ADmitMac for CAC (AFC) securely integrates U.S. Department of Defense Common Access Cards (CAC) with Apple Macintosh computers. AFC provides a single sign-on environment, verifying a CAC against a centralized network authority. AFC obtains Kerberos tickets using CAC certificates, makes these certificates available to “Kerberized” applications, locks the computer upon removal of a CAC, and protects the computer from unauthorized wake from sleep modes.
Security goes far beyond a simple verification of the PIN against the CAC. With AFC, the card itself is challenged to ensure that neither the card nor the privileges granted the user have been revoked.
When a CAC is inserted into a Macintosh, AFC changes the normal login screen and challenges the user to enter their CAC PIN authorization. Upon verification of the user‘s PIN, AFC then obtains the proper network credentials from the Kerberos Key Distribution Center.
AFC includes its own PKINIT (Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos) that enables this secure integration.
Saturday, October 28, 2006
Does al-Qaeda have a new leader? by Mark Mackinnon
'You lying failure," the man in the video said, addressing the President of the United States and shaking a finger for emphasis. "Why can't you be brave for once in your life and inform your nation of the disasters being suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq?"
Sporting his thick, greying beard, a black turban and metal-rimmed glasses, it was the seventh video that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda founder and right-hand jihadist to Osama bin Laden, has recorded since June, a period during which Mr. bin Laden has made no public statements at all.
That, experts and acquaintances say, likely means something's gone awry inside al-Qaeda. Some speculate the world's second-most wanted man, a pioneer in the use of suicide bombings and martyr videos, has become the group's new No. 1.
Recorded at the end of last month in what looked like the den of a comfortable home, the video was the latest in a long string of al-Qaeda propaganda videos featuring Mr. al-Zawahiri — a man whose angry, hectoring visage is becoming almost as familiar to television viewers in the West as Mr. bin Laden's.
Here in the Cairo area, among those who know Mr. al-Zawahiri personally, and those who have studied his rise through the world of militant Islam, there's a belief that given the choice he would rather remain in the shadows, letting someone else be the public face of his organization.
"Ayman al-Zawahiri prefers to be the second man; he feels it's the most effective position," said Mohammed Saleh, editor-in-chief of Egypt's al-Hayat newspaper and an expert on political Islam. "He put Osama bin Laden in front, until now. Osama might be sick, dead or look different. The circumstances obviously require [Mr. al-Zawahiri] to be in the spotlight."
While there are few recent clues as to Mr. bin Laden's whereabouts, Diaa Rashwan, a terrorism expert at the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said that hints contained in recent tapes suggest that Mr. al-Zawahiri is likely still in the Pakistani province of Waziristan, along the Afghan border, where Pakistani soldiers and armed tribesmen clashed regularly until a peace agreement last month gave the rebels effective control of the province.
"During the Waziristan battles, al-Zawahiri gave five or six speeches. In all of them he attacked [Pakistani President] Pervez Musharraf, threatening him with death. I had the impression he was very close to the battlefield," Mr. Rashwan said.
Mr. bin Laden hasn't appeared on video since November of 2004, shortly before the last U.S. presidential election. Though his voice has been heard on several audio tapes since then, most recently in June, rumours have abounded that the Saudi-born extremist has died or become somehow incapacitated.
A leaked French secret-service memo claimed that he died in Pakistan on Aug. 23 from a serious case of typhoid. Several other intelligence agencies have since said they have no information that Mr. bin Laden is dead, although the suggestion that he may have contacted a water-borne illness lingers.
But if Mr. bin Laden is dead or gravely ill, and Mr. al-Zawahiri is replacing him, few believe it would greatly affect the way al-Qaeda works.
"Ayman al-Zawahiri is in charge, even in the presence of Bin Laden, to cut a long story short," said Montasser El-Zayyat, a lawyer who got to know Mr. al-Zawahiri while the two were in adjacent jail cells for 2½ years in the early 1980s. They were among hundreds of people arrested after former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamic militants in 1981.
"Of course Osama Bin Laden has his status and all, and is photogenic, but al-Zawahiri is Osama's brain. He is the one to plan and organize everything. So, the absence of Bin Laden will not constitute a problem."
Before joining al-Qaeda, the 55-year-old played the same role, leading from behind, while he was arguably the most important figure inside the Egyptian militant group Jamaa Islamiya in the 1980s and early 1990s. Others were better known, but Mr. al-Zawahiri was the key recruiter and organizer, leading an extremist wing known as Islamic Jihad. Mr. El-Zayyat, who regularly defends members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, calls his former prison mate a friend and describes him as "very humble, very easily admired and quite amiable." But he was also consumed by hate for those he considered the enemies of Islam: Israel, the West and the pro-Western regimes of the Arab world.
"He believes and always said that freeing Jerusalem begins in Cairo. He had an opinion that the Arab leaders are tails of the U.S. and Israeli dog. He wanted to get rid of [the pro-Western Arab regimes] first, free our countries first, then face the bigger ones."
Mr. El-Zayyat recalls Mr. al-Zawahiri, who was tortured while in prison, as a very quiet person who spoke only rarely, making it that much stranger that he now puts out videos addressing the entire world.
Mr. al-Zawahiri's path to extremism was a somewhat unconventional one, although hardly unique in Egypt, a country where the government's grip on power has for decades been challenged by a rising tide of politicized Islam. Born into a prominent family — his grandfather was a sheik at Cairo's influential al-Azhar mosque — Mr. al-Zawahiri grew up in Maadi, a leafy suburb south of Cairo that today is home to a mixture of upper-middle class Egyptians and foreign diplomats who work in the capital.
His family still lives in the Cairo region, reportedly under the constant surveillance of Egyptian security services.
His father, Rabieh was a professor of pharmacology, and Mr. al-Zawahiri would himself eventually get a medical degree from the University of Cairo. But by then, he had already fallen under the sway of radical Islam.
The imam at his local mosque in Maadi preached an angry, anti-Western variety of Islam, and by the time he was 14, Mr. al-Zawahiri had joined the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist group that seeks a caliphate stretching across the entire Middle East and North Africa.
By the time he was in his late 20s, he was one of the leading recruiters and organizers in Jamaa Islamiya, a radical offshoot of the Brotherhood that was created after the Brotherhood renounced violence as a means of achieving its goal. Mr. El-Zayyat said his former prison mate's thinking was heavily influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian intellectual and Islamist who wrote that the world was divided into two camps: Islam and those ignorant of the religion. Mr. Qutb had lived in the United States and considered it an impure and unstable society. Humanity, Mr. Qutb wrote, could only be saved if Islam came to dominate the world.
After he was released from jail in 1984, Mr. al-Zawahiri travelled to the Pakistani city of Peshawar to work as a doctor in the camps set up for refugees fleeing the Soviet Union's occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan. It was there that he met Mr. bin Laden, who was raising money for the Afghan "holy warriors" battling the Red Army. Under the tutelage of Palestinian militant Abdullah Azzam, the two men began a partnership that would eventually lead to the birth of al-Qaeda.
"After his alliance with bin Laden, he changed, and moved from jihad against the near enemy [the Arab regimes] to jihad against the farther enemy [the West]," Mr. El-Zayyat said. But the aim, he said, remained the same: "Get rid of those infidel governments and replace them with Islamic governments who will implement Islamic sharia."
Mr. al-Zawahiri later called the Afghanistan war "a training course of the utmost importance to prepare the Muslim mujahedeen to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States."
On his return to Egypt, Mr. al-Zawahiri took part in a sharp radicalization of the Jamaa Islamiya that culminated in 1997, when gunmen from the group killed 62 tourists who were visiting the pharaonic ruins at the Egyptian city of Luxor. Mr. al-Zawahiri was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death for his role in masterminding those killings.
He pioneered the use of suicide bombings, breaking with powerful religious taboos. Under his leadership, Islamic Jihad used suicide car bombers even when other militant groups spurned them as un-Islamic because they involved the murder of innocents. It has been reported that the videotapes of suicide bombers speaking of their desire to become "martyrs," made just before they carry out their deadly final acts, are Mr. al-Zawahiri's invention.
Mr. Saleh, the newspaper editor, said that Mr. al-Zawahiri's rejection of his affluent background gives him authority within jihadist circles. "People know he could have been a very rich man by now, so he's seen as a real believer in his cause. He has very strong credibility; what he said actually happens."
After Luxor and a string of other attacks that left hundreds dead, Mr. al-Zawahiri was a man on the run. The attacks, which crippled the country's crucial tourist industry, also eroded his support base in Egypt. Like Mr. bin Laden, he is believed to have taken refuge, first in Sudan, and then returned to Afghanistan, where he accepted the protection of the ruling Taliban.
In 1998, he merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda and issued a fatwa, or religious edict, cosigned with Mr. bin Laden, entitled "World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders" that many believe marked the formal beginning of their holy war against the West.
It was followed by the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole as it sat in a Yemeni port, and the Sept. 11, 2001, strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Mr. Saleh said the spectacular attacks were Mr. al-Zawahiri's "style," and were likely masterminded by him.
In the aftermath, a tape surfaced showing a pallid Mr. bin Laden and a hale Mr. al-Zawahiri sitting together on a blanket, discussing the Sept. 11 attacks. "This was not just a human achievement; it was a holy act. These 19 brave men who gave their lives for the cause of God will be well taken care of. God granted them the strength to do what they did," Mr. al-Zawahiri said.
Since that time, the number of videos issued by Mr. bin Laden has declined as Mr. al-Zawahiri's public profile has risen.
Sporting his thick, greying beard, a black turban and metal-rimmed glasses, it was the seventh video that Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda founder and right-hand jihadist to Osama bin Laden, has recorded since June, a period during which Mr. bin Laden has made no public statements at all.
That, experts and acquaintances say, likely means something's gone awry inside al-Qaeda. Some speculate the world's second-most wanted man, a pioneer in the use of suicide bombings and martyr videos, has become the group's new No. 1.
Recorded at the end of last month in what looked like the den of a comfortable home, the video was the latest in a long string of al-Qaeda propaganda videos featuring Mr. al-Zawahiri — a man whose angry, hectoring visage is becoming almost as familiar to television viewers in the West as Mr. bin Laden's.
Here in the Cairo area, among those who know Mr. al-Zawahiri personally, and those who have studied his rise through the world of militant Islam, there's a belief that given the choice he would rather remain in the shadows, letting someone else be the public face of his organization.
"Ayman al-Zawahiri prefers to be the second man; he feels it's the most effective position," said Mohammed Saleh, editor-in-chief of Egypt's al-Hayat newspaper and an expert on political Islam. "He put Osama bin Laden in front, until now. Osama might be sick, dead or look different. The circumstances obviously require [Mr. al-Zawahiri] to be in the spotlight."
While there are few recent clues as to Mr. bin Laden's whereabouts, Diaa Rashwan, a terrorism expert at the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said that hints contained in recent tapes suggest that Mr. al-Zawahiri is likely still in the Pakistani province of Waziristan, along the Afghan border, where Pakistani soldiers and armed tribesmen clashed regularly until a peace agreement last month gave the rebels effective control of the province.
"During the Waziristan battles, al-Zawahiri gave five or six speeches. In all of them he attacked [Pakistani President] Pervez Musharraf, threatening him with death. I had the impression he was very close to the battlefield," Mr. Rashwan said.
