There will soon be another war in the Middle East, this time a renewal of the conflict between the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and Hizbollah. The conflict is inevitable and unavoidable. It will come about because Israel cannot tolerate the rebuilding of Hizbollah's fortified zone in south Lebanon, from which last year it launched its missile bombardment of northern Israel.
Hizbollah has now reconstructed the fortified zone and is replenishing its stocks of missiles there. Hamas is also creating a fortified zone in the Gaza Strip and building up its stocks of missiles. Israel, therefore, faces missile attack on two fronts. When the Israel general staff decides the threat has become intolerable, it will strike.
What happened in south Lebanon earlier this year has been widely misunderstood, largely because the anti-Israel bias in the international media led to the situation being misreported as an Israeli defeat.
It was no such thing. It was certainly an Israeli setback, but the idea that the IDF had suddenly lost its historic superiority over its Arab enemies and that they had acquired military qualities that had hitherto eluded them was quite false. Hizbollah suffered heavy losses in the fighting, perhaps as many as 1,000 killed out of its strength of up to 5,000 and it is only just now recovering.
What allowed Hizbollah to appear successful was its occupation of the bunker-and-tunnel system that it had constructed since June 2000, when the IDF gave up its presence in south Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982.
Although the IDF had got into south Lebanon, the casualties it had suffered in entering the fortified zone had alarmed the government and high command, since Israel's tiny population is acutely vulnerable to losses in battle. Israel's plan was to destroy Hizbollah's tunnels and bunkers, but the sending of a United Nations intervention force did not allow the destruction to be completed before the IDF was forced to withdraw.
Tunnel systems have played a crucial part in many modern campaigns, without attracting much attention. That is a serious oversight. The success of the Viet Cong in sustaining its war effort in Vietnam in 1968-72 depended heavily on its use of the so-called War Zone B, a complex of deep tunnels and underground bases north of Saigon, which had been begun during the war against the French in 1946-55.
War Zone B provided the Viet Cong with a permanent base of refuge and resupply that proved effectively invulnerable even against a determined American effort to destroy it. War Zone B has now become a major tourist attraction to Western visitors to Vietnam.
In its time, however, War Zone B was very far from being a holiday facility: it assured the survival of the Viet Cong close to Saigon and their ability to mount operations against the government forces and the Americans. Hizbollah, either by mimicry or on its own account, has now begun to employ a tunnel and underground base strategy against Israel. It was for that reason it was able to confront Israeli armoured forces in south Lebanon earlier this year.
The adoption of a tunnel strategy has allowed Hizbollah to wage asymmetric warfare against Israel's previously all-conquering armoured forces. The tunnel system is also impervious to attack by the Israeli Air Force.
Since Israel's reason for existence is to provide a secure base for the Jewish people, and that of the IDF is to act as their shield and safeguard – functions that have been carried out with high success since 1948 – it is obvious that neither can tolerate a zone of invulnerability occupied by a sworn enemy located directly on Israel's northern border.
It is therefore an easy prediction to foresee that the IDF will – at some time in the near future – reopen its offensive against Hizbollah in south Lebanon and will not cease until it has destroyed the underground system, even if, in the process, it inflicts heavy damage on the towns and villages of the region.
It is likely that it will also move against the underground system being constructed in the Gaza Strip. Hamas resupplies itself with arms and munitions brought from Egypt through those channels. Gaza is a softer target than south Lebanon, since it is an enclave that Israel easily dominates.
Indeed, the IDF may attack Gaza as a distraction from south Lebanon in an effort to make Hizbollah divide its forces and efforts.
Destroying the underground military facilities may be straightforward, but it is likely to create diplomatic complexities, particularly with the UN. Entering south Lebanon risks provoking a clash with Unifil, the major part of whose strength is provided by France. It is unlikely that such a risk will deter Israel. When national survival is at risk, Israel behaves with extreme ruthlessness. It attacked an American communications ship during the Six-Day War because it objected to America listening in to its most secret signals.
The big question hanging over an Israeli return to south Lebanon is whether that would provoke a war with Syria, Lebanon's Arab protector. The answer is quite possibly yes, but that such an extension of hostilities might prove welcome both to Israel and to the United States, which regards Syria as Iran's advanced post on the Mediterranean shore.
What is certain is that – probably before the year is out – Israel will have struck at Hizbollah in south Lebanon. And the strike will come even sooner if Hizbollah reopens its missile bombardment of northern Israel from its underground systems.
Friday, November 03, 2006
Pelosi's Unintelligent Choice by Ruth Marcus
If Democrats win control of the House next week, Nancy Pelosi's first test as speaker will arrive long before the 110th Congress convenes. Her choice to head the House intelligence committee -- unlike other House committees, this one is left entirely up to the party leadership -- will speak volumes about whether a Speaker Pelosi will be able to resist a return to paint-by-numbers Democratic Party interest-group politics as usual.
Pelosi is in a box of her own devising. The panel's ranking Democrat is her fellow Californian Jane Harman -- smart and hardworking but also abrasive, ambitious and, in Pelosi's estimation, insufficiently partisan on the committee. So Pelosi, once the intelligence panel's ranking Democrat herself, has made clear that she doesn't intend to name Harman to the chairmanship.
The wrong decision, in my view, but one that's magnified by the unfortunate fact that next in line is Florida Rep. Alcee Hastings. In 1989, after being acquitted in a criminal trial, Hastings was stripped of his position as a federal judge -- impeached by the House in which he now serves and convicted by the Senate -- for conspiring to extort a $150,000 bribe in a case before him, repeatedly lying about it under oath and manufacturing evidence at his trial.
Ordinarily, that might doom Hastings's chances, but the situation is further inflamed by racial politics: Hastings is African American, and the Congressional Black Caucus has made it clear that it will not tolerate his rejection. Another black lawmaker, Georgia's Sanford Bishop, was passed over to accommodate Harman, who reclaimed her seniority when she returned to Congress in 2000 after a gubernatorial run. And the black caucus is still smarting over Pelosi's move to oust Louisiana's William J. Jefferson from the Ways and Means Committee after the FBI found a freezerful of cash in Jefferson's home.
Pelosi has floated the notion of naming the intelligence committee's third-ranking Democrat, Texan Silvestre Reyes, who is Hispanic, but that's not flying with the black caucus. "The CBC would not look kindly on that," caucus spokeswoman Myra Dandridge told The Post's Jonathan Weisman. "The first order of business of the CBC chairman would be to protect his members, and Alcee Hastings has the seniority, the knowledge and the experience to be chairman of the intelligence committee."
True -- and still he shouldn't get the job.
The events occurred so long ago (the alleged conspiracy took place in 1981), the facts are so complex and the outcomes so antithetical (the jury acquitted Hastings; the judicial panel that investigated him, the House and the Senate concluded the opposite) that it's tempting to simply let bygones be bygones. After all, Hastings has been in Congress since 1992, on the intelligence committee since 1999. I don't worry that as chairman he'd suddenly be up for sale: If he could be entrusted with national security secrets as a committee member, why not as chairman?
But this was no ordinary crime, and Intelligence is no ordinary committee.
"My goodness gracious, when does it end? When does it end?" Hastings asked me yesterday in a long telephone interview. "It's no way that I can prove a negative. I can't go back and try to establish for everybody alive my bona fides. I've earned my stripes and I suffered through 9 3/4 years that would have crushed the average person, and fortunately for me I was not the kind of person that was crushed."
It's impossible not to like Hastings. But as someone who covered his impeachment and Senate trial, I can't get past the facts of the case, which convince me that Hastings did indeed agree to conspire with a close friend, a prominent Washington lawyer named William A. Borders Jr., to solicit the bribe. Borders was convicted of the bribery scheme in a separate trial, and he served additional time for contempt rather than testify in the congressional proceedings.
The evidence against Hastings is circumstantial, but it's too much to explain away: a suspicious pattern of telephone calls between Hastings and Borders at key moments in the case; Borders's apparent insider knowledge of developments in the criminal case; Hastings's appearance at a Miami hotel, as promised by Borders as a signal that the judge had agreed to the payoff; a cryptic telephone conversation between the two men that appears to be a coded discussion of the bribe arrangement.
Consider: Hastings, a federal judge, gets word from Borders's lawyer that Borders has been arrested for conspiring to bribe him and that the FBI wants to interview him. Instead of calling the FBI agents whose names and numbers he's been given, Hastings leaves his hotel without checking out and heads to the airport outside Baltimore instead of National, where there's an earlier flight. At BWI, Hastings calls his girlfriend, has her call him back at a different pay phone, then asks her to leave the house to call him from a pay phone, then calls her back from a different pay phone. He doesn't speak to the FBI until they track him down at the girlfriend's house later that night.
Pelosi is in a box of her own devising. The panel's ranking Democrat is her fellow Californian Jane Harman -- smart and hardworking but also abrasive, ambitious and, in Pelosi's estimation, insufficiently partisan on the committee. So Pelosi, once the intelligence panel's ranking Democrat herself, has made clear that she doesn't intend to name Harman to the chairmanship.
The wrong decision, in my view, but one that's magnified by the unfortunate fact that next in line is Florida Rep. Alcee Hastings. In 1989, after being acquitted in a criminal trial, Hastings was stripped of his position as a federal judge -- impeached by the House in which he now serves and convicted by the Senate -- for conspiring to extort a $150,000 bribe in a case before him, repeatedly lying about it under oath and manufacturing evidence at his trial.
Ordinarily, that might doom Hastings's chances, but the situation is further inflamed by racial politics: Hastings is African American, and the Congressional Black Caucus has made it clear that it will not tolerate his rejection. Another black lawmaker, Georgia's Sanford Bishop, was passed over to accommodate Harman, who reclaimed her seniority when she returned to Congress in 2000 after a gubernatorial run. And the black caucus is still smarting over Pelosi's move to oust Louisiana's William J. Jefferson from the Ways and Means Committee after the FBI found a freezerful of cash in Jefferson's home.
Pelosi has floated the notion of naming the intelligence committee's third-ranking Democrat, Texan Silvestre Reyes, who is Hispanic, but that's not flying with the black caucus. "The CBC would not look kindly on that," caucus spokeswoman Myra Dandridge told The Post's Jonathan Weisman. "The first order of business of the CBC chairman would be to protect his members, and Alcee Hastings has the seniority, the knowledge and the experience to be chairman of the intelligence committee."
True -- and still he shouldn't get the job.
The events occurred so long ago (the alleged conspiracy took place in 1981), the facts are so complex and the outcomes so antithetical (the jury acquitted Hastings; the judicial panel that investigated him, the House and the Senate concluded the opposite) that it's tempting to simply let bygones be bygones. After all, Hastings has been in Congress since 1992, on the intelligence committee since 1999. I don't worry that as chairman he'd suddenly be up for sale: If he could be entrusted with national security secrets as a committee member, why not as chairman?
But this was no ordinary crime, and Intelligence is no ordinary committee.
"My goodness gracious, when does it end? When does it end?" Hastings asked me yesterday in a long telephone interview. "It's no way that I can prove a negative. I can't go back and try to establish for everybody alive my bona fides. I've earned my stripes and I suffered through 9 3/4 years that would have crushed the average person, and fortunately for me I was not the kind of person that was crushed."
It's impossible not to like Hastings. But as someone who covered his impeachment and Senate trial, I can't get past the facts of the case, which convince me that Hastings did indeed agree to conspire with a close friend, a prominent Washington lawyer named William A. Borders Jr., to solicit the bribe. Borders was convicted of the bribery scheme in a separate trial, and he served additional time for contempt rather than testify in the congressional proceedings.
The evidence against Hastings is circumstantial, but it's too much to explain away: a suspicious pattern of telephone calls between Hastings and Borders at key moments in the case; Borders's apparent insider knowledge of developments in the criminal case; Hastings's appearance at a Miami hotel, as promised by Borders as a signal that the judge had agreed to the payoff; a cryptic telephone conversation between the two men that appears to be a coded discussion of the bribe arrangement.
Consider: Hastings, a federal judge, gets word from Borders's lawyer that Borders has been arrested for conspiring to bribe him and that the FBI wants to interview him. Instead of calling the FBI agents whose names and numbers he's been given, Hastings leaves his hotel without checking out and heads to the airport outside Baltimore instead of National, where there's an earlier flight. At BWI, Hastings calls his girlfriend, has her call him back at a different pay phone, then asks her to leave the house to call him from a pay phone, then calls her back from a different pay phone. He doesn't speak to the FBI until they track him down at the girlfriend's house later that night.
Thursday, November 02, 2006
Neutrality of the Net by Tim Berners-Lee
Net Neutrality is an international issue. In some countries it is addressed better than others. (In France, for example, I understand that the layers are separated, and my colleague in Paris attributes getting 24 Mb/s net, a phone with free international dialing and digital TV for 30 euros/ month to the resulting competition.) In the US, there have been threats to the concept, and a wide discussion about what to do. That is why, though I have written and spoken on this many times.
Twenty-seven years ago, the inventors of the Internet[1] designed an architecture[2] which was simple and general. Any computer could send a packet to any other computer. The network did not look inside packets. It is the cleanness of that design, and the strict independence of the layers, which allowed the Internet to grow and be useful. It allowed the hardware and transmission technology supporting the Internet to evolve through a thousandfold increase in speed, yet still run the same applications. It allowed new Internet applications to be introduced and to evolve independently.
When, seventeen years ago, I designed the Web, I did not have to ask anyone's permission[3]. The new application rolled out over the existing Internet without modifying it. I tried then, and many people still work very hard still, to make the Web technology, in turn, a universal, neutral, platform. It must not discriminate against particular hardware, software, underlying network, language, culture, disability, or against particular types of data.
Anyone can build a new application on the Web, without asking me, or Vint Cerf, or their ISP, or their cable company, or their operating system provider, or their government, or their hardware vendor.
It is of the utmost importance that, if I connect to the Internet, and you connect to the Internet, that we can then run any Internet application we want, without discrimination as to who we are or what we are doing. We pay for connection to the Net as though it were a cloud which magically delivers our packets. We may pay for a higher or a lower quality of service. We may pay for a service which has the characteristics of being good for video, or quality audio. But we each pay to connect to the Net, but no one can pay for exclusive access to me.
When I was a child, I was impressed by the fact that the installation fee for a telephone was everywhere the same in the UK, whether you lived in a city or on a mountain, just as the same stamp would get a letter to either place.
To actually design legislation which allows creative interconnections between different service providers, but ensures neutrality of the Net as a whole may be a difficult task. It is a very important one. The US should do it now, and, if it turns out to be the only way, be as draconian as to require financial isolation between IP providers and businesses in other layers.
The Internet is increasingly becoming the dominant medium binding us. The neutral communications medium is essential to our society. It is the basis of a fair competitive market economy. It is the basis of democracy, by which a community should decide what to do. It is the basis of science, by which humankind should decide what is true.
Let us protect the neutrality of the net.
Twenty-seven years ago, the inventors of the Internet[1] designed an architecture[2] which was simple and general. Any computer could send a packet to any other computer. The network did not look inside packets. It is the cleanness of that design, and the strict independence of the layers, which allowed the Internet to grow and be useful. It allowed the hardware and transmission technology supporting the Internet to evolve through a thousandfold increase in speed, yet still run the same applications. It allowed new Internet applications to be introduced and to evolve independently.
When, seventeen years ago, I designed the Web, I did not have to ask anyone's permission[3]. The new application rolled out over the existing Internet without modifying it. I tried then, and many people still work very hard still, to make the Web technology, in turn, a universal, neutral, platform. It must not discriminate against particular hardware, software, underlying network, language, culture, disability, or against particular types of data.
Anyone can build a new application on the Web, without asking me, or Vint Cerf, or their ISP, or their cable company, or their operating system provider, or their government, or their hardware vendor.
It is of the utmost importance that, if I connect to the Internet, and you connect to the Internet, that we can then run any Internet application we want, without discrimination as to who we are or what we are doing. We pay for connection to the Net as though it were a cloud which magically delivers our packets. We may pay for a higher or a lower quality of service. We may pay for a service which has the characteristics of being good for video, or quality audio. But we each pay to connect to the Net, but no one can pay for exclusive access to me.
When I was a child, I was impressed by the fact that the installation fee for a telephone was everywhere the same in the UK, whether you lived in a city or on a mountain, just as the same stamp would get a letter to either place.
To actually design legislation which allows creative interconnections between different service providers, but ensures neutrality of the Net as a whole may be a difficult task. It is a very important one. The US should do it now, and, if it turns out to be the only way, be as draconian as to require financial isolation between IP providers and businesses in other layers.
The Internet is increasingly becoming the dominant medium binding us. The neutral communications medium is essential to our society. It is the basis of a fair competitive market economy. It is the basis of democracy, by which a community should decide what to do. It is the basis of science, by which humankind should decide what is true.
Let us protect the neutrality of the net.
Air Force to Create Cyberspace Command by Jim Wolf
The U.S. Air Force plans to set up what could become a major command aimed at safeguarding U.S. military and civilian cyberspace, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne said on Thursday.
Wynne, speaking at a military communications and intelligence conference, said U.S. vulnerabilities in cyberspace included financial networks, satellite communications, and radar and navigational jamming.
"The capital cost of entry to the cyberspace domain is low," Wynne said. "The threat is that a foe can mass forces that weaken the network that supports our operations."
Wynne said the new command would be part of the 8th Air Force based at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, a unit made famous during the combined armored offensive in Europe during World War II.
The mission of bombers now within the 8th Air Force would remain, and the new cyber-command reflects the Air Force's growing reliance on computer networks, data and electronic warfare.
Wynne said he hoped the new command would eventually be on par with such major Air Force units as the Space Command and the Air Combat Command. In creating what could become a unit led by a four-star Air Force general, the Air Force would set the stage for significant budget resources and congressional interest.
The new command will be led by Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, who would reach across all Air Force commands to draw the right people and capabilities, Wynne said.
The Air Force will seek funding for the cyber-command in fiscal 2009, which begins October 1, 2008, he said.
In December 2005, the Air Force mission statement was amended to include cyberspace as an operational area, along with air and space.
Wynne, speaking at a military communications and intelligence conference, said U.S. vulnerabilities in cyberspace included financial networks, satellite communications, and radar and navigational jamming.
"The capital cost of entry to the cyberspace domain is low," Wynne said. "The threat is that a foe can mass forces that weaken the network that supports our operations."
Wynne said the new command would be part of the 8th Air Force based at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, a unit made famous during the combined armored offensive in Europe during World War II.
The mission of bombers now within the 8th Air Force would remain, and the new cyber-command reflects the Air Force's growing reliance on computer networks, data and electronic warfare.
Wynne said he hoped the new command would eventually be on par with such major Air Force units as the Space Command and the Air Combat Command. In creating what could become a unit led by a four-star Air Force general, the Air Force would set the stage for significant budget resources and congressional interest.
The new command will be led by Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, who would reach across all Air Force commands to draw the right people and capabilities, Wynne said.
The Air Force will seek funding for the cyber-command in fiscal 2009, which begins October 1, 2008, he said.
In December 2005, the Air Force mission statement was amended to include cyberspace as an operational area, along with air and space.
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Intellipedia is a Wikipedia for Spooks by R.
The US intelligence community has unveiled its own secretive version of Wikipedia, saying the popular online encyclopedia format known for its openness is key to the future of American espionage.
The office of US intelligence czar, John Negroponte, announced Intellipedia, which allows intelligence analysts and other officials to collaboratively add and edit content on the government's classified Intelink web much like its more famous namesake on the World Wide Web.
A "top secret" Intellipedia system, currently available to the 16 agencies that make up the US intelligence community, has grown to more than 28,000 pages and 3600 registered users since its introduction on April 17. Less restrictive versions exist for "secret" and "sensitive but unclassified" material.
The system is also available to the Transportation Security Administration and national laboratories.
Intellipedia is currently being used to assemble a major intelligence report, known as a national intelligence estimate, on Nigeria as well as the State Department's annual country reports on terrorism, officials said.
Some day it may also be the path intelligence officials take to produce the president's daily intelligence briefing.
But the system, which makes data available to thousands of users who would not see it otherwise, has also stirred qualms about potential security lapses following the recent media leak of a national intelligence estimate that caused a political uproar by identifying Iraq as a contributor to the growth of global terrorism.
"We're taking a risk," acknowledged Michael Wertheimer, the intelligence community's chief technical officer. "There's a risk it's going to show up in the media, that it'll be leaked."
Intelligence officials say the format is perfect for sharing information between agencies, a center piece of the reform legislation that established Negroponte's office as national intelligence director after the September 11 attacks.
They also said it could lead to more accurate intelligence reports because the system allows a wider range of officials to scrutinise material and keeps a complete, permanent record of individual contributions including dissenting points of view.
That might help avoid errors of the kind that led to the widely criticised 2002 national intelligence estimate that said Saddam Hussein possessed large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
Intelligence officials are so enthusiastic about Intellipedia that they plan to provide access to Britain, Canada and Australia.
Even China could be granted access to help produce an unclassified intelligence estimate on the worldwide threat posed by infectious diseases.
"We'd hope to get down to the doctor in Shanghai who may have a useful contribution on avian flu," a senior intelligence analyst, Fred Hassani, said.
The office of US intelligence czar, John Negroponte, announced Intellipedia, which allows intelligence analysts and other officials to collaboratively add and edit content on the government's classified Intelink web much like its more famous namesake on the World Wide Web.
A "top secret" Intellipedia system, currently available to the 16 agencies that make up the US intelligence community, has grown to more than 28,000 pages and 3600 registered users since its introduction on April 17. Less restrictive versions exist for "secret" and "sensitive but unclassified" material.
The system is also available to the Transportation Security Administration and national laboratories.
Intellipedia is currently being used to assemble a major intelligence report, known as a national intelligence estimate, on Nigeria as well as the State Department's annual country reports on terrorism, officials said.
Some day it may also be the path intelligence officials take to produce the president's daily intelligence briefing.
But the system, which makes data available to thousands of users who would not see it otherwise, has also stirred qualms about potential security lapses following the recent media leak of a national intelligence estimate that caused a political uproar by identifying Iraq as a contributor to the growth of global terrorism.
"We're taking a risk," acknowledged Michael Wertheimer, the intelligence community's chief technical officer. "There's a risk it's going to show up in the media, that it'll be leaked."
Intelligence officials say the format is perfect for sharing information between agencies, a center piece of the reform legislation that established Negroponte's office as national intelligence director after the September 11 attacks.
They also said it could lead to more accurate intelligence reports because the system allows a wider range of officials to scrutinise material and keeps a complete, permanent record of individual contributions including dissenting points of view.
That might help avoid errors of the kind that led to the widely criticised 2002 national intelligence estimate that said Saddam Hussein possessed large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
Intelligence officials are so enthusiastic about Intellipedia that they plan to provide access to Britain, Canada and Australia.
Even China could be granted access to help produce an unclassified intelligence estimate on the worldwide threat posed by infectious diseases.
"We'd hope to get down to the doctor in Shanghai who may have a useful contribution on avian flu," a senior intelligence analyst, Fred Hassani, said.
Iran to fire Shahab 3 Missile to Kick Off War-Games on Thursday by I.F.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) will begin week-long military exercises, code-named the “Great Prophet 2”, with the firing of the Shahab missile on Thursday.
The drills will be held in 14 provinces in four stages, and Shahab 2 and Shahab 3 missiles carrying cluster warheads will be fired from the Persian Gulf over the operation zone.
The Supreme Commander of the IRGC said on Wednesday that the Shahab missiles fired will have a range of more than 1,000 kilometres.
Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi told reporters that the purpose of the war-games was to put on display the “strength and resolve” of the IRGC in defending the country’s borders.
General Safavi said that the paramilitary Bassij force will be deployed to 14 of the country’s 30 province and other armed forces units taking part in the drills will be scattered in 10 provinces, and the focus of their operations will be in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
The military drills will involve the IRGC Army, Navy, and Air Force, he said.
A Fateh-110 missile and a Zolfaqar-103 missile, as well as hundreds of rockets and missiles with ranges above 150 km, will be fired during the military manoeuvres.
In April, the IRGC conducted naval war-games, dubbed “Great Prophet”, in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman. During the exercises, Iran put on display what it claimed were new stealth missiles, sonar-evading torpedoes, and even a "flying boat".
Iran has a dual military system with a regular Armed Forces as well as the IRGC. Both have their own Army, Navy, and Air Force and report directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
United States-led forces have been carrying out naval war-games in the Persian Gulf this week in what analysts have said are meant to serve as a warning to Tehran.
Twenty five nations, including Britain, France, Italy, and Bahrain, have taken part in the naval exercises as part of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The goal of the exercises is to practice blocking transports of weapons of mass destruction.
The drills will be held in 14 provinces in four stages, and Shahab 2 and Shahab 3 missiles carrying cluster warheads will be fired from the Persian Gulf over the operation zone.
The Supreme Commander of the IRGC said on Wednesday that the Shahab missiles fired will have a range of more than 1,000 kilometres.
Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi told reporters that the purpose of the war-games was to put on display the “strength and resolve” of the IRGC in defending the country’s borders.
General Safavi said that the paramilitary Bassij force will be deployed to 14 of the country’s 30 province and other armed forces units taking part in the drills will be scattered in 10 provinces, and the focus of their operations will be in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
The military drills will involve the IRGC Army, Navy, and Air Force, he said.
A Fateh-110 missile and a Zolfaqar-103 missile, as well as hundreds of rockets and missiles with ranges above 150 km, will be fired during the military manoeuvres.
In April, the IRGC conducted naval war-games, dubbed “Great Prophet”, in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman. During the exercises, Iran put on display what it claimed were new stealth missiles, sonar-evading torpedoes, and even a "flying boat".
Iran has a dual military system with a regular Armed Forces as well as the IRGC. Both have their own Army, Navy, and Air Force and report directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
United States-led forces have been carrying out naval war-games in the Persian Gulf this week in what analysts have said are meant to serve as a warning to Tehran.
Twenty five nations, including Britain, France, Italy, and Bahrain, have taken part in the naval exercises as part of the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The goal of the exercises is to practice blocking transports of weapons of mass destruction.
Russia Defends Missile Deal With Iran by M.
The Russian defense minister on Wednesday defended Moscow’s deal to supply air defense missiles to Iran, saying they were purely defensive weapons with a limited range, the Associated Press news agency reports.
“I wish to underline that these systems cannot be used in offensive operations,” Sergei Ivanov told Russia Today television in an interview broadcast early Wednesday. “Secondly, they have a limited use as they are capable of protecting a small part of the Iranian territory.”
Moscow has refused to bow to Western pressure and cancel its US 700 million contract to sell 29 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran, which was signed last December.
“I wish to underline that these systems cannot be used in offensive operations,” Sergei Ivanov told Russia Today television in an interview broadcast early Wednesday. “Secondly, they have a limited use as they are capable of protecting a small part of the Iranian territory.”
Moscow has refused to bow to Western pressure and cancel its US 700 million contract to sell 29 Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran, which was signed last December.
Military Charts Movement of Conflict in Iraq Toward Chaos by Michael R. Gordon
A classified briefing prepared two weeks ago by the United States Central Command portrays Iraq as edging toward chaos, in a chart that the military is using as a barometer of civil conflict.
A one-page slide shown at the Oct. 18 briefing provides a rare glimpse into how the military command that oversees the war is trying to track its trajectory, particularly in terms of sectarian fighting.
The slide includes a color-coded bar chart that is used to illustrate an “Index of Civil Conflict.” It shows a sharp escalation in sectarian violence since the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, and tracks a further worsening this month despite a concerted American push to tamp down the violence in Baghdad.
In fashioning the index, the military is weighing factors like the ineffectual Iraqi police and the dwindling influence of moderate religious and political figures, rather than more traditional military measures such as the enemy’s fighting strength and the control of territory.
The conclusions the Central Command has drawn from these trends are not encouraging, according to a copy of the slide that was obtained by The New York Times. The slide shows Iraq as moving sharply away from “peace,” an ideal on the far left side of the chart, to a point much closer to the right side of the spectrum, a red zone marked “chaos.” As depicted in the command’s chart, the needle has been moving steadily toward the far right of the chart.
An intelligence summary at the bottom of the slide reads “urban areas experiencing ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns to consolidate control” and “violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.” According to a Central Command official, the index on civil strife has been a staple of internal command briefings for most of this year. The analysis was prepared by the command’s intelligence directorate, which is overseen by Brig. Gen. John M. Custer.
Gen. John P. Abizaid, who heads the command, warned publicly in August about the risk of civil war in Iraq, but he said then that he thought it could be averted. In evaluating the prospects for all-out civil strife, the command concentrates on “key reads,” or several principal variables.
According to the slide from the Oct. 18 briefing, the variables include “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders, which can be measured by listening to sermons at mosques and to important Shiite and Sunni leaders, and the amount of influence that moderate political and religious figures have over the population. The other main variables are assassinations and other especially provocative sectarian attacks, as well as “spontaneous mass civil conflict.”
A number of secondary indicators are also taken into account, including activity by militias, problems with ineffective police, the ability of Iraqi officials to govern effectively, the number of civilians who have been forced to move by sectarian violence, the willingness of Iraqi security forces to follow orders, and the degree to which the Iraqi Kurds are pressing for independence from the central government.
These factors are evaluated to create the index of civil strife, which has registered a steady worsening for months. “Ever since the February attack on the Shiite mosque in Samarra, it has been closer to the chaos side than the peace side,” said a Central Command official who asked not to be identified because he was talking about classified information.
In the Oct. 18 brief, the index moved still another notch toward “chaos.” That briefing was prepared three days before General Abizaid met in Washington with President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take stock of the situation in Iraq.
A spokesman for the Central Command declined to comment on the index or other information in the slide. “We don’t comment on secret material,” the spokesman said.
One significant factor in the military’s decision to move the scale toward “chaos” was the expanding activity by militias.
Another reason was the limitations of Iraqi government security forces, which despite years of training and equipping by the United States, are either ineffective or, in some cases, infiltrated by the very militias they are supposed to be combating. The slide notes that “ineffectual” Iraqi police forces have been a significant problem, and cites as a concern sectarian conflicts between Iraqi security forces.
Other significant factors are in the political realm. The slide notes that Iraq’s political and religious leaders have lost some of their moderating influence over their constituents or adherents.
Notably, the slide also cites difficulties that the new Iraqi administration has experienced in “governance.” That appears to be shorthand for the frustration felt by American military officers about the Iraqi government’s delays in bringing about a genuine political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis. It also appears to apply to the lack of reconstruction programs to restore essential services and the dearth of job creation efforts to give young Iraqis an alternative to joining militias, as well as the absence of firm action against militias.
The slide lists other factors that are described as important but less significant. They include efforts by Iran and Syria to enable violence by militias and insurgent groups and the interest by many Kurds in achieving independence. The slide describes violence motivated by sectarian differences as having moved into a “critical” phase.
The chart does note some positive developments. Specifically, it notes that “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders has not increased. It also notes that Iraqi security forces are refusing less often than in the past to take orders from the central government and that there has been a drop-off in mass desertions.
Still, for a military culture that thrives on PowerPoint briefings, the shifting index was seen by some officials as a stark warning about the difficult course of events in Iraq, and mirrored growing concern by some military officers.
A one-page slide shown at the Oct. 18 briefing provides a rare glimpse into how the military command that oversees the war is trying to track its trajectory, particularly in terms of sectarian fighting.
The slide includes a color-coded bar chart that is used to illustrate an “Index of Civil Conflict.” It shows a sharp escalation in sectarian violence since the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, and tracks a further worsening this month despite a concerted American push to tamp down the violence in Baghdad.
In fashioning the index, the military is weighing factors like the ineffectual Iraqi police and the dwindling influence of moderate religious and political figures, rather than more traditional military measures such as the enemy’s fighting strength and the control of territory.
The conclusions the Central Command has drawn from these trends are not encouraging, according to a copy of the slide that was obtained by The New York Times. The slide shows Iraq as moving sharply away from “peace,” an ideal on the far left side of the chart, to a point much closer to the right side of the spectrum, a red zone marked “chaos.” As depicted in the command’s chart, the needle has been moving steadily toward the far right of the chart.
An intelligence summary at the bottom of the slide reads “urban areas experiencing ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns to consolidate control” and “violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.” According to a Central Command official, the index on civil strife has been a staple of internal command briefings for most of this year. The analysis was prepared by the command’s intelligence directorate, which is overseen by Brig. Gen. John M. Custer.
Gen. John P. Abizaid, who heads the command, warned publicly in August about the risk of civil war in Iraq, but he said then that he thought it could be averted. In evaluating the prospects for all-out civil strife, the command concentrates on “key reads,” or several principal variables.
According to the slide from the Oct. 18 briefing, the variables include “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders, which can be measured by listening to sermons at mosques and to important Shiite and Sunni leaders, and the amount of influence that moderate political and religious figures have over the population. The other main variables are assassinations and other especially provocative sectarian attacks, as well as “spontaneous mass civil conflict.”
A number of secondary indicators are also taken into account, including activity by militias, problems with ineffective police, the ability of Iraqi officials to govern effectively, the number of civilians who have been forced to move by sectarian violence, the willingness of Iraqi security forces to follow orders, and the degree to which the Iraqi Kurds are pressing for independence from the central government.
These factors are evaluated to create the index of civil strife, which has registered a steady worsening for months. “Ever since the February attack on the Shiite mosque in Samarra, it has been closer to the chaos side than the peace side,” said a Central Command official who asked not to be identified because he was talking about classified information.
In the Oct. 18 brief, the index moved still another notch toward “chaos.” That briefing was prepared three days before General Abizaid met in Washington with President Bush, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take stock of the situation in Iraq.
A spokesman for the Central Command declined to comment on the index or other information in the slide. “We don’t comment on secret material,” the spokesman said.
One significant factor in the military’s decision to move the scale toward “chaos” was the expanding activity by militias.
Another reason was the limitations of Iraqi government security forces, which despite years of training and equipping by the United States, are either ineffective or, in some cases, infiltrated by the very militias they are supposed to be combating. The slide notes that “ineffectual” Iraqi police forces have been a significant problem, and cites as a concern sectarian conflicts between Iraqi security forces.
Other significant factors are in the political realm. The slide notes that Iraq’s political and religious leaders have lost some of their moderating influence over their constituents or adherents.
Notably, the slide also cites difficulties that the new Iraqi administration has experienced in “governance.” That appears to be shorthand for the frustration felt by American military officers about the Iraqi government’s delays in bringing about a genuine political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis. It also appears to apply to the lack of reconstruction programs to restore essential services and the dearth of job creation efforts to give young Iraqis an alternative to joining militias, as well as the absence of firm action against militias.
The slide lists other factors that are described as important but less significant. They include efforts by Iran and Syria to enable violence by militias and insurgent groups and the interest by many Kurds in achieving independence. The slide describes violence motivated by sectarian differences as having moved into a “critical” phase.
The chart does note some positive developments. Specifically, it notes that “hostile rhetoric” by political and religious leaders has not increased. It also notes that Iraqi security forces are refusing less often than in the past to take orders from the central government and that there has been a drop-off in mass desertions.
Still, for a military culture that thrives on PowerPoint briefings, the shifting index was seen by some officials as a stark warning about the difficult course of events in Iraq, and mirrored growing concern by some military officers.
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
Future Terrorism: Mutant Jihads by Walid Phares
The strategic decision to carry out 9/11 was made in the early 1990s, almost ten years before the barbaric attacks on New York and Washington took place. The decade long preparations and the testing of America’s defenses and political tolerance to terrorism that took place before September 11th were a stage in the much longer modern history of the jihadist movement that produced al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers. Decades from now, historians will discover that the United States, the West and the international community were being targeted by a global ideological movement which emerged in the 1920s, survived World War II and the Cold War, and carefully chose the timing of its onslaught against democracy.
Undoubtedly, the issue that policy planners and government leaders need to address with greatest urgency, and which the American public is most concerned about, is the future shape of the terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies. Yet developments since 2001, both at home and overseas, have shown that terror threats in general — and the jihadi menace in particular — remain at the same time resilient and poorly understood.
Defining the War
The jihadi war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War — and the struggle against the United States and some of its allies thereafter — are all part of a single continuum. Over time, jihadi Salafists and Khomeinist radicals alike have become proficient in selecting their objectives and infiltrating targets. Indeed, an analysis of the security failures that made 9/11 possible clearly demonstrates that the hijackers exploited systemic malfunctions at the national security level.
Learning these lessons is essential for better counterterrorism planning in the future. But the jihadists are also learning, and the advantage will go to the side which can adapt most quickly. If the jihadists learn to understand and anticipate their opponents, their tactics and strategies will mutate.
The first strain of mutating Islamist ideology is that of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In his now - historic April 2006 speech, Osama Bin Laden confirmed his commitment to global, total and uncompromising jihad. “It is a duty for the Umma with all its categories, men, women and youths, to give away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of material support, enough [to establish jihad in the fields of jihad] particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kashmir and Chechnya,” Bin Laden has maintained. “Jihad today is an imperative for every Muslim. The Umma will commit sin if it did not provide adequate material support for jihad.”1
Bin Laden’s latest risala (message) is as important as his initial declarations of war and of mobilization, laying out his most comprehensive vision so far. As this “world declaration” makes clear, the global Salafi agenda accepts no truth other than radical Islamist dogma. All non-Islamist governments must be brought down, and pure, pious ones erected in their stead. Global jihadism, in its Salafi-Wahhabi form, is ideologically at war with the rest of the world. The conflict is universal in nature. It encompasses the entire West, not just the United States and Europe. Russia, India, and at some point even China, in addition to moderate Muslim governments, must be brought down. Like no other document to date, Bin Laden’s speech outlines the final fantasy of the jihadi mind: world domination.
The second branch of jihadism is smaller, and concentrated in the hands of a single regime: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since its inception, Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution has seen itself as universal in nature. And today, flush with oil dividends, it is rapidly expanding its influence in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. Similar to its Salafi counterpart, the Khomeinist world - view seeks to erect Islamist regimes, launch radical organizations and expand its ideology. But unlike in Wahhabism, the chain of command is narrow and tightly controlled; Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the unquestioned ideological head, while Iran’s radical president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, decides the time, place and scope of the battles.
Future Battlefields
By understanding the objectives of these forces, it is possible to extrapolate some theaters of likely confrontation in the years ahead.
Iraq
Today, U.S. - led forces in Iraq are battling al-Qaeda and other Salafi forces in the so - called “Sunni Triangle.” In the south, meanwhile, Coalition forces have engaged Iranian - supported militias, such as Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army. U.S. and Iraqi forces will continue to battle on both of these fronts, in Iraq’s center and south. The Salafi strategy will center on classical terrorist attacks, while Iranian - supported forces are likely to attempt to infiltrate and take control of Iraqi forces. U.S. - Iraqi counterterrorism cooperation will continue to expand, but a decisive victory for Baghdad cannot take place before Iranian and Syrian interference has receded - and that will not happen until both of those regimes are weakened from the inside. Hence, American support for democratic and opposition forces in Syria (and by extension Lebanon) and Iran is the surest way to ensure success in Iraq.
Afghanistan
The consolidation of the Karzai government in Kabul is essential to American strategy, both as a bridge to a younger generation of Afghans and as a counterweight to the appeal of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is committed to preventing such a development. It has a vested interest in causing the country’s post - Taliban government to fail, and in preventing a new generation of citizens from being exposed to non - Salafi teachings. U.S. and NATO forces therefore face a long - term struggle against jihadists in that country, both on the military and the socio - cultural level. Sustaining engagement there will depend on two factors: American public support, and the outcome of the struggle between fundamentalists and the government currently taking place in Pakistan.
Pakistan
Many of the components of the worldwide war with jihadism are concentrated in Pakistan. So far, Pakistan’s radical Islamists have been able to block their government from taking back control of the country’s western tribal areas and uprooting the fundamentalist organizations in its east. But potentially even more dangerous is the possibility that jihadists could take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In this context, the most serious threat to the United States would be the collapse of the Musharraf government and the Pakistani military at the hands of radical Islamists. Should this happen, the U.S. would be under direct nuclear threat from a nuclear - armed al-Qaeda regime — one that would have tremendous control over
many other Muslim countries.
Asia
A major shift in south Asia will not only impact Afghanistan and Pakistan, but is likely to spill over into Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines, with ripple effects on U.S. allies Australia, Thailand, and India. The U.S. will be deeply and adversely affected by the expansion of jihadism in Asia. The most serious threat to the United States would be the collapse of the Musharraf government and the Pakistani military at the hands of radical Islamists. Should this happen, the U.S. would be under direct nuclear threat from a nuclear - armed al-Qaeda regime — one that would have tremendous control over many other Muslim countries.
Iran
While the Salafi threat is likely to extend east into Asia, Khomeinism is likely to expand westward, from Iran to southern Lebanon via Iraq’s Shi’ite areas and Syria’s Alawite - dominated regime. Since its inception, the radical regime in Tehran has had a vision of itself as a great power, and consequently perceives itself to be on a collision course with the “Great Satan”: the United States. The imperial vision of a Shi’a Crescent from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean held by Iran’s leaders mirrors the Sunni Caliphate envisioned by al-Qaeda and its followers — albeit one with a modern twist: nuclear weapons. Bolstered by its partnership with Syria and the strength of its proxy force in Lebanon, Tehran today envisions a global confrontation with the United States. As such, the Iranian regime represents a cardinal threat to democracies in the region and, by extension, to the United States.
Syria
Ever since Hafez al-Assad chose to permit Iran to expand its influence in Lebanon, a Syrian - Iranian axis has existed in the region.2 During the Cold War, Damascus was able to outmaneuver the U.S. on a number of fronts, chief among them Lebanon. By 1990, the latter had been abandoned by Washington to Syria. The Ba’athist domination of Lebanon, in turn, led to the ascendance of Hezbollah. But America’s post - 9/11 volte - face brought the dangers of Syrian - occupied Lebanon into sharp focus. By 2005, Syria had been forced out of Lebanon, but Bashar al-Assad remains defiant. Today, in the aftermath of Hezbollah’s war with Israel, Syria, like Iran, finds itself hurtling toward confrontation with the United States.
Lebanon
Since the 1970s, Lebanon has been a key battlefield between the forces of terror and the West. The country houses a dense conglomeration of anti-democratic forces, ranging from Hezbollah to pro - Syrian groups to extreme Salafists. Since the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks, the United States has altered its strategy toward Lebanon several times, but today, Washington finds itself forced to contain a rising Hezbollah and support a struggling “Cedar Revolution.”
Sudan and the Horn of Africa
All the indications suggest that al-Qaeda is planning to open a new battlefield in Africa. In the speeches of Bin Laden and other Islamist leaders, Sudan represents a central arena of confrontation with the infidels, and a major launching pad for world jihad. The jihadists aim to thwart the international community in Darfur and reignite a holy war in southern Sudan. In addition, fundamentalists are expanding their influence in Somalia, and conspiring against U.S. ally Ethiopia. Here again, the U.S. and other democracies find themselves on a collision course with radical Islamists, even though international engagement in Africa today is essentially limited to humanitarian assistance.
Europe
With the Madrid and London attacks, the many plots foiled in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, the violence in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, the French “intifada” and the “Cartoon Jihad,” Europe has well and truly become the next battlefield. Transatlantic cooperation could give way to tensions between America and its European partners, as European jihadis become a danger to the United States. Indeed, jihadi penetration of Europe, particularly Western Europe, is expected to facilitate the infiltration of North America.
Russia
Since the 2002 Moscow theater hostage taking and the subsequent Beslan school massacre, jihadism has engulfed Russia. Wahhabism has already taken hold in Russia’s southern provinces, and jihadists are thinking beyond Chechnya, toward the dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Russian strategy, for its part, has been peculiar; while Moscow has confronted fundamentalists at home head - on, it nonetheless pursues a policy of support for Iran and Syria — and, by extension, Hezbollah. In doing so, Russia’s foreign policy has become antithetical to its own national security. The U.S. and Russia have a solid basis for collaboration against international terrorism, but unless Moscow abandons its tolerance of Tehran’s radicalism, the two countries will miss a strategic opportunity to defeat world terror in this decade.
Latin America
While the Soviet legacy has mostly dissipated in Latin America, with Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba the last ailing vestige of the Cold War, it has taken just one decade for new threats to emerge. The populist regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela not only poses a challenge to liberal democracies in the region, it also serves as a conduit for foreign jihadi threats. With an alliance with Iran in the making and with an al-Qaeda and Hezbollah presence in the country, Venezuela is facilitating the activities of a network of forces inimical to U.S. interests. Deeper in the continent, meanwhile, both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have successfully put down roots in the Andes and the Tri - Border Region between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. With the long and porous Mexican - American border a major vulnerability, another future threat to the U.S. is brewing to its south.
Canada
Finally, American security is also at risk from the north. Not only is Canada considered a passageway by which international terrorists can enter the United States, it has also become a site for the proliferation of jihadi groups. The arrests made in Toronto in the summer of 2006, and the coordination between U.S. - born radicals and their Canadian “brothers,” are signs of a new era — one in which Islamists view the United States and Canada as one strategic arena for operations. Washington therefore will increasingly need to coordinate its counterterrorism strategies with its northern neighbor, despite the differences in political culture, institutions and attitudes.
The Home Front
For the United States, winning the War on Terror depends on two battlefields. The first is overseas, where Washington must confront jihadi forces and help allies to win their own struggles with terrorism. This will require the United States to support democratic change abroad, both as a counterweight to jihadist lobbies and as a means of assisting Arab and Muslim democrats to win the conflict within their own societies.
The second, however, is closer to home. Homeland security planners must be thinking seriously about a duo of unsettling questions. First, are jihadists already in possession of unconventional weapons on American soil, and how can the U.S. government deter them? This crucial issue tops all other challenges, for a terrorist nuclear strike on the U.S. has the potential to transform international relations as we know them.
Second, how deeply have jihadist elements infiltrated the U.S. government and federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and various military commands, either through sympathizers or via actual operatives?
As the recent scandal over the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance program has shown, the answers are fraught with complications. Five years into the War on Terror, the U.S. has not fully made the transition from the pre - 9/11 legal counterterrorism framework to one based on intelligence, prevention and robust police action. And, without a national consensus about the seriousness of the jihadi threat, America will lose its own war of ideas.
The future enemies of the United States will be a mutation of current and past terrorist foes. In confronting these forces, knowledge of their ideologies, objectives and determination will make all the difference.
1. “Transcript: Bin Laden Accuses West,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), April 24, 2006, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F9694745-060C-419C-8523-2E093B7B807D.htm.
2. For a comprehensive analysis of this alliance, see Walid Phares, “The Syrian-Iran
Axis,” Global Affairs VII, no. 3 (1992), 83-86.
Undoubtedly, the issue that policy planners and government leaders need to address with greatest urgency, and which the American public is most concerned about, is the future shape of the terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies. Yet developments since 2001, both at home and overseas, have shown that terror threats in general — and the jihadi menace in particular — remain at the same time resilient and poorly understood.
Defining the War
The jihadi war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War — and the struggle against the United States and some of its allies thereafter — are all part of a single continuum. Over time, jihadi Salafists and Khomeinist radicals alike have become proficient in selecting their objectives and infiltrating targets. Indeed, an analysis of the security failures that made 9/11 possible clearly demonstrates that the hijackers exploited systemic malfunctions at the national security level.
Learning these lessons is essential for better counterterrorism planning in the future. But the jihadists are also learning, and the advantage will go to the side which can adapt most quickly. If the jihadists learn to understand and anticipate their opponents, their tactics and strategies will mutate.
The first strain of mutating Islamist ideology is that of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In his now - historic April 2006 speech, Osama Bin Laden confirmed his commitment to global, total and uncompromising jihad. “It is a duty for the Umma with all its categories, men, women and youths, to give away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of material support, enough [to establish jihad in the fields of jihad] particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kashmir and Chechnya,” Bin Laden has maintained. “Jihad today is an imperative for every Muslim. The Umma will commit sin if it did not provide adequate material support for jihad.”1
Bin Laden’s latest risala (message) is as important as his initial declarations of war and of mobilization, laying out his most comprehensive vision so far. As this “world declaration” makes clear, the global Salafi agenda accepts no truth other than radical Islamist dogma. All non-Islamist governments must be brought down, and pure, pious ones erected in their stead. Global jihadism, in its Salafi-Wahhabi form, is ideologically at war with the rest of the world. The conflict is universal in nature. It encompasses the entire West, not just the United States and Europe. Russia, India, and at some point even China, in addition to moderate Muslim governments, must be brought down. Like no other document to date, Bin Laden’s speech outlines the final fantasy of the jihadi mind: world domination.
The second branch of jihadism is smaller, and concentrated in the hands of a single regime: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since its inception, Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution has seen itself as universal in nature. And today, flush with oil dividends, it is rapidly expanding its influence in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. Similar to its Salafi counterpart, the Khomeinist world - view seeks to erect Islamist regimes, launch radical organizations and expand its ideology. But unlike in Wahhabism, the chain of command is narrow and tightly controlled; Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the unquestioned ideological head, while Iran’s radical president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, decides the time, place and scope of the battles.
Future Battlefields
By understanding the objectives of these forces, it is possible to extrapolate some theaters of likely confrontation in the years ahead.
Iraq
Today, U.S. - led forces in Iraq are battling al-Qaeda and other Salafi forces in the so - called “Sunni Triangle.” In the south, meanwhile, Coalition forces have engaged Iranian - supported militias, such as Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army. U.S. and Iraqi forces will continue to battle on both of these fronts, in Iraq’s center and south. The Salafi strategy will center on classical terrorist attacks, while Iranian - supported forces are likely to attempt to infiltrate and take control of Iraqi forces. U.S. - Iraqi counterterrorism cooperation will continue to expand, but a decisive victory for Baghdad cannot take place before Iranian and Syrian interference has receded - and that will not happen until both of those regimes are weakened from the inside. Hence, American support for democratic and opposition forces in Syria (and by extension Lebanon) and Iran is the surest way to ensure success in Iraq.
Afghanistan
The consolidation of the Karzai government in Kabul is essential to American strategy, both as a bridge to a younger generation of Afghans and as a counterweight to the appeal of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is committed to preventing such a development. It has a vested interest in causing the country’s post - Taliban government to fail, and in preventing a new generation of citizens from being exposed to non - Salafi teachings. U.S. and NATO forces therefore face a long - term struggle against jihadists in that country, both on the military and the socio - cultural level. Sustaining engagement there will depend on two factors: American public support, and the outcome of the struggle between fundamentalists and the government currently taking place in Pakistan.
Pakistan
Many of the components of the worldwide war with jihadism are concentrated in Pakistan. So far, Pakistan’s radical Islamists have been able to block their government from taking back control of the country’s western tribal areas and uprooting the fundamentalist organizations in its east. But potentially even more dangerous is the possibility that jihadists could take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In this context, the most serious threat to the United States would be the collapse of the Musharraf government and the Pakistani military at the hands of radical Islamists. Should this happen, the U.S. would be under direct nuclear threat from a nuclear - armed al-Qaeda regime — one that would have tremendous control over
many other Muslim countries.
Asia
A major shift in south Asia will not only impact Afghanistan and Pakistan, but is likely to spill over into Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines, with ripple effects on U.S. allies Australia, Thailand, and India. The U.S. will be deeply and adversely affected by the expansion of jihadism in Asia. The most serious threat to the United States would be the collapse of the Musharraf government and the Pakistani military at the hands of radical Islamists. Should this happen, the U.S. would be under direct nuclear threat from a nuclear - armed al-Qaeda regime — one that would have tremendous control over many other Muslim countries.
Iran
While the Salafi threat is likely to extend east into Asia, Khomeinism is likely to expand westward, from Iran to southern Lebanon via Iraq’s Shi’ite areas and Syria’s Alawite - dominated regime. Since its inception, the radical regime in Tehran has had a vision of itself as a great power, and consequently perceives itself to be on a collision course with the “Great Satan”: the United States. The imperial vision of a Shi’a Crescent from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean held by Iran’s leaders mirrors the Sunni Caliphate envisioned by al-Qaeda and its followers — albeit one with a modern twist: nuclear weapons. Bolstered by its partnership with Syria and the strength of its proxy force in Lebanon, Tehran today envisions a global confrontation with the United States. As such, the Iranian regime represents a cardinal threat to democracies in the region and, by extension, to the United States.
Syria
Ever since Hafez al-Assad chose to permit Iran to expand its influence in Lebanon, a Syrian - Iranian axis has existed in the region.2 During the Cold War, Damascus was able to outmaneuver the U.S. on a number of fronts, chief among them Lebanon. By 1990, the latter had been abandoned by Washington to Syria. The Ba’athist domination of Lebanon, in turn, led to the ascendance of Hezbollah. But America’s post - 9/11 volte - face brought the dangers of Syrian - occupied Lebanon into sharp focus. By 2005, Syria had been forced out of Lebanon, but Bashar al-Assad remains defiant. Today, in the aftermath of Hezbollah’s war with Israel, Syria, like Iran, finds itself hurtling toward confrontation with the United States.
Lebanon
Since the 1970s, Lebanon has been a key battlefield between the forces of terror and the West. The country houses a dense conglomeration of anti-democratic forces, ranging from Hezbollah to pro - Syrian groups to extreme Salafists. Since the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks, the United States has altered its strategy toward Lebanon several times, but today, Washington finds itself forced to contain a rising Hezbollah and support a struggling “Cedar Revolution.”
Sudan and the Horn of Africa
All the indications suggest that al-Qaeda is planning to open a new battlefield in Africa. In the speeches of Bin Laden and other Islamist leaders, Sudan represents a central arena of confrontation with the infidels, and a major launching pad for world jihad. The jihadists aim to thwart the international community in Darfur and reignite a holy war in southern Sudan. In addition, fundamentalists are expanding their influence in Somalia, and conspiring against U.S. ally Ethiopia. Here again, the U.S. and other democracies find themselves on a collision course with radical Islamists, even though international engagement in Africa today is essentially limited to humanitarian assistance.
Europe
With the Madrid and London attacks, the many plots foiled in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, the violence in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, the French “intifada” and the “Cartoon Jihad,” Europe has well and truly become the next battlefield. Transatlantic cooperation could give way to tensions between America and its European partners, as European jihadis become a danger to the United States. Indeed, jihadi penetration of Europe, particularly Western Europe, is expected to facilitate the infiltration of North America.
Russia
Since the 2002 Moscow theater hostage taking and the subsequent Beslan school massacre, jihadism has engulfed Russia. Wahhabism has already taken hold in Russia’s southern provinces, and jihadists are thinking beyond Chechnya, toward the dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Russian strategy, for its part, has been peculiar; while Moscow has confronted fundamentalists at home head - on, it nonetheless pursues a policy of support for Iran and Syria — and, by extension, Hezbollah. In doing so, Russia’s foreign policy has become antithetical to its own national security. The U.S. and Russia have a solid basis for collaboration against international terrorism, but unless Moscow abandons its tolerance of Tehran’s radicalism, the two countries will miss a strategic opportunity to defeat world terror in this decade.
Latin America
While the Soviet legacy has mostly dissipated in Latin America, with Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba the last ailing vestige of the Cold War, it has taken just one decade for new threats to emerge. The populist regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela not only poses a challenge to liberal democracies in the region, it also serves as a conduit for foreign jihadi threats. With an alliance with Iran in the making and with an al-Qaeda and Hezbollah presence in the country, Venezuela is facilitating the activities of a network of forces inimical to U.S. interests. Deeper in the continent, meanwhile, both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have successfully put down roots in the Andes and the Tri - Border Region between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. With the long and porous Mexican - American border a major vulnerability, another future threat to the U.S. is brewing to its south.
Canada
Finally, American security is also at risk from the north. Not only is Canada considered a passageway by which international terrorists can enter the United States, it has also become a site for the proliferation of jihadi groups. The arrests made in Toronto in the summer of 2006, and the coordination between U.S. - born radicals and their Canadian “brothers,” are signs of a new era — one in which Islamists view the United States and Canada as one strategic arena for operations. Washington therefore will increasingly need to coordinate its counterterrorism strategies with its northern neighbor, despite the differences in political culture, institutions and attitudes.
The Home Front
For the United States, winning the War on Terror depends on two battlefields. The first is overseas, where Washington must confront jihadi forces and help allies to win their own struggles with terrorism. This will require the United States to support democratic change abroad, both as a counterweight to jihadist lobbies and as a means of assisting Arab and Muslim democrats to win the conflict within their own societies.
The second, however, is closer to home. Homeland security planners must be thinking seriously about a duo of unsettling questions. First, are jihadists already in possession of unconventional weapons on American soil, and how can the U.S. government deter them? This crucial issue tops all other challenges, for a terrorist nuclear strike on the U.S. has the potential to transform international relations as we know them.
Second, how deeply have jihadist elements infiltrated the U.S. government and federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and various military commands, either through sympathizers or via actual operatives?
As the recent scandal over the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance program has shown, the answers are fraught with complications. Five years into the War on Terror, the U.S. has not fully made the transition from the pre - 9/11 legal counterterrorism framework to one based on intelligence, prevention and robust police action. And, without a national consensus about the seriousness of the jihadi threat, America will lose its own war of ideas.
The future enemies of the United States will be a mutation of current and past terrorist foes. In confronting these forces, knowledge of their ideologies, objectives and determination will make all the difference.
1. “Transcript: Bin Laden Accuses West,” Al-Jazeera (Doha), April 24, 2006, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F9694745-060C-419C-8523-2E093B7B807D.htm.
2. For a comprehensive analysis of this alliance, see Walid Phares, “The Syrian-Iran
Axis,” Global Affairs VII, no. 3 (1992), 83-86.
Monday, October 30, 2006
'Star Wars' becomes reality as US unveils laser-equipped 747 by Roxana Hegeman
Remember Ronald Reagan's Star Wars programme? The futuristic and frightening plan to build laser guns that could shoot down enemy missiles? Well, it's about to start becoming a reality.
On Friday, the US Missile Defense Agency rolled out an airborne laser aircraft, the latest development in a missile-defence system that was once ridiculed as a Star Wars-style fantasy.
In a ceremony at Boeing's integrated defence systems facility in Wichita, the agency announced it was ready to flight test systems on the ABL aircraft, a modified Boeing 747-400F designed to destroy enemy missiles.
Its director, General Henry "Trey" Obering III, evoked the Jedi Knights vs Evil Empire saga. "I believe we are building the forces of good to beat the forces of evil ... We are giving the American people their first light sabre."
He added: "This is not the prettiest aircraft I have seen. It is not supposed to be pretty. It is supposed to be mean."
On Friday, the US Missile Defense Agency rolled out an airborne laser aircraft, the latest development in a missile-defence system that was once ridiculed as a Star Wars-style fantasy.
In a ceremony at Boeing's integrated defence systems facility in Wichita, the agency announced it was ready to flight test systems on the ABL aircraft, a modified Boeing 747-400F designed to destroy enemy missiles.
Its director, General Henry "Trey" Obering III, evoked the Jedi Knights vs Evil Empire saga. "I believe we are building the forces of good to beat the forces of evil ... We are giving the American people their first light sabre."
He added: "This is not the prettiest aircraft I have seen. It is not supposed to be pretty. It is supposed to be mean."
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