Here's my theoretical extension/redux of John Boyd's thinking. If you are inclined to enjoy deeply theoretical works, please read on (it's a work in progress).
Let's start with an assumption: War is a contest of minds. Therefore, the process of using minds -- decision-making -- is the core process upon which all warfare is built. Weapons, tactics, methods, systems, organizations, strategies, etc. are all derivative of this fundamental framework. Therefore, a narrow view of warfare is that it is a race to make decisions that optimize these derivatives within the restrictions imposed by access to resources and the other side's attempt to do the same (friction).
A more expansive view is that all decision making processes exist within the abstract mental models we use to understand the (complex, uncertain, and complex) environment we live in. Unfortunately, these models are at best flawed approximations that only get more flawed over time. So, we may conclude that warfare is in large part an ability to use decision making, in particular cycles of analysis/synthesis, to create new/revised mental models that are closer approximations of the environment's true nature.
John Boyd's Approach
John Boyd, arguably the greatest military strategist produced by America, produced the background material core to this argument. In "Destruction and Creation," Boyd lays out the philosophical elements of decision-making that limit potential optimization and eventually forces the creation of more effective mental models to explain the environment. In the "Conceptual Spiral," he formalizes the process of decision-making (novelty production) that produces new mental models. This eventually serves as a foundation for the final version of the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act).
The Problem
This gets us to the nexus of our current problem. The environment within which we fight war is getting more complex, uncertain, and incomplete at a faster rate than the mental constructs we use to model it are being improved. To wit: ever greater amounts of novelty (for example: new technology) is being produced than ever before yet our military strategies and methods are scarcely different than those we used half a century ago.
Why?
The reason is likely due to the limits of a unitary decision making system. Even under the most ideal conditions, its dubious whether the US military's decision making loop (the sum total of the intellectual product of the entire military bureaucracy) can even closely approximate the requirements of the rapidly evolving global environment we currently find ourselves in. In short, we are falling behind ever more every day.
What This Means
Given a situation where decision making is falling behind the requirements of the environmental reality, we can expect inevitable catastrophic failure at some point in the future. When this occurs, one of the following new approaches will emerge:
A) Radical limitations on the environment within which the US military operates. In short, reduce the required effort. However, this reduces the utility of the solution provided.
B) Decentralized decision making within the current structure. This is the approach advocated by the proponents of maneuver warfare (and Boyd himself). This is accomplished by ensuring all of the component decision making bodies share a common outlook (a harmonization of orientation). This means that each component's decision making processes will enjoy a high degree of similarity and synergy with that of parallel efforts. Unfortunately, this homogeneity of approach can reduce the production of novelty.
C) Decentralized decision making via a market mechanism or open source framework. This approach is similar to process "B" detailed above, except that a much wider degree of diversity of outlook/orientation within the contributing components is allowed/desired. The end result is a decision making process where multiple groups make contributions (new optimizations and models). As these contributions are tested against the environment, we will find that most of these contributions will fail. Those few that work are then widely copied/replicated within components. The biggest problem (opportunity?) with this approach is that its direction is emergent and it is not directed by a human being (the commander) .
Friday, April 04, 2008
A Good Deal for America by Governor of Alabama Bob Riley
The Air Force's selection of Northrop Grumman to build its replacement for the KC-135 surprised many Pentagon-watchers. It also unleashed an unfortunate tsunami of shock and indignation from some politicians.
I, too, am shocked but not at the Air Force's decision. I'm shocked at the shrill rhetoric and outright falsehoods being hurled at the winners of this competition. If we are to have a national discussion on jobs and the defense industry, it should be based on facts.
First, and perhaps most obviously, Northrop Grumman is an American company. With its headquarters in Los Angeles, it employs 120,000 Americans in every corner of our great nation. Northrop Grumman has been a fixture in American aerospace from the F6F "Hellcat" and P-61 "Black Widow" to the F/A-18 "Hornet" and B-2 stealth bomber. Northrop Grumman is as American as apple pie and baseball.
Second, Northrop Grumman had the courage to enter the competition, knowing it was the underdog. It secured suppliers in the same manner as its competitor and its victory will employ 48,000 Americans in 49 states in direct and indirect jobs. That's a significant boost to America's industrial base.
More than 7,500 of those jobs are in California, 4,000 in Arizona, 1,800 in New Mexico and 2,300 in Ohio. Plus, 5,000 of those Americans call Alabama home. To decry the Air Force's decision as sending jobs overseas ignores the reality of these thousands of American jobs being created at home. It also ignores the fact that the Northrop Grumman tanker program does not transfer any jobs from the United States overseas. Actually, with the Northrop win, new jobs will be added to the U.S. industrial base.
Third, the competition for the tanker contract was the most rigorous and transparent in the history of the Air Force. It certainly has been the most scrutinized. The Defense Department inspector general, the Government Accountability Office and Army and Navy acquisition personnel were all involved to ensure fair methodologies were used in judging the competitors' proposals. Throughout the process, both competitors praised the Air Force for conducting a fair and open competition.
Fourth, in America, when you have a competition, the winner is supposed to be selected on the merits, not because someone wanted to change the rules after the fact because their competitor didn't win.
Two great American companies competed, so who won?
Our troops won because they are getting an aircraft the Air Force decided has the most capabilities. Our citizens won because the Air Force selected the aircraft that was judged to be the best value to the taxpayers. Our nation won because America is getting a second aerospace sector and the first new wide-body aircraft manufacturing plant in 40 years.
Politicians always talk about giving our troops the best equipment. Well, a fair competition judged this aircraft as being the best equipment for our troops. It's dismaying to hear some in Congress now talking about blocking funds so the Air Force can't replace its aging fleet of tankers just because Northrop Grumman won. The average age of these tankers is now almost 50 years old.
In a time of war, it would be an outrage if politics forced our troops to wait any longer for the equipment they need, or if politics forced an inferior product on them.
I, too, am shocked but not at the Air Force's decision. I'm shocked at the shrill rhetoric and outright falsehoods being hurled at the winners of this competition. If we are to have a national discussion on jobs and the defense industry, it should be based on facts.
First, and perhaps most obviously, Northrop Grumman is an American company. With its headquarters in Los Angeles, it employs 120,000 Americans in every corner of our great nation. Northrop Grumman has been a fixture in American aerospace from the F6F "Hellcat" and P-61 "Black Widow" to the F/A-18 "Hornet" and B-2 stealth bomber. Northrop Grumman is as American as apple pie and baseball.
Second, Northrop Grumman had the courage to enter the competition, knowing it was the underdog. It secured suppliers in the same manner as its competitor and its victory will employ 48,000 Americans in 49 states in direct and indirect jobs. That's a significant boost to America's industrial base.
More than 7,500 of those jobs are in California, 4,000 in Arizona, 1,800 in New Mexico and 2,300 in Ohio. Plus, 5,000 of those Americans call Alabama home. To decry the Air Force's decision as sending jobs overseas ignores the reality of these thousands of American jobs being created at home. It also ignores the fact that the Northrop Grumman tanker program does not transfer any jobs from the United States overseas. Actually, with the Northrop win, new jobs will be added to the U.S. industrial base.
Third, the competition for the tanker contract was the most rigorous and transparent in the history of the Air Force. It certainly has been the most scrutinized. The Defense Department inspector general, the Government Accountability Office and Army and Navy acquisition personnel were all involved to ensure fair methodologies were used in judging the competitors' proposals. Throughout the process, both competitors praised the Air Force for conducting a fair and open competition.
Fourth, in America, when you have a competition, the winner is supposed to be selected on the merits, not because someone wanted to change the rules after the fact because their competitor didn't win.
Two great American companies competed, so who won?
Our troops won because they are getting an aircraft the Air Force decided has the most capabilities. Our citizens won because the Air Force selected the aircraft that was judged to be the best value to the taxpayers. Our nation won because America is getting a second aerospace sector and the first new wide-body aircraft manufacturing plant in 40 years.
Politicians always talk about giving our troops the best equipment. Well, a fair competition judged this aircraft as being the best equipment for our troops. It's dismaying to hear some in Congress now talking about blocking funds so the Air Force can't replace its aging fleet of tankers just because Northrop Grumman won. The average age of these tankers is now almost 50 years old.
In a time of war, it would be an outrage if politics forced our troops to wait any longer for the equipment they need, or if politics forced an inferior product on them.
A Battalion’s Worth of Good Ideas by John A. Nagl
The “surge” of American forces in Iraq, coupled with an adherence to classic counterinsurgency principles, has gone a long way toward improving security there. Ultimately, though, success must be handled by the Iraqis themselves. And the key to success — in Afghanistan as well — rests largely with a small group of American military advisers who live and fight alongside foreign forces.
In a speech last fall to the Association of the United States Army, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates argued that the most important military component of what the Pentagon calls the “long war” against radical extremists will not be the fighting we do ourselves but how we “empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” This is something we know how to do, though we often move too slowly in shifting the burden of fighting from our own troops to those we are trying to help.
Based on American experiences in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, an advisory strategy can help the Iraqi Army and security forces beat Al Qaeda and protect their country. (Obviously, these are my personal views, and do not represent those of the Army.) However, doing so will require America’s ground forces to provide at least 20,000 combat advisers for the duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — men and women specially equipped and trained to help foreign forces bear a greater share of the combat load.
Unfortunately, America’s military did not have the advisory capacity it should have had after major combat operations ceased. The first attempt to create a new Iraqi Army was farmed out to private contractors. When that effort failed, and it became clear that the assistance needed to help the fledgling Iraqi Army far exceeded the capability of the Army’s Special Forces, regular Army troops were called on to fill the gap. Given their lack of training, these soldiers did remarkably well, but it was always a stopgap measure.
Fortunately, the advisory effort has been improved in the last couple of years. No longer do our troops receive training of varying quality conducted at different Army posts; since 2006, all Army, Navy and Air Force adviser training has been centralized at Fort Riley, Kan., under the Army’s First Infantry Division, where I lead one of the training battalions engaged in this effort.
Graduates deploy in 10- to 16-person teams that embed with Iraqi and Afghan security forces, assist in their training and accompany them into combat. Not only does this give those foreign troops exposure to our military tactics, it also provides a critical link to American artillery, air support and logistics during operations. Still, we have not seen the urgency the mission requires.
Doctrine — a standard enumeration of the purpose of a military organization and how it will accomplish its goals — is still nonexistent for the adviser mission. Organization is inconsistent, for example, with most Afghanistan teams consisting of 16 soldiers with no medic, while most Iraq teams contain 11 soldiers, including a medic. The fact is, both types of teams are too small for the tasks they have been assigned, and many consequently have been augmented on the ground by regular troops on an ad hoc basis.
This is simply because not enough advisers are being produced — just 5,000 per year. We are going to need ever more experienced, trained advisers as the size and complexity of the Iraqi and Afghan police forces and armies grow and as the combat burden increasingly shifts to them.
Part of the problem is institutional. The United States military’s ability in battle is unmatched, but we have a spotty history in terms of helping allies fight for themselves. Advisers who live and fight with a struggling “poor cousin” local army often do their dangerous and sometimes frustrating work out of sight of the brass, and it can be a career-killer for ambitious young officers.
In Vietnam, the advisory effort got off to a slow start and was too often neglected in favor of United States-only operations. Only after Washington committed in 1969 to so-called Vietnamization at the direction of President Richard M. Nixon did advisers get the resources and recognition they deserved, and by then it was too late. In the words of an (anonymous) Army officer who served in that war, “Our military institution seems to be prevented by its own doctrinal rigidity from understanding the nature of this war and from making the necessary modifications to apply its power more intelligently, more economically and, above all, more relevantly.”
Too much of that statement still rings true today. In the long term, we need to institutionalize our ability to field advisers and provide effective military assistance to allies. As it stands now, the troops we train at Fort Riley do their tour and are then moved back into conventional roles, while the embedded training teams are demobilized. This is as senseless as if in World War II we had decided that the First Infantry Division, which had gone ashore in North Africa and Sicily, was to be disbanded and replaced on D-Day with a division that had no experience landing on hostile ground. What we need, even after the Iraq and Afghanistan missions have ended, is a standing advisory corps of about 20,000 troops that can deploy wherever in the world we need to get our allies up to speed.
Ultimately, a successful shift of the combat load from American forces to the Iraqi and Afghan armies depends on four things.
First, United States military and civilian leadership must recognize that resources to support this major shift in strategy have to be re-routed from our regular forces. Left to themselves, the military services will inevitably neglect advisory efforts to sustain conventional forces. It took presidential direction to Vietnamize the war in Southeast Asia, and it will take a similar push to successfully “Iraqify” this war.
Second, shifting the burden from our forces to Iraqi and Afghan troops will call for close coordination between our civilian leadership and commanders in the field. Even as American combat forces draw down in favor of adviser-supported local armies, American combat support in the form of firepower, intelligence and logistics will continue to be crucial, possibly to the tune of tens of thousands of Americans in the combat zone. Politically, that may be a tough sell at home, but the success we’re finally seeing will falter without a continued American presence.
Third, the United States’ success depends on the willingness of the Iraqi and Afghan armies to fight with tenacity and skill. Soldiers of both countries are good fighters when well led. But we’ll let them down if we don’t send more and larger teams to embed with locals.
Finally, the American people must continue to be patient. In the 20th century, the average counterinsurgency campaign took nine years. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to run longer, and other commitments loom in this protracted struggle against Al Qaeda and its imitators. Bitter experience has long recognized that only local armies can ultimately prevail in counterinsurgency operations.
For the United States, helping our friends defend themselves will be critical for victory in the long war, and improving our adviser capacity will be the foundation of a long-term strategy.
In a speech last fall to the Association of the United States Army, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates argued that the most important military component of what the Pentagon calls the “long war” against radical extremists will not be the fighting we do ourselves but how we “empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” This is something we know how to do, though we often move too slowly in shifting the burden of fighting from our own troops to those we are trying to help.
Based on American experiences in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, an advisory strategy can help the Iraqi Army and security forces beat Al Qaeda and protect their country. (Obviously, these are my personal views, and do not represent those of the Army.) However, doing so will require America’s ground forces to provide at least 20,000 combat advisers for the duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — men and women specially equipped and trained to help foreign forces bear a greater share of the combat load.
Unfortunately, America’s military did not have the advisory capacity it should have had after major combat operations ceased. The first attempt to create a new Iraqi Army was farmed out to private contractors. When that effort failed, and it became clear that the assistance needed to help the fledgling Iraqi Army far exceeded the capability of the Army’s Special Forces, regular Army troops were called on to fill the gap. Given their lack of training, these soldiers did remarkably well, but it was always a stopgap measure.
Fortunately, the advisory effort has been improved in the last couple of years. No longer do our troops receive training of varying quality conducted at different Army posts; since 2006, all Army, Navy and Air Force adviser training has been centralized at Fort Riley, Kan., under the Army’s First Infantry Division, where I lead one of the training battalions engaged in this effort.
Graduates deploy in 10- to 16-person teams that embed with Iraqi and Afghan security forces, assist in their training and accompany them into combat. Not only does this give those foreign troops exposure to our military tactics, it also provides a critical link to American artillery, air support and logistics during operations. Still, we have not seen the urgency the mission requires.
Doctrine — a standard enumeration of the purpose of a military organization and how it will accomplish its goals — is still nonexistent for the adviser mission. Organization is inconsistent, for example, with most Afghanistan teams consisting of 16 soldiers with no medic, while most Iraq teams contain 11 soldiers, including a medic. The fact is, both types of teams are too small for the tasks they have been assigned, and many consequently have been augmented on the ground by regular troops on an ad hoc basis.
This is simply because not enough advisers are being produced — just 5,000 per year. We are going to need ever more experienced, trained advisers as the size and complexity of the Iraqi and Afghan police forces and armies grow and as the combat burden increasingly shifts to them.
Part of the problem is institutional. The United States military’s ability in battle is unmatched, but we have a spotty history in terms of helping allies fight for themselves. Advisers who live and fight with a struggling “poor cousin” local army often do their dangerous and sometimes frustrating work out of sight of the brass, and it can be a career-killer for ambitious young officers.
In Vietnam, the advisory effort got off to a slow start and was too often neglected in favor of United States-only operations. Only after Washington committed in 1969 to so-called Vietnamization at the direction of President Richard M. Nixon did advisers get the resources and recognition they deserved, and by then it was too late. In the words of an (anonymous) Army officer who served in that war, “Our military institution seems to be prevented by its own doctrinal rigidity from understanding the nature of this war and from making the necessary modifications to apply its power more intelligently, more economically and, above all, more relevantly.”
Too much of that statement still rings true today. In the long term, we need to institutionalize our ability to field advisers and provide effective military assistance to allies. As it stands now, the troops we train at Fort Riley do their tour and are then moved back into conventional roles, while the embedded training teams are demobilized. This is as senseless as if in World War II we had decided that the First Infantry Division, which had gone ashore in North Africa and Sicily, was to be disbanded and replaced on D-Day with a division that had no experience landing on hostile ground. What we need, even after the Iraq and Afghanistan missions have ended, is a standing advisory corps of about 20,000 troops that can deploy wherever in the world we need to get our allies up to speed.
Ultimately, a successful shift of the combat load from American forces to the Iraqi and Afghan armies depends on four things.
First, United States military and civilian leadership must recognize that resources to support this major shift in strategy have to be re-routed from our regular forces. Left to themselves, the military services will inevitably neglect advisory efforts to sustain conventional forces. It took presidential direction to Vietnamize the war in Southeast Asia, and it will take a similar push to successfully “Iraqify” this war.
Second, shifting the burden from our forces to Iraqi and Afghan troops will call for close coordination between our civilian leadership and commanders in the field. Even as American combat forces draw down in favor of adviser-supported local armies, American combat support in the form of firepower, intelligence and logistics will continue to be crucial, possibly to the tune of tens of thousands of Americans in the combat zone. Politically, that may be a tough sell at home, but the success we’re finally seeing will falter without a continued American presence.
Third, the United States’ success depends on the willingness of the Iraqi and Afghan armies to fight with tenacity and skill. Soldiers of both countries are good fighters when well led. But we’ll let them down if we don’t send more and larger teams to embed with locals.
Finally, the American people must continue to be patient. In the 20th century, the average counterinsurgency campaign took nine years. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to run longer, and other commitments loom in this protracted struggle against Al Qaeda and its imitators. Bitter experience has long recognized that only local armies can ultimately prevail in counterinsurgency operations.
For the United States, helping our friends defend themselves will be critical for victory in the long war, and improving our adviser capacity will be the foundation of a long-term strategy.
Thursday, April 03, 2008
Congress Holds First Hearing on Virtual Worlds by Benjamin Duranske
The first-ever Congressional hearing on virtual worlds took place today in Washington. Linden Lab CEO Philip Rosedale testified, along with representatives of IBM, TechSoup, and the New Media Consortium.
The hearing was conducted by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce). It was cast as an educational hearing, essentially a first look at these spaces for subcommittee members. With a few notable exceptions, the subcommittee members displayed a better understanding of virtual worlds than one might have expected, and both their comments and the testimony offer a look at the future of virtual law and the interaction between real world governments–or at least the U.S. government–and virtual worlds.
Opening Comments
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts), who chairs the subcommittee, seems to have a surprisingly solid understanding of virtual worlds. He described virtual worlds as a “glimpse into future [and] a window into current reality for millions of people.” He noted that “at their best, virtual worlds are vehicles for understanding across boarders and in communities.” The concerns he listed were also on point: consumer protection, intellectual property protection, online banking, gambling, and child protection.
The ranking member of the committee, Cliff Stearns (R-Florida) also seemed to come in with a good understanding of virtual worlds and a clear focus on the future. He recognized something that a fair number of commentators seem to miss: this isn’t really about Second Life in the long run. Stearns noted that “better graphics will lead to avatars that look, walk, and act just like real people […] in the very near future.” He did point out that virtual worlds can “enable egregious social behavior and social ills,” but emphasized, at two different points in his remarks, that virtual worlds “can best flourish without overregulation.”
Another bright spot was Gene Green (R-Texas) who noted that virtual worlds provide a “realistic way to get experience running an entrepreneurial venture.” Green also used the opportunity to push for more support for broadband deployment and competition.
The opening remarks went downhill from there. Several representative did not seem to understand the difference between games and social virtual worlds (one joked, “you’ll only get two experience points for attending this hearing”). Another said it made him uncomfortable that the word “avatar” means “god” in Hindu philosophy (”we’re not gods…”). Jane Harman (D-California) compared using a laptop while sitting on the beach to “working in a virtual world,” and focused her remarks on a somewhat suspect press report of terrorists “using virtual worlds to transfer money and find new recruits.”
Testimony to the Subcommittee
Philip Rosedale (soon-to-be-ex-CEO of Linden Lab, the company that runs Second Life) offered a few opening remarks about the benefits of Second Life and ran a video highlighting some of the interesting, socially acceptable things people do there. There was not a “Strokerz Toyz” poseball in sight.
The subcommittee members seemed willing to let Rosedale discuss the benefits of these spaces to an extent, and displayed some real enthusiasm for them. Several members even pointed out that they had avatars.
However, the subcommittee focused a fair portion of Rosedale’s testimony on one potential problem: child sexual predation in virtual worlds. In one exchange, Chairman Markey pressed Rosedale on the lack of safeguards in the Second Life software to flag suspicion behavior, asking, “How do you keep the adults out of the teen area and teens out of the adult area?” Rosedale said that following a standard “best practice,” the teen community was encouraged to report suspicious behavior. Markey interrupted him: “But once there, they could camouflage themselves.” Markey pushed for specifics, asking if Linden Lab gets social security numbers or a driver’s license (it doesn’t) and if not, then how does it know a users’ age, beyond self-reporting? Markey did not seem convinced that the self-reporting and community-based measures Rosedale said were in place were sufficient, noting, “A lot of people would not tell the truth. If they’re going into there with some overt intent, they’d not be truthful.”
One piece of information that will be of interest to both attorneys looking at Second Life as a repository for potential discovery and Second Life users concerned about privacy is that, according to Rosedale, Linden Lab currently keeps communication logs for “several weeks.”
Representative Bart Stupak (R-Michigan) returned to the line of questioning later, asking Rosedale if they had “set up any kind of sting operation” in Second Life. “We have not,” Rosedale said, “but I suspect law enforcement agencies may have done so. We have not, as a company, felt a need to do that.”
Stupak then asked about limits on excessive use. Rosedale pointed out that “excessive” needs to be sensitive to what the application is, since virtual worlds offer so many choices. “If you’re killing monsters,” he said, “then too much can make you unable to perform well in human society.” On the other hand, Rosedale noted, running a small business in Second Life can be “a lemonade stand experience, and may be superior to other kinds of learning.”
Representative Jane Harman (D-California) repeated her concerns about terrorism based on the largely discredited idea that terrorists are using virtual worlds for training, recruitment, and fund transfers. [Update: New World Notes points out that a team of anti-terrorism investigators does try to track jihadists in Second Life, so it’s not an absurd point or as discredited as I thought, though I do think that Representative Harman overstates the danger.] She started by reading part of a Sunday Times “virtual jihad” article from last August into the record and asked Rosedale to respond. Rosedale pointed out that Second Life manually reviews all transactions of more than US $10, and noted that “as a company we have never seen any evidence that there is any such activity going on in Second Life.” He also pointed out that “because we have a stronger recorded identity there, it is likely that virtual world activities are somewhat more policeable and the law is more enforceable there than it is on websites.”
In addition to Rosedale’s testimony, TechSoup’s Susan Tenby, Senior Manager of Community Development, discussed non-profit opportunities in virtual worlds, IBM’s Dr. Colin Parris discussed the future of these spaces as the natural evolution of the 2D internet into three dimensions, and Dr. Larry Johnson, Chief Executive Officer of the New Media Consortium, focused on the educational opportunities these spaces offer.
Dr. Parris’s testimony regarding the opportunity for businesses to make money in these spaces was particularly interesting. Ranking member Cliff Stearns asked how virtual worlds could be used by businesses beyond “just marketing.” Parris focused on inexpensive distance communications, product simulations and design, and particularly on the benefits of using virtual worlds for training. He noted that it “is more cost effective” in the long run to conduct interactive training in virtual worlds. He said that while it is “early in cycle, there are a number of ways that these do help businesses make money.”
The hearing was conducted by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (a subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce). It was cast as an educational hearing, essentially a first look at these spaces for subcommittee members. With a few notable exceptions, the subcommittee members displayed a better understanding of virtual worlds than one might have expected, and both their comments and the testimony offer a look at the future of virtual law and the interaction between real world governments–or at least the U.S. government–and virtual worlds.
Opening Comments
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts), who chairs the subcommittee, seems to have a surprisingly solid understanding of virtual worlds. He described virtual worlds as a “glimpse into future [and] a window into current reality for millions of people.” He noted that “at their best, virtual worlds are vehicles for understanding across boarders and in communities.” The concerns he listed were also on point: consumer protection, intellectual property protection, online banking, gambling, and child protection.
The ranking member of the committee, Cliff Stearns (R-Florida) also seemed to come in with a good understanding of virtual worlds and a clear focus on the future. He recognized something that a fair number of commentators seem to miss: this isn’t really about Second Life in the long run. Stearns noted that “better graphics will lead to avatars that look, walk, and act just like real people […] in the very near future.” He did point out that virtual worlds can “enable egregious social behavior and social ills,” but emphasized, at two different points in his remarks, that virtual worlds “can best flourish without overregulation.”
Another bright spot was Gene Green (R-Texas) who noted that virtual worlds provide a “realistic way to get experience running an entrepreneurial venture.” Green also used the opportunity to push for more support for broadband deployment and competition.
The opening remarks went downhill from there. Several representative did not seem to understand the difference between games and social virtual worlds (one joked, “you’ll only get two experience points for attending this hearing”). Another said it made him uncomfortable that the word “avatar” means “god” in Hindu philosophy (”we’re not gods…”). Jane Harman (D-California) compared using a laptop while sitting on the beach to “working in a virtual world,” and focused her remarks on a somewhat suspect press report of terrorists “using virtual worlds to transfer money and find new recruits.”
Testimony to the Subcommittee
Philip Rosedale (soon-to-be-ex-CEO of Linden Lab, the company that runs Second Life) offered a few opening remarks about the benefits of Second Life and ran a video highlighting some of the interesting, socially acceptable things people do there. There was not a “Strokerz Toyz” poseball in sight.
The subcommittee members seemed willing to let Rosedale discuss the benefits of these spaces to an extent, and displayed some real enthusiasm for them. Several members even pointed out that they had avatars.
However, the subcommittee focused a fair portion of Rosedale’s testimony on one potential problem: child sexual predation in virtual worlds. In one exchange, Chairman Markey pressed Rosedale on the lack of safeguards in the Second Life software to flag suspicion behavior, asking, “How do you keep the adults out of the teen area and teens out of the adult area?” Rosedale said that following a standard “best practice,” the teen community was encouraged to report suspicious behavior. Markey interrupted him: “But once there, they could camouflage themselves.” Markey pushed for specifics, asking if Linden Lab gets social security numbers or a driver’s license (it doesn’t) and if not, then how does it know a users’ age, beyond self-reporting? Markey did not seem convinced that the self-reporting and community-based measures Rosedale said were in place were sufficient, noting, “A lot of people would not tell the truth. If they’re going into there with some overt intent, they’d not be truthful.”
One piece of information that will be of interest to both attorneys looking at Second Life as a repository for potential discovery and Second Life users concerned about privacy is that, according to Rosedale, Linden Lab currently keeps communication logs for “several weeks.”
Representative Bart Stupak (R-Michigan) returned to the line of questioning later, asking Rosedale if they had “set up any kind of sting operation” in Second Life. “We have not,” Rosedale said, “but I suspect law enforcement agencies may have done so. We have not, as a company, felt a need to do that.”
Stupak then asked about limits on excessive use. Rosedale pointed out that “excessive” needs to be sensitive to what the application is, since virtual worlds offer so many choices. “If you’re killing monsters,” he said, “then too much can make you unable to perform well in human society.” On the other hand, Rosedale noted, running a small business in Second Life can be “a lemonade stand experience, and may be superior to other kinds of learning.”
Representative Jane Harman (D-California) repeated her concerns about terrorism based on the largely discredited idea that terrorists are using virtual worlds for training, recruitment, and fund transfers. [Update: New World Notes points out that a team of anti-terrorism investigators does try to track jihadists in Second Life, so it’s not an absurd point or as discredited as I thought, though I do think that Representative Harman overstates the danger.] She started by reading part of a Sunday Times “virtual jihad” article from last August into the record and asked Rosedale to respond. Rosedale pointed out that Second Life manually reviews all transactions of more than US $10, and noted that “as a company we have never seen any evidence that there is any such activity going on in Second Life.” He also pointed out that “because we have a stronger recorded identity there, it is likely that virtual world activities are somewhat more policeable and the law is more enforceable there than it is on websites.”
In addition to Rosedale’s testimony, TechSoup’s Susan Tenby, Senior Manager of Community Development, discussed non-profit opportunities in virtual worlds, IBM’s Dr. Colin Parris discussed the future of these spaces as the natural evolution of the 2D internet into three dimensions, and Dr. Larry Johnson, Chief Executive Officer of the New Media Consortium, focused on the educational opportunities these spaces offer.
Dr. Parris’s testimony regarding the opportunity for businesses to make money in these spaces was particularly interesting. Ranking member Cliff Stearns asked how virtual worlds could be used by businesses beyond “just marketing.” Parris focused on inexpensive distance communications, product simulations and design, and particularly on the benefits of using virtual worlds for training. He noted that it “is more cost effective” in the long run to conduct interactive training in virtual worlds. He said that while it is “early in cycle, there are a number of ways that these do help businesses make money.”
Wednesday, April 02, 2008
Maliki's Missteps by Max Boot
Many respected commentators see hidden agendas at play in the Iraqi army assault on militias in Basra. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes that the “fighting, which the government portrays as a crackdown on criminality, is better seen as a power grab, an effort by Mr. Maliki and the most powerful Shiite political parties to establish their authority over Basra and the parts of Baghdad.”
Vali Nasr of Tufts University says “that [Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki is completely irrelevant. The real show is between Hakim and Sadr.” That would be Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and its militia, the Badr Organization, and Moqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadr Trend and its militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi.
It is usually a safe bet to look for hidden motives in the morass of Iraqi politics, but in this case there is a danger of being overly sophisticated. The Iraqi army was ordered down to Basra by Maliki, not by Hakim or anyone else. The prime minister flew down himself to supervise its operations.
Whatever motives may lie behind his action (and what politician does not take politics into account when making any decision?), he has right on his side. Militias have been the bane of Iraq since 2003, and nowhere more so than in Basra, where the failure of British forces to keep the peace ceded control of this vital port to warring groups of thugs. Ordinary Iraqis are thoroughly sick of these desperados and anxious for their elected leaders to get rid of them. That is what Maliki has tried to do in Basra, and he should be applauded for his willingness to take on not just Sunni but also Shiite militias.
The problem is that the prime minister has proved singularly inept in prosecuting operation Knights’ Charge. He tried to repeat in Basra the success he enjoyed last August in confronting the Jaish al Mahdi in Karbala. Back then the Iraqi Security Forces defeated Mahdist gunmen and forced the volatile Sadr to declare a cease fire that was widely seen as a defeat for him. This time, the ceasefire does not look like a victory for the government, because its security forces failed to dislodge the Mahdists from their bastions in Basra. Worse, they triggered an Iranian-orchestrated counter-attack that resulted in heavy rocketing of the Green Zone in Baghdad as well as fighting in Sadr City, Hilla, and other Shiite enclaves.
There seemed to be little planning behind the Basra assault. The Iraqi army once again showed its willingness to fight, and it was impressive to see it shift a division’s worth of combat power to the south on short notice with minimal coalition help. The army and other security forces also managed to keep control of Karbala, Najaf, and other parts of the Shiite heartland where some Sadrists rose up. But the army was not given an opportunity to “prepare the battlefield” in Basra—a term of art for putting into place before the main assault everything from logistics and fire support to a persuasive message for the media.
Maliki’s worst failure was the lack of an “information operation” to get out his side of the story. Accordingly, what should have been seen as a long-overdue law-and-order campaign by the lawfully elected government has instead been depicted both inside and outside of Iraq in the cynical terms enunciated by Cordesman and Nasr. Maliki has received lukewarm support at best from his own coalition allies, including Hakim. Arab countries, which should be ecstatic that Iraq’s government is taking on Iranian-backed Shiite gangs, have been conspicuously silent.
Lacking political support and encountering a tougher than expected foe, the prime minister seems to be ceasing major combat operations. If so, that is the worst of all worlds: Having started a fight, it is imperative to finish it. By not doing more damage to the Sadrists, Maliki allows them to claim a victory. That is the same mistake the coalition made in fighting the Sadrists in 2004 and that Israel made in fighting Hezbollah (which has been training some of the Sadrists) in 2006. The situation in Iraq is made all the worse because it was an Iranian Quds Force general who finally brokered the ceasefire in Basra, thus reinforcing Iran's dominant role in the south.
Prior to this latest outbreak General David Petraeus had been pursuing a more subtle strategy. He has been working to incorporate the more moderate Sadrist elements into the political process while sending Iraqi and American Special Operations forces to capture or kill the ruthless Special Groups that are funded and directed from Tehran and that are largely outside of Sadr’s control. Maliki has upset that calculated campaign plan, leading mainstream Jaish al Mahdi elements to take up arms alongside the Special Groups. With the Basra offensive petering out, Petraeus should be able to get back to his more low-key approach.
It is doubtful, however, that it will be possible to gain control of Basra unless coalition troops are sent there to work with the Iraqis—something that is unlikely to happen because American force levels are falling and the British forces are unwilling to risk casualties.
While the recent fighting will be cited in our domestic politics to discredit the surge, it actually reinforces its rationale. The Iraqi government is starting to do the right thing—from passing reconciliation legislation to challenging militias. Its security forces are displaying more moxie. But they still do not have the ability to go it alone against the most ruthless, foreign-funded terrorists and militias. By retreating from the streets of Basra, the British allowed the situation to spin out of control. That is a mistake we should not repeat in the rest of the country.
Vali Nasr of Tufts University says “that [Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki is completely irrelevant. The real show is between Hakim and Sadr.” That would be Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and its militia, the Badr Organization, and Moqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadr Trend and its militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi.
It is usually a safe bet to look for hidden motives in the morass of Iraqi politics, but in this case there is a danger of being overly sophisticated. The Iraqi army was ordered down to Basra by Maliki, not by Hakim or anyone else. The prime minister flew down himself to supervise its operations.
Whatever motives may lie behind his action (and what politician does not take politics into account when making any decision?), he has right on his side. Militias have been the bane of Iraq since 2003, and nowhere more so than in Basra, where the failure of British forces to keep the peace ceded control of this vital port to warring groups of thugs. Ordinary Iraqis are thoroughly sick of these desperados and anxious for their elected leaders to get rid of them. That is what Maliki has tried to do in Basra, and he should be applauded for his willingness to take on not just Sunni but also Shiite militias.
The problem is that the prime minister has proved singularly inept in prosecuting operation Knights’ Charge. He tried to repeat in Basra the success he enjoyed last August in confronting the Jaish al Mahdi in Karbala. Back then the Iraqi Security Forces defeated Mahdist gunmen and forced the volatile Sadr to declare a cease fire that was widely seen as a defeat for him. This time, the ceasefire does not look like a victory for the government, because its security forces failed to dislodge the Mahdists from their bastions in Basra. Worse, they triggered an Iranian-orchestrated counter-attack that resulted in heavy rocketing of the Green Zone in Baghdad as well as fighting in Sadr City, Hilla, and other Shiite enclaves.
There seemed to be little planning behind the Basra assault. The Iraqi army once again showed its willingness to fight, and it was impressive to see it shift a division’s worth of combat power to the south on short notice with minimal coalition help. The army and other security forces also managed to keep control of Karbala, Najaf, and other parts of the Shiite heartland where some Sadrists rose up. But the army was not given an opportunity to “prepare the battlefield” in Basra—a term of art for putting into place before the main assault everything from logistics and fire support to a persuasive message for the media.
Maliki’s worst failure was the lack of an “information operation” to get out his side of the story. Accordingly, what should have been seen as a long-overdue law-and-order campaign by the lawfully elected government has instead been depicted both inside and outside of Iraq in the cynical terms enunciated by Cordesman and Nasr. Maliki has received lukewarm support at best from his own coalition allies, including Hakim. Arab countries, which should be ecstatic that Iraq’s government is taking on Iranian-backed Shiite gangs, have been conspicuously silent.
Lacking political support and encountering a tougher than expected foe, the prime minister seems to be ceasing major combat operations. If so, that is the worst of all worlds: Having started a fight, it is imperative to finish it. By not doing more damage to the Sadrists, Maliki allows them to claim a victory. That is the same mistake the coalition made in fighting the Sadrists in 2004 and that Israel made in fighting Hezbollah (which has been training some of the Sadrists) in 2006. The situation in Iraq is made all the worse because it was an Iranian Quds Force general who finally brokered the ceasefire in Basra, thus reinforcing Iran's dominant role in the south.
Prior to this latest outbreak General David Petraeus had been pursuing a more subtle strategy. He has been working to incorporate the more moderate Sadrist elements into the political process while sending Iraqi and American Special Operations forces to capture or kill the ruthless Special Groups that are funded and directed from Tehran and that are largely outside of Sadr’s control. Maliki has upset that calculated campaign plan, leading mainstream Jaish al Mahdi elements to take up arms alongside the Special Groups. With the Basra offensive petering out, Petraeus should be able to get back to his more low-key approach.
It is doubtful, however, that it will be possible to gain control of Basra unless coalition troops are sent there to work with the Iraqis—something that is unlikely to happen because American force levels are falling and the British forces are unwilling to risk casualties.
While the recent fighting will be cited in our domestic politics to discredit the surge, it actually reinforces its rationale. The Iraqi government is starting to do the right thing—from passing reconciliation legislation to challenging militias. Its security forces are displaying more moxie. But they still do not have the ability to go it alone against the most ruthless, foreign-funded terrorists and militias. By retreating from the streets of Basra, the British allowed the situation to spin out of control. That is a mistake we should not repeat in the rest of the country.
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