Mr. bin Laden hasn't appeared on video since November of 2004, shortly before the last U.S. presidential election. Though his voice has been heard on several audio tapes since then, most recently in June, rumours have abounded that the Saudi-born extremist has died or become somehow incapacitated.
A leaked French secret-service memo claimed that he died in Pakistan on Aug. 23 from a serious case of typhoid. Several other intelligence agencies have since said they have no information that Mr. bin Laden is dead, although the suggestion that he may have contacted a water-borne illness lingers.
But if Mr. bin Laden is dead or gravely ill, and Mr. al-Zawahiri is replacing him, few believe it would greatly affect the way al-Qaeda works.
"Ayman al-Zawahiri is in charge, even in the presence of Bin Laden, to cut a long story short," said Montasser El-Zayyat, a lawyer who got to know Mr. al-Zawahiri while the two were in adjacent jail cells for 2½ years in the early 1980s. They were among hundreds of people arrested after former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamic militants in 1981.
"Of course Osama Bin Laden has his status and all, and is photogenic, but al-Zawahiri is Osama's brain. He is the one to plan and organize everything. So, the absence of Bin Laden will not constitute a problem."
Before joining al-Qaeda, the 55-year-old played the same role, leading from behind, while he was arguably the most important figure inside the Egyptian militant group Jamaa Islamiya in the 1980s and early 1990s. Others were better known, but Mr. al-Zawahiri was the key recruiter and organizer, leading an extremist wing known as Islamic Jihad. Mr. El-Zayyat, who regularly defends members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, calls his former prison mate a friend and describes him as "very humble, very easily admired and quite amiable." But he was also consumed by hate for those he considered the enemies of Islam: Israel, the West and the pro-Western regimes of the Arab world.
"He believes and always said that freeing Jerusalem begins in Cairo. He had an opinion that the Arab leaders are tails of the U.S. and Israeli dog. He wanted to get rid of [the pro-Western Arab regimes] first, free our countries first, then face the bigger ones."
Mr. El-Zayyat recalls Mr. al-Zawahiri, who was tortured while in prison, as a very quiet person who spoke only rarely, making it that much stranger that he now puts out videos addressing the entire world.
Mr. al-Zawahiri's path to extremism was a somewhat unconventional one, although hardly unique in Egypt, a country where the government's grip on power has for decades been challenged by a rising tide of politicized Islam. Born into a prominent family — his grandfather was a sheik at Cairo's influential al-Azhar mosque — Mr. al-Zawahiri grew up in Maadi, a leafy suburb south of Cairo that today is home to a mixture of upper-middle class Egyptians and foreign diplomats who work in the capital.
His family still lives in the Cairo region, reportedly under the constant surveillance of Egyptian security services.
His father, Rabieh was a professor of pharmacology, and Mr. al-Zawahiri would himself eventually get a medical degree from the University of Cairo. But by then, he had already fallen under the sway of radical Islam.
The imam at his local mosque in Maadi preached an angry, anti-Western variety of Islam, and by the time he was 14, Mr. al-Zawahiri had joined the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist group that seeks a caliphate stretching across the entire Middle East and North Africa.
By the time he was in his late 20s, he was one of the leading recruiters and organizers in Jamaa Islamiya, a radical offshoot of the Brotherhood that was created after the Brotherhood renounced violence as a means of achieving its goal. Mr. El-Zayyat said his former prison mate's thinking was heavily influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian intellectual and Islamist who wrote that the world was divided into two camps: Islam and those ignorant of the religion. Mr. Qutb had lived in the United States and considered it an impure and unstable society. Humanity, Mr. Qutb wrote, could only be saved if Islam came to dominate the world.
After he was released from jail in 1984, Mr. al-Zawahiri travelled to the Pakistani city of Peshawar to work as a doctor in the camps set up for refugees fleeing the Soviet Union's occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan. It was there that he met Mr. bin Laden, who was raising money for the Afghan "holy warriors" battling the Red Army. Under the tutelage of Palestinian militant Abdullah Azzam, the two men began a partnership that would eventually lead to the birth of al-Qaeda.
"After his alliance with bin Laden, he changed, and moved from jihad against the near enemy [the Arab regimes] to jihad against the farther enemy [the West]," Mr. El-Zayyat said. But the aim, he said, remained the same: "Get rid of those infidel governments and replace them with Islamic governments who will implement Islamic sharia."
Mr. al-Zawahiri later called the Afghanistan war "a training course of the utmost importance to prepare the Muslim mujahedeen to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States."
On his return to Egypt, Mr. al-Zawahiri took part in a sharp radicalization of the Jamaa Islamiya that culminated in 1997, when gunmen from the group killed 62 tourists who were visiting the pharaonic ruins at the Egyptian city of Luxor. Mr. al-Zawahiri was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death for his role in masterminding those killings.
He pioneered the use of suicide bombings, breaking with powerful religious taboos. Under his leadership, Islamic Jihad used suicide car bombers even when other militant groups spurned them as un-Islamic because they involved the murder of innocents. It has been reported that the videotapes of suicide bombers speaking of their desire to become "martyrs," made just before they carry out their deadly final acts, are Mr. al-Zawahiri's invention.
Mr. Saleh, the newspaper editor, said that Mr. al-Zawahiri's rejection of his affluent background gives him authority within jihadist circles. "People know he could have been a very rich man by now, so he's seen as a real believer in his cause. He has very strong credibility; what he said actually happens."
After Luxor and a string of other attacks that left hundreds dead, Mr. al-Zawahiri was a man on the run. The attacks, which crippled the country's crucial tourist industry, also eroded his support base in Egypt. Like Mr. bin Laden, he is believed to have taken refuge, first in Sudan, and then returned to Afghanistan, where he accepted the protection of the ruling Taliban.
In 1998, he merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda and issued a fatwa, or religious edict, cosigned with Mr. bin Laden, entitled "World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders" that many believe marked the formal beginning of their holy war against the West.
It was followed by the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole as it sat in a Yemeni port, and the Sept. 11, 2001, strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Mr. Saleh said the spectacular attacks were Mr. al-Zawahiri's "style," and were likely masterminded by him.
In the aftermath, a tape surfaced showing a pallid Mr. bin Laden and a hale Mr. al-Zawahiri sitting together on a blanket, discussing the Sept. 11 attacks. "This was not just a human achievement; it was a holy act. These 19 brave men who gave their lives for the cause of God will be well taken care of. God granted them the strength to do what they did," Mr. al-Zawahiri said.
Since that time, the number of videos issued by Mr. bin Laden has declined as Mr. al-Zawahiri's public profile has risen.
Thursday, October 26, 2006
Another bin Laden victory by Michael Scheuer
In a world where leading Western experts have consigned Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to near-irrelevant status, the gangly Saudi is on the verge of seeing the forces he leads and inspires knock off their third infidel government. Not bad for a guy running from rock to rock and cave to cave.
First was the defeat of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's conservative government after the Islamists' 2003 attack on Madrid's train station. Spanish voters ousted that rarity, a European leader who recognized bin Laden led much more than a criminal gang, and that Islamists would have to be confronted and smashed with a heavy, prolonged application of Western military power. Sadly, Mr. Aznar allowed himself to believe Washington's delusion that war in Iraq would be an effective, tide-turning extension of the battle against Islamist militancy. He paid the ultimate electoral price for indulging that lethal pipe dream, and the West lost a man who had accurately gauged the severity of the Islamist threat.
Next down the drain was the government of Thailand via last month's military coup. After the coup, rumors of deposed Premier Thaksin Shinawatra's corrupt activities spread, but at base the Thai generals seized power because of the increasing intensity of the Islamist separatist revolt in Thailand's three Muslim-dominated southern provinces. Nearly 2,000 people have died there since 2003, the central government is losing its grip in the region, and Mr. Thaksin's military response to the unrest was making little progress.
The Thai generals named a Thai Muslim as the new premier, and he has said it is time to slow military operations and talk about autonomy for the Muslim south. As always, what seems reasonable to the West and the westernized Thai will be seen by Thai Islamists and their backers as a long step toward victory that requires more military aggressiveness.
Bin Laden, his lieutenants and their allies are no doubt pleased by the destruction of the Spanish and Thai governments and the exhilarating message it sends to the worldwide Islamist movement: The infidels are weak, politically divided, terrified of using full military power and think we can be appeased. In short, war works; keep at it.
Even so, bin Laden, et. al, know the biggest prize looms just ahead — the chance that the Republican Party will be ousted from one or both houses of Congress. There are many factors contributing to this possibility: the Foley abomination, other corruption cases, the trumped?up "crisis" over First Amendment rights and the administration's ill-informed and ham-fisted handling of the Iraq and Afghan wars. If the Republicans are ousted, pundits on both sides of the aisle will find the causes strictly in America's navel.
But what will bin Laden and his Islamist allies think? Well, if Republican defeat comes to pass, they will first thank the Almighty — "Allahu Akhbar!" or "God is the greatest!" — for tangible proof of approaching victory. In Spain, Thailand, and Britain — where Prime Minister Tony Blair suffered the fate of Messrs. Aznar and Thaksin for the same reason, but is leaving gracefully — al Qaeda and its allies see politicians winning power who argue: "The military option has been tried and it has failed. We must seek other-than-martial means to defuse the Islamists' appeal and power." As in Europe and Thailand, this has been the refrain of Sens. Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Charles Schumer, Hillary Clinton, Rep. Jane Harman, and a swath of Republicans who value their seats more than U.S. security.
If Americans vote for what sounds like sweet reason from the Democrats, bin Laden and company will rejoice. What they will hear is the death knell for any prospect of effective U.S. military resistance to militant Islam. With the Republicans out, the Islamists will be confident that Democrats will deliver the best of both worlds: less emphasis on military force and a rigid maintenance of U.S. foreign policies that are hated with passion and near-unanimity by 1.3 billion Muslims. If Osama approved of music, he would be whistling "Happy Days Are Here Again!"
What the enemy thinks is not the sole reason on which to base a vote. I will vote for Republicans, as I always do, because some know unborn babies are human beings who should not be murdered with the Democrats' joyful zeal. Enemy perceptions are worth remembering, however, because if Americans elect Democrats believing them likely to defeat al Qaedaism, history suggests they will be wrong.
The combination of Democratic rhetoric and the indelible fact of the Clinton administration's relentless refusal to try to kill bin Laden — preferring to protect its Arab, arms-buying buddies at the cost of American corpses — ensures that voters will receive what Clinton-era Democrats are best at giving: barely disguised pacifism that has and will continue to allow al-Qaeda and its allies to steadily destroy U.S. security.
First was the defeat of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's conservative government after the Islamists' 2003 attack on Madrid's train station. Spanish voters ousted that rarity, a European leader who recognized bin Laden led much more than a criminal gang, and that Islamists would have to be confronted and smashed with a heavy, prolonged application of Western military power. Sadly, Mr. Aznar allowed himself to believe Washington's delusion that war in Iraq would be an effective, tide-turning extension of the battle against Islamist militancy. He paid the ultimate electoral price for indulging that lethal pipe dream, and the West lost a man who had accurately gauged the severity of the Islamist threat.
Next down the drain was the government of Thailand via last month's military coup. After the coup, rumors of deposed Premier Thaksin Shinawatra's corrupt activities spread, but at base the Thai generals seized power because of the increasing intensity of the Islamist separatist revolt in Thailand's three Muslim-dominated southern provinces. Nearly 2,000 people have died there since 2003, the central government is losing its grip in the region, and Mr. Thaksin's military response to the unrest was making little progress.
The Thai generals named a Thai Muslim as the new premier, and he has said it is time to slow military operations and talk about autonomy for the Muslim south. As always, what seems reasonable to the West and the westernized Thai will be seen by Thai Islamists and their backers as a long step toward victory that requires more military aggressiveness.
Bin Laden, his lieutenants and their allies are no doubt pleased by the destruction of the Spanish and Thai governments and the exhilarating message it sends to the worldwide Islamist movement: The infidels are weak, politically divided, terrified of using full military power and think we can be appeased. In short, war works; keep at it.
Even so, bin Laden, et. al, know the biggest prize looms just ahead — the chance that the Republican Party will be ousted from one or both houses of Congress. There are many factors contributing to this possibility: the Foley abomination, other corruption cases, the trumped?up "crisis" over First Amendment rights and the administration's ill-informed and ham-fisted handling of the Iraq and Afghan wars. If the Republicans are ousted, pundits on both sides of the aisle will find the causes strictly in America's navel.
But what will bin Laden and his Islamist allies think? Well, if Republican defeat comes to pass, they will first thank the Almighty — "Allahu Akhbar!" or "God is the greatest!" — for tangible proof of approaching victory. In Spain, Thailand, and Britain — where Prime Minister Tony Blair suffered the fate of Messrs. Aznar and Thaksin for the same reason, but is leaving gracefully — al Qaeda and its allies see politicians winning power who argue: "The military option has been tried and it has failed. We must seek other-than-martial means to defuse the Islamists' appeal and power." As in Europe and Thailand, this has been the refrain of Sens. Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Charles Schumer, Hillary Clinton, Rep. Jane Harman, and a swath of Republicans who value their seats more than U.S. security.
If Americans vote for what sounds like sweet reason from the Democrats, bin Laden and company will rejoice. What they will hear is the death knell for any prospect of effective U.S. military resistance to militant Islam. With the Republicans out, the Islamists will be confident that Democrats will deliver the best of both worlds: less emphasis on military force and a rigid maintenance of U.S. foreign policies that are hated with passion and near-unanimity by 1.3 billion Muslims. If Osama approved of music, he would be whistling "Happy Days Are Here Again!"
What the enemy thinks is not the sole reason on which to base a vote. I will vote for Republicans, as I always do, because some know unborn babies are human beings who should not be murdered with the Democrats' joyful zeal. Enemy perceptions are worth remembering, however, because if Americans elect Democrats believing them likely to defeat al Qaedaism, history suggests they will be wrong.
The combination of Democratic rhetoric and the indelible fact of the Clinton administration's relentless refusal to try to kill bin Laden — preferring to protect its Arab, arms-buying buddies at the cost of American corpses — ensures that voters will receive what Clinton-era Democrats are best at giving: barely disguised pacifism that has and will continue to allow al-Qaeda and its allies to steadily destroy U.S. security.
What Osama Wants by Peter Bergen
The French saying, often attributed to Talleyrand, that “this is worse than a crime, it’s a blunder,” could easily describe America’s invasion of Iraq. But for the United States to pull entirely out of that country right now, as is being demanded by a growing chorus of critics, would be to snatch an unqualified disaster from the jaws of an enormous blunder.
To understand why, look to history. Vietnam often looms large in the debate over Iraq, but the better analogy is what happened in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. During the 1980’s, Washington poured billions of dollars into the Afghan resistance. Around the time of Moscow’s withdrawal in 1989, however, the United States shut its embassy in Kabul and largely ignored the ensuing civil war and the rise of the Taliban and its Qaeda allies. We can’t make the same mistake again in Iraq.
A total withdrawal from Iraq would play into the hands of the jihadist terrorists. As Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, made clear shortly after 9/11 in his book “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” Al Qaeda’s most important short-term strategic goal is to seize control of a state, or part of a state, somewhere in the Muslim world. “Confronting the enemies of Islam and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land,” he wrote. “Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing.” Such a jihadist state would be the ideal launching pad for future attacks on the West.
And there is no riper spot than the Sunni-majority areas of central and western Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — the most feared insurgent commander in Iraq — was issuing an invitation to Mr. bin Laden when he named his group Al Qaeda in Iraq. When Mr. Zarqawi was killed this year, his successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, also swore allegiance to Al Qaeda’s chief.
Another problem with a total American withdrawal is that it would fit all too neatly into Osama bin Laden’s master narrative about American foreign policy. His theme is that America is a paper tiger that cannot tolerate body bags coming home; to back it up, he cites President Ronald Reagan’s 1984 withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and President Bill Clinton’s decision nearly a decade later to pull troops from Somalia. A unilateral pullout from Iraq would only confirm this analysis of American weakness among his jihadist allies.
Indeed, in 2005 Mr. Zawahri sent Mr. Zarqawi a letter, which was intercepted by the United States military, exhorting him to start preparing for the impending American withdrawal similar to that of Vietnam 30 years ago. “The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam — and how they ran and left their agents — is noteworthy,” Mr. Zawahri said. “Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them.”
Yes, there is little doubt that the botched American occupation of Iraq was the critical factor that fueled the Iraqi insurgency. But for the United States to wash its hands of the country now would give Al Qaeda’s leaders what they want.
This does not mean simply holding course. America should abandon its pretensions that it can make Iraq a functioning democracy and halt the civil war. Instead, we should focus on a minimalist definition of our interests in Iraq, which is to prevent a militant Sunni jihadist mini-state from emerging and allowing Al Qaeda to regroup.
While withdrawing a substantial number of American troops from Iraq would probably tamp down the insurgency and should be done as soon as is possible, a significant force must remain in Iraq for many years to destroy Al Qaeda in Iraq.
That can be accomplished by making the American presence less visible; withdrawing American troops to bases in central and western Iraq; and relying on contingents of Special Forces to hunt militants. To do otherwise would be to ignore the lessons of history, lessons that Al Qaeda’s leaders certainly haven’t forgotten.
To understand why, look to history. Vietnam often looms large in the debate over Iraq, but the better analogy is what happened in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. During the 1980’s, Washington poured billions of dollars into the Afghan resistance. Around the time of Moscow’s withdrawal in 1989, however, the United States shut its embassy in Kabul and largely ignored the ensuing civil war and the rise of the Taliban and its Qaeda allies. We can’t make the same mistake again in Iraq.
A total withdrawal from Iraq would play into the hands of the jihadist terrorists. As Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, made clear shortly after 9/11 in his book “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” Al Qaeda’s most important short-term strategic goal is to seize control of a state, or part of a state, somewhere in the Muslim world. “Confronting the enemies of Islam and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land,” he wrote. “Without achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing.” Such a jihadist state would be the ideal launching pad for future attacks on the West.
And there is no riper spot than the Sunni-majority areas of central and western Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — the most feared insurgent commander in Iraq — was issuing an invitation to Mr. bin Laden when he named his group Al Qaeda in Iraq. When Mr. Zarqawi was killed this year, his successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, also swore allegiance to Al Qaeda’s chief.
Another problem with a total American withdrawal is that it would fit all too neatly into Osama bin Laden’s master narrative about American foreign policy. His theme is that America is a paper tiger that cannot tolerate body bags coming home; to back it up, he cites President Ronald Reagan’s 1984 withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and President Bill Clinton’s decision nearly a decade later to pull troops from Somalia. A unilateral pullout from Iraq would only confirm this analysis of American weakness among his jihadist allies.
Indeed, in 2005 Mr. Zawahri sent Mr. Zarqawi a letter, which was intercepted by the United States military, exhorting him to start preparing for the impending American withdrawal similar to that of Vietnam 30 years ago. “The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam — and how they ran and left their agents — is noteworthy,” Mr. Zawahri said. “Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them.”
Yes, there is little doubt that the botched American occupation of Iraq was the critical factor that fueled the Iraqi insurgency. But for the United States to wash its hands of the country now would give Al Qaeda’s leaders what they want.
This does not mean simply holding course. America should abandon its pretensions that it can make Iraq a functioning democracy and halt the civil war. Instead, we should focus on a minimalist definition of our interests in Iraq, which is to prevent a militant Sunni jihadist mini-state from emerging and allowing Al Qaeda to regroup.
While withdrawing a substantial number of American troops from Iraq would probably tamp down the insurgency and should be done as soon as is possible, a significant force must remain in Iraq for many years to destroy Al Qaeda in Iraq.
That can be accomplished by making the American presence less visible; withdrawing American troops to bases in central and western Iraq; and relying on contingents of Special Forces to hunt militants. To do otherwise would be to ignore the lessons of history, lessons that Al Qaeda’s leaders certainly haven’t forgotten.
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
Hamas Trial in Chicago - Week 1 by Steven Emerson
Last week the government began its case against alleged Hamas operatives, Mohammed Salah and Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar (and Hamas Deputy Political Chief Mousa Abu Marzook who was charged in absentia). The trial is expected three months and former New York Times reporter Judith Miller is scheduled to testify on behalf of the prosecution. A few months before the trial began, al-Ashqar hired William Moffitt, who represented Sami al-Arian, so the prosecution can probably expect a similar defense strategy of, amongst other tactics, twisting material support for a terrorist organization as protected under the First Amendment. IPT Analyst Scott Rosenbaum has been following the case in the Northern District of Illinois and below are the links to his coverage of the trial:
Opening Statement of the Government
Opening Statement of Michael Deutsch, Mohammed Salah’s lawyer
Opening Statement of William Moffitt, Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar’s lawyer
Opening Statement of the Government
Opening Statement of Michael Deutsch, Mohammed Salah’s lawyer
Opening Statement of William Moffitt, Abdelhaleem al-Ashqar’s lawyer
Tuesday, October 24, 2006
The Big 2-0 by Blake Ross
No, not my age. Firefox—go get it! Congrats to Chris, Mike B., Mike C., Mike S. (I think this project needs some name diversity), Mitchell, Paul, Asa, John, Brendan and everyone else. I’ll write more when I’ve had a chance to use Internet Explorer 7 for a bit longer. I’ve been using Firefox 2 for awhile, so it only seems fair to give IE a chance before discussing both. The team did, after all, send cake.
Europe: Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide by Olivier Guitta
French President Jacques Chirac has put it quite bluntly: “I have one principle regarding foreign policy. I look at what the Americans are doing and I do the opposite. Then I am sure to be right.”1 On the other hand, Edouard Balladur, a close ally of Chirac and former French Prime Minister, sees things very differently: “Europe has no advantages in systematically opposing the U.S. Our fundamental interests are closely linked.”2
These two perspectives—one antagonistic and one Atlanticist—encapsulate the tug-of-war now underway in Europe over cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, for now, Chirac appears to be the rule and Balladur the exception. But the reality is a good deal more complex. While publicly, anti-Americanism may be not only fashionable but politically advantageous, when it comes to quiet cooperation (on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and other issues), Europeans dance to a different tune.
