The thoughtful private Intelligence company Stratfor just released a piece suggesting what it thinks are the limits to jihadi terrorists being able to conduct their terrorist planning and training online: The Role and Limitations of the ‘Dark Web’ In jihadist Training. Stratfor acknowledges that the Internet has been an enabler for terrorism but it doubts that the required tradecraft of terrorist operations can be taught online. Where Stratfor makes an error in this article is in not taking account of the enhanced capabilities of 3-D virtual worlds to assist the next generation of jihadi terrorists. The educational abilities of virtual worlds have been well-documented and as Stratfor points out bomb-making is best learnt from an expert. With the abilities available within virtual worlds there is no reason why this knowledge cannot be passed from teacher to pupil within a persistent 3-D environment. The real-time communication systems incorporating VoIP and the ability to produce sophisticated, ‘working’ 3-D models makes training in the engineering of terrorist technique a current reality.
But Stratfor, on this occasion, also makes the wider mistake of looking at the Internet as it is today, when the Internet always exists in the future. Therefore, while Stratfor rightly points to the limitations of Google Earth as a terrorist reconnaissance tool it fails to account for the Internet of tomorrow where target locations can be re-created in virtual worlds and attacks can be planned and practiced. It isn’t just virtual worlds but other applications that are making use of the explosion of data available to the ordinary user in order to create sophisticated digital tools, which will in time supplant Google Earth as the terrorist tool of choice. New software from Microsoft’s research lab entitled, Photosynth meshes with online photo sharing sites to deliver highly intricate 3-D models of real-world buildings and environments. Terrorists are understandably interested in any application that enhances their reconnaissance capability without exposing them to risk and photosynth fits that category. Conducting pre-attack surveillance is often when terrorist cells are at their most vulnerable - digital tools can reduce these vulnerabilities.
Technology companies are developing enhanced representations of the real world almost daily and these can clearly be corrupted for extremist use. Jihadi digital natives will increase the sophistication of their platforms to further enhance their potency - the limitations Stratfor correctly identifies will rapidly fall away.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Lessons of Algiers, December 11, 2007 Again by Frank Hyland
I really dislike writing this piece, but apparently it is still necessary. I and thousands of others have written “it” thousands of times before over the years. There must be some magic number of times that, once reached, obviates the need for any further repetition. It appears, though, that the number hasn’t yet been reached, the lesson has not yet been learned. Without any further ado, then……………….
Dear Secretary General:
I write to offer my condolences to you and to your staffers worldwide in the aftermath of the 11 December bombing of your offices in Algiers that killed ten of their colleagues. As others have expressed as well, this was a cowardly act carried out by subhuman perpetrators with absolutely no sense of decency. In that this attack follows on the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, with the loss of the lives of 22 brave UN staffers, I should also note that my sorrow is tempered by anger. There are lessons being “taught” by the terrorists, but the audience also plays a crucial role - it absolutely must remain awake and be responsive. Others have learned these lessons; now it is the UN’s turn.
Lesson Number One: This may seem at first glance to be obvious or that I cite it in jest, but terrorists strike where, when, and how they are able to strike. That is, your facilities continue to fall into the category of “soft” targets as opposed to those that have been hardened - by being distant enough from the nearby roadway, by appropriate construction materials, by physical barriers, by armed security personnel.
Lesson Number Two: The term “UN Security” must be more than an oxymoron. Candlelight prayer vigils, public statements decrying attacks are all comforting, but insufficient in the prevention of further attacks. In fact, they are a “magnet,” in that the accompanying media coverage calls attention to the lack of security at your facilities. The protection of UN staffers must be the highest priority, far and away, of the United Nations. It cannot be in competition for time, money, and attention with, for example, the pursuit of a pact on global warming. Those killed in Baghdad and in Algiers will never feel that warmth because of the lack of an adequate UN physical security program.
Sincerely,
Frank Hyland
Dear Secretary General:
I write to offer my condolences to you and to your staffers worldwide in the aftermath of the 11 December bombing of your offices in Algiers that killed ten of their colleagues. As others have expressed as well, this was a cowardly act carried out by subhuman perpetrators with absolutely no sense of decency. In that this attack follows on the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, with the loss of the lives of 22 brave UN staffers, I should also note that my sorrow is tempered by anger. There are lessons being “taught” by the terrorists, but the audience also plays a crucial role - it absolutely must remain awake and be responsive. Others have learned these lessons; now it is the UN’s turn.
Lesson Number One: This may seem at first glance to be obvious or that I cite it in jest, but terrorists strike where, when, and how they are able to strike. That is, your facilities continue to fall into the category of “soft” targets as opposed to those that have been hardened - by being distant enough from the nearby roadway, by appropriate construction materials, by physical barriers, by armed security personnel.
Lesson Number Two: The term “UN Security” must be more than an oxymoron. Candlelight prayer vigils, public statements decrying attacks are all comforting, but insufficient in the prevention of further attacks. In fact, they are a “magnet,” in that the accompanying media coverage calls attention to the lack of security at your facilities. The protection of UN staffers must be the highest priority, far and away, of the United Nations. It cannot be in competition for time, money, and attention with, for example, the pursuit of a pact on global warming. Those killed in Baghdad and in Algiers will never feel that warmth because of the lack of an adequate UN physical security program.
Sincerely,
Frank Hyland
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