Eli Lake, of the The New York Sun, reports that documents captured from Iranian operatives in Iraq indicate that Iran has been supporting Sunni jihadists in Iraq. There have been other hints of this support. Reports on the IEDs have noted obliquely that the highest quality explosives come from Iran, and Hezbollah has been deploying IEDs against Israel since the 1990s.
Considering the well-known Iranian support for the Shiite militias (including Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, Abd al-Aziz Hakim’s SCIRI, and al-Dawa) and the bloody sectarian fighting between Shia and Sunnis, Iranian support for Sunni jihadis seems counter-intuitive. While the veracity of the report is not yet certain, seen in the context for Iranian support for terrorism elsewhere, a Iranian link to the Sunni insurgency has precedent. Not only, has Iran been willing to support Sunnis, Iran has frequently taken complex, multi-pronged approaches in their support for terrorism. This is approach particularly evident in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where it has been highly effective in expanding Iranian influence.
First, since the 1979 revolution the Iranian regime reached out to Sunni radicals worldwide with open hands. In places with only small Shia populations, Sunni antipathy tends to be muted and often these Sunni radicals were open to Iranian aid. Hezbollah, Iran’s leading terror proxy, provided training for radicals of all stripes at Sudanese training camps in the early 1990s. Egyptian and Algerian radicals received Iranian support. Also, Hezbollah’s top killer, Imad Mughniyah met with Bin Laden in Khartoum and forged an alliance. Later al-Qaeda operations, particularly the 1998 Embassy Bombings bore all the hallmarks of a Hezbollah operation (particularly the meticulous planning and the multiple simultaneous truck bombs).
Second, the Iranians have employed sophisticated strategies in supporting terrorist organizations in areas of priority. In Lebanon in 1982, Iran’s Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohatashemi, brought several radical Lebanese Shia factions together to form Hezbollah. Now the “Father of Hezbollah” is coordinating Iranian support for the Palestinian terrorist groups. But here he is taking an opposite strategy, fostering competition between different groups to keep the pot boiling.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is Iran’s closest ally and was almost completely dependent on Iranian funding. The funding came via Hezbollah, but in June 2002 – as a reward for their many successful operations – PIJ was given an independent funding stream. The Iranians can be sure that even if Hamas and Fatah sign on to a hudna, PIJ will break it. But Iran has been generous to all factions (even minor secular ones like the PFLP) with money and arms. Iran is carefully infiltrating both Hamas and Fatah. Top leaders of both organizations, particularly Hamas’ Damascus leadership, are tightly linked to Iran. At the same time, lower level operatives from Hamas and Fatah are given training and medical treatment in Iran and some start Hezbollah cells in the West Bank and Gaza on their return. The first Hezbollah cells in the West Bank and Gaza were started by members of Force 17, the Palestinian Presidential Guard (which the U.S. is now arming to counter Hamas.)*
On the micro-level, having cells beholden to Tehran gives the Iranians direct levers to continue the violence. On the macro-Palestinian political level, the essential dynamic is that attacking Israel builds a group’s credibility. If Hamas or Fatah leaders decide to reach an understanding with Israel, then other groups have an increased incentive to launch attacks and build their own credibility.
This dynamic is essential to the third point about understanding Iranian support for terrorism. Iranian politics is a complex “black box” with numerous players. There are the formal ministries and intelligence agencies. But there is also the parallel government of the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards, who are charged with protecting the Islamic revolution and have played a key role in sponsoring international terrorist groups. There are also non-governmental radical institutions in Iran such as the bonyads (cleric controlled cartels that funnel some of their profits to radical causes world-wide) and internal vigilante groups that crack down on dissidents and reformers. Finally, Syria and Hezbollah, while closely allied with Iran, also pursue their own priorities via their own channels. These multiple semi-independent factions can create complicated situations in which different factions will compete to support extremist activity, build alliances with proxies, and generally not be left out of developments.
In short, Iran and its allies represent an alloyed network in which many of the network elements have formidable capabilities and can operate with tremendous cunning. At the same time the dynamics between the elements of the network can further foster chaotic situations that broadly serve Iranian interests and where Iran can fill the vacuum.
During the Cold War, the Soviets were often considered master chess players. But chess was invented in ancient Iran.
*Force 17 and Hezbollah have a long history of interaction. Hezbollah’s top killer, Imad Mughniyah – mastermind of Hezbollah’s deadliest attacks, including the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing – was a Force 17 alumnus. Also worth noting, Force 17 (which was supposed named due to its address at 17 Faqahani St. in Beirut) started as a protection unit for PLO officials. Naturally these skills were dual use and Force 17 became an integral part of PLO terror operations. When the PA was established, Force 17 became the Presidential Security Unit. Interestingly, under the PA, the unit’s uniforms had the number 17 on the arm.
Thursday, January 04, 2007
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Spreading Terrorist Dogma by Evan Kohlmann
Interactive site shows how terrorist propaganda is distributed to global media.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13848605/
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13848605/
Tuesday, January 02, 2007
Will Islamists now turn to terror attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia? by Kevin J. Kelly
Some American government officials as well as independent experts on the Horn are expressing fears that the war inside Somalia could spill into Kenya, probably in the form of terrorist attacks.
Other US-based analysts say, however, that Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU) lacks both the capacity and the motivation to open a front inside Kenya.
Somalia experts offered these varied interpretations in interviews last week with The EastAfrican.
The courts are unlikely to become involved in Kenya because they appear to be battling for their survival in Somalia, says David Shinn, a former US ambassador to Ethiopia. The Islamists were kicked out of the capital, Mogadishu, on Thursday.
Ted Dagne, a Horn specialist with the Washington-based Congressional Research Service, agrees with that assessment, saying, “I don’t see how it’s in the Courts’ interest to get involved in Kenya.”
Mr. Dagne also takes a sceptical view of reports suggesting that ICU leaders have laid claim to parts of Kenyan territory with large ethnic-Somali populations. “That talk of irredentist claims seems overblown to me,” he says.
Prof. Ken Menkhaus, a Somalia expert based at Davidson College in the state of North Carolina, accepts those assessments in part, but he also offers a scenario whereby Somali Islamists might decide to carry out or encourage terrorist operations in Kenya.
“Rational decision makers in the Courts would probably decide to leave Kenya alone,” Prof. Menkhaus says. “The Somalis have everything they want now in Kenya, where they run a virtual state-within-a-state. The Courts draw a lot of benefit from the status quo.”
The danger lies with more extreme elements in the Islamist militias that are fighting on behalf of the ICU, Prof. Menkhaus adds. They could well resort to guerrilla tactics, including terror bombings, now that Ethiopia has achieved full battlefield supremacy, he says.
“If groups within the militias decide that asymmetrical warfare should be the next step, Kenya does provide a lot of targets that they would see as inviting,” Menkhaus observes.
Other non-governmental analysts in the United States say the possibility of attacks inside Kenya, as well as Ethiopia, is of growing concern to Bush administration officials.
The US government would do well to consider the ramifications of the Somalia war not only for the Horn as a whole but for the entire Muslim world, Mr Dagne adds.
Many analysts dispute claims that the ICU is controlled by Al Qaeda. Jendayi Frazer, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said recently that “East Africa Al Qaeda cell individuals” are directing the Courts’ council.
Mr. Dagne, who travels to the Horn regularly, says he has seen no evidence to support Ms Frazer’s claims.
Mr. Shinn and Prof. Menkhaus also say Al Qaeda does not wield as much influence over the courts as Ms. Frazer suggests, although they add that factions inside the ICU do have links to terrorist groups.
Mr. Shinn says that some radical measures taken by the courts, such as banning miraa, had been proving unpopular among many Somalis. At the same time, Prof. Menkhaus adds, the ICU’s generally favourable standing ensures that “the Islamist movement is going to be part of the Somali scene for a long time to come.”
