Muslim dictatorships have caused a lot of frustration. These days Islamists – individuals and groups who believe that their system of government should be based on Islamic principles – are one of the leading groups challenging dictators. Unfortunately, while Islamists do want to usher in democracy, many then want to appoint a body of clerics to strike down legislation they don't approve of. Thankfully, today we see the emergence of a post-Islamist order among Muslims.
A new crop of Muslims has figured out how to reconcile liberal democracy with Islam. They have given up on creating religious organizations devoted to da'wa (Islamic evangelism) and have become organized as civil-political parties with platforms based on equality and pluralism. Part of the credit for the popularity of post-Islamism goes to theocratic Islamists. In their eagerness to merge religion with politics, they thought the result would be religion. Instead, the devout middle class realized that religion alone could not provide for their social concerns. Post-Islamism, thus, is the recognition that while religion may provide salvation in the next life, politics is what provides for welfare in this one.
Today, post-Islamist groups are at work in places like Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan.
One of Egypt's main post-Islamist parties is called Hizb ul-Wasat (the Center Party). It was founded in 1996, breaking away from the Muslim Brotherhood. The reasons for the split included the Brotherhood's unwillingness to accept non-Muslims as members of the party or as citizens of Egypt, unwillingness to cease splitting the world between the "Abode of War" and the "Abode of Islam," and unwillingness to change their focus away from Islamic evangelism. Wasat calls itself an Islamic party but it is open to Christians and secularists. Rafiq Habib, a Protestant intellectual in Egypt, was among its founding members and is on its five-man board of operations. After a 10-year battle, Wasat was officially recognized as a political party in 2007.
The fundamental point that makes Wasat post-Islamist is that instead of defining Islam as a religion, it defines it as a culture, or civilization, which is inclusive of minorities. Thinking of Islam as a culture is similar to how certain people in the West refer to the West as "Judeo-Christian" while still leaving room for Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and others to practice freely therein.
The Wasat party's platform assures the separation of powers, rejects religious or gender-based discrimination, explicitly calls for pluralism and equality between men and women, and makes space for unions and syndicates. Most importantly, unlike the Brotherhood's platform it does not set up an extra-constitutional body of clerics who can veto legislation (like they do in Iran).
Although Wasat is a key example of a post-Islamist party, perhaps the most successful post-Islamist group is Turkey's ruling AK (Justice and Development) party which, like Wasat, originated by breaking away from an Islamist organization.
Three important benchmarks – women, the West, and Israel – show that the AKP's breakaway from regular Islamists is conclusive. One of the first things that the AKP declared upon its election in 2002, as reported by the New York Times, was that "secularism is the protector of all beliefs and religions. We are the guarantors of this secularism, and our management will clearly prove that."
Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) party is also developing a post-Islamist alternative. It has emerged only during the Musharraf years, led by cricketer-turned-politician, Imran Khan. One of the most notable elements about it is that it seeks to provide free education for women, legislation against sexual harassment, and affirmative action toward women, by utilizing Islamic welfare.
Just as Wasat has antagonized the Brotherhood in Egypt, Tehreek has criticized Pakistan's hard-line Islamist organizations for collusion with anti-democratic forces, again showing that post-Islamists are more concerned with the democratic pie than with appeasing Islamists. While Tehreek is nascent, it should be monitored closely, because it has increasing support among Pakistan's youth and expatriate communities. It should be remembered that it took Turkey's AKP barely 10 years from formation to become the ruling party.
Political Islam is in its third phase. The first round was revolutionary. The second round, still with us, became methodical but was still supremacist. The forthcoming post-Islamist push is committed to the democratic process and has ceased to think of itself as a religious movement, instead adopting a civil-political platform.
When post-Islamist groups come to power, they will be social conservatives focused on family and spirituality. A post-Islamist politician will sound somewhere between John Edwards and Mike Huckabee, i.e., faith informs one's legislation but is ultimately personal. In their foreign policy, they will reject intrusions upon their sovereignty from all foreign groups, including NATO on the one hand, and al-Qaida and the Taliban on the other. Because of their middle-class support base, they will generally abide by international norms and not launch themselves into international conflicts, finding them to be fiscally and socially expensive. Just as Europe's Christian democratic parties gave birth to liberal democrats, it is likely that after consolidating power, post-Islamist parties will create space for openly secular parties to gain more traction.
Wednesday, December 05, 2007
Tuesday, December 04, 2007
Indonesia Update by Kenneth Conboy
For the past two years, conservative Islamic parties in Indonesia, often supported by paramilitary religious groups known for their intolerance in an otherwise tolerant, diverse society, have been periodically pushing to have elements of Islamic Law become the law of the land.
This time, social critics are pushing back. On 3 December, a diverse group of activists—including many from mainstream Islamic groups—urged the country’s legislative branch to reject the proposed legislation.
What makes the debate noteworthy is the way that the Islamic hardliners have been able to disguise their end-game. In a brilliant political move, they penned a so-called “Anti-Pornography Bill” that would ostensibly protect women and children from the scourges associated with pornography.
In fact, the anti-pornography angle was just a veil. According to the authors of the document, pornography is vaguely defined to include just about anything that would offend their hyper-caffeinated moral sensitivities. Many forms of women’s bathing suits, for example, would suddenly become illegal. Any publications or works of art that showed all but a fully-dressed female form, too, would conceivably be off limits. So would many cultural events, such as those in tourist destinations like Bali.
Worse, the bill calls on “all parties” to protect morality. This has been seen as a call to arms for the Islamic Defenders Front and their ilk, which have made a name for themselves raiding nightspots during the Ramadhan fasting month.
Secular political groups oppose this shift, which they correctly note would undermine the nation’s cultural diversity. But because of the name of the bill, they are often left having to explain why they are defending “pornography.”
The current administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, meantime, is doing precious little to maintain the status quo—in no small part because the fragile ruling coalition contains some of the very political parties that wrote the bill in the first place.
No date has been set for the final debate on the Anti-Pornography Bill. But with presidential campaigning set to unofficially start next year (the election is not until 2009), hard-line Islamic parties will probably try to flex their muscles—and make another push for passage of the bill—within the next two quarters.
In other news in Indonesia, a court in South Jakarta on 3 December sentenced six Islamic militants for a series of terrorist acts in Sulawesi, including the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls and the murder of a priest. The extremists got up to nineteen years in prison, though in the Indonesian justice system they could conceivably be freed in a fraction of that time.
At least one of the militants was unrepentant after his sentencing. “Eighteen years is not a problem,” he said. “There will be a more noble trial before God.”
This time, social critics are pushing back. On 3 December, a diverse group of activists—including many from mainstream Islamic groups—urged the country’s legislative branch to reject the proposed legislation.
What makes the debate noteworthy is the way that the Islamic hardliners have been able to disguise their end-game. In a brilliant political move, they penned a so-called “Anti-Pornography Bill” that would ostensibly protect women and children from the scourges associated with pornography.
In fact, the anti-pornography angle was just a veil. According to the authors of the document, pornography is vaguely defined to include just about anything that would offend their hyper-caffeinated moral sensitivities. Many forms of women’s bathing suits, for example, would suddenly become illegal. Any publications or works of art that showed all but a fully-dressed female form, too, would conceivably be off limits. So would many cultural events, such as those in tourist destinations like Bali.
Worse, the bill calls on “all parties” to protect morality. This has been seen as a call to arms for the Islamic Defenders Front and their ilk, which have made a name for themselves raiding nightspots during the Ramadhan fasting month.
Secular political groups oppose this shift, which they correctly note would undermine the nation’s cultural diversity. But because of the name of the bill, they are often left having to explain why they are defending “pornography.”
The current administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, meantime, is doing precious little to maintain the status quo—in no small part because the fragile ruling coalition contains some of the very political parties that wrote the bill in the first place.
No date has been set for the final debate on the Anti-Pornography Bill. But with presidential campaigning set to unofficially start next year (the election is not until 2009), hard-line Islamic parties will probably try to flex their muscles—and make another push for passage of the bill—within the next two quarters.
In other news in Indonesia, a court in South Jakarta on 3 December sentenced six Islamic militants for a series of terrorist acts in Sulawesi, including the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls and the murder of a priest. The extremists got up to nineteen years in prison, though in the Indonesian justice system they could conceivably be freed in a fraction of that time.
At least one of the militants was unrepentant after his sentencing. “Eighteen years is not a problem,” he said. “There will be a more noble trial before God.”
Contending with Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities by Matthew Levitt
This week, the U.S. intelligence community released to Capitol Hill the unclassified key judgments of its latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities. The new estimate opens with the startling judgment that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003, which is sure to dominate the discourse to follow. It shouldn't.
The estimate's more significant conclusion is that the most likely tool to successfully alter Iran's nuclear calculus is targeted political and economic pressure, not military action.
According to the estimate, Iran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program in 2003 was "in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work." (Though it provides no more detail about this scrutiny and pressure, it was around this time that the United States and other governments exposed the A.Q. Kahn network and its international nuclear weapons material black market). The key judgments conclude that the intelligence community's "assessment that the [nuclear weapons] program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue that we judged previously."
The declassification of these key judgments suggests the Bush administration intends to pursue non-military tools. Some might say that the NIE shows that sanctions are not needed. That is hardly the case; the U.N. Security Council and IAEA concern has always been about Iran's enrichment facilities, not about a weaponization program. In fact, what the NIE shows is that carrots and sticks work. The estimate concludes Iran might be convinced to extend the halt to its nuclear weapons program with "some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways."
The declassified key judgments are sure to spark fierce debate over the nature of the nuclear threat posed by Iran. But on the pressing issue of how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions the intelligence assessment is clear: financial and political sanctions can be effective.
Evidence suggests Iran is indeed vulnerable to outside influence and, unlike the blanket sanctions applied against Iraq under Saddam Hussein, today's sanctions are both targeted and graduated. First, the sanctions are aimed only at those regime elements specifically engaged in illicit conduct (such as banks engaged in deceptive financial practices, nuclear proliferation front companies, the Revolutionary Guards and Qods Force). Second, they are applied in phases in order to demonstrate that their purpose is not simply to punish Iran but to encourage a change in behavior. Should that behavior not change, additional targeted and graduated sanctions must be implemented for the threat of sanctions to remain credible.
It is perhaps ironic that the new NIE was released on the same day that European and American diplomats announced in Paris that China now supports further international sanctions targeting Iran. In the wake of disappointing reports from both the IAEA and European Union on Iran's nuclear program, China's support for targeted measures focused on Iranian banks, as well as travel restrictions on key individuals, means a third U.N. Security Council resolution is possible before the new year.
Until recently, China maintained it preferred diplomacy over sanctions. But in fact sanctions do not undermine diplomacy, they create leverage for diplomacy. With China now indicating support for multilateral sanctions, there is good reason to hope that smart sanctions may yet create diplomatic leverage.
Iran poses a proliferation threat whether it maintains an active nuclear weapons program or merely produces fissile material in a civilian program that could be quickly weaponized at a later date. Should financial and political pressure fail to create sufficient diplomatic leverage, policymakers could eventually be left with the unenviable task of deciding between using military force or tolerating a nuclear Iran. That possibility should give us all pause. The assessment that non-military pressure may yet prevail should give us hope.
The estimate's more significant conclusion is that the most likely tool to successfully alter Iran's nuclear calculus is targeted political and economic pressure, not military action.
According to the estimate, Iran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program in 2003 was "in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work." (Though it provides no more detail about this scrutiny and pressure, it was around this time that the United States and other governments exposed the A.Q. Kahn network and its international nuclear weapons material black market). The key judgments conclude that the intelligence community's "assessment that the [nuclear weapons] program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue that we judged previously."
The declassification of these key judgments suggests the Bush administration intends to pursue non-military tools. Some might say that the NIE shows that sanctions are not needed. That is hardly the case; the U.N. Security Council and IAEA concern has always been about Iran's enrichment facilities, not about a weaponization program. In fact, what the NIE shows is that carrots and sticks work. The estimate concludes Iran might be convinced to extend the halt to its nuclear weapons program with "some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways."
The declassified key judgments are sure to spark fierce debate over the nature of the nuclear threat posed by Iran. But on the pressing issue of how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions the intelligence assessment is clear: financial and political sanctions can be effective.
Evidence suggests Iran is indeed vulnerable to outside influence and, unlike the blanket sanctions applied against Iraq under Saddam Hussein, today's sanctions are both targeted and graduated. First, the sanctions are aimed only at those regime elements specifically engaged in illicit conduct (such as banks engaged in deceptive financial practices, nuclear proliferation front companies, the Revolutionary Guards and Qods Force). Second, they are applied in phases in order to demonstrate that their purpose is not simply to punish Iran but to encourage a change in behavior. Should that behavior not change, additional targeted and graduated sanctions must be implemented for the threat of sanctions to remain credible.
It is perhaps ironic that the new NIE was released on the same day that European and American diplomats announced in Paris that China now supports further international sanctions targeting Iran. In the wake of disappointing reports from both the IAEA and European Union on Iran's nuclear program, China's support for targeted measures focused on Iranian banks, as well as travel restrictions on key individuals, means a third U.N. Security Council resolution is possible before the new year.
Until recently, China maintained it preferred diplomacy over sanctions. But in fact sanctions do not undermine diplomacy, they create leverage for diplomacy. With China now indicating support for multilateral sanctions, there is good reason to hope that smart sanctions may yet create diplomatic leverage.
Iran poses a proliferation threat whether it maintains an active nuclear weapons program or merely produces fissile material in a civilian program that could be quickly weaponized at a later date. Should financial and political pressure fail to create sufficient diplomatic leverage, policymakers could eventually be left with the unenviable task of deciding between using military force or tolerating a nuclear Iran. That possibility should give us all pause. The assessment that non-military pressure may yet prevail should give us hope.
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