Behind the Scenes
Germany is a case in point. Back in 2002, the administration of Gerhard Schröder was reelected on a vehemently anti-American and anti-war platform. But new revelations suggest that in reality, Berlin was not nearly as removed from the U.S.-led war effort against Iraq as Schröder liked to claim. “Despite the troubles in the relationship between Berlin and Washington, the political decision was made to continue the close relationship of the intelligence services,” an unidentified source from the BND told the public German television station ARD.3 This collaboration, moreover, was approved at the highest levels, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Schröder’s then chief of staff and current Foreign Minister) and Joschka Fischer, then foreign minister, signing off on continued intelligence contacts.4
That close relationship apparently involved the stationing of two German intelligence agents in Baghdad throughout the course of the entire Iraq war, even while Schröder and his coalition cabinet were officially maintaining strong opposition to Washington’s actions. The German operatives allegedly helped American forces by identifying “non-targets” such buildings as embassies, schools and hospitals that should not be bombed. But they also went further, delivering assistance in the identification of high-value targets—including the April 2003 bombing in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansur district aimed at Saddam Hussein and several top members of his regime. An additional German agent reportedly was stationed in Qatar in the office of General Tommy Franks, the U.S. commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And all three received the Meritorious Service medals from the United States for their assistance.5
Another unlikely ally has been France. One might even go as far as to say that, for all its public vitriol, the French government ranks as Washington’s top counterterrorism partner. Former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin has described the relationship between the CIA and its French counterparts as “one of the best in the world” and termed French contributions as “extraordinarily valuable.”6 Indeed, in the days after 9/11, President Chirac advised his intelligence services to collaborate with their opposite numbers in the United States “as if they were your own service.”7 But the most significant example of Franco-American cooperation was revealed by the Washington Post in July 2005. Three years earlier, a top secret center called Alliance Base had been established in Paris by the CIA and French intelligence services. Its purpose was to analyze the transnational movement of terrorist suspects, and to develop operations to catch or spy on them. As such, it was a unique operation—one geared toward not simply sharing information, but actually planning operations.8
It should be quite telling indeed that two of the most visible and vocal opponents of American foreign policy are in fact extraordinary partners of the United States on counterterrorism issues.
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
Germany and France are not alone. Before September 11th, intelligence services throughout Europe would complain about their lack of interaction with the United States. But no longer. Europeans now acknowledge that cooperation is much improved, with information flowing freely in both directions. This interaction, moreover, is facilitated by the fact that European and American cooperation is complementary in nature. The forte of European services—and especially those of France—is human intelligence and knowledge of Islamist terrorism, while America’s strength lies in electronic intelligence gathering. The resulting synergy is beneficial for both sides of the Atlantic.
According to former CIA official Stanley Sloan, “U.S.-European cooperation has been one of the more successful aspects of post-September 11 efforts against international terrorism.”9 Sloan’s comments ring true. Given that most of the planning for the September 11th attacks occurred in Hamburg, and that Europe has become a base for Islamist cells, America’s national security is irrevocably linked to the Old Continent. And Europe needs America too; its defense capabilities (and budgets) fall well below those of the United States, and there is little probability that this will change. As such, neither side can afford political divisions to impede partnership.
But while cooperation has greatly improved, it has not been without bumps in the road. The first deals with designation. In December 2001, the European Union (EU) formulated an official list of terrorist organizations, but forgot to include al-Qaeda. Instead, twelve groups, including the ETA, the Real IRA, and Northern Ireland’s obscure Orange Volunteers, were designated. And little has changed; the EU’s most recent list, issued in November 2005, includes 47 groups, but still no al-Qaeda.10 This glaring omission has been the product of a heated semantic debate in Europe about whether al-Qaeda’s diffuse, atomized nature allowed it to be depicted as a unitary entity. European officials have claimed that since they are using the UN list designating al-Qaeda as a terrorist entity, there is no need to include it in their own list.
Likewise, perceptions about the scope of the current conflict differ greatly. Europeans categorically refuse to view the struggle against terrorism as a war. To them, a legal approach to combating terrorism is still preferred. In short, Europe wants to fight the war with arrest warrants, and never ever use force. Another aspect of the European approach is the priority given to human rights. Rhetorically, human rights have become the leitmotif for a whole generation of Eurocrats, even though most European anti-terror laws restrict civil liberties to a much greater extent than those passed by the United States. One such example is France, where authorities have the right to detain suspected individuals for six days without access to a lawyer, and where suspects can be held for up to three-and-a-half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues.
Sticking Points
In light of the European philosophy on the current conflict, Washington is perhaps right to be suspicious about the extent to which the EU, as a whole, actually has the stomach for a prolonged fight against terror—or more importantly, a real understanding of the magnitude of the problem. In response to a written questionnaire prepared by the European Parliament in 2005, Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke of development work, poverty reduction, and education as the essential tools to fight terrorism. But, while combating the root causes of terrorism is an important long-term objective, the current conflict requires immediate and concrete policy tools—effective counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, extradition treaties, and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and if necessary, force. And here, the EU has been unable to focus on a suitable role for itself to play in the War of Terror.
On occasion, Washington has given voice to its frustrations on this subject. As the U.S. State Department’s 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism report notes:
Efforts to combat the threat in Europe were sometimes hampered by legal protections that made it difficult to take firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that afforded loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards of evidence that limited the use of classified information in holding terrorist suspects. The new EU arrest warrant encountered legal difficulties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens. Germany found it difficult to convict members of the Hamburg cell of suspected terrorists allegedly linked to the September 11 attacks. Some European states have at times not been able to prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists brought before their courts.11
Transatlantic cooperation has also stumbled over the issue of Iraq. More than any other event in recent history, the American decision to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein has badly damaged relations across the Atlantic, especially with France and Germany. This friction was unexpected; until January 2003, the government of Jacques Chirac in France had sided with the U.S., even going so far as to order the French army to begin preparations for war and expand coordination with U.S. forces. But things turned sour in February 2003, after then-Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s now-famous speech at the UN raised the specter of a French veto to planned military intervention. Villepin went even further, embarking upon a lobbying tour to convince all the other members of the UN Security Council to vote against the U.S. Even Interior Minister (and presidential hopeful) Nicolas Sarkozy had qualms about France’s zealous attitude.12
Some European countries, however, did step up to the plate. It is worth noting that 12 EU member states were part of the initial “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.13 And eight European prime ministers—from Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic, expressed their solidarity with the Bush administration on the pages of the Wall Street Journal Europe, outlining their commitment to “unity and cohesion: in the face of terrorism and proliferation.”14 This did not go over especially well with Chirac, who blasted the East European countries that had sided with Washington and ordered them to “shut up.”
This incident in itself represents a ray of hope. Indeed, the former members of the Soviet bloc have emerged as staunch and faithful allies of Washington. So have Denmark, Holland, Britain and now Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel. They, together with a new generation of pro-Atlanticist European politicians, are making a forceful case for a much closer transatlantic alliance.
Still, the U.S. has lost at least two faithful allies in recent years. In 2004, it was Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar who was overthrown by socialist challenger Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. More recently, Italy’s conservative prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, lost to his center-left opponent, Romano Prodi, in the country’s May 2006 elections. In both cases, the change of government brought to power forces far less amenable to cooperation with the United States than their predecessors.
The specter of anti-Americanism likewise looms large in transatlantic ties. In poll after poll, Europeans term the U.S. the biggest threat to world peace, ahead of Iran, Syria and North Korea. Indeed, in some countries, it has become a national sport to blame America first—nowhere more so than in France. Such perceptions have only been reinforced in recent years by the emergence of Arab satellite channels, which influence large segments of Europe’s Muslim population.
Which raises the issue of the Continent’s large—and growing—Muslim population. With around 20 million Muslims living in Europe, and with a failure of regional government to integrate them, Europe is facing a profound crisis of identity. And against the backdrop of conflicts in the Middle East and the Israeli-Arab conflict, European politicians need to think about their constituents. For countries that were already traditionally favorably biased towards Arab regimes, this domestic dimension only serves to reinforce their ingrained positions.
A Finnish diplomat summed it up simply not too long ago: “In Europe political parties worry about the Muslim vote.”15 And the most worrisome country for the future of transatlantic ties is none other than our current greatest ally: the United Kingdom. British Muslims are the most integrated in Europe because of England’s history of multiculturalism, which has made them the envy of their French and German counterparts. Nonetheless, British Muslims are by far the most radicalized and anti-Western of the European Muslim communities. This has been borne out by recent polls, which have found that 24 percent of Muslims in England supported the motives behind the July 7th London terror attacks,16 40 percent are for the installation of sharia (Islamic law) in Britain,17 and 68 percent have a negative view of Jews.18 Not surprisingly, the largest and most violent European demonstrations during the Danish “cartoon controversy”—and, more recently, openly supporting Hezbollah in its war against Israel—have taken place in the center of London.
Authorities in London are aware—and worried—about this threat. A 2004 British government report leaked in July 2005, after the London attacks, acknowledged that about 16,000 British Muslims are engaged in terror activities.19 It is unfortunately not by chance that recent cases of homegrown terrorism, among them the 7/7 attacks and the recent foiled multiple airliner plot, have occurred in Britain. And this problem is poised to get worse; pressure on British officials is mounting from the Muslim community to rescind the country’s historic close links with America, with tangible results. Politicians from the Labour party are already pushing Prime Minister Tony Blair away from Washington. This domestic pressure, moreover, coincides with a very long pro-Arab tradition in the British Foreign office, which has of late advocated closer links to Islamists and a departure from the Atlanticist tradition. This is not surprising, since the man in charge of Islamic affairs within the Foreign Office is an Islamist himself. In fact, Mockbul Ali has successfully lobbied to bring the notorious Muslim Brother Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who is still banned in the U.S., to Britain. Unfortunately, if these efforts are successful, it may mean losing America’s best political ally in Europe.
Indeed, the Muslim issue is already influencing foreign policy, in Britain and elsewhere. A case in point: in 2003, just before the outbreak of the Iraq war, France’s rough equivalent of the FBI, the Renseignements Généraux, warned Prime Minister Chirac that were France to join the Coalition, it would have to face extensive rioting and unrest in the largely Muslim-populated suburbs—creating major domestic pressure for Chirac, already indisposed toward cooperation, to keep his distance from U.S. efforts. And this trend is only likely to intensify in the future, as expanding Muslim populations among the countries of Europe generate increasingly pro-Arab policies.
Taking Stock
All in all, transatlantic ties have seen better days, but they are still vibrant. The “behind the scenes” collaboration between Washington and European capitals is proceeding as robustly as ever. But on issues of defense and foreign policy, public dissensions are still numerous.
This does not need to be the case, however. Europe does not have to choose between the EU and the U.S.; it can have the best of both. Officials in Europe should be working to make their partnership with the U.S., in the words of Balladur, “an indestructible alliance.”20 The first step in this direction would be for Europe to realize that it is at war—but not with America. Rather, European capitals, like Washington, are at war with radical Islam. Until they recognize this fact, Islamist terrorists will have the ability to drive a wedge between Western democracies.
1. Franz-Olivier Giesbert, La Tragédie du Président (Paris: Flammarion Paris, 2006), 329.
2. Edouard Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jacobine (Paris: Fayard 2005), 101.
3. Charles Hawley, “Berlin’s Spies Reportedly Helped U.S.,” Spiegel Online (Hamburg), January 12, 2006, http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,394874,00.html.
4. Richard Bernstein and Michael R. Gordon, “Berlin File Says Germany’s Spies Aided U.S. in Iraq,” New York Times, March 2, 2006.
5. Ibid.
6. Dana Priest, “Help From France Key in Covert Operations,” Washington Post, July 3, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Louis R. Golino, “Europeans Move Against Terrorists,” Washington Times, December 18, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20051218-011205-5956r.htm.
10. “Council Common Position 2005/847/CFSP of 29 November 2005,” Official Journal of the European Union 314, November 30, 2005, 41, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf.
11. “Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview,” in Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 29, 2006, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm.
12. Giesbert, La Tragédie du Président, 333.
13. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.
14. Jose Maria Aznar et al., “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal Europe, January 30, 2003, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994.
15. Cited in Mark Perry and Alistair Crooke, “The Loser in Lebanon: The Atlantic Alliance,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), August 7, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH08Ak01.html.
16. Anthony King, “One in Four Muslims Sympathizes With Motives of Terrorists,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 23, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/23/npoll23.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/23/ixnewstop.html.
17. ICM, “Muslims Poll,” February 2006, http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2006/Sunday%20Telegraph%20-%20Mulims%20Feb/Sunday%20Telegraph%20Muslims%20feb06.asp.
18. “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=831.
19. Robert Winnett and David Leppard, “Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British Recruits,” Sunday Times (London), July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1688261,00.html.
20. Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jacobine, 97.
These two perspectives—one antagonistic and one Atlanticist—encapsulate the tug-of-war now underway in Europe over cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, for now, Chirac appears to be the rule and Balladur the exception. But the reality is a good deal more complex. While publicly, anti-Americanism may be not only fashionable but politically advantageous, when it comes to quiet cooperation (on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and other issues), Europeans dance to a different tune.
Behind the Scenes
Germany is a case in point. Back in 2002, the administration of Gerhard Schröder was reelected on a vehemently anti-American and anti-war platform. But new revelations suggest that in reality, Berlin was not nearly as removed from the U.S.-led war effort against Iraq as Schröder liked to claim. “Despite the troubles in the relationship between Berlin and Washington, the political decision was made to continue the close relationship of the intelligence services,” an unidentified source from the BND told the public German television station ARD.3 This collaboration, moreover, was approved at the highest levels, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Schröder’s then chief of staff and current Foreign Minister) and Joschka Fischer, then foreign minister, signing off on continued intelligence contacts.4
That close relationship apparently involved the stationing of two German intelligence agents in Baghdad throughout the course of the entire Iraq war, even while Schröder and his coalition cabinet were officially maintaining strong opposition to Washington’s actions. The German operatives allegedly helped American forces by identifying “non-targets” such buildings as embassies, schools and hospitals that should not be bombed. But they also went further, delivering assistance in the identification of high-value targets—including the April 2003 bombing in Baghdad’s wealthy Mansur district aimed at Saddam Hussein and several top members of his regime. An additional German agent reportedly was stationed in Qatar in the office of General Tommy Franks, the U.S. commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And all three received the Meritorious Service medals from the United States for their assistance.5
Another unlikely ally has been France. One might even go as far as to say that, for all its public vitriol, the French government ranks as Washington’s top counterterrorism partner. Former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin has described the relationship between the CIA and its French counterparts as “one of the best in the world” and termed French contributions as “extraordinarily valuable.”6 Indeed, in the days after 9/11, President Chirac advised his intelligence services to collaborate with their opposite numbers in the United States “as if they were your own service.”7 But the most significant example of Franco-American cooperation was revealed by the Washington Post in July 2005. Three years earlier, a top secret center called Alliance Base had been established in Paris by the CIA and French intelligence services. Its purpose was to analyze the transnational movement of terrorist suspects, and to develop operations to catch or spy on them. As such, it was a unique operation—one geared toward not simply sharing information, but actually planning operations.8
It should be quite telling indeed that two of the most visible and vocal opponents of American foreign policy are in fact extraordinary partners of the United States on counterterrorism issues.
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
Germany and France are not alone. Before September 11th, intelligence services throughout Europe would complain about their lack of interaction with the United States. But no longer. Europeans now acknowledge that cooperation is much improved, with information flowing freely in both directions. This interaction, moreover, is facilitated by the fact that European and American cooperation is complementary in nature. The forte of European services—and especially those of France—is human intelligence and knowledge of Islamist terrorism, while America’s strength lies in electronic intelligence gathering. The resulting synergy is beneficial for both sides of the Atlantic.
According to former CIA official Stanley Sloan, “U.S.-European cooperation has been one of the more successful aspects of post-September 11 efforts against international terrorism.”9 Sloan’s comments ring true. Given that most of the planning for the September 11th attacks occurred in Hamburg, and that Europe has become a base for Islamist cells, America’s national security is irrevocably linked to the Old Continent. And Europe needs America too; its defense capabilities (and budgets) fall well below those of the United States, and there is little probability that this will change. As such, neither side can afford political divisions to impede partnership.
But while cooperation has greatly improved, it has not been without bumps in the road. The first deals with designation. In December 2001, the European Union (EU) formulated an official list of terrorist organizations, but forgot to include al-Qaeda. Instead, twelve groups, including the ETA, the Real IRA, and Northern Ireland’s obscure Orange Volunteers, were designated. And little has changed; the EU’s most recent list, issued in November 2005, includes 47 groups, but still no al-Qaeda.10 This glaring omission has been the product of a heated semantic debate in Europe about whether al-Qaeda’s diffuse, atomized nature allowed it to be depicted as a unitary entity. European officials have claimed that since they are using the UN list designating al-Qaeda as a terrorist entity, there is no need to include it in their own list.
Likewise, perceptions about the scope of the current conflict differ greatly. Europeans categorically refuse to view the struggle against terrorism as a war. To them, a legal approach to combating terrorism is still preferred. In short, Europe wants to fight the war with arrest warrants, and never ever use force. Another aspect of the European approach is the priority given to human rights. Rhetorically, human rights have become the leitmotif for a whole generation of Eurocrats, even though most European anti-terror laws restrict civil liberties to a much greater extent than those passed by the United States. One such example is France, where authorities have the right to detain suspected individuals for six days without access to a lawyer, and where suspects can be held for up to three-and-a-half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues.
Sticking Points
In light of the European philosophy on the current conflict, Washington is perhaps right to be suspicious about the extent to which the EU, as a whole, actually has the stomach for a prolonged fight against terror—or more importantly, a real understanding of the magnitude of the problem. In response to a written questionnaire prepared by the European Parliament in 2005, Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke of development work, poverty reduction, and education as the essential tools to fight terrorism. But, while combating the root causes of terrorism is an important long-term objective, the current conflict requires immediate and concrete policy tools—effective counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, extradition treaties, and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and if necessary, force. And here, the EU has been unable to focus on a suitable role for itself to play in the War of Terror.
On occasion, Washington has given voice to its frustrations on this subject. As the U.S. State Department’s 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism report notes:
Efforts to combat the threat in Europe were sometimes hampered by legal protections that made it difficult to take firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that afforded loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards of evidence that limited the use of classified information in holding terrorist suspects. The new EU arrest warrant encountered legal difficulties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens. Germany found it difficult to convict members of the Hamburg cell of suspected terrorists allegedly linked to the September 11 attacks. Some European states have at times not been able to prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists brought before their courts.11
Transatlantic cooperation has also stumbled over the issue of Iraq. More than any other event in recent history, the American decision to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein has badly damaged relations across the Atlantic, especially with France and Germany. This friction was unexpected; until January 2003, the government of Jacques Chirac in France had sided with the U.S., even going so far as to order the French army to begin preparations for war and expand coordination with U.S. forces. But things turned sour in February 2003, after then-Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s now-famous speech at the UN raised the specter of a French veto to planned military intervention. Villepin went even further, embarking upon a lobbying tour to convince all the other members of the UN Security Council to vote against the U.S. Even Interior Minister (and presidential hopeful) Nicolas Sarkozy had qualms about France’s zealous attitude.12
Some European countries, however, did step up to the plate. It is worth noting that 12 EU member states were part of the initial “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.13 And eight European prime ministers—from Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic, expressed their solidarity with the Bush administration on the pages of the Wall Street Journal Europe, outlining their commitment to “unity and cohesion: in the face of terrorism and proliferation.”14 This did not go over especially well with Chirac, who blasted the East European countries that had sided with Washington and ordered them to “shut up.”
This incident in itself represents a ray of hope. Indeed, the former members of the Soviet bloc have emerged as staunch and faithful allies of Washington. So have Denmark, Holland, Britain and now Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel. They, together with a new generation of pro-Atlanticist European politicians, are making a forceful case for a much closer transatlantic alliance.
Still, the U.S. has lost at least two faithful allies in recent years. In 2004, it was Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar who was overthrown by socialist challenger Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. More recently, Italy’s conservative prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, lost to his center-left opponent, Romano Prodi, in the country’s May 2006 elections. In both cases, the change of government brought to power forces far less amenable to cooperation with the United States than their predecessors.
The specter of anti-Americanism likewise looms large in transatlantic ties. In poll after poll, Europeans term the U.S. the biggest threat to world peace, ahead of Iran, Syria and North Korea. Indeed, in some countries, it has become a national sport to blame America first—nowhere more so than in France. Such perceptions have only been reinforced in recent years by the emergence of Arab satellite channels, which influence large segments of Europe’s Muslim population.
Which raises the issue of the Continent’s large—and growing—Muslim population. With around 20 million Muslims living in Europe, and with a failure of regional government to integrate them, Europe is facing a profound crisis of identity. And against the backdrop of conflicts in the Middle East and the Israeli-Arab conflict, European politicians need to think about their constituents. For countries that were already traditionally favorably biased towards Arab regimes, this domestic dimension only serves to reinforce their ingrained positions.
A Finnish diplomat summed it up simply not too long ago: “In Europe political parties worry about the Muslim vote.”15 And the most worrisome country for the future of transatlantic ties is none other than our current greatest ally: the United Kingdom. British Muslims are the most integrated in Europe because of England’s history of multiculturalism, which has made them the envy of their French and German counterparts. Nonetheless, British Muslims are by far the most radicalized and anti-Western of the European Muslim communities. This has been borne out by recent polls, which have found that 24 percent of Muslims in England supported the motives behind the July 7th London terror attacks,16 40 percent are for the installation of sharia (Islamic law) in Britain,17 and 68 percent have a negative view of Jews.18 Not surprisingly, the largest and most violent European demonstrations during the Danish “cartoon controversy”—and, more recently, openly supporting Hezbollah in its war against Israel—have taken place in the center of London.
Authorities in London are aware—and worried—about this threat. A 2004 British government report leaked in July 2005, after the London attacks, acknowledged that about 16,000 British Muslims are engaged in terror activities.19 It is unfortunately not by chance that recent cases of homegrown terrorism, among them the 7/7 attacks and the recent foiled multiple airliner plot, have occurred in Britain. And this problem is poised to get worse; pressure on British officials is mounting from the Muslim community to rescind the country’s historic close links with America, with tangible results. Politicians from the Labour party are already pushing Prime Minister Tony Blair away from Washington. This domestic pressure, moreover, coincides with a very long pro-Arab tradition in the British Foreign office, which has of late advocated closer links to Islamists and a departure from the Atlanticist tradition. This is not surprising, since the man in charge of Islamic affairs within the Foreign Office is an Islamist himself. In fact, Mockbul Ali has successfully lobbied to bring the notorious Muslim Brother Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who is still banned in the U.S., to Britain. Unfortunately, if these efforts are successful, it may mean losing America’s best political ally in Europe.
Indeed, the Muslim issue is already influencing foreign policy, in Britain and elsewhere. A case in point: in 2003, just before the outbreak of the Iraq war, France’s rough equivalent of the FBI, the Renseignements Généraux, warned Prime Minister Chirac that were France to join the Coalition, it would have to face extensive rioting and unrest in the largely Muslim-populated suburbs—creating major domestic pressure for Chirac, already indisposed toward cooperation, to keep his distance from U.S. efforts. And this trend is only likely to intensify in the future, as expanding Muslim populations among the countries of Europe generate increasingly pro-Arab policies.
Taking Stock
All in all, transatlantic ties have seen better days, but they are still vibrant. The “behind the scenes” collaboration between Washington and European capitals is proceeding as robustly as ever. But on issues of defense and foreign policy, public dissensions are still numerous.
This does not need to be the case, however. Europe does not have to choose between the EU and the U.S.; it can have the best of both. Officials in Europe should be working to make their partnership with the U.S., in the words of Balladur, “an indestructible alliance.”20 The first step in this direction would be for Europe to realize that it is at war—but not with America. Rather, European capitals, like Washington, are at war with radical Islam. Until they recognize this fact, Islamist terrorists will have the ability to drive a wedge between Western democracies.
1. Franz-Olivier Giesbert, La Tragédie du Président (Paris: Flammarion Paris, 2006), 329.
2. Edouard Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jacobine (Paris: Fayard 2005), 101.
3. Charles Hawley, “Berlin’s Spies Reportedly Helped U.S.,” Spiegel Online (Hamburg), January 12, 2006, http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,394874,00.html.
4. Richard Bernstein and Michael R. Gordon, “Berlin File Says Germany’s Spies Aided U.S. in Iraq,” New York Times, March 2, 2006.
5. Ibid.
6. Dana Priest, “Help From France Key in Covert Operations,” Washington Post, July 3, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/02/AR2005070201361.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Louis R. Golino, “Europeans Move Against Terrorists,” Washington Times, December 18, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20051218-011205-5956r.htm.
10. “Council Common Position 2005/847/CFSP of 29 November 2005,” Official Journal of the European Union 314, November 30, 2005, 41, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf.
11. “Chapter 5 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview,” in Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 29, 2006, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm.
12. Giesbert, La Tragédie du Président, 333.
13. The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom.
14. Jose Maria Aznar et al., “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal Europe, January 30, 2003, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994.
15. Cited in Mark Perry and Alistair Crooke, “The Loser in Lebanon: The Atlantic Alliance,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), August 7, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH08Ak01.html.
16. Anthony King, “One in Four Muslims Sympathizes With Motives of Terrorists,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 23, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/23/npoll23.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/23/ixnewstop.html.
17. ICM, “Muslims Poll,” February 2006, http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2006/Sunday%20Telegraph%20-%20Mulims%20Feb/Sunday%20Telegraph%20Muslims%20feb06.asp.
18. “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=831.
19. Robert Winnett and David Leppard, “Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British Recruits,” Sunday Times (London), July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1688261,00.html.
20. Balladur, La Fin de L’illusion Jacobine, 97.
Alleged Explosive Device found near US Embassy by D.E.U.
The Baruta Municipality Police Corps Monday found two alleged explosive devices near the US Embassy in Valle Arriba, southeast Caracas.
One of the presumed bombs was found in a box containing leaflets making reference to Lebanese radical Islamic group Hezbollah.
"One person was arrested by the Baruta Police and we are waiting for their report and information from the (political police) Disip," a spokesman of the US Embassy told AFP.
Local TV news network Globovisión reported that one of the devices was in a flowerpot near the Embassy, while the other was outside a school, near the diplomatic premises.
Wilfredo Porras, acting director of Baruta Police, said they arrested a man carrying a "backpack with 100 black powder bases, pliers, adhesive tape, glue and electric leads."
The man declared that "the devices were set to explode in 15 minutes. At first, we thought he was crazy, but we concluded he is not because of the features of both devices and the contents in the backpack," Porras said.
One of the presumed bombs was found in a box containing leaflets making reference to Lebanese radical Islamic group Hezbollah.
"One person was arrested by the Baruta Police and we are waiting for their report and information from the (political police) Disip," a spokesman of the US Embassy told AFP.
Local TV news network Globovisión reported that one of the devices was in a flowerpot near the Embassy, while the other was outside a school, near the diplomatic premises.
Wilfredo Porras, acting director of Baruta Police, said they arrested a man carrying a "backpack with 100 black powder bases, pliers, adhesive tape, glue and electric leads."
The man declared that "the devices were set to explode in 15 minutes. At first, we thought he was crazy, but we concluded he is not because of the features of both devices and the contents in the backpack," Porras said.
Germany to use Troops for Anti-terror Missions at Home by E.
In a move likely to fuel controversy, German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung called Tuesday for troops to be deployed on homeland anti-terror missions.
Germany has strict constitutional limits for deploying its armed forces on domestic missions - a reaction to massive abuses under the Nazi Third Reich - and Jung's plans could require a change to the constitution.
Jung, in a speech to a security conference, said the difference between internal and external security was now so fluid that both elements had to be better "interlocked".
"The German armed forces must be deployed for domestic missions in cases where it is the only body with necessary capabilities," said Jung according to an advance text of his speech.
Germany's government is due on Wednesday to approve a new white paper on the future of the Bundeswehr, the combined armed forces.
There are presently 247,000 troops in the Bundeswehr and about 10,000 are serving on missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Balkans.
Jung underlined that Chancellor Angela Merkel's government viewed the transatlantic alliance with the United States and NATO at its central security pillar.
"A close and trusting relationship to the US is of paramount importance for Germany's security in the 21st century," said Jung.
Merkel, who came to power a year ago, has made strong efforts to improve ties with the US which were damaged by bitter battles between former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and US President George W Bush over the Iraq war.
While also calling for European Union capabilities to be built up in the security sphere, Jung stressed that the EU and NATO must not be allowed to enter into any kind of competition.
He said forging better strategic ties between the US and the EU would be on the agenda for Germany's EU presidency during the first half of 2007.
"The German government is going to make efforts to improve relations between both organizations," Jung said.
Meanwhile, a report in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper said Germany and France were in disagreement over further expanding the role of NATO.
Berlin wants to give NATO more power to get involved in civilian rebuilding tasks but Paris is strongly opposed and wants to reserve such missions for the EU.
The issue is expected to be debated at NATO's summit in Riga, Latvia next month.
Germany has strict constitutional limits for deploying its armed forces on domestic missions - a reaction to massive abuses under the Nazi Third Reich - and Jung's plans could require a change to the constitution.
Jung, in a speech to a security conference, said the difference between internal and external security was now so fluid that both elements had to be better "interlocked".
"The German armed forces must be deployed for domestic missions in cases where it is the only body with necessary capabilities," said Jung according to an advance text of his speech.
Germany's government is due on Wednesday to approve a new white paper on the future of the Bundeswehr, the combined armed forces.
There are presently 247,000 troops in the Bundeswehr and about 10,000 are serving on missions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Balkans.
Jung underlined that Chancellor Angela Merkel's government viewed the transatlantic alliance with the United States and NATO at its central security pillar.
"A close and trusting relationship to the US is of paramount importance for Germany's security in the 21st century," said Jung.
Merkel, who came to power a year ago, has made strong efforts to improve ties with the US which were damaged by bitter battles between former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and US President George W Bush over the Iraq war.
While also calling for European Union capabilities to be built up in the security sphere, Jung stressed that the EU and NATO must not be allowed to enter into any kind of competition.
He said forging better strategic ties between the US and the EU would be on the agenda for Germany's EU presidency during the first half of 2007.
"The German government is going to make efforts to improve relations between both organizations," Jung said.
Meanwhile, a report in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper said Germany and France were in disagreement over further expanding the role of NATO.
Berlin wants to give NATO more power to get involved in civilian rebuilding tasks but Paris is strongly opposed and wants to reserve such missions for the EU.
The issue is expected to be debated at NATO's summit in Riga, Latvia next month.
Knowing the Enemy, Understanding the Enemy by Douglas Farah
One of the greatest weaknesses five years after 9-11 is the striking inability of the political leadership and body politic to define and reach a consensus on who the Islamist enemy is and what the enemy wants. There is a striking lack of intellectual curiosity, or perhaps fear because of concerns about political correctness, that have blocked a serious discussion of what bin Laden and al Qaeda really think, what their real targets and objectives are and how that group fits into the broader Islamist project of converting the world to an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.
Hence we have the absurd ridiculing in Newsweek magazine of President Bush’s use of the word “caliphate” in discussing the Islamist project (and the even more absurd CAIR response that talking about the caliphate is anti-Islamic). We have the inability of senior people whose job it is to study and understand the Islamist project unable to identify the two major branches of Islam, never mind how they differ and what such divisions might mean.
The caliphate, from its historical signficance to the dream of its recreation, is perhaps the best way to understand how the different currents of Islamist thought relate to each other, support each other and form a coherent whole that embraces the Muslim Brotherhood to the historic al Qaeda.
I cannot do better than my friend Walid Phares on the Counterterrorism Blog in describing the history and signficance of the term. But what is most disturbing is that this is an issue at all. The Islamist project to recreate the caliphate is not a secret plot gleaned from suspicious methods of intelligence gathering that are subject to manipulation and political usage.
Rather, it is written and rewritten, as an intergral part of the Muslim Brotherhood strategy, al Qaeda, affiliated al Qaeda groups in Europe, by Islamists themselves. They provide the roadmap that they hope to follow, in official publications and in open conferences.
Not all who support the Islamist project support violence to bring it about, but support a more gradual political take over of different countries. Many, perhaps most, of the Islamist community, focus on the conditions in the Arab world and how to get rid of the corrupt, secular regimes there. But the Islamist project does specifically and clearly embrace the concept of re-establishing the caliphate at its time of greatest territorial conquest. From there, the war with the rest of the world will begin.
This is what I find so disturbing about this debate. It is intellectual laziness, not a lack of information, that has led to the paucity of understanding of what the Islamist project it.
The administration, from the beginning, has done an abysmal job of explaining this to the American people. The Democrats have not done any better in presenting an alternative view. Yet it is written out, and we quibble over using the very Islamist terms that the Islamists use to define their Islamist project. And listen when they tell us that those words make us anti-Islamic. Alice in Wonderland would feel right at home on this side of the looking glass.
Hence we have the absurd ridiculing in Newsweek magazine of President Bush’s use of the word “caliphate” in discussing the Islamist project (and the even more absurd CAIR response that talking about the caliphate is anti-Islamic). We have the inability of senior people whose job it is to study and understand the Islamist project unable to identify the two major branches of Islam, never mind how they differ and what such divisions might mean.
The caliphate, from its historical signficance to the dream of its recreation, is perhaps the best way to understand how the different currents of Islamist thought relate to each other, support each other and form a coherent whole that embraces the Muslim Brotherhood to the historic al Qaeda.
I cannot do better than my friend Walid Phares on the Counterterrorism Blog in describing the history and signficance of the term. But what is most disturbing is that this is an issue at all. The Islamist project to recreate the caliphate is not a secret plot gleaned from suspicious methods of intelligence gathering that are subject to manipulation and political usage.
Rather, it is written and rewritten, as an intergral part of the Muslim Brotherhood strategy, al Qaeda, affiliated al Qaeda groups in Europe, by Islamists themselves. They provide the roadmap that they hope to follow, in official publications and in open conferences.
Not all who support the Islamist project support violence to bring it about, but support a more gradual political take over of different countries. Many, perhaps most, of the Islamist community, focus on the conditions in the Arab world and how to get rid of the corrupt, secular regimes there. But the Islamist project does specifically and clearly embrace the concept of re-establishing the caliphate at its time of greatest territorial conquest. From there, the war with the rest of the world will begin.
This is what I find so disturbing about this debate. It is intellectual laziness, not a lack of information, that has led to the paucity of understanding of what the Islamist project it.
The administration, from the beginning, has done an abysmal job of explaining this to the American people. The Democrats have not done any better in presenting an alternative view. Yet it is written out, and we quibble over using the very Islamist terms that the Islamists use to define their Islamist project. And listen when they tell us that those words make us anti-Islamic. Alice in Wonderland would feel right at home on this side of the looking glass.
Monday, October 23, 2006
Invention: Microwave-Oven Gun by Barry Fox
You can do a lot of damage with a directed beam of microwave energy. It can destroy electronics by inducing high voltages in chips and wires (just as metal objects spark if left in a microwave oven). Such a beam could also burn a person's skin, or even detonate improvised explosive devices by exciting unstable chemicals.
A megawatt magnetron is normally needed to make the beam, though, and these are big and expensive beasts that need water cooling.
However, two inventors from Albuquerque, New Mexico in the US, reckon there is cheaper way to get the power. Simply gather together a stack of magnetrons ripped out of consumer microwave ovens, and lock their output together so that they combine into one coherent beam. What is more, they say, the trick can be done mechanically.
Microwave magnetrons come with a tube-shaped component that controls the output signal. The idea is to arrange a dozen or so side by side and have a small metal plate in front that reflects some of the energy from each tube back into the mouth of adjacent ones. This should make all the magnetrons resonate in synchronisation, the inventors reckon. Three hundred consumer devices, rated at 1 kilowatt each, could combine to generate megawatt pulses from the back of a mobile generator.
The only puzzle is why the US government Patent Office has published an application that might explain to anyone, including terrorists, how to build such a weapon.
Read the full microwave oven gun patent application.
A megawatt magnetron is normally needed to make the beam, though, and these are big and expensive beasts that need water cooling.
However, two inventors from Albuquerque, New Mexico in the US, reckon there is cheaper way to get the power. Simply gather together a stack of magnetrons ripped out of consumer microwave ovens, and lock their output together so that they combine into one coherent beam. What is more, they say, the trick can be done mechanically.
Microwave magnetrons come with a tube-shaped component that controls the output signal. The idea is to arrange a dozen or so side by side and have a small metal plate in front that reflects some of the energy from each tube back into the mouth of adjacent ones. This should make all the magnetrons resonate in synchronisation, the inventors reckon. Three hundred consumer devices, rated at 1 kilowatt each, could combine to generate megawatt pulses from the back of a mobile generator.
The only puzzle is why the US government Patent Office has published an application that might explain to anyone, including terrorists, how to build such a weapon.
Read the full microwave oven gun patent application.
Pre-Emptive Regime Change: China's Turn by Thomas Barnett
North Korea's Kim Jong Il rattled his nuclear saber one time too many with his recent underground testing of a crude device. Now he's really got a superpower mad, one that can seriously do something about it.
No, I'm not talking about the United States. America's continuing military tie-down in Iraq rules out any substantial military action on our part. Given our performance post-Saddam, this news is clearly welcomed in both Pyongyang and Seoul, with the latter being scared witless at the prospect of paying any post-Kim reconstruction bill.
Although officially there are multiple parties in this conversation, only one player matters right now: North Korea's increasingly flummoxed patron - China.
Following Kim's nuclear test a couple of weeks ago, President Bush's rather force-less response was to plead that everyone should give diplomacy enough time to unfold. Just hearing our cowboy-in-chief utter that word must have sent chills down the spines of China's party bosses because surely they decoded this statement as, "China, please bail us out!"
Is North Korea more Beijing's responsibility than ours? Absolutely. If China were not propping up Kim's criminally cruel regime with aid, then it probably would have collapsed years ago.
America did its superpower duty by keeping South Korea both stable and nonnuclear all these decades. Now Beijing must step up and do the right thing if it wants to be considered a legitimate, full-service superpower. Punching below its weight on Asian security issues suggests that China's free riding on globo-cop America is a permanent feature of its foreign policy. That just won't wash when the Middle Kingdom's economic networks have gone global.
Has the U.S. prepared China for this challenge? Hardly.
The Bush administration came into power clearly gunning for rising near-peer competitor China, largely justifying its dreams of military transformation on that increasingly specious scenario of war over Taiwan. The preview of that self-fulfilling prophecy was the EP-3 spy plane incident in early 2001.
But 9/11 and the Long War sidelined the Pentagon's China hawks, twisting military transformation in directions scarcely imagined - to wit, we apparently still do need an Army and a bigger one at that.
But China did not completely fall off the Bush administration's strategic radar. Since 9/11, our government has consistently sought to contain "rising China" through expanded military ties with its neighbors - most prominently India and Japan. Tokyo, for instance, was invited to join our defense guarantee on Taiwan. Remembering that Imperial Japan served as that island's pre-Cold War colonial master, you can only imagine how warmly Beijing received that unmistakable signal.
Ah, but necessity is the mother of diplomacy. Despite opposition from surviving neocons, the State Department has quietly forged the beginnings of strategic dialogue with China.
This began in the second term with then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who first broached the idea that a post-Kim Asian security environment should naturally yield an East Asian version of NATO. After Zoellick left, this quiet conversation continued under Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, who - not accidentally - was essentially freed from his ongoing duties as chief negotiator with North Korea by Kim's increasingly intransigent behavior.
But while those diplomatic bridges are being built, our military cooperation with China remains embryonic, despite the best efforts of Pacific Command's current boss, Admiral William Fallon, who just last month oversaw the first Sino-American naval exercise off California's coast.
So if you're Beijing, fearing a refugee crisis on your southern border, how comfortable are you about suddenly being sucked into a military scenario featuring both American forces and nuclear weapons?
Not very.
Our best hope right now is that Beijing decides "better us than the Americans" and silently gets rids of Kim on its own - like maybe the Dear Leader's train comes back empty next time from China. And if Kim isn't interested in golden parachutes, then maybe China uses its remaining pull within North Korea's political elite to engineer the same sort of rapid popular uprising that toppled Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989 - a scenario Chinese senior officials have seriously studied.
However this goes down, the United States better be ready to reward China handsomely for going out on this limb and that means immediately discarding Cold War suspicions and recognizing its potential as a strategic ally.
North Korea won't be the last time we ask for China's help on troublesome regimes. That list is already long.
No, I'm not talking about the United States. America's continuing military tie-down in Iraq rules out any substantial military action on our part. Given our performance post-Saddam, this news is clearly welcomed in both Pyongyang and Seoul, with the latter being scared witless at the prospect of paying any post-Kim reconstruction bill.
Although officially there are multiple parties in this conversation, only one player matters right now: North Korea's increasingly flummoxed patron - China.
Following Kim's nuclear test a couple of weeks ago, President Bush's rather force-less response was to plead that everyone should give diplomacy enough time to unfold. Just hearing our cowboy-in-chief utter that word must have sent chills down the spines of China's party bosses because surely they decoded this statement as, "China, please bail us out!"
Is North Korea more Beijing's responsibility than ours? Absolutely. If China were not propping up Kim's criminally cruel regime with aid, then it probably would have collapsed years ago.
America did its superpower duty by keeping South Korea both stable and nonnuclear all these decades. Now Beijing must step up and do the right thing if it wants to be considered a legitimate, full-service superpower. Punching below its weight on Asian security issues suggests that China's free riding on globo-cop America is a permanent feature of its foreign policy. That just won't wash when the Middle Kingdom's economic networks have gone global.
Has the U.S. prepared China for this challenge? Hardly.
The Bush administration came into power clearly gunning for rising near-peer competitor China, largely justifying its dreams of military transformation on that increasingly specious scenario of war over Taiwan. The preview of that self-fulfilling prophecy was the EP-3 spy plane incident in early 2001.
But 9/11 and the Long War sidelined the Pentagon's China hawks, twisting military transformation in directions scarcely imagined - to wit, we apparently still do need an Army and a bigger one at that.
But China did not completely fall off the Bush administration's strategic radar. Since 9/11, our government has consistently sought to contain "rising China" through expanded military ties with its neighbors - most prominently India and Japan. Tokyo, for instance, was invited to join our defense guarantee on Taiwan. Remembering that Imperial Japan served as that island's pre-Cold War colonial master, you can only imagine how warmly Beijing received that unmistakable signal.
Ah, but necessity is the mother of diplomacy. Despite opposition from surviving neocons, the State Department has quietly forged the beginnings of strategic dialogue with China.
This began in the second term with then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who first broached the idea that a post-Kim Asian security environment should naturally yield an East Asian version of NATO. After Zoellick left, this quiet conversation continued under Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, who - not accidentally - was essentially freed from his ongoing duties as chief negotiator with North Korea by Kim's increasingly intransigent behavior.
But while those diplomatic bridges are being built, our military cooperation with China remains embryonic, despite the best efforts of Pacific Command's current boss, Admiral William Fallon, who just last month oversaw the first Sino-American naval exercise off California's coast.
So if you're Beijing, fearing a refugee crisis on your southern border, how comfortable are you about suddenly being sucked into a military scenario featuring both American forces and nuclear weapons?
Not very.
Our best hope right now is that Beijing decides "better us than the Americans" and silently gets rids of Kim on its own - like maybe the Dear Leader's train comes back empty next time from China. And if Kim isn't interested in golden parachutes, then maybe China uses its remaining pull within North Korea's political elite to engineer the same sort of rapid popular uprising that toppled Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989 - a scenario Chinese senior officials have seriously studied.
However this goes down, the United States better be ready to reward China handsomely for going out on this limb and that means immediately discarding Cold War suspicions and recognizing its potential as a strategic ally.
North Korea won't be the last time we ask for China's help on troublesome regimes. That list is already long.
Sunday, October 22, 2006
Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite? by Jeff Stein
For the past several months, I’ve been wrapping up lengthy interviews with Washington counterterrorism officials with a fundamental question: “Do you know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite?”
A “gotcha” question? Perhaps. But if knowing your enemy is the most basic rule of war, I don’t think it’s out of bounds. And as I quickly explain to my subjects, I’m not looking for theological explanations, just the basics: Who’s on what side today, and what does each want?
After all, wouldn’t British counterterrorism officials responsible for Northern Ireland know the difference between Catholics and Protestants? In a remotely similar but far more lethal vein, the 1,400-year Sunni-Shiite rivalry is playing out in the streets of Baghdad, raising the specter of a breakup of Iraq into antagonistic states, one backed by Shiite Iran and the other by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states.
A complete collapse in Iraq could provide a haven for Al Qaeda operatives within striking distance of Israel, even Europe. And the nature of the threat from Iran, a potential nuclear power with protégés in the Gulf states, northern Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, is entirely different from that of Al Qaeda. It seems silly to have to argue that officials responsible for counterterrorism should be able to recognize opportunities for pitting these rivals against each other.
But so far, most American officials I’ve interviewed don’t have a clue. That includes not just intelligence and law enforcement officials, but also members of Congress who have important roles overseeing our spy agencies. How can they do their jobs without knowing the basics?
My curiosity about our policymakers’ grasp of Islam’s two major branches was piqued in 2005, when Jon Stewart and other TV comedians made hash out of depositions, taken in a whistleblower case, in which top F.B.I. officials drew blanks when asked basic questions about Islam. One of the bemused officials was Gary Bald, then the bureau’s counterterrorism chief. Such expertise, Mr. Bald maintained, wasn’t as important as being a good manager.
A few months later, I asked the F.B.I.’s spokesman, John Miller, about Mr. Bald’s comments. “A leader needs to drive the organization forward,” Mr. Miller told me. “If he is the executive in a counterterrorism operation in the post-9/11 world, he does not need to memorize the collected statements of Osama bin Laden, or be able to read Urdu to be effective. ... Playing ‘Islamic Trivial Pursuit’ was a cheap shot for the lawyers and a cheaper shot for the journalist. It’s just a gimmick.”
Of course, I hadn’t asked about reading Urdu or Mr. bin Laden’s writings.
A few weeks ago, I took the F.B.I.’s temperature again. At the end of a long interview, I asked Willie Hulon, chief of the bureau’s new national security branch, whether he thought that it was important for a man in his position to know the difference between Sunnis and Shiites. “Yes, sure, it’s right to know the difference,” he said. “It’s important to know who your targets are.”
That was a big advance over 2005. So next I asked him if he could tell me the difference. He was flummoxed. “The basics goes back to their beliefs and who they were following,” he said. “And the conflicts between the Sunnis and the Shia and the difference between who they were following.”
O.K., I asked, trying to help, what about today? Which one is Iran — Sunni or Shiite? He thought for a second. “Iran and Hezbollah,” I prompted. “Which are they?”
He took a stab: “Sunni.”
Wrong.
Al Qaeda? “Sunni.”
Right.
AND to his credit, Mr. Hulon, a distinguished agent who is up nights worrying about Al Qaeda while we safely sleep, did at least know that the vicious struggle between Islam’s Abel and Cain was driving Iraq into civil war. But then we pay him to know things like that, the same as some members of Congress.
Take Representative Terry Everett, a seven-term Alabama Republican who is vice chairman of the House intelligence subcommittee on technical and tactical intelligence.
“Do you know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite?” I asked him a few weeks ago.
Mr. Everett responded with a low chuckle. He thought for a moment: “One’s in one location, another’s in another location. No, to be honest with you, I don’t know. I thought it was differences in their religion, different families or something.”
To his credit, he asked me to explain the differences. I told him briefly about the schism that developed after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and how Iraq and Iran are majority Shiite nations while the rest of the Muslim world is mostly Sunni. “Now that you’ve explained it to me,” he replied, “what occurs to me is that it makes what we’re doing over there extremely difficult, not only in Iraq but that whole area.”
Representative Jo Ann Davis, a Virginia Republican who heads a House intelligence subcommittee charged with overseeing the C.I.A.’s performance in recruiting Islamic spies and analyzing information, was similarly dumbfounded when I asked her if she knew the difference between Sunnis and Shiites.
“Do I?” she asked me. A look of concentration came over her face. “You know, I should.” She took a stab at it: “It’s a difference in their fundamental religious beliefs. The Sunni are more radical than the Shia. Or vice versa. But I think it’s the Sunnis who’re more radical than the Shia.”
Did she know which branch Al Qaeda’s leaders follow?
“Al Qaeda is the one that’s most radical, so I think they’re Sunni,” she replied. “I may be wrong, but I think that’s right.”
Did she think that it was important, I asked, for members of Congress charged with oversight of the intelligence agencies, to know the answer to such questions, so they can cut through officials’ puffery when they came up to the Hill?
“Oh, I think it’s very important,” said Ms. Davis, “because Al Qaeda’s whole reason for being is based on their beliefs. And you’ve got to understand, and to know your enemy.”
It’s not all so grimly humorous. Some agency officials and members of Congress have easily handled my “gotcha” question. But as I keep asking it around Capitol Hill and the agencies, I get more and more blank stares. Too many officials in charge of the war on terrorism just don’t care to learn much, if anything, about the enemy we’re fighting. And that’s enough to keep anybody up at night.
A “gotcha” question? Perhaps. But if knowing your enemy is the most basic rule of war, I don’t think it’s out of bounds. And as I quickly explain to my subjects, I’m not looking for theological explanations, just the basics: Who’s on what side today, and what does each want?
After all, wouldn’t British counterterrorism officials responsible for Northern Ireland know the difference between Catholics and Protestants? In a remotely similar but far more lethal vein, the 1,400-year Sunni-Shiite rivalry is playing out in the streets of Baghdad, raising the specter of a breakup of Iraq into antagonistic states, one backed by Shiite Iran and the other by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states.
A complete collapse in Iraq could provide a haven for Al Qaeda operatives within striking distance of Israel, even Europe. And the nature of the threat from Iran, a potential nuclear power with protégés in the Gulf states, northern Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, is entirely different from that of Al Qaeda. It seems silly to have to argue that officials responsible for counterterrorism should be able to recognize opportunities for pitting these rivals against each other.
But so far, most American officials I’ve interviewed don’t have a clue. That includes not just intelligence and law enforcement officials, but also members of Congress who have important roles overseeing our spy agencies. How can they do their jobs without knowing the basics?
My curiosity about our policymakers’ grasp of Islam’s two major branches was piqued in 2005, when Jon Stewart and other TV comedians made hash out of depositions, taken in a whistleblower case, in which top F.B.I. officials drew blanks when asked basic questions about Islam. One of the bemused officials was Gary Bald, then the bureau’s counterterrorism chief. Such expertise, Mr. Bald maintained, wasn’t as important as being a good manager.
A few months later, I asked the F.B.I.’s spokesman, John Miller, about Mr. Bald’s comments. “A leader needs to drive the organization forward,” Mr. Miller told me. “If he is the executive in a counterterrorism operation in the post-9/11 world, he does not need to memorize the collected statements of Osama bin Laden, or be able to read Urdu to be effective. ... Playing ‘Islamic Trivial Pursuit’ was a cheap shot for the lawyers and a cheaper shot for the journalist. It’s just a gimmick.”
Of course, I hadn’t asked about reading Urdu or Mr. bin Laden’s writings.
A few weeks ago, I took the F.B.I.’s temperature again. At the end of a long interview, I asked Willie Hulon, chief of the bureau’s new national security branch, whether he thought that it was important for a man in his position to know the difference between Sunnis and Shiites. “Yes, sure, it’s right to know the difference,” he said. “It’s important to know who your targets are.”
That was a big advance over 2005. So next I asked him if he could tell me the difference. He was flummoxed. “The basics goes back to their beliefs and who they were following,” he said. “And the conflicts between the Sunnis and the Shia and the difference between who they were following.”
O.K., I asked, trying to help, what about today? Which one is Iran — Sunni or Shiite? He thought for a second. “Iran and Hezbollah,” I prompted. “Which are they?”
He took a stab: “Sunni.”
Wrong.
Al Qaeda? “Sunni.”
Right.
AND to his credit, Mr. Hulon, a distinguished agent who is up nights worrying about Al Qaeda while we safely sleep, did at least know that the vicious struggle between Islam’s Abel and Cain was driving Iraq into civil war. But then we pay him to know things like that, the same as some members of Congress.
Take Representative Terry Everett, a seven-term Alabama Republican who is vice chairman of the House intelligence subcommittee on technical and tactical intelligence.
“Do you know the difference between a Sunni and a Shiite?” I asked him a few weeks ago.
Mr. Everett responded with a low chuckle. He thought for a moment: “One’s in one location, another’s in another location. No, to be honest with you, I don’t know. I thought it was differences in their religion, different families or something.”
To his credit, he asked me to explain the differences. I told him briefly about the schism that developed after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and how Iraq and Iran are majority Shiite nations while the rest of the Muslim world is mostly Sunni. “Now that you’ve explained it to me,” he replied, “what occurs to me is that it makes what we’re doing over there extremely difficult, not only in Iraq but that whole area.”
Representative Jo Ann Davis, a Virginia Republican who heads a House intelligence subcommittee charged with overseeing the C.I.A.’s performance in recruiting Islamic spies and analyzing information, was similarly dumbfounded when I asked her if she knew the difference between Sunnis and Shiites.
“Do I?” she asked me. A look of concentration came over her face. “You know, I should.” She took a stab at it: “It’s a difference in their fundamental religious beliefs. The Sunni are more radical than the Shia. Or vice versa. But I think it’s the Sunnis who’re more radical than the Shia.”
Did she know which branch Al Qaeda’s leaders follow?
“Al Qaeda is the one that’s most radical, so I think they’re Sunni,” she replied. “I may be wrong, but I think that’s right.”
Did she think that it was important, I asked, for members of Congress charged with oversight of the intelligence agencies, to know the answer to such questions, so they can cut through officials’ puffery when they came up to the Hill?
“Oh, I think it’s very important,” said Ms. Davis, “because Al Qaeda’s whole reason for being is based on their beliefs. And you’ve got to understand, and to know your enemy.”
It’s not all so grimly humorous. Some agency officials and members of Congress have easily handled my “gotcha” question. But as I keep asking it around Capitol Hill and the agencies, I get more and more blank stares. Too many officials in charge of the war on terrorism just don’t care to learn much, if anything, about the enemy we’re fighting. And that’s enough to keep anybody up at night.
The Role of Cities by John Robb
During the years between world wars one and two, strategists like J.F.C. Fuller contemplated the role of cities in light of his work on the emerging theory of maneuver warfare (3GW). They speculated that cities, particularly large ones in a strategic locations, could be used to dampen or stop the rapid advance of maneuver forces seeding chaos in their rear areas. This analysis proved out, particularly in the steppes of Russia, as cities proved their ability to first slow and then bleed maneuver forces dry. Within the context of emerging theories of system disruption, that are emerging as this war slowly ramps-up, cities play an entirely different role. As the events in Baghdad are proving daily, cities can be engineered to radiate instability rather than dampen it. This is accomplished through acts that leverage three attributes of modern cities. These include:
Extreme mobility and interconnectedness (for example, high rates of automobile and cell phone ownership).
Complete reliance on high volume infrastructure networks.
Complex and heterogeneous social networks that are held together under pressure.
Blitzing the system
The key to unlocking the disruptive potential of cities within this new form of warfare, is to attack key points (systempunkts) within target infrastructