In the coming days, Iran is expected to make what is being billed as a major announcement on its nuclear programme to coincide with the anniversary of the Iranian revolution.
But just how close is Iran to mastering nuclear technology?
Both Iran and some of its critics may have their own reasons for exaggerating the progress - but the real truth is hard to establish.
In its announcement, Iran may claim to have begun large-scale industrial enrichment of uranium.
But any statement is likely to be as much about political positioning as real technical progress, according to nuclear analysts.
The announcement may focus on work Iran has conducted in installing two cascades of more than 300 centrifuges in an underground industrial size plant at Natanz with the aim of moving towards a total of 3,000 machines.
With US troops so close to Iran's borders, a small event could easily ignite a wider escalation and even trigger an 'accidental' war.
The centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. This is in addition to two existing cascades in a pilot plant above ground.
But Iran's plan to initially run 3,000 centrifuges before moving towards an ultimate goal of 54,000 has run into obstacles and delays and is well behind target. Even the cascades in the pilot plant have seen problems.
However, once Iran has mastered the technology of enrichment and the ability to enrich gas at high speeds in a centrifuge then transferring it to a larger scale presents a lesser challenge.
Own Mistakes
Uranium enriched to around 5% can be used as nuclear fuel, but if it is enriched to around 90% it can be used in a weapon.
Over the years, some of the problems with the programme seem to be due to Iran's own mistakes. For instance, one of the top figures in the programme has talked of how in the early days, those assembling the centrifuges did not wear cloth gloves. As a result, tiny beads of sweat would be transferred to the rotor which spins inside the centrifuge. This almost imperceptibly increased the weight of the rotor which then unbalanced the centrifuge when it started to spin, causing it to "explode".
Iran also was thought to have had problems with the purity of the uranium hexafluoride which is fed into the centrifuges, although its scientists now say this has been solved.
Mossad's Hand
But the problems may also be due to more shady activity by others. Over a number of years, both US and Israeli intelligence are believed to have covertly passed flawed parts and equipment to Iran to cause technical difficulties and slow the Iranian programme down. In one event last April, according to Iranian press reports, the explosion of another set of centrifuges was attributed to problems with the power supply.
The supply needs to be kept precise and constant to ensure the centrifuges spin at the correct speed but Iranian scientists said that on this occasion the power supply might have been "manipulated" which may imply they were sabotaged.
It is possible that some of the electrical parts for Iran may have come through the Turkish end of the network run by Pakistani scientist AQ Khan which also supplied electrical components to the Libyan nuclear programme.
By the end of the network's activity in early 2004, it had been penetrated by British and American intelligence with some of the suppliers turned as agents.
Recent reports have also questioned whether the death in January of a 45-year-old Iranian scientist, Ardeshire Hosseinpour, might have been the result of an operation by Israel's intelligence service, Mossad. Hosseinpour had been involved in the enrichment programme, but Iranian reports have denied that his death was due to anything other than natural causes. Mossad is widely believed to have been behind a campaign of killings and intimidation targeted at the Iraqi nuclear programme and some of its suppliers in Europe in the early 1980s, but this has never been definitively proven.
Many Unknowns
Arguably it is human expertise in the form of trained scientists rather than equipment which is the most important element of a nuclear programme.
Whether or not there has been extensive covert activity directed at Iran (and by definition it is hard to discern the truth), the variety of technical problems mean that its hard to know if Iran is actually far away from mastering nuclear technology or relatively close to it and thereby able to make the relatively short journey from "peaceful" civilian technology towards manufacturing nuclear material for a bomb.
The problem is that there remain many "unknowns" when it comes to the Iranian programme.
One of the most important is exactly how much help Tehran received from the Khan network. The network first sold centrifuge designs to Iran in 1987 and provided on-off help for more than a decade after, including parts and designs for more advanced machines. But international investigators remain unsure that they have an understanding on the full extent of the assistance, not least because no-one outside Pakistan has been able to question Khan directly whilst he remains under a form of house-arrest in Islamabad. The biggest question surrounds the more advanced P2 centrifuge design that Khan passed to the Iranians. Iran initially said it had conducted little work on the design but last year Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Tehran was working on the machine (which would be far more efficient than the model in Natanz).
However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been provided any information on such work.
No rush?
If Iran was able to run a parallel, second enrichment program which it had managed to keep secret, then many of the estimates of how far Iran was from mastering the technology might be way of the mark. But this remains an unknown. The degree of uncertainty can cut the debate over action against Iran in both directions.
Some voices argue that Iran remains at least five years away from nuclear weapons capability, and US intelligence estimates have consistently pushed back when that might be - so some argue there is no rush. Other hawkish and pessimistic voices argue that Iran could soon master the technology and the time-frame for action lies this year. Israel is keen to emphasise that it sees the shorter time-frame as the valid one and is willing to take action. The US has been playing down its willingness to engage in military action but is currently pushing the Europeans to squeeze Iran financially.
Accidental War
But conflict between the US and Iran is still possible.
President Ahmadinejad is facing his own domestic problems with mounting criticism of not just his approach to foreign policy and the nuclear issue but also his failure to deal with economic concerns at home. This could lead to other power centres in Iran forcing him to back down but could also encourage him to take a harder line on the nuclear programme in order to try and rally support. At the same time, Washington has been increasing the pressure over Iran's alleged involvement in Iraq.
With US troops so close to Iran's borders, a small event could easily ignite a wider escalation and even trigger an "accidental" war - although conspiracy theorists might argue that there are some in both Tehran and Washington who would like to engineer just such a confrontation and blame the other side.
Saturday, February 10, 2007
Friday, February 09, 2007
There Are Four Iraq Wars: How many of them can we win? by Phillip Carter
I came home from Iraq in September 2006 with a paradox ($) on my mind: How was it that we were making tangible progress in developing Iraq's security forces, government, and economy, yet the overall security situation was worsening?
Thanks to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, I now have an answer: Our strategic stagnation results from the fact that we are fighting four wars, not one. According to Gates: "One is Shi'a on Shi'a, principally in the south; the second is sectarian conflict, principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is al Qaida, and al Qaida is attacking, at times, all of those targets." The multifaceted nature of these four wars has frustrated American strategy since 2003. Successes in one area produce setbacks in the others, with al-Qaida hovering above the fray to spoil progress whenever it threatens to bring stability to Iraq, as they did by bombing the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006 after the successful Iraqi elections. Consequently, any strategies implementing the "counterinsurgency playbook," smart as those plans may be, will necessarily prove insufficient because we aren't just fighting an insurgency anymore.
Gates' first war in the south is a classic internecine political struggle between Shiite factions seeking dominance over the south's oil-rich land and its religiously significant cities such as Najaf and Karbala. American politicians and generals have struggled mightily to control these tensions since 2003; Coalition Provisional Authority proconsul Paul Bremer spent enormous amounts of time juggling the interests and intrigues of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, rebel cleric Muqtada Sadr, and secular Shiite aspirants to power like Ayad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi. Today, the problem is that Iraq is governed by a fragile Shiite coalition, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which relies on all kinds of Shiite groups for its power. Any efforts to stamp out the Shiite-on-Shiite conflict will inflame Maliki's base and possibly destroy his government. The same is true of efforts to neutralize Sadr and his Jaish al-Mahdi militia. Thus, stopping the first war would undermine the goal of building a legitimate and stable government for Iraq.
The second war, the bloody sectarian conflict, is an even thornier question. The textbook approach for managing internal tension calls for a massive imposition of force and control, which is how Saddam kept order before his fall and how Tito controlled Yugoslavia. The United States has chosen not to do this, both because it lacks the troops in Iraq to impose order, and because it recognizes that such a police state would undermine its goals for creating a liberal democracy. So, the United States has opted instead for a lighter approach, seeking a "political" solution to the sectarian conflict that would bring together warring Shiite and Sunni factions. However, every attempt to reach out to Sunni militants is impeded by simultaneous U.S. efforts to crush the Sunni insurgency, and every attempt to rein in the Shiite militias threatens the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, so these political overtures invariably fail.
Likewise, American efforts to implement "Counterinsurgency 101" to win the third war have faltered because they fail to deal with the other wars. Take, for instance, the much-touted effort to "stand up" the Iraqi security forces so we could "stand down" American forces. Indigenous army and police personnel have the requisite language, cultural, and political capability to effectively police their population. From Algeria to Malaya to the Balkans, successful peacemakers and counterinsurgents have achieved success by leveraging indigenous forces to provide security for the population. But in Iraq, this counterinsurgency strategy backfires. As Stephen Biddle wrote in Foreign Affairs, building the Iraqi army and police—a first step to beating insurgents—has merely trained and equipped the partisans fighting Iraq's sectarian civil war. The same can be said for our efforts to rebuild the Iraqi economy and infrastructure. Rebuilding the economy is essential to gaining the popular support needed to weaken the insurgency. But by ceding control over much of those projects to the nascent Iraqi government, driven by its sectarian pedigree, we ensured that those projects would be doled out inequitably. The resulting disparity between reconstruction in Sunni and Shiite areas has only provided more fuel for the sectarian civil war which now engulfs Iraq.
Finally, we have the fourth war with al-Qaida. Gates rightly suggests that they play the role of spoiler in Iraq, intervening whenever and wherever they detect progress with a spectacular attack, such as the August 2003 bombing of the U.N. compound in Baghdad or the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. However, what's less appreciated is the interplay between coalition efforts to crush al-Qaida (a Sunni Muslim terrorist organization), contradictory efforts to make peace with or destroy native Iraqi Sunni insurgents, and the larger effort to enfranchise Sunnis as part of the Iraqi government. Counterinsurgency expert Ahmed Hashim writes that the ham-fisted U.S. military often conflated these goals during its initial efforts in 2003 and 2004, creating a general animus toward the United States among Iraqi Sunnis that persists today. Ironically, al-Qaida and its foreign militants are quite unpopular in Iraq. Most Iraqis I met in Diyala (both Sunni and Shiite) considered al-Qaida to be outsiders and troublemakers. Nonetheless, coalition moves against al-Qaida are popularly seen by Iraqis as attacks on Sunnis generally, and they tend to undermine America's larger efforts to bring Sunnis into the fold.
America has sacrificed more than 3,000 men and women, and $500 billion, to fight a war in Iraq that we have never fully understood. For nearly a year, senior administration officials refused to use the phrases "insurgency" or "guerilla war," only changing their rhetoric when their top general in the Middle East contradicted them publicly. Today, it is clear that Iraq has mutated into something more than just an insurgency or civil war, and it will take much more than cherry-picking counterinsurgency's "best practices" to win. Secretary Gates appears to be both intellectually honest and curious enough to find the right words to describe this war—these wars. Finding and executing the right strategies to fight them will be much tougher.
Thanks to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, I now have an answer: Our strategic stagnation results from the fact that we are fighting four wars, not one. According to Gates: "One is Shi'a on Shi'a, principally in the south; the second is sectarian conflict, principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is al Qaida, and al Qaida is attacking, at times, all of those targets." The multifaceted nature of these four wars has frustrated American strategy since 2003. Successes in one area produce setbacks in the others, with al-Qaida hovering above the fray to spoil progress whenever it threatens to bring stability to Iraq, as they did by bombing the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006 after the successful Iraqi elections. Consequently, any strategies implementing the "counterinsurgency playbook," smart as those plans may be, will necessarily prove insufficient because we aren't just fighting an insurgency anymore.
Gates' first war in the south is a classic internecine political struggle between Shiite factions seeking dominance over the south's oil-rich land and its religiously significant cities such as Najaf and Karbala. American politicians and generals have struggled mightily to control these tensions since 2003; Coalition Provisional Authority proconsul Paul Bremer spent enormous amounts of time juggling the interests and intrigues of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, rebel cleric Muqtada Sadr, and secular Shiite aspirants to power like Ayad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi. Today, the problem is that Iraq is governed by a fragile Shiite coalition, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which relies on all kinds of Shiite groups for its power. Any efforts to stamp out the Shiite-on-Shiite conflict will inflame Maliki's base and possibly destroy his government. The same is true of efforts to neutralize Sadr and his Jaish al-Mahdi militia. Thus, stopping the first war would undermine the goal of building a legitimate and stable government for Iraq.
The second war, the bloody sectarian conflict, is an even thornier question. The textbook approach for managing internal tension calls for a massive imposition of force and control, which is how Saddam kept order before his fall and how Tito controlled Yugoslavia. The United States has chosen not to do this, both because it lacks the troops in Iraq to impose order, and because it recognizes that such a police state would undermine its goals for creating a liberal democracy. So, the United States has opted instead for a lighter approach, seeking a "political" solution to the sectarian conflict that would bring together warring Shiite and Sunni factions. However, every attempt to reach out to Sunni militants is impeded by simultaneous U.S. efforts to crush the Sunni insurgency, and every attempt to rein in the Shiite militias threatens the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, so these political overtures invariably fail.
Likewise, American efforts to implement "Counterinsurgency 101" to win the third war have faltered because they fail to deal with the other wars. Take, for instance, the much-touted effort to "stand up" the Iraqi security forces so we could "stand down" American forces. Indigenous army and police personnel have the requisite language, cultural, and political capability to effectively police their population. From Algeria to Malaya to the Balkans, successful peacemakers and counterinsurgents have achieved success by leveraging indigenous forces to provide security for the population. But in Iraq, this counterinsurgency strategy backfires. As Stephen Biddle wrote in Foreign Affairs, building the Iraqi army and police—a first step to beating insurgents—has merely trained and equipped the partisans fighting Iraq's sectarian civil war. The same can be said for our efforts to rebuild the Iraqi economy and infrastructure. Rebuilding the economy is essential to gaining the popular support needed to weaken the insurgency. But by ceding control over much of those projects to the nascent Iraqi government, driven by its sectarian pedigree, we ensured that those projects would be doled out inequitably. The resulting disparity between reconstruction in Sunni and Shiite areas has only provided more fuel for the sectarian civil war which now engulfs Iraq.
Finally, we have the fourth war with al-Qaida. Gates rightly suggests that they play the role of spoiler in Iraq, intervening whenever and wherever they detect progress with a spectacular attack, such as the August 2003 bombing of the U.N. compound in Baghdad or the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. However, what's less appreciated is the interplay between coalition efforts to crush al-Qaida (a Sunni Muslim terrorist organization), contradictory efforts to make peace with or destroy native Iraqi Sunni insurgents, and the larger effort to enfranchise Sunnis as part of the Iraqi government. Counterinsurgency expert Ahmed Hashim writes that the ham-fisted U.S. military often conflated these goals during its initial efforts in 2003 and 2004, creating a general animus toward the United States among Iraqi Sunnis that persists today. Ironically, al-Qaida and its foreign militants are quite unpopular in Iraq. Most Iraqis I met in Diyala (both Sunni and Shiite) considered al-Qaida to be outsiders and troublemakers. Nonetheless, coalition moves against al-Qaida are popularly seen by Iraqis as attacks on Sunnis generally, and they tend to undermine America's larger efforts to bring Sunnis into the fold.
America has sacrificed more than 3,000 men and women, and $500 billion, to fight a war in Iraq that we have never fully understood. For nearly a year, senior administration officials refused to use the phrases "insurgency" or "guerilla war," only changing their rhetoric when their top general in the Middle East contradicted them publicly. Today, it is clear that Iraq has mutated into something more than just an insurgency or civil war, and it will take much more than cherry-picking counterinsurgency's "best practices" to win. Secretary Gates appears to be both intellectually honest and curious enough to find the right words to describe this war—these wars. Finding and executing the right strategies to fight them will be much tougher.
Thursday, February 08, 2007
The Iran Option That Isn't on the Table by Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh
As Iran crosses successive nuclear demarcations and mischievously intervenes in Iraq, the question of how to address the Islamic republic is once more preoccupying Washington. Economic sanctions, international ostracism, military strikes and even support for hopeless exiles are all contemplated with vigor and seriousness. One option, however, is rarely assessed: engagement as a means of achieving a more pluralistic and responsible government in Tehran.
The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.
Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the Internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.
Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.
The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.
For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.
More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -- transparency, the rule of law and decentralization -- as a price for their commerce.
Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.
It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament.
The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.
Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the Internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.
Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.
The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.
For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.
More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -- transparency, the rule of law and decentralization -- as a price for their commerce.
Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.
It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament.
Iran warns U.S. it will Retaliate if Hit by Nasser Karimi
Iran stepped up its warnings to the United States Thursday, with the nation's supreme leader saying Tehran will strike U.S. interests around the world if his country is attacked.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's words were also likely meant as a show of toughness to rally Iranians, who are increasingly worried about the possibility of American military action as the two countries' standoff has grown more tense.
Days earlier, an Iranian diplomat was detained in Iraq in an incident that Iran blamed on America. The United States denied any role. The U.S. also says it has no plans to strike Iran militarily, but has sent a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf to show strength in the face of rising Iranian regional influence.
But many in Iran say they fear attack. Iranian media and Web sites have almost daily commentaries on a possible U.S. attack — some of them blaming hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the deterioration in the already sour U.S.-Iranian relations by his provocative rhetoric against America and Israel.
Speaking to Iranian air force commanders, Khamenei said: "The enemy knows well that any invasion would be followed by a comprehensive reaction to the invaders and their interests all over the world." His words were carried on state-run TV.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Tom Casey, asked about the comments, said American efforts on Iran focus on diplomacy. The two are in dispute over Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq.
"Our efforts to respond to Iran's nuclear program are focused on diplomacy. ... I think we've made it clear that what our intentions are, is to pursue this issue through diplomatic channels," Casey said.
Even as Iran's rhetoric has escalated, it has increasingly insisted it is open to a diplomatic solution to its standoff with the West. Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said Wednesday he would meet European officials for talks on Iran's nuclear program during a security conference this weekend in Munich, Germany.
Tehran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javad Zarif, complained in a column published Thursday in The New York Times that the United States was trying to make Iran a "scapegoat" for Washington's failures in the Mideast, particularly Iraq. He warned that efforts to isolate Iran would backfire on the United States, increasing sectarian tensions in the region.
The United States is reaping "the expected bitter fruits of its ill-conceived adventurism" in Iraq, he said.
"But rather than face these unpleasant facts, the United States administration is trying to sell an escalated version of the same failed policy. It does this by trying to make Iran its scapegoat and fabricating evidence of Iranian activities in Iraq," he said.
Zarif also made clear, however, that Iran wants to be part of some regional and international solution to calm Iraq, despite U.S. rejection of the idea of reaching out to Iran for help.
Solving Iraq's problems requires "prudence, dialogue and a genuine search for solutions," he wrote. "Only through such regional cooperation, with the necessary international support, can we contain the current crisis and prevent future ones."
Before becoming U.N. ambassador, Zarif was an aide to pro-reform former President Mohammad Khatami. His comments thus may represent an attempt to balance Khamenei's combative rhetoric with diplomatic pragmatism.
They also reflect a widespread feeling among many Iranians that they wish the United States and Iran would find a way to talk directly.
Also Thursday, Iran's intelligence minister said the government had detected a network of U.S. and Israeli spies operating on its borders and had detained a group of Iranians who planned to go abroad for espionage training, state television reported.
But the minister, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejehi, did not say whether any members of the U.S.-Israeli network had been arrested nor provide any details on the Iranians.
Khamenei's words are not that unusual — Iranian leaders often speak of a crushing response to any attack as a way to drum up domestic support.
But the rhetoric overall has escalated: two weeks ago, the official publication of the country's elite Revolutionary Guards, Sobh-e-Sadegh, noted it would be easy to kidnap Americans and transfer them to "any location of choice" in retaliation for any attack.
Many Iranians have said they feel under siege and fear an attack despite U.S. denials of such a plan. President Bush has ordered American troops to act against Iranians suspected of being involved in the Iraqi insurgency, in addition to sending the second carrier to the region.
The U.N. Security Council has imposed sanctions because of Iran's refusal to cease uranium enrichment, and is due to consider strengthening them later this month.
Iran also successfully test-fired a cruise missile Thursday over the Oman Sea and the northern Indian Ocean. Iran routinely tests missiles.
Gen. Ali Fadavi of the Revolutionary Guards told state-run radio the missile, with a 217-mile range and a 1,102-pound warhead, was fired in low-level flight from a launcher.
Asked by reporters about Iranian military exercises in the Gulf and whether they posed a threat to U.S. forces, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, "My impression is they make threats like this from time to time. We have no intention of attacking Iran."
Gates was in Seville, Spain, for a gathering of NATO ministers.
He added, "It's just another day in the Persian Gulf."
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's words were also likely meant as a show of toughness to rally Iranians, who are increasingly worried about the possibility of American military action as the two countries' standoff has grown more tense.
Days earlier, an Iranian diplomat was detained in Iraq in an incident that Iran blamed on America. The United States denied any role. The U.S. also says it has no plans to strike Iran militarily, but has sent a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf to show strength in the face of rising Iranian regional influence.
But many in Iran say they fear attack. Iranian media and Web sites have almost daily commentaries on a possible U.S. attack — some of them blaming hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the deterioration in the already sour U.S.-Iranian relations by his provocative rhetoric against America and Israel.
Speaking to Iranian air force commanders, Khamenei said: "The enemy knows well that any invasion would be followed by a comprehensive reaction to the invaders and their interests all over the world." His words were carried on state-run TV.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Tom Casey, asked about the comments, said American efforts on Iran focus on diplomacy. The two are in dispute over Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq.
"Our efforts to respond to Iran's nuclear program are focused on diplomacy. ... I think we've made it clear that what our intentions are, is to pursue this issue through diplomatic channels," Casey said.
Even as Iran's rhetoric has escalated, it has increasingly insisted it is open to a diplomatic solution to its standoff with the West. Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said Wednesday he would meet European officials for talks on Iran's nuclear program during a security conference this weekend in Munich, Germany.
Tehran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javad Zarif, complained in a column published Thursday in The New York Times that the United States was trying to make Iran a "scapegoat" for Washington's failures in the Mideast, particularly Iraq. He warned that efforts to isolate Iran would backfire on the United States, increasing sectarian tensions in the region.
The United States is reaping "the expected bitter fruits of its ill-conceived adventurism" in Iraq, he said.
"But rather than face these unpleasant facts, the United States administration is trying to sell an escalated version of the same failed policy. It does this by trying to make Iran its scapegoat and fabricating evidence of Iranian activities in Iraq," he said.
Zarif also made clear, however, that Iran wants to be part of some regional and international solution to calm Iraq, despite U.S. rejection of the idea of reaching out to Iran for help.
Solving Iraq's problems requires "prudence, dialogue and a genuine search for solutions," he wrote. "Only through such regional cooperation, with the necessary international support, can we contain the current crisis and prevent future ones."
Before becoming U.N. ambassador, Zarif was an aide to pro-reform former President Mohammad Khatami. His comments thus may represent an attempt to balance Khamenei's combative rhetoric with diplomatic pragmatism.
They also reflect a widespread feeling among many Iranians that they wish the United States and Iran would find a way to talk directly.
Also Thursday, Iran's intelligence minister said the government had detected a network of U.S. and Israeli spies operating on its borders and had detained a group of Iranians who planned to go abroad for espionage training, state television reported.
But the minister, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejehi, did not say whether any members of the U.S.-Israeli network had been arrested nor provide any details on the Iranians.
Khamenei's words are not that unusual — Iranian leaders often speak of a crushing response to any attack as a way to drum up domestic support.
But the rhetoric overall has escalated: two weeks ago, the official publication of the country's elite Revolutionary Guards, Sobh-e-Sadegh, noted it would be easy to kidnap Americans and transfer them to "any location of choice" in retaliation for any attack.
Many Iranians have said they feel under siege and fear an attack despite U.S. denials of such a plan. President Bush has ordered American troops to act against Iranians suspected of being involved in the Iraqi insurgency, in addition to sending the second carrier to the region.
The U.N. Security Council has imposed sanctions because of Iran's refusal to cease uranium enrichment, and is due to consider strengthening them later this month.
Iran also successfully test-fired a cruise missile Thursday over the Oman Sea and the northern Indian Ocean. Iran routinely tests missiles.
Gen. Ali Fadavi of the Revolutionary Guards told state-run radio the missile, with a 217-mile range and a 1,102-pound warhead, was fired in low-level flight from a launcher.
Asked by reporters about Iranian military exercises in the Gulf and whether they posed a threat to U.S. forces, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, "My impression is they make threats like this from time to time. We have no intention of attacking Iran."
Gates was in Seville, Spain, for a gathering of NATO ministers.
He added, "It's just another day in the Persian Gulf."
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