials seem to realize the significance of these religio-political words". Like many commentators, the author fails to actually define the significance of such "religio-political" words, but assumes that they are understood. Today's State Department report and President Bush's comments in yesterday's press conference clearly shows how wrong that assumption is.
The Thailand newspaper "The Nation" published an editorial applauding such terminology guidelines in its April 30 edition titled "US govt may be getting the message - finally". For context, Thailand is a nation that, over the past 4 years, has seen 2,776 killed as a result of Jihadist attacks in Thailand's southern regions - nearly the same death toll as the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City. Thailand is a nation whose southern region has suffered from a continuous string of cowardly Jihadist attacks on children, women, and the elderly, including the beheading of helpless elders.
Yet The Nation's editorial applauds the W.O.E. tactic of banning the term "jihadist", stating that jihad is an "overused word" that is correctly used to apply to the "broader Islamic concept of the struggle to do good". The Nation states that "[w]alking a dog across the street to ensure it doesn't get hit by a fast-moving car is a jihad, one Islamic cleric told The Nation." The Nation further argues that "if we want to win the hearts and minds...we are going to have to come up with a choice of words, not to mention the need to think outside the box". This editorial was published the same day as three more of Thailand's police were murdered in a Jihadist ambush. Perhaps The Nation can tell this message to the widows and the families of policemen murdered by Thai Jihadists on the very day its newspaper championed banning the use of the term "jihadist" in reference to terrorism. Clearly, appeasement of Jihadists knows no boundaries.
Why Definitions Are So Vital To Our War Strategy
As previously discussed, the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)AUMF, there has been no consistent or detailed definition of the enemy, nor has there been a clearly defined strategy to defeat this enemy in the global "ideological struggle". This has resulted in a reactive approach to fighting "terrorists", and now "extremists", without an ideological framework of who and why we are fighting. Provides a very limited definition of the enemy restricted to "those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons".
In developing any blueprint strategy in an "ideological struggle", the first and most fundamental action must be shared, agreed-upon definitions. In a war strategy, such definitions are literally of life-and-death importance. Yet our leadership on this issue continues to send out mixed, confused messages as to who and what the enemy is. Not only is solving this problem a priority for future American political leadership, it is the patriotic responsibility of the current American political leadership. This is not a theoretical discussion for the members of America's armed forces who literally trust their lives on the effectiveness of such leadership in providing such clear strategic guidance.
A nation that cannot define its enemy has little hope of defeating it. Hope is not a strategy, but hope is dependent on a strategy. In a global ideological struggle, the one thing the American people can't afford to lose is hope. As the advocates of War on Extremism (W.O.E.) struggle with newspeak on "extremists" that we must not "legitimize", the security, trust, and hopes of the American people are dependent on American political leadership to effectively define an enemy whose ideology we can strategically counter and defeat.
This recent demonstration of the American government's inability to consistently define the enemy illustrates how vital and imperative such action is.
Friday, May 02, 2008
Investigative Project Releases Gov't Memos Curtailing Speech in War on Terror by Steven Emerson
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is refusing to identify the "influential Muslim Americans" and "leading U.S.-based scholars and commentators on Islam" who met with Secretary Michael Chertoff in helping shape a softer approach to government lexicon about terrorists and their ideological motivations.
"Our policy is we don't comment on the Secretary's private schedule," spokeswoman Amy Kudwa told the IPT. Nor would she identify any of the participants' organizational affiliation.
DHS and the State Department's Counterterrorism Communications Center each issued reports urging government employees to avoid words like "jihad," "mujahedeen" or any reference to Islam or Muslims, especially in relation to Al Qaeda. The Investigative Project on Terrorism is making the documents available for the first time here and here.
As we reported last week, the memos say a change in language from the U.S. government is needed to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims and avoid glamorizing terrorists motivated by religious ideology. "Moderate" is also frowned upon in the memos, though, with "mainstream" or "traditional" suggested as replacements.
Among the recommendations not reported previously:
* "The experts we consulted debated the word ‘liberty,' but rejected it because many around the world would discount the term as a buzzword for American hegemony."
* "The fact is that Islam and secular democracy are fully compatible – in fact, they can make each other stronger. Senior officials should emphasize that fact."
* The USG [U.S. government] should draw the conflict lines not between Islam and the West, but between a dangerous, cult-like network of terrorists and everyone who is in support of global security and progress.
So America, after serving for more than two centuries the sanctuary for huddled masses yearning to breathe free, is being asked to minimize liberty against fanatics bent on a global religious state. The memo doesn't offer examples to show where Islam and secular democracy have reinforced each other, or explain how Shariah law, the imposition of religion into state affairs, is "fully compatible" with secular democracy.
It is no surprise, however, to see the changes praised by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC):
"MPAC has long promoted a nuanced approach towards the lexicon of terrorism emanating from the United States government and media. It is essential that various elements of the government recognize the importance of decoupling Islam with terrorism. Furthermore, using Islamic language to describe terrorists falsely bolsters their religious credibility among the very people we most need -- the majority of mainstream Muslims around the world."
The memorandum described by the Associated Press reportedly also draws heavily on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report that examined the way American Muslims reacted to different phrases used by U.S. officials to describe terrorists and recommended ways to improve the message. Through its regular government engagement with government agencies including DHS, MPAC has repeatedly addressed the importance of refraining from ideologically based language that mischaracterizes the Muslim community domestically and abroad.
The fact that the government agencies are implementing such recommendations in their communications is a victory for constructive engagement with the Muslim American community. Implementing the recommendations, as they are described in media reports, would serve as a powerful tool in isolating the terrorists.
In other writings, MPAC's more nuanced approach involves accepting, not isolating, terrorists. It repeatedly has lobbied to remove Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah from the U.S. list of designated terrorist groups. Its 2003 counterterrorism policy critique says:
"Arab states question Washington's list of designated pro-Palestinian groups and humanitarian organizations. It is clear that the current terrorist threat to the US emanates from Al-Qaeda and not Palestinian groups. There is no evidence that Palestinian groups designated as terrorist organizations have any connections to Al-Qaeda. Yet the preoccupation with these groups raises the question as to whether targeting Palestinian groups serves true national security interests or is based on political considerations."
Now, look at the bottom of page 2 on the DHS memo: "Hezbollah and Hamas are distinct in methods, motivations and goals from Al Qaeda," it says. "When possible, the experts recommend that USG terminology should make this clear."
If only it were true. Suicide attacks are staples of the methods of each group. The imposition of Islamic law, or Shariah, is a goal stated by each.
These organizations are responsible for the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians – often by the preferred method of suicide bombing, not to mention their roles in derailing U.S. foreign policy and efforts to achieve peace. But MPAC, despite these obvious details, as well as the fact that the U.S. has designated terrorist groups in every corner of the earth [Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Spain (the Basque group, ETA), Japan (Aum Shinrikyo), Sri Lanka (the Tamil Tigers), Ireland (IRA and related groups), Colombia (FARC), Peru (Shining Path) and even Israel (Kahane Chai)], somehow finds itself engaging in conspiracy theorizing about the unfair "political" treatment of misunderstood entities like Hamas and Hizballah. And it is incredibly frightening to see government agencies directly involved in our national security buy into this philosophy, wholesale.
One prominent Muslim American who wasn't consulted is physician M. Zuhdi Jasser, president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy. In response to an e-mail from the IPT about the memos, Jasser said the suggested changes could diminish American understanding of the ideological motivations behind those who threaten our security:
"It is interesting that the only venues in which this nomenclature is even a question is in the west where Muslims are a minority and Islamists are able to deceive the majority or just live in complete denial. In Muslim majority nations the radicals call themselves Muslims, Islamists, and Jihadists in Arabic and every other language with little time spent admonishing society not to call them what they call themselves."
Certainly pious loyal American Muslims will be frustrated with the inappropriate use of the name of Islam and ‘jihad' in the militant causes by these radicals around the world. But that frustration should be directed toward frontal Muslim anti-Islamist and anti-militant causes and movements. Denying that considerable movements of radical Muslims exist around the world which exploit our religion and truly believe that their barbarism is ‘jihad' will only empower them more and delay the inevitable conflict within our faith community over "whose Islam, which Islam". For the USG to paternally dismiss the self-described nomenclature of ‘jihadists' and "Islamists" is to in fact embark into a realm which really is an internal struggle within the consciousness of the Muslim community. We should call the terrorists what they call themselves. Once any Muslim, let alone non-Muslims, begins to determine who is and who is not qualified to define ‘jihad', ‘Muslim', or ‘Islam' they are creating a clergy and a ‘church' with a communication and excommunication process. That is exactly what the likes of Bin Laden and other radical Islamists want.
"Words matter," the DHS report says. They sure do. That's why hiding the very language and ideological justification used by terrorists from the American people is misguided at best. It is why a soft-pedaled lexicon from unnamed experts and Islamist activists is counter productive.
Trying to isolate terrorists is a clear goal for the government. But moderate, er, mainstream Muslims, shouldn't need us to serve as language police to protect them from those who use their religion to terrorize the world.
"Our policy is we don't comment on the Secretary's private schedule," spokeswoman Amy Kudwa told the IPT. Nor would she identify any of the participants' organizational affiliation.
DHS and the State Department's Counterterrorism Communications Center each issued reports urging government employees to avoid words like "jihad," "mujahedeen" or any reference to Islam or Muslims, especially in relation to Al Qaeda. The Investigative Project on Terrorism is making the documents available for the first time here and here.
As we reported last week, the memos say a change in language from the U.S. government is needed to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims and avoid glamorizing terrorists motivated by religious ideology. "Moderate" is also frowned upon in the memos, though, with "mainstream" or "traditional" suggested as replacements.
Among the recommendations not reported previously:
* "The experts we consulted debated the word ‘liberty,' but rejected it because many around the world would discount the term as a buzzword for American hegemony."
* "The fact is that Islam and secular democracy are fully compatible – in fact, they can make each other stronger. Senior officials should emphasize that fact."
* The USG [U.S. government] should draw the conflict lines not between Islam and the West, but between a dangerous, cult-like network of terrorists and everyone who is in support of global security and progress.
So America, after serving for more than two centuries the sanctuary for huddled masses yearning to breathe free, is being asked to minimize liberty against fanatics bent on a global religious state. The memo doesn't offer examples to show where Islam and secular democracy have reinforced each other, or explain how Shariah law, the imposition of religion into state affairs, is "fully compatible" with secular democracy.
It is no surprise, however, to see the changes praised by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC):
"MPAC has long promoted a nuanced approach towards the lexicon of terrorism emanating from the United States government and media. It is essential that various elements of the government recognize the importance of decoupling Islam with terrorism. Furthermore, using Islamic language to describe terrorists falsely bolsters their religious credibility among the very people we most need -- the majority of mainstream Muslims around the world."
The memorandum described by the Associated Press reportedly also draws heavily on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report that examined the way American Muslims reacted to different phrases used by U.S. officials to describe terrorists and recommended ways to improve the message. Through its regular government engagement with government agencies including DHS, MPAC has repeatedly addressed the importance of refraining from ideologically based language that mischaracterizes the Muslim community domestically and abroad.
The fact that the government agencies are implementing such recommendations in their communications is a victory for constructive engagement with the Muslim American community. Implementing the recommendations, as they are described in media reports, would serve as a powerful tool in isolating the terrorists.
In other writings, MPAC's more nuanced approach involves accepting, not isolating, terrorists. It repeatedly has lobbied to remove Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah from the U.S. list of designated terrorist groups. Its 2003 counterterrorism policy critique says:
"Arab states question Washington's list of designated pro-Palestinian groups and humanitarian organizations. It is clear that the current terrorist threat to the US emanates from Al-Qaeda and not Palestinian groups. There is no evidence that Palestinian groups designated as terrorist organizations have any connections to Al-Qaeda. Yet the preoccupation with these groups raises the question as to whether targeting Palestinian groups serves true national security interests or is based on political considerations."
Now, look at the bottom of page 2 on the DHS memo: "Hezbollah and Hamas are distinct in methods, motivations and goals from Al Qaeda," it says. "When possible, the experts recommend that USG terminology should make this clear."
If only it were true. Suicide attacks are staples of the methods of each group. The imposition of Islamic law, or Shariah, is a goal stated by each.
These organizations are responsible for the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians – often by the preferred method of suicide bombing, not to mention their roles in derailing U.S. foreign policy and efforts to achieve peace. But MPAC, despite these obvious details, as well as the fact that the U.S. has designated terrorist groups in every corner of the earth [Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Spain (the Basque group, ETA), Japan (Aum Shinrikyo), Sri Lanka (the Tamil Tigers), Ireland (IRA and related groups), Colombia (FARC), Peru (Shining Path) and even Israel (Kahane Chai)], somehow finds itself engaging in conspiracy theorizing about the unfair "political" treatment of misunderstood entities like Hamas and Hizballah. And it is incredibly frightening to see government agencies directly involved in our national security buy into this philosophy, wholesale.
One prominent Muslim American who wasn't consulted is physician M. Zuhdi Jasser, president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy. In response to an e-mail from the IPT about the memos, Jasser said the suggested changes could diminish American understanding of the ideological motivations behind those who threaten our security:
"It is interesting that the only venues in which this nomenclature is even a question is in the west where Muslims are a minority and Islamists are able to deceive the majority or just live in complete denial. In Muslim majority nations the radicals call themselves Muslims, Islamists, and Jihadists in Arabic and every other language with little time spent admonishing society not to call them what they call themselves."
Certainly pious loyal American Muslims will be frustrated with the inappropriate use of the name of Islam and ‘jihad' in the militant causes by these radicals around the world. But that frustration should be directed toward frontal Muslim anti-Islamist and anti-militant causes and movements. Denying that considerable movements of radical Muslims exist around the world which exploit our religion and truly believe that their barbarism is ‘jihad' will only empower them more and delay the inevitable conflict within our faith community over "whose Islam, which Islam". For the USG to paternally dismiss the self-described nomenclature of ‘jihadists' and "Islamists" is to in fact embark into a realm which really is an internal struggle within the consciousness of the Muslim community. We should call the terrorists what they call themselves. Once any Muslim, let alone non-Muslims, begins to determine who is and who is not qualified to define ‘jihad', ‘Muslim', or ‘Islam' they are creating a clergy and a ‘church' with a communication and excommunication process. That is exactly what the likes of Bin Laden and other radical Islamists want.
"Words matter," the DHS report says. They sure do. That's why hiding the very language and ideological justification used by terrorists from the American people is misguided at best. It is why a soft-pedaled lexicon from unnamed experts and Islamist activists is counter productive.
Trying to isolate terrorists is a clear goal for the government. But moderate, er, mainstream Muslims, shouldn't need us to serve as language police to protect them from those who use their religion to terrorize the world.
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