The Bush administration itself is divided on the degree to which international terrorists influence the ICU, Prof. Menkhaus says.
“Among even those who agree with Ms. Frazer’s view, there is a fear that Ethiopia’s policy will make things worse,” he notes.
Prof. Menkhaus points to the possibility that Ethiopian forces will become bogged down by guerrilla-style resistance inside Somalia. Ethiopia’s intervention could also “allow hardliners in the ICU to rally broad Somali support and attract foreign jihadists,” he adds. “There’s also the real risk that the war will eventually be taken to Kenyan and Ethiopian soil.”
All three independent analysts suggest that the United States is not unreservedly supporting Ethiopia’s actions inside Somalia. A State Department spokesman’s recent comments on Ethiopia’s role are being wrongly interpreted, they say.
“Ethiopia has genuine security concerns with regard to developments in Somalia and has provided support at the request of the legitimate governing authority, the Transitional Federal institutions,” State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said on December 26.
But Gallegos added, “We, the US, have urged, and continue to urge, the Ethiopian government to exercise maximum restraint in intervening or responding to developments in Somalia and to assure the protection of civilians.”
Each of the analysts says the best interim outcome in Somalia would involve an agreement whereby all foreign forces leave the country. United Nations monitors say that roughly 2,000 Eritrean troops are operating in Somalia in support of the ICU.
Prof. Menkhaus argues, however, that withdrawal of foreign forces can be achieved only in tandem with other concessions, including a decision by the ICU to renounce irredentist claims to Ethiopian territory.
The Courts have been supporting anti-government forces in eastern Ethiopia while also forging close ties with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s arch-enemy, Menkhaus notes. He cites these factors in arguing that, “The Courts have baited Ethiopia into war.”
But Mr. Dagne says internal problems in Ethiopia are longstanding and “were not created by the Somalis.” Rebellions in the Ogaden region broke out during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie and during the Mengistu dictatorship in the 1970s, Mr. Dagne notes.
Ultimately, the analysts agree, security can be achieved in Somalia only with the assistance of international peacekeeping troops.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) cannot provide the needed resources, they say. President George W. Bush did telephone Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni last week, however, to thank him for offering to dispatch troops for an Igad peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
The African Union could play an effective peacekeeping role, observers say — ideally in conjunction with a settlement between Ethiopia and the ICU as well as with Eritrea.
Other US-based analysts say, however, that Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union (ICU) lacks both the capacity and the motivation to open a front inside Kenya.
Somalia experts offered these varied interpretations in interviews last week with The EastAfrican.
The courts are unlikely to become involved in Kenya because they appear to be battling for their survival in Somalia, says David Shinn, a former US ambassador to Ethiopia. The Islamists were kicked out of the capital, Mogadishu, on Thursday.
Ted Dagne, a Horn specialist with the Washington-based Congressional Research Service, agrees with that assessment, saying, “I don’t see how it’s in the Courts’ interest to get involved in Kenya.”
Mr. Dagne also takes a sceptical view of reports suggesting that ICU leaders have laid claim to parts of Kenyan territory with large ethnic-Somali populations. “That talk of irredentist claims seems overblown to me,” he says.
Prof. Ken Menkhaus, a Somalia expert based at Davidson College in the state of North Carolina, accepts those assessments in part, but he also offers a scenario whereby Somali Islamists might decide to carry out or encourage terrorist operations in Kenya.
“Rational decision makers in the Courts would probably decide to leave Kenya alone,” Prof. Menkhaus says. “The Somalis have everything they want now in Kenya, where they run a virtual state-within-a-state. The Courts draw a lot of benefit from the status quo.”
The danger lies with more extreme elements in the Islamist militias that are fighting on behalf of the ICU, Prof. Menkhaus adds. They could well resort to guerrilla tactics, including terror bombings, now that Ethiopia has achieved full battlefield supremacy, he says.
“If groups within the militias decide that asymmetrical warfare should be the next step, Kenya does provide a lot of targets that they would see as inviting,” Menkhaus observes.
Other non-governmental analysts in the United States say the possibility of attacks inside Kenya, as well as Ethiopia, is of growing concern to Bush administration officials.
The US government would do well to consider the ramifications of the Somalia war not only for the Horn as a whole but for the entire Muslim world, Mr Dagne adds.
Many analysts dispute claims that the ICU is controlled by Al Qaeda. Jendayi Frazer, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said recently that “East Africa Al Qaeda cell individuals” are directing the Courts’ council.
Mr. Dagne, who travels to the Horn regularly, says he has seen no evidence to support Ms Frazer’s claims.
Mr. Shinn and Prof. Menkhaus also say Al Qaeda does not wield as much influence over the courts as Ms. Frazer suggests, although they add that factions inside the ICU do have links to terrorist groups.
Mr. Shinn says that some radical measures taken by the courts, such as banning miraa, had been proving unpopular among many Somalis. At the same time, Prof. Menkhaus adds, the ICU’s generally favourable standing ensures that “the Islamist movement is going to be part of the Somali scene for a long time to come.”
The Bush administration itself is divided on the degree to which international terrorists influence the ICU, Prof. Menkhaus says.
“Among even those who agree with Ms. Frazer’s view, there is a fear that Ethiopia’s policy will make things worse,” he notes.
Prof. Menkhaus points to the possibility that Ethiopian forces will become bogged down by guerrilla-style resistance inside Somalia. Ethiopia’s intervention could also “allow hardliners in the ICU to rally broad Somali support and attract foreign jihadists,” he adds. “There’s also the real risk that the war will eventually be taken to Kenyan and Ethiopian soil.”
All three independent analysts suggest that the United States is not unreservedly supporting Ethiopia’s actions inside Somalia. A State Department spokesman’s recent comments on Ethiopia’s role are being wrongly interpreted, they say.
“Ethiopia has genuine security concerns with regard to developments in Somalia and has provided support at the request of the legitimate governing authority, the Transitional Federal institutions,” State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said on December 26.
But Gallegos added, “We, the US, have urged, and continue to urge, the Ethiopian government to exercise maximum restraint in intervening or responding to developments in Somalia and to assure the protection of civilians.”
Each of the analysts says the best interim outcome in Somalia would involve an agreement whereby all foreign forces leave the country. United Nations monitors say that roughly 2,000 Eritrean troops are operating in Somalia in support of the ICU.
Prof. Menkhaus argues, however, that withdrawal of foreign forces can be achieved only in tandem with other concessions, including a decision by the ICU to renounce irredentist claims to Ethiopian territory.
The Courts have been supporting anti-government forces in eastern Ethiopia while also forging close ties with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s arch-enemy, Menkhaus notes. He cites these factors in arguing that, “The Courts have baited Ethiopia into war.”
But Mr. Dagne says internal problems in Ethiopia are longstanding and “were not created by the Somalis.” Rebellions in the Ogaden region broke out during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie and during the Mengistu dictatorship in the 1970s, Mr. Dagne notes.
Ultimately, the analysts agree, security can be achieved in Somalia only with the assistance of international peacekeeping troops.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) cannot provide the needed resources, they say. President George W. Bush did telephone Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni last week, however, to thank him for offering to dispatch troops for an Igad peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
The African Union could play an effective peacekeeping role, observers say — ideally in conjunction with a settlement between Ethiopia and the ICU as well as with Eritrea.
Why do people want the Applephone so much? by Ryan Block
It’s true, rumors of the long-awaited Applephone (that took me a couple tries — I kept typing “iPhone”) are at a fever pitch. Not that it’s necessarily a barometer, but Mac fanboy haven Digg has seen no less than 39 “iPhone” related articles hit the front page of its tech section this month. The questions people ask me more than any other: When is the iPhone Applephone coming out? and What do you know about it? But why all the fuss? Well, there are a few reasons why there’s such a pent-up demand for an Apple cellphone:
1. Cellphones today suck. Especially smartphones. It’s 2006 and a good phone — and I mean an honestly really good phone — still hasn’t been made. A new competitor — any new competitor, be it ALP or Linux or the Applephone — is highly anticipated.
2. People are already sick of Windows Mobile dominating the landscape. I’ve been a long time Windows Mobile user, but let’s face it, it’s pretty much the only smartphone game in town in the US. You can go Symbian, but the devices just aren’t there through carrier purchases. Palm is obviously a joke, and Linux / JUIX is nowhere to be found.
3. Cellphones haven’t gotten music integration right. Sure, there are enough phones with media buttons and microSD slots to go around, but that doesn’t mean they work well.
4. Using your phone and your Mac is often a painful and tedious experience. In fact, the same goes for using your phone and most any computer.
5. People are curious to see how radically the cellphone can be re-envisioned, and they expect Apple to lead that charge.
Now let’s square that off against the realities about the Applephone that people probably don’t want to face.
1. The battery life will probably be pretty awful. And if it’s going to be a small phone, battery life will be even worse. Even phones with massive 1000mAh+ batteries drain off fast when playing media. A two battery design isn’t going to change anything software battery partitioning couldn’t solve. Unless Apple is waiting to announce a major advancement in battery tech, that is just the way things are.
2. The phone will be buggy. Anyone ever use the first few releases of OS X? It took Apple years — specifically until about 10.3 — to get it right, and it’s taken Microsoft a good five years to get Windows Mobile to a state decent enough to be mass-market. Remember, this would be the first cellphone from a company that’s never made a phone before. Do you really think it would be perfect?
3. It won’t be what people want. People want a QWERTY slider flip phone with a numeric keypad, 3G, GPS, Bluetooth 2.0 and A2DP, a mini USB slot, 3.5mm stereo jack, and 3 megapixel digital camera (with flash). In other words, when a new product is merely rumored about, it takes a polymorphous shape. It won’t be everything — we should all know this by now that Apple’s design philosophy isn’t found in what they include, it’s in what they omit. The iPhone will undoubtedly be, comparatively speaking, under-featured.
4. It probably won’t have 3G. At least not at first. I don’t think the US carriers are ready for what Apple wants to do with this phone. If it does have 3G, it’ll probably be sold through Apple — not through a carrier — meaning you’ll have to pay the full $500 for your a first gen Applephone.
5. It’s safe to assume it won’t work with Windows out of the box. At least not fully. It’ll probably sync with iTunes, but getting your Outlook contacts on board probably won’t come until later (or will only happen via third party apps).
6. It won’t be revolutionary. If anything, it’ll be a well designed, well thought-out phone — which is, I suppose, revolutionary considering the market. But only because no one else is really pushing the envelope. From a device standpoint it will be fairly conventional in form-factor, shape, size, etc.
I’m not trying to be a buzzkill, believe me. But I’ve seen enough product launches — especially Apple ones — to know hype very rarely intersects with reality. Then again, it’s only a rumored product, right? Who knows, maybe Apple will really surprise us, and never actually even release a cellphone. THAT would be interesting.
1. Cellphones today suck. Especially smartphones. It’s 2006 and a good phone — and I mean an honestly really good phone — still hasn’t been made. A new competitor — any new competitor, be it ALP or Linux or the Applephone — is highly anticipated.
2. People are already sick of Windows Mobile dominating the landscape. I’ve been a long time Windows Mobile user, but let’s face it, it’s pretty much the only smartphone game in town in the US. You can go Symbian, but the devices just aren’t there through carrier purchases. Palm is obviously a joke, and Linux / JUIX is nowhere to be found.
3. Cellphones haven’t gotten music integration right. Sure, there are enough phones with media buttons and microSD slots to go around, but that doesn’t mean they work well.
4. Using your phone and your Mac is often a painful and tedious experience. In fact, the same goes for using your phone and most any computer.
5. People are curious to see how radically the cellphone can be re-envisioned, and they expect Apple to lead that charge.
Now let’s square that off against the realities about the Applephone that people probably don’t want to face.
1. The battery life will probably be pretty awful. And if it’s going to be a small phone, battery life will be even worse. Even phones with massive 1000mAh+ batteries drain off fast when playing media. A two battery design isn’t going to change anything software battery partitioning couldn’t solve. Unless Apple is waiting to announce a major advancement in battery tech, that is just the way things are.
2. The phone will be buggy. Anyone ever use the first few releases of OS X? It took Apple years — specifically until about 10.3 — to get it right, and it’s taken Microsoft a good five years to get Windows Mobile to a state decent enough to be mass-market. Remember, this would be the first cellphone from a company that’s never made a phone before. Do you really think it would be perfect?
3. It won’t be what people want. People want a QWERTY slider flip phone with a numeric keypad, 3G, GPS, Bluetooth 2.0 and A2DP, a mini USB slot, 3.5mm stereo jack, and 3 megapixel digital camera (with flash). In other words, when a new product is merely rumored about, it takes a polymorphous shape. It won’t be everything — we should all know this by now that Apple’s design philosophy isn’t found in what they include, it’s in what they omit. The iPhone will undoubtedly be, comparatively speaking, under-featured.
4. It probably won’t have 3G. At least not at first. I don’t think the US carriers are ready for what Apple wants to do with this phone. If it does have 3G, it’ll probably be sold through Apple — not through a carrier — meaning you’ll have to pay the full $500 for your a first gen Applephone.
5. It’s safe to assume it won’t work with Windows out of the box. At least not fully. It’ll probably sync with iTunes, but getting your Outlook contacts on board probably won’t come until later (or will only happen via third party apps).
6. It won’t be revolutionary. If anything, it’ll be a well designed, well thought-out phone — which is, I suppose, revolutionary considering the market. But only because no one else is really pushing the envelope. From a device standpoint it will be fairly conventional in form-factor, shape, size, etc.
I’m not trying to be a buzzkill, believe me. But I’ve seen enough product launches — especially Apple ones — to know hype very rarely intersects with reality. Then again, it’s only a rumored product, right? Who knows, maybe Apple will really surprise us, and never actually even release a cellphone. THAT would be interesting.
Monday, January 01, 2007
Qaeda-LJ link in terror attacks by Abbas Naqvi
After investigating the three bomb blasts that took place in Karachi in 2006, the police have come to the conclusion that terrorist groups with different priorities have ganged up. They are specifically worried about the Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, Al Qaeda and the Abdullah Mehsud-led group of Afghanistan.
The first suicide bombing took place on March 3 behind the US Consulate, killing diplomat David Foy and three others. Two men, Anwarul Haq and Usman Ghani, are being tried in an anti-terrorism court for the attack. The alleged suicide bomber was identified as Raja Mohammad Tahir, a resident of Karachi, who had spent time in Afghanistan and Wana and had alleged links with Al Qaeda. The car that was used in the attack had been fitted with the explosives in Wana, the police claim.
The second suicide bombing took place about a month later, on April 11, at Nishtar Park at an Eid Miladun Nabi prayer congregation. More than 60 people died, including the entire top hierarchy of the Sunni Tehreek (of the Barelvi school of thought). During investigations, the police, who termed it the biggest terrorist attack of the year, began to suspect that it was sectarian.
“Up till now this case could not be solved completely,” said a senior CID investigator, who did not wish to be named. “But what has surfaced is that the Nishtar Park bombing was about a sectarian clash.”
The third suicide attack was on July 14 in which Allama Hasan Turabi was killed along with his nephew outside his house in Gulshan-e-Iqbal. During investigations, the police caught a group from Karachi and identified the suicide attacker as a 16-year-old of Bengali origin named Abdul Karim from Karachi. The police followed clues that took them to Wana in this case, leading them to conclude that the LJ, Al Qaeda and the Abdullah Mehsud-led group of Afghanistan were behind the job.
Investigators told Daily Times that some LJ men with links to Karachi went to Wana where they got in touch with the Abdullah Mehsud-led group. They then befriended Abdullah Mehsud’s cousin, Abid Mehsud. Through Abid they developed more links with Al Qaeda in Karachi and upon Abid’s advice roped in some young men from Orangi Town.
The jacket that was used in the Turabi suicide attack had been prepared in Darra Adam Khel by a man the investigators called Hazrat Ali, who was found dead after an explosion in a house in the area.
CID investigators said that for the first time it has been proved that LJ and Al Qaeda worked together in the sectarian case. Karim, who allegedly killed Turabi, was, however, neither linked to the LJ nor Al Qaeda, investigators pointed out, saying that they believed he was brainwashed into doing the job.
The first suicide bombing took place on March 3 behind the US Consulate, killing diplomat David Foy and three others. Two men, Anwarul Haq and Usman Ghani, are being tried in an anti-terrorism court for the attack. The alleged suicide bomber was identified as Raja Mohammad Tahir, a resident of Karachi, who had spent time in Afghanistan and Wana and had alleged links with Al Qaeda. The car that was used in the attack had been fitted with the explosives in Wana, the police claim.
The second suicide bombing took place about a month later, on April 11, at Nishtar Park at an Eid Miladun Nabi prayer congregation. More than 60 people died, including the entire top hierarchy of the Sunni Tehreek (of the Barelvi school of thought). During investigations, the police, who termed it the biggest terrorist attack of the year, began to suspect that it was sectarian.
“Up till now this case could not be solved completely,” said a senior CID investigator, who did not wish to be named. “But what has surfaced is that the Nishtar Park bombing was about a sectarian clash.”
The third suicide attack was on July 14 in which Allama Hasan Turabi was killed along with his nephew outside his house in Gulshan-e-Iqbal. During investigations, the police caught a group from Karachi and identified the suicide attacker as a 16-year-old of Bengali origin named Abdul Karim from Karachi. The police followed clues that took them to Wana in this case, leading them to conclude that the LJ, Al Qaeda and the Abdullah Mehsud-led group of Afghanistan were behind the job.
Investigators told Daily Times that some LJ men with links to Karachi went to Wana where they got in touch with the Abdullah Mehsud-led group. They then befriended Abdullah Mehsud’s cousin, Abid Mehsud. Through Abid they developed more links with Al Qaeda in Karachi and upon Abid’s advice roped in some young men from Orangi Town.
The jacket that was used in the Turabi suicide attack had been prepared in Darra Adam Khel by a man the investigators called Hazrat Ali, who was found dead after an explosion in a house in the area.
CID investigators said that for the first time it has been proved that LJ and Al Qaeda worked together in the sectarian case. Karim, who allegedly killed Turabi, was, however, neither linked to the LJ nor Al Qaeda, investigators pointed out, saying that they believed he was brainwashed into doing the job.
Islamic Courts Abandon Kismayo, Establish "Shadow Governments" by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
I spoke with a military intelligence officer this morning about the situation in Somalia. He reported that the radical Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has abandoned Kismayo and dispersed. Kismayo is one of Somalia's strategic port cities: after abandoning Kismayo, the ICU seemingly no longer controls any strategic cities. However, the group does control a sizeable geographic area, both in the north and south of the country. The ICU primarily controls smaller towns and villages.
My source reports that even in areas that the ICU controls, it is giving up active control and forming "shadow governments." The term "shadow government" refers to Mafia-style governance, similar to what Al Capone had in Chicago in the 1920s: in these areas the ICU doesn't have formal control, but is the real power. This mirrors the Taliban's position in much of northern Pakistan. The main advantage the ICU derives from moving to shadow government is that it doesn't have to actually govern: ICU representatives don't have to appear publicly and don't have to make any of the public works run. Instead, they can focus all their effort on insurgent campaigns -- which, all told, is easier than managing a fully-functioning government. Also, a functioning government has to exist in a place that can be targeted. A shadow government, in contrast, can just disperse and regroup.
There are also disadvantages to a shadow government. It's difficult for a shadow government to mass to control territory because once it does, it can be targeted. A second disadvantage is that the tools the shadow government uses to control the population are negative rather than positive. (For positive tools that the ICU used, remember how it managed to gain the support of Somalia's business community.) Instead of having anything positive to offer, the shadow government's position is that Somalis need to cooperate with it or they'll be killed. These negative tools of control run the risk of alienating the population. However, if the country slips back into chaos, these negative controls may actually be seen by the population as positive means to stability.
My source notes that in those areas where the ICU hasn't moved to shadow government, it's probably because of communication difficulties: ICU leaders in those areas probably aren't aware that they should do so.
Moreover, my source says that "the real battle" in Somalia will likely begin when Ethiopia begins to pull its troops back. Thus far, ICU forces have been melting away as the Ethiopians advance. This is reminiscent of the Taliban's dispersal after Kandahar fell in Afghanistan. There is confirmation that the three suspects in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings who were in Somalia escaped during the ICU's retreat. Some ICU members are trying to escape to Kenya, and have a good chance of succeeding because the Kenyan police are notoriously corrupt. ICU leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is nowhere to be seen. Ethiopians and U.S. intelligence reportedly put the number of ICU fighters killed in the thousands.
My source reports that as the ICU left Mogadishu, they opened the jails and gave the criminal population all the weapons that the ICU wasn't able to take with it. This action was designed to give the Ethiopians and transitional government more problems to take care of as they assume control of the city.
This would be a good time, my source says, for the African Union peacekeeping force that has often been discussed to be introduced to Somalia.
My source reports that even in areas that the ICU controls, it is giving up active control and forming "shadow governments." The term "shadow government" refers to Mafia-style governance, similar to what Al Capone had in Chicago in the 1920s: in these areas the ICU doesn't have formal control, but is the real power. This mirrors the Taliban's position in much of northern Pakistan. The main advantage the ICU derives from moving to shadow government is that it doesn't have to actually govern: ICU representatives don't have to appear publicly and don't have to make any of the public works run. Instead, they can focus all their effort on insurgent campaigns -- which, all told, is easier than managing a fully-functioning government. Also, a functioning government has to exist in a place that can be targeted. A shadow government, in contrast, can just disperse and regroup.
There are also disadvantages to a shadow government. It's difficult for a shadow government to mass to control territory because once it does, it can be targeted. A second disadvantage is that the tools the shadow government uses to control the population are negative rather than positive. (For positive tools that the ICU used, remember how it managed to gain the support of Somalia's business community.) Instead of having anything positive to offer, the shadow government's position is that Somalis need to cooperate with it or they'll be killed. These negative tools of control run the risk of alienating the population. However, if the country slips back into chaos, these negative controls may actually be seen by the population as positive means to stability.
My source notes that in those areas where the ICU hasn't moved to shadow government, it's probably because of communication difficulties: ICU leaders in those areas probably aren't aware that they should do so.
Moreover, my source says that "the real battle" in Somalia will likely begin when Ethiopia begins to pull its troops back. Thus far, ICU forces have been melting away as the Ethiopians advance. This is reminiscent of the Taliban's dispersal after Kandahar fell in Afghanistan. There is confirmation that the three suspects in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings who were in Somalia escaped during the ICU's retreat. Some ICU members are trying to escape to Kenya, and have a good chance of succeeding because the Kenyan police are notoriously corrupt. ICU leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is nowhere to be seen. Ethiopians and U.S. intelligence reportedly put the number of ICU fighters killed in the thousands.
My source reports that as the ICU left Mogadishu, they opened the jails and gave the criminal population all the weapons that the ICU wasn't able to take with it. This action was designed to give the Ethiopians and transitional government more problems to take care of as they assume control of the city.
This would be a good time, my source says, for the African Union peacekeeping force that has often been discussed to be introduced to Somalia.
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