At a panel on Capitol Hill yesterday, Contributing Experts Matthew Levitt and Walid Phares, along with Prof. Yonah Alexander and Dr. Milton Hoenig, discussed the range of options available to the U.S. and the West in dealing with Iran. I will post a more detailed summary of the discussion within the next week, but in the meantime, please review the excellent story by reporter Matt Korade in today's edition of Congressional Quarterly's Homeland Security. The story was written for subscribers, but CQ has generously agreed to my request to post the entire story as a service to our readers. I've reduced the line spacing from the original to save space.
Iran Analysts Look to Reframe the Debate
By Matt Korade, CQ Staff
To engage or confront Iran: That is the question on one of the most critical issues of the day — the Middle East nation’s nuclear program. But Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy, told a Capitol Hill audience Tuesday that the question is being framed the wrong way. The two options, engagement or confrontation, are poles of a spectrum whose middle ground offers a number of alternatives, with sanctions one possibility, said Levitt, who was participating in a panel discussion of the outlook for U.S.-Iranian relations over the next decade. The discussion was part of a forum sponsored by the Counterterrorism Foundation, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
Right now, however, sanctions are seen not as one tool, but the tool, a problem akin to “constantly hitting the sink with a hammer,” Levitt said. The main thrust of actions against Iran should be to paralyze its aggressive behavior, whether that be its meddling in Israeli-Palestinian affairs through the provision of funding, technical support and weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah, its Quds force activities in Iraq, or its financing and providing arms to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Levitt said. In fact, he said, such activities as Iran’s reliance on proxy groups reflect its vulnerabilities in the international balance. Iran’s support for Sunni groups, for example, is more an effort to make local conflicts part of a global strategy to further its objectives than a Shia attempt to become part of the Salafist-Islamist movement.
Walid Phares, a senior fellow with the Future of Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of “The Confrontation: Winning the War Against Future Jihad,” explained that the country’s activities in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan reflect its feeling of being contained on all sides, most recently by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan; although it has gained strength since the toppling of Iraq, Iran is being prevented from easily expanding its regional influence. The nuclear question will aid Iran’s ambitions in part by enabling it to keep its domestic affairs in order, its possession of the bomb helping to prevent the international community from getting involved in its internal crises, and in particular the numerous conflicts arising from reformists.
Understanding Iran’s primary concern of stabilizing its internal control over opposition groups is a key to recognizing what kinds of negotiating tactics to take and incentives to offer with the country, Levitt said. The United States also should consider taking additional actions against the Quds force, which in addition to involvement with terrorism is invested throughout the Iranian economy, as well as examining further options against the county’s banking, reinsurance and shipping industries.
Yonah Alexander, director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and co-author with nuclear physicist Milton Hoenig of “The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East,” said there is a long list of Iranian activities to focus on, including theological and political radicalization, propaganda and psychological warfare, violations of human rights, economic problems, organized crime such as that involved with narco-trafficking, state-sponsored terrorism, WMD development and regional destabilization.
Hoenig added that Iran should be made to admit to its past nuclear-weapons development activities. While many in Washington viewed the latest National Intelligence Estimate as misleading because of its limited definition of a nuclear weapons program to the design of warheads and covert enrichment of fissile materials, at least the estimate identified that there was in fact such a nuclear weapons program, something the Iranian government has never admitted.
With Iran moving quickly toward its uranium enrichment goals — including the recent announcement by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Iran was installing 6,000 centrifuges at its plant in Natanz — the panelists said it’s time for the United States and its allies to try a new approach.
Hoenig said one option proposed recently by Thomas Pickering, a former undersecretary of State for political affairs; William Luers, a former ambassador; and Jim Walsh, a former director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, would allow Iran to pursue uranium-enrichment activities as part of a multinational, jointly managed effort. Although Ahmadinejad himself proposed a similar multilateral solution in the past, it was difficult to see how such a plan could be implemented while Iran continues international hostilities and remains unwilling to account for its past nuclear weapons program.
Whatever course the United States and international community takes, it is important to realize that engaging Iran for the sake of engaging won’t bear fruit, Levitt said. “Iran must be made to understand that violent tactics and political engagement can’t go together,” he said.
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Trying to Stay One Step Ahead of the Terrorists by Andrew Cochran
In connection with our continuing coverage of terrorists' uses of the online world, I submit the following advertisement for an online seminar to educate law enforcement in the next generation of cyber forensics:
"Unlike most other smart phones, the iPhone incorporates desktop-like features in an easy-to-use mobile package. As a result of its high level of technology and available features, many are likely to use it as a primary device for various forms of data and communication. While some of a suspect's data can be viewed using the direct GUI interfaces in the iPhone's software, much hidden and deleted data is available as well, which may provide for more thorough evidence gathering."
"Existing commercial forensic tools are sadly lacking their ability to perform deep raw disk level recovery, and so Jonathan will demonstrate how to install his custom forensics toolkit on any existing model iPhone and send a raw disk image to a desktop machine. He will also show you how to recover files specific to the iPhone including deleted keyboard caches, photos, web objects, and much more."
"Jonathan" is apparently quite an expert at hacking the iPhone and other mobile phones. It's good to know he's with "the good guys," although it leads me to believe, in part based on past episodes involving advanced technology, that Al Qaeda, major drug smugglers, and some other groups might figure out how to perform tricks with an iPhone to avoid being caught. The act-react nature of the struggle doesn't change.
"Unlike most other smart phones, the iPhone incorporates desktop-like features in an easy-to-use mobile package. As a result of its high level of technology and available features, many are likely to use it as a primary device for various forms of data and communication. While some of a suspect's data can be viewed using the direct GUI interfaces in the iPhone's software, much hidden and deleted data is available as well, which may provide for more thorough evidence gathering."
"Existing commercial forensic tools are sadly lacking their ability to perform deep raw disk level recovery, and so Jonathan will demonstrate how to install his custom forensics toolkit on any existing model iPhone and send a raw disk image to a desktop machine. He will also show you how to recover files specific to the iPhone including deleted keyboard caches, photos, web objects, and much more."
"Jonathan" is apparently quite an expert at hacking the iPhone and other mobile phones. It's good to know he's with "the good guys," although it leads me to believe, in part based on past episodes involving advanced technology, that Al Qaeda, major drug smugglers, and some other groups might figure out how to perform tricks with an iPhone to avoid being caught. The act-react nature of the struggle doesn't change.
An Online Terrorist Training Manual - Part One: Creating a Terrorist Cell by Adbul Hameed Bakier
Jihadis continue to pursue terror training and knowledge exchange with fellow jihadis through Internet forums. Often, the jihadi forum participants post short, though significant, details pertinent to terror conduct drawn from real life experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recently, a forum participant posted six training episodes comprised of the basic knowledge needed by a novice jihadi to become a full-fledged terrorist (ek-ls.org, March 15). The episodes begin with two basics lessons on "How to set up a terrorist cell." Four more episodes followed, over a week, on sniper attacks, assassination techniques, attacking and looting government centers, and conducting massive terror strikes. Terrorism Focus will cover all six episodes of this important training manual, beginning with this issue and continuing over the next two weeks.
Posted by an Islamist forum participant nicknamed “Shamil al-Baghdadi,” the first of the training lessons is entitled, “Do you want to form a terror cell?” and is directed at setting up a terrorist cell behind enemy lines under tight security conditions. The cell, says al-Baghdadi, should commence with one, strong, monotheistic and valorous man as the nucleus. This individual should meet the following conditions:
• He must be a strong adherent of the Sunni ideology and well educated in the history of jihad.
• He should be experienced in—at the very least—light weapons such as pistols and rifles because these are available in nearly any society.
• He should be trained in secure communications through the Internet and mobile devices.
• He should be tolerant and display perseverance in religious preaching and teaching.
• He should maintain a good cover and not be on any security watch lists in order to allow free mobility.
Upon meeting these conditions, the terror cell organizer should present his proposition to friends who are trustworthy, brave and not mundane. “Don't trust anyone from the Muslim Brotherhood’s party for, even if he agrees at the beginning, he will become your biggest catastrophe," says al-Baghdadi. If all recruitment efforts fail, the jihadi must not abort the mission, but should rather continue on his own as a one-man cell. If the organizer is successful in recruiting at least two jihadis, al-Baghdadi instructs the cell to start a fitness program, preferably including the martial art of Taekwondo, followed by fundraising endeavors to procure light and semi-automatic weapons. Interestingly, al-Baghdadi warns recruits not to rob banks to secure funds because such operations need extensive planning and over 30 men. Instead, the cell must rob a small target such as the bill collection center for water and electrical utilities, or Shiite and Christian businesses, making sure the victims do not know that the robbers are Islamists. To secure big weapons for massive terror attacks, the cell must first make an assault on rural checkpoints or small security stations while avoiding killing people, since homicide cases are pursued relentlessly by the authorities, as opposed to simple felonies. Avoiding homicides makes it easier to deny the terror intentions of the cell if captured.
A scenario for an assault on a police station is outlined in this context. The preferable number of weapons to be procured for the small cell is 10 to 20 AK-47's, 15 to 20 pistols, 20 sets of handcuffs, three to five PK machine guns and, if available, three to five rocket-propelled grenades. Planning for quality terrorist attacks commences by selecting soft, yet significant targets such as tourists—keeping in mind not to take hostages at this stage. “I propose you start with those that have blood on their hands torturing and suppressing Muslims like high-ranking intelligence officers, the governor or any foreign official," says al-Baghdadi. At the end of lesson one, al-Baghdadi advises videotaping the assassination of tourists or senior officials, releasing the footage together with a communiqué announcing the name of the terror cell. Al-Baghdadi ends lesson one by saying, “Brothers, this is not prattling. The collapse of tyrant governments from the Gulf to the ocean has started. The news of jihadis is making them sway even before they hit them. Don't miss the opportunity to contribute in the destruction of one state and the establishment of another"—a tacit direction to hit Arab governments, or the "near enemy" as they are termed in al-Qaeda's literature. A forum member nicknamed “Gharib Fi Ardeh” adds to al-Baghdadi's posting by highlighting the different circumstances in certain countries and the importance of adapting these techniques accordingly.
The second training lesson deals with the definition and merits of solo jihadist operations and assassinations. Solo jihad is defined as the perpetration of assassinations, abductions and storming and killing the enemy without the individual being associated with any terrorist group or political party. Solo jihad, according to al-Baghdadi, enjoys a greater margin of safety and secrecy depending on the jihadi's wit, fitness and field experience. Special care should also be taken to overcome the negative characteristics of any new recruit by demonstrating a strong resolve, reassuring and convincing reluctant but willing jihadis to work within a small cell rather than with al-Qaeda.
Al-Baghdadi dedicates a whole section of the second lesson to assassinations, deeming this a very effective technique in guerrilla warfare. The lesson outlines different methods of assassination, including booby-trapping cars or the use of chemical poisons on door knobs or steering wheels. “Assassinations should be planned professionally. In the next episode we will discuss plans to assassinate senior and junior officials.”
Although the first two training lessons often contain very basic instructions that may be less significant for experienced jihadis, they provide essential training for novices. Without a fundamental background, willing jihadis might make mistakes leading to their arrest even before conducting any terror operations.
Posted by an Islamist forum participant nicknamed “Shamil al-Baghdadi,” the first of the training lessons is entitled, “Do you want to form a terror cell?” and is directed at setting up a terrorist cell behind enemy lines under tight security conditions. The cell, says al-Baghdadi, should commence with one, strong, monotheistic and valorous man as the nucleus. This individual should meet the following conditions:
• He must be a strong adherent of the Sunni ideology and well educated in the history of jihad.
• He should be experienced in—at the very least—light weapons such as pistols and rifles because these are available in nearly any society.
• He should be trained in secure communications through the Internet and mobile devices.
• He should be tolerant and display perseverance in religious preaching and teaching.
• He should maintain a good cover and not be on any security watch lists in order to allow free mobility.
Upon meeting these conditions, the terror cell organizer should present his proposition to friends who are trustworthy, brave and not mundane. “Don't trust anyone from the Muslim Brotherhood’s party for, even if he agrees at the beginning, he will become your biggest catastrophe," says al-Baghdadi. If all recruitment efforts fail, the jihadi must not abort the mission, but should rather continue on his own as a one-man cell. If the organizer is successful in recruiting at least two jihadis, al-Baghdadi instructs the cell to start a fitness program, preferably including the martial art of Taekwondo, followed by fundraising endeavors to procure light and semi-automatic weapons. Interestingly, al-Baghdadi warns recruits not to rob banks to secure funds because such operations need extensive planning and over 30 men. Instead, the cell must rob a small target such as the bill collection center for water and electrical utilities, or Shiite and Christian businesses, making sure the victims do not know that the robbers are Islamists. To secure big weapons for massive terror attacks, the cell must first make an assault on rural checkpoints or small security stations while avoiding killing people, since homicide cases are pursued relentlessly by the authorities, as opposed to simple felonies. Avoiding homicides makes it easier to deny the terror intentions of the cell if captured.
A scenario for an assault on a police station is outlined in this context. The preferable number of weapons to be procured for the small cell is 10 to 20 AK-47's, 15 to 20 pistols, 20 sets of handcuffs, three to five PK machine guns and, if available, three to five rocket-propelled grenades. Planning for quality terrorist attacks commences by selecting soft, yet significant targets such as tourists—keeping in mind not to take hostages at this stage. “I propose you start with those that have blood on their hands torturing and suppressing Muslims like high-ranking intelligence officers, the governor or any foreign official," says al-Baghdadi. At the end of lesson one, al-Baghdadi advises videotaping the assassination of tourists or senior officials, releasing the footage together with a communiqué announcing the name of the terror cell. Al-Baghdadi ends lesson one by saying, “Brothers, this is not prattling. The collapse of tyrant governments from the Gulf to the ocean has started. The news of jihadis is making them sway even before they hit them. Don't miss the opportunity to contribute in the destruction of one state and the establishment of another"—a tacit direction to hit Arab governments, or the "near enemy" as they are termed in al-Qaeda's literature. A forum member nicknamed “Gharib Fi Ardeh” adds to al-Baghdadi's posting by highlighting the different circumstances in certain countries and the importance of adapting these techniques accordingly.
The second training lesson deals with the definition and merits of solo jihadist operations and assassinations. Solo jihad is defined as the perpetration of assassinations, abductions and storming and killing the enemy without the individual being associated with any terrorist group or political party. Solo jihad, according to al-Baghdadi, enjoys a greater margin of safety and secrecy depending on the jihadi's wit, fitness and field experience. Special care should also be taken to overcome the negative characteristics of any new recruit by demonstrating a strong resolve, reassuring and convincing reluctant but willing jihadis to work within a small cell rather than with al-Qaeda.
Al-Baghdadi dedicates a whole section of the second lesson to assassinations, deeming this a very effective technique in guerrilla warfare. The lesson outlines different methods of assassination, including booby-trapping cars or the use of chemical poisons on door knobs or steering wheels. “Assassinations should be planned professionally. In the next episode we will discuss plans to assassinate senior and junior officials.”
Although the first two training lessons often contain very basic instructions that may be less significant for experienced jihadis, they provide essential training for novices. Without a fundamental background, willing jihadis might make mistakes leading to their arrest even before conducting any terror operations.
Iran Charged with Infiltration and Sabotage of Iraq’s Awakening Councils by Fadhil Ali
General Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani, head of Iraq’s intelligence service, released a statement on February 27 accusing the Iranian intelligence services of planning to sabotage the largely Sunni tribal-based Awakening Councils that have formed in Iraq to combat al-Qaeda. The statement was placed on the formal website of the Iraqi intelligence service only days before the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Baghdad on March 2 and 3 (Azzaman, February 28).
Although Iran has been frequently accused by U.S. officials at every level of destabilizing Iraq, it has rarely been criticized by the Iraqi government, which is formed from a coalition of Shiites and Kurds—the Sunnis withdrew from the cabinet in August 2007. The ties between Iran and the current Iraqi governing parties go back to the years of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, when those parties were the exiled opposition to the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein.
President Ahmadinejad’s visit was boycotted by the Sunni politicians and there were rallies in some Sunni towns denouncing the visit (Azzaman, March 2). The Sunnis have always looked at Shiite Iran as an enemy, but this could not disturb the visit nor the warm welcome that Ahmadinejad received from the Shiite and Kurdish politicians in Baghdad. Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, said that the Iranian president came with a defiant message to the United States: “You [America] have your presence [in Iraq] and I have mine” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 11).
The statement of General al-Shahwani—who rarely speaks to the media or releases public statements—indicated that Iraqi intelligence had information that the Iranian intelligence services had deployed operatives all over Iraq to sabotage the Awakening Councils. Al-Shahwani stressed that people should be vigilant and urged them to support the Awakening movement in order to preserve hard-won security improvements. Al-Shahwani is a Sunni and a former officer in Saddam’s military. He left the army in 1990 to enter the U.S.-backed opposition and was heavily involved in a failed coup attempt in 1996. Three of his sons were executed in retribution. He maintains close links with the CIA, which continues to exert tight control over the Mukhabarat, Iraq’s overwhelmingly Sunni and Kurdish secret intelligence service.
Al-Shahwani did not reveal any details about particular operations the Iranians might have participated in, but he called on the Iraqi security services to monitor and pursue any suspect activities. General Abdul Kareem Khalaf, spokesman of the Ministry of the Interior, agreed with al-Shahwani, saying that the head of the intelligence service would not have made his statement without having decisive evidence. A U.S. military source, speaking under condition of anonymity to an Arab newspaper, agreed with General al-Shahwani and added that forces connected to the Iranian al-Quds force had targeted the Awakening movement (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28). Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, a prominent Awakening leader from al-Anbar province, also stressed that General al-Shahwani’s statement should be taken seriously. Abu Risha did not rule out that there were Iranian efforts to foil the awakening movement (al-Malaf Press, February 29).
Tamir al-Tamimi—also known as Abu Azzam al-Tamimi—a former member of the Islamic Army insurgent group and head of the Awakening Council of Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad, commented on the information by making the surprising statement that Iran targets the Awakening movement directly and indirectly through organizations like al-Qaeda. The attacks come by explosive devices, car bombs or suicide attacks (Azzaman, February 28).
It is interesting that a wide range of Sunnis in Iraq believe that Shiite Iran has a link with the Sunni extremist organization of al-Qaeda. Two prominent leaders of Awakening groups in western Baghdad, Abu Elabid and Shujaa al-Adhami, believe that Iran supplies al-Qaeda and the Shiite militias with weapons and money to target their movements (Radiosawa.com, January 11).
Many Sunnis point to individuals like former Badr Brigades commander Abu Mustafa al-Shaibani, who is charged with running a network to smuggle Iranian-made improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) into Iraq. According to a source from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, al-Shaibani, who was arrested by Coalition forces in 2007, admitted that the Iranian bodies that supported him had given him instructions to widen his network to as many insurgent groups as he could reach. He revealed that in addition to the Shiite militias he had tight relations with insurgent groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (al-Malaf Press, May 22, 2007). U.S. sources allege that al-Shaibani works under the supervision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, operating a network whose “first objective is to fight U.S. forces, attacking convoys and killing soldiers. Its second objective is to eliminate Iraqi politicians opposed to Iran's influence” (U.S. Treasury Department, HP-759, January 9).
As part of his reservations about the Awakening Councils, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki justified his reluctance to recruit Sunni fighters to the government forces by indicating that the banned al-Baath Party and al-Qaeda had ordered their members to infiltrate the Awakening groups (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 5). According to what the Sunnis believe about the relation between Iran and al-Qaeda, Iran may be partly behind the infiltrating tactics of al-Qaeda and al-Baath, or the Iranians might be using such infiltrations to serve their strategy of attacking the Awakening movement.
The Awakening movement started in al-Anbar where its organization was based on tribal formations led by tribal leaders. This has made it very hard for infiltration efforts to succeed. In Baghdad the Awakening movement spread in almost every Sunni neighborhood, but here the population is not from one tribe and the tribal bond in general is weaker. This offers more opportunities for infiltration. While the tribal bond protects al-Anbar Awakening from a specific type of infiltration, the continuing rivalries among the Sunni powers (see Terrorism Focus, March 11) might open the way to another type. A leader of one the Awakening groups in al-Anbar expressed his concern about the repeated visits of Shaykh Hamid Farhan al-Hays, a Grand Shaykh and Awakening leader, to Iran (al-Hayat, October 8, 2007). Al-Hays was once seen as a possible successor to the leadership of the Anbar Awakening Council after Shaykh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was killed by a car bomb in September 2007 (see Terrorism Focus, March 11).
Whether the theory held by some Sunnis that there is a link between Iran and al-Qaeda is right or wrong, any possible evidence and indications should be taken seriously and carefully considered. Iraqi Sunni sources point out that breaking up the Awakening Councils has become a priority for Iranian policy in Iraq. The Awakening groups armed by the U.S. army have become dangerous for the Iranian-backed Shiite militias (thirdpower.org, January 6).
Rows over pay have become frequent between the U.S. army and the Awakening Councils. This is not an encouraging sign as most of these Sunni fighters lost their old jobs as officers in Saddam Hussein’s army and security forces and have not yet been absorbed into the new Iraqi Army. This type of situation would be of great assistance to infiltration efforts by Iranian or other foreign intelligence services.
The Iraqi Sunnis believe that there is coordination between Iranian intelligence and al-Qaeda to attack the Awakening movement in order to reverse its role in the security improvement in Iraq. Iran is not willing to stabilize Iraq in order to keep the United States under pressure and prevent it from putting pressure on Iran (Tamir al-Tamimi to newsabah.com, March 16). With the allies of Tehran dominating the political scene in Iraq, the ambition of some Sunni leaders might push them closer to Iran.
Although Iran has been frequently accused by U.S. officials at every level of destabilizing Iraq, it has rarely been criticized by the Iraqi government, which is formed from a coalition of Shiites and Kurds—the Sunnis withdrew from the cabinet in August 2007. The ties between Iran and the current Iraqi governing parties go back to the years of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980s, when those parties were the exiled opposition to the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein.
President Ahmadinejad’s visit was boycotted by the Sunni politicians and there were rallies in some Sunni towns denouncing the visit (Azzaman, March 2). The Sunnis have always looked at Shiite Iran as an enemy, but this could not disturb the visit nor the warm welcome that Ahmadinejad received from the Shiite and Kurdish politicians in Baghdad. Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, said that the Iranian president came with a defiant message to the United States: “You [America] have your presence [in Iraq] and I have mine” (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 11).
The statement of General al-Shahwani—who rarely speaks to the media or releases public statements—indicated that Iraqi intelligence had information that the Iranian intelligence services had deployed operatives all over Iraq to sabotage the Awakening Councils. Al-Shahwani stressed that people should be vigilant and urged them to support the Awakening movement in order to preserve hard-won security improvements. Al-Shahwani is a Sunni and a former officer in Saddam’s military. He left the army in 1990 to enter the U.S.-backed opposition and was heavily involved in a failed coup attempt in 1996. Three of his sons were executed in retribution. He maintains close links with the CIA, which continues to exert tight control over the Mukhabarat, Iraq’s overwhelmingly Sunni and Kurdish secret intelligence service.
Al-Shahwani did not reveal any details about particular operations the Iranians might have participated in, but he called on the Iraqi security services to monitor and pursue any suspect activities. General Abdul Kareem Khalaf, spokesman of the Ministry of the Interior, agreed with al-Shahwani, saying that the head of the intelligence service would not have made his statement without having decisive evidence. A U.S. military source, speaking under condition of anonymity to an Arab newspaper, agreed with General al-Shahwani and added that forces connected to the Iranian al-Quds force had targeted the Awakening movement (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28). Shaykh Ahmad Abu Risha, a prominent Awakening leader from al-Anbar province, also stressed that General al-Shahwani’s statement should be taken seriously. Abu Risha did not rule out that there were Iranian efforts to foil the awakening movement (al-Malaf Press, February 29).
Tamir al-Tamimi—also known as Abu Azzam al-Tamimi—a former member of the Islamic Army insurgent group and head of the Awakening Council of Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad, commented on the information by making the surprising statement that Iran targets the Awakening movement directly and indirectly through organizations like al-Qaeda. The attacks come by explosive devices, car bombs or suicide attacks (Azzaman, February 28).
It is interesting that a wide range of Sunnis in Iraq believe that Shiite Iran has a link with the Sunni extremist organization of al-Qaeda. Two prominent leaders of Awakening groups in western Baghdad, Abu Elabid and Shujaa al-Adhami, believe that Iran supplies al-Qaeda and the Shiite militias with weapons and money to target their movements (Radiosawa.com, January 11).
Many Sunnis point to individuals like former Badr Brigades commander Abu Mustafa al-Shaibani, who is charged with running a network to smuggle Iranian-made improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) into Iraq. According to a source from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, al-Shaibani, who was arrested by Coalition forces in 2007, admitted that the Iranian bodies that supported him had given him instructions to widen his network to as many insurgent groups as he could reach. He revealed that in addition to the Shiite militias he had tight relations with insurgent groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (al-Malaf Press, May 22, 2007). U.S. sources allege that al-Shaibani works under the supervision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, operating a network whose “first objective is to fight U.S. forces, attacking convoys and killing soldiers. Its second objective is to eliminate Iraqi politicians opposed to Iran's influence” (U.S. Treasury Department, HP-759, January 9).
As part of his reservations about the Awakening Councils, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki justified his reluctance to recruit Sunni fighters to the government forces by indicating that the banned al-Baath Party and al-Qaeda had ordered their members to infiltrate the Awakening groups (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 5). According to what the Sunnis believe about the relation between Iran and al-Qaeda, Iran may be partly behind the infiltrating tactics of al-Qaeda and al-Baath, or the Iranians might be using such infiltrations to serve their strategy of attacking the Awakening movement.
The Awakening movement started in al-Anbar where its organization was based on tribal formations led by tribal leaders. This has made it very hard for infiltration efforts to succeed. In Baghdad the Awakening movement spread in almost every Sunni neighborhood, but here the population is not from one tribe and the tribal bond in general is weaker. This offers more opportunities for infiltration. While the tribal bond protects al-Anbar Awakening from a specific type of infiltration, the continuing rivalries among the Sunni powers (see Terrorism Focus, March 11) might open the way to another type. A leader of one the Awakening groups in al-Anbar expressed his concern about the repeated visits of Shaykh Hamid Farhan al-Hays, a Grand Shaykh and Awakening leader, to Iran (al-Hayat, October 8, 2007). Al-Hays was once seen as a possible successor to the leadership of the Anbar Awakening Council after Shaykh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was killed by a car bomb in September 2007 (see Terrorism Focus, March 11).
Whether the theory held by some Sunnis that there is a link between Iran and al-Qaeda is right or wrong, any possible evidence and indications should be taken seriously and carefully considered. Iraqi Sunni sources point out that breaking up the Awakening Councils has become a priority for Iranian policy in Iraq. The Awakening groups armed by the U.S. army have become dangerous for the Iranian-backed Shiite militias (thirdpower.org, January 6).
Rows over pay have become frequent between the U.S. army and the Awakening Councils. This is not an encouraging sign as most of these Sunni fighters lost their old jobs as officers in Saddam Hussein’s army and security forces and have not yet been absorbed into the new Iraqi Army. This type of situation would be of great assistance to infiltration efforts by Iranian or other foreign intelligence services.
The Iraqi Sunnis believe that there is coordination between Iranian intelligence and al-Qaeda to attack the Awakening movement in order to reverse its role in the security improvement in Iraq. Iran is not willing to stabilize Iraq in order to keep the United States under pressure and prevent it from putting pressure on Iran (Tamir al-Tamimi to newsabah.com, March 16). With the allies of Tehran dominating the political scene in Iraq, the ambition of some Sunni leaders might push them closer to Iran.
Resilient Community: Microgrids by John Robb
Electricity is the lifeblood of modernity, but it is going to become much more expensive (fuel expense/availability) and unavailable (due to an increase in random failures via underinvestment to a plethora of black swan scenarios). As such, communities need to gain control over the flows of electricity in order to become resilient. One of the first steps towards this goal is through the concept of the Microgrid. Essentially it is a local power network connected to the national/regional grid through a smart switch.
Why the Microgrid?
There's been lots of exploration at the national level on incorporating computing architectures (data services plus sensors) into the grid system (known under the rubric "the Smart Grid"). Unfortunately, these efforts suffer from the step function problem. This means that the changes contemplated are too expensive and too wrenching to accomplish on a large scale (akin to boiling the ocean). The only way to implement these new technologies and methods is to find a way to do it organically. The Microgrid enables this by creating a local network (electricity plus data services) that can become a platform for the organic growth of a diverse and innovative ecosystem of solutions and providers.
What it Does
A Microgrid enables the ability to do the following:
* to disconnect from the national grid when there is a general utility failure. This enables a combination of back-up power systems from third party providers -- everything from flywheels to back-up generators (very much the same approach that data-centers use).
* to build a local market for power production. Since the Microgrid buys power in volume from the national grid, it will likely get dynamic pricing data (time of day, etc.). This data allows the Microgrid to offer local producers of electricity the ability to sell into the Microgrid at competitive prices (peer to peer production). Of course, if local power production is a priority, then the price comparison can be weighted via subsidies to favor local producers.
* to add smart features that will only get nominal deployment on the national grid. For example, the ability to add smarts to devices and homes to allow customers to manage their consumption of electricity at a granular level -- from price to device.
WIM (what it means)
It's important to point out that Microgrid technology and processes have applicability to:
* Counter-insurgency. Even though tens of billions of dollars have been invested in the reconstruction of Iraq, we still can't keep the lights on in Baghdad. Microgrids could make this possible.
* Development. Microgrids provide a mechanism for organic growth in developing economies plagued by badly functioning national grids.
* Competitive advantage. Communities that get this right (high availability power that is also very clean), will gain a competitive edge in competing for residents and business flow. The pay-off is higher home values and better/more jobs.
Why the Microgrid?
There's been lots of exploration at the national level on incorporating computing architectures (data services plus sensors) into the grid system (known under the rubric "the Smart Grid"). Unfortunately, these efforts suffer from the step function problem. This means that the changes contemplated are too expensive and too wrenching to accomplish on a large scale (akin to boiling the ocean). The only way to implement these new technologies and methods is to find a way to do it organically. The Microgrid enables this by creating a local network (electricity plus data services) that can become a platform for the organic growth of a diverse and innovative ecosystem of solutions and providers.
What it Does
A Microgrid enables the ability to do the following:
* to disconnect from the national grid when there is a general utility failure. This enables a combination of back-up power systems from third party providers -- everything from flywheels to back-up generators (very much the same approach that data-centers use).
* to build a local market for power production. Since the Microgrid buys power in volume from the national grid, it will likely get dynamic pricing data (time of day, etc.). This data allows the Microgrid to offer local producers of electricity the ability to sell into the Microgrid at competitive prices (peer to peer production). Of course, if local power production is a priority, then the price comparison can be weighted via subsidies to favor local producers.
* to add smart features that will only get nominal deployment on the national grid. For example, the ability to add smarts to devices and homes to allow customers to manage their consumption of electricity at a granular level -- from price to device.
WIM (what it means)
It's important to point out that Microgrid technology and processes have applicability to:
* Counter-insurgency. Even though tens of billions of dollars have been invested in the reconstruction of Iraq, we still can't keep the lights on in Baghdad. Microgrids could make this possible.
* Development. Microgrids provide a mechanism for organic growth in developing economies plagued by badly functioning national grids.
* Competitive advantage. Communities that get this right (high availability power that is also very clean), will gain a competitive edge in competing for residents and business flow. The pay-off is higher home values and better/more jobs.
Making Hurricane Response More Effective: Lessons from the Private Sector and the Coast Guard During Katrina by Steven Horwitz
Download PDF.
Many assume that the only viable option for emergency response and recovery from a natural disaster is one that is centrally directed. However, highlighted by the poor response from the federal government and the comparatively effective response from private retailers and the Coast Guard after Hurricane Katrina, this assumption seems to be faulty. Big box retailers such as Wal-Mart were extraordinarily successful in providing help to damaged communities in the days, weeks, and months after the storm. This Policy Comment provides a framework for understanding why private retailers and the Coast Guard mounted an effective response in the Gulf Coast region. Using this framework provides four clear policy recommendations:
1. Give the private sector as much freedom as possible to provide resources for relief and recovery efforts and ensure that its role is officially recognized as part of disaster protocols.
2. Decentralize government relief to local governments and non-governmental organizations and provide that relief in the form of cash or broadly defined vouchers.
3. Move the Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) out of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
4. Reform "Good Samaritan" laws so that private-sector actors are clearly protected when they make good faith efforts to help.
If disaster situations are to be better handled in the future, it is important that institutions are in place so that actors have the appropriate knowledge to act and incentives to behave in ways that benefit others. The framework and recommendations provided in this paper help to provide a good understanding of the appropriate institutions.
Many assume that the only viable option for emergency response and recovery from a natural disaster is one that is centrally directed. However, highlighted by the poor response from the federal government and the comparatively effective response from private retailers and the Coast Guard after Hurricane Katrina, this assumption seems to be faulty. Big box retailers such as Wal-Mart were extraordinarily successful in providing help to damaged communities in the days, weeks, and months after the storm. This Policy Comment provides a framework for understanding why private retailers and the Coast Guard mounted an effective response in the Gulf Coast region. Using this framework provides four clear policy recommendations:
1. Give the private sector as much freedom as possible to provide resources for relief and recovery efforts and ensure that its role is officially recognized as part of disaster protocols.
2. Decentralize government relief to local governments and non-governmental organizations and provide that relief in the form of cash or broadly defined vouchers.
3. Move the Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) out of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
4. Reform "Good Samaritan" laws so that private-sector actors are clearly protected when they make good faith efforts to help.
If disaster situations are to be better handled in the future, it is important that institutions are in place so that actors have the appropriate knowledge to act and incentives to behave in ways that benefit others. The framework and recommendations provided in this paper help to provide a good understanding of the appropriate institutions.
Case Study on Open Decision Making by John Robb
Regional disasters of all types, from natural to man-made, are similar to warfare in that they are:
# informationally (low levels of information flow, rapidly changing circumstance, and high levels of novelty),
# morally (who should you help first, how far should you go to help, etc.),
# and physically (the scale exceeds means) complex.
Therefore, disasters in extremis should provide an excellent opportunity to compare the efficacy of different organizational decision making styles and their applicability to the escalating complexity of modern warfare.
Katrina
So, how well did the respective decision making styles do during hurricane Katrina? Fortunately, Steve Horwitz, from St. Lawrence University, has already done this work with an excellent case study on the topic. He found that organizations with open decision making systems, both public and private, greatly outperformed those that didn't. Across every measure of success (in particular, the feedback from locals) the Coast Guard, Wal-Mart, Home Depot stood in stark contrast to the miserable performance of FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency).
NOTE: All three organizations that were successful used Boyd's approach. Strong organizational cultures and training were used to harmonize orientation for local decision makers. This common outlook in turn allowed decentralized decision makers to quickly optimize their actions to meet the requirements of rapidly evolving local circumstances without specific guidance from a centralized leadership or written regulatory framework.
# informationally (low levels of information flow, rapidly changing circumstance, and high levels of novelty),
# morally (who should you help first, how far should you go to help, etc.),
# and physically (the scale exceeds means) complex.
Therefore, disasters in extremis should provide an excellent opportunity to compare the efficacy of different organizational decision making styles and their applicability to the escalating complexity of modern warfare.
Katrina
So, how well did the respective decision making styles do during hurricane Katrina? Fortunately, Steve Horwitz, from St. Lawrence University, has already done this work with an excellent case study on the topic. He found that organizations with open decision making systems, both public and private, greatly outperformed those that didn't. Across every measure of success (in particular, the feedback from locals) the Coast Guard, Wal-Mart, Home Depot stood in stark contrast to the miserable performance of FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency).
NOTE: All three organizations that were successful used Boyd's approach. Strong organizational cultures and training were used to harmonize orientation for local decision makers. This common outlook in turn allowed decentralized decision makers to quickly optimize their actions to meet the requirements of rapidly evolving local circumstances without specific guidance from a centralized leadership or written regulatory framework.
Apple's OS Edge Is a Threat to Microsoft by Gary Morgenthaler
The 20-year death grip that Microsoft has held on the core of computing is finally weakening—pried loose with just two fingers. With one finger you press "Control" and with the other you press "right arrow." Instantly you switch from a Macintosh operating system (OS) to a Microsoft Windows OS. Then, with another two-finger press, you switch back again. So as you edit family pictures, you might use Mac's iPhoto. And when you want to access your corporate e-mail, you can switch back instantly to Microsoft Exchange.
This easy toggling on an Apple computer, enabled by a feature called Spaces, was but an interesting side note to last fall's upgrade of the Mac OS. But coupled with other recent developments, the stars are aligning in a very intriguing pattern. Apple's recent release of a tool kit for programmers to write applications for the iPhone will be followed by the June launch of iPhone 2.0, a software upgrade geared toward business users.
Taken together, these seemingly unrelated moves are taking the outline of a full-fledged strategy. Windows users, in the very near future, will be free to switch to Apple computers and mobile devices, drawn by a widening array of Mac software, without suffering the pain of giving up critical Windows-based applications right away. The easy virtualization of two radically different operating systems on a single desktop paves a classic migration path. Business users will be tempted. Apple is positioning itself to challenge Microsoft for overall computing dominance—even in the corporate realm.
Kernel of Computing Might
Such an idea rarely finds expression in public. Apple today is a "consumer-products company." Each new Apple product unveiled—from iPod to iPhone—comes with the excitement and glamour of Steve Jobs' "reality distortion field." Yet if you look at the larger picture, broader battle lines are forming. It's as if Jobs were a general from the 19th century, quietly massing troops out of view and under cover of trees. Mere "features" like Spaces look increasingly "strategic." On present course, an Apple assault on Microsoft's (MSFT) seemingly impregnable enterprise monopoly now appears quite possible by 2010.
It all started with Mac OS X, the multi-core, multi-processor platform officially released in 2001. Based on "Mach," a university UNIX research prototype, Mac OS X represented a clean break with the computer industry's uniprocessor past. The modular new OS allowed Apple to condense its core task management function into a tiny computing kernel.
That kernel has proved easily adaptable across the entire Apple product line, from highly complex servers all the way down to the relatively simple iPod Touch. Such modularity allows Apple to add whatever functions are necessary for each product environment—all while maintaining cross-product compatibility.
By contrast, Microsoft has held on to an OS tethered to the 1980s, piling additions upon additions with each upgrade to Windows. With last year's arrival of Vista, Windows has swollen to 1 billion bytes (a gigabyte) or more of software code. The "Mach" kernel of the Mac OS X, however, requires less than 1 million bytes (a megabyte) of data in its smallest configuration, expanding modestly with the sophistication of the application.
Toward an Apple-Flavored Office
The contrast between Microsoft's and Apple's product development strategies couldn't be starker. Where Microsoft is increasingly hamstrung by OS rigidities, Apple moves flexibly and swiftly. While Microsoft struggles to bring a kernel-based "Windows 7" to market in 2010, Steve Jobs has declared Mac OS X the right platform for the next decade of new products. Engineering improvements in one Apple product quickly find use at low cost in another. While Apple's "multi-touch" screen innovation made its debut with the iPhone, it appeared on the MacBook within 60 days. With this sort of flexibility, Apple is ever-free to target existing markets or invent whole new ones.
More Mobile, More Apple
As corporations become increasingly mobile, the pressure will build to make them Apple-centric from top to bottom. Rising sales of Apple laptops and iPhones will make the Mac OS only that much more mainstream and acceptable to corporate IT departments. By 2010, the number of iPhones in use could approach 100 million. It's possible that the iPhone's share of the U.S. smartphone market (28% in the fourth quarter) will soon approach the 70% share iPod now holds in the MP3 market.
The final piece to this puzzle would be the rebirth of the Apple applications development ecosystem. The new Software Development Kit (SDK) for the iPhone not only allows independent developers to create new applications for that device but also brings them back to the Macintosh platform. That means any program written for the iPhone can be easily adapted into a Mac computer version as well. The response has been huge: More than 100,000 developers downloaded the SDK in the first week of its availability. And iPhone's popularity for mobile business applications can only grow. (Put Vista on a cell phone? I don't think so.)
This easy toggling on an Apple computer, enabled by a feature called Spaces, was but an interesting side note to last fall's upgrade of the Mac OS. But coupled with other recent developments, the stars are aligning in a very intriguing pattern. Apple's recent release of a tool kit for programmers to write applications for the iPhone will be followed by the June launch of iPhone 2.0, a software upgrade geared toward business users.
Taken together, these seemingly unrelated moves are taking the outline of a full-fledged strategy. Windows users, in the very near future, will be free to switch to Apple computers and mobile devices, drawn by a widening array of Mac software, without suffering the pain of giving up critical Windows-based applications right away. The easy virtualization of two radically different operating systems on a single desktop paves a classic migration path. Business users will be tempted. Apple is positioning itself to challenge Microsoft for overall computing dominance—even in the corporate realm.
Kernel of Computing Might
Such an idea rarely finds expression in public. Apple today is a "consumer-products company." Each new Apple product unveiled—from iPod to iPhone—comes with the excitement and glamour of Steve Jobs' "reality distortion field." Yet if you look at the larger picture, broader battle lines are forming. It's as if Jobs were a general from the 19th century, quietly massing troops out of view and under cover of trees. Mere "features" like Spaces look increasingly "strategic." On present course, an Apple assault on Microsoft's (MSFT) seemingly impregnable enterprise monopoly now appears quite possible by 2010.
It all started with Mac OS X, the multi-core, multi-processor platform officially released in 2001. Based on "Mach," a university UNIX research prototype, Mac OS X represented a clean break with the computer industry's uniprocessor past. The modular new OS allowed Apple to condense its core task management function into a tiny computing kernel.
That kernel has proved easily adaptable across the entire Apple product line, from highly complex servers all the way down to the relatively simple iPod Touch. Such modularity allows Apple to add whatever functions are necessary for each product environment—all while maintaining cross-product compatibility.
By contrast, Microsoft has held on to an OS tethered to the 1980s, piling additions upon additions with each upgrade to Windows. With last year's arrival of Vista, Windows has swollen to 1 billion bytes (a gigabyte) or more of software code. The "Mach" kernel of the Mac OS X, however, requires less than 1 million bytes (a megabyte) of data in its smallest configuration, expanding modestly with the sophistication of the application.
Toward an Apple-Flavored Office
The contrast between Microsoft's and Apple's product development strategies couldn't be starker. Where Microsoft is increasingly hamstrung by OS rigidities, Apple moves flexibly and swiftly. While Microsoft struggles to bring a kernel-based "Windows 7" to market in 2010, Steve Jobs has declared Mac OS X the right platform for the next decade of new products. Engineering improvements in one Apple product quickly find use at low cost in another. While Apple's "multi-touch" screen innovation made its debut with the iPhone, it appeared on the MacBook within 60 days. With this sort of flexibility, Apple is ever-free to target existing markets or invent whole new ones.
More Mobile, More Apple
As corporations become increasingly mobile, the pressure will build to make them Apple-centric from top to bottom. Rising sales of Apple laptops and iPhones will make the Mac OS only that much more mainstream and acceptable to corporate IT departments. By 2010, the number of iPhones in use could approach 100 million. It's possible that the iPhone's share of the U.S. smartphone market (28% in the fourth quarter) will soon approach the 70% share iPod now holds in the MP3 market.
The final piece to this puzzle would be the rebirth of the Apple applications development ecosystem. The new Software Development Kit (SDK) for the iPhone not only allows independent developers to create new applications for that device but also brings them back to the Macintosh platform. That means any program written for the iPhone can be easily adapted into a Mac computer version as well. The response has been huge: More than 100,000 developers downloaded the SDK in the first week of its availability. And iPhone's popularity for mobile business applications can only grow. (Put Vista on a cell phone? I don't think so.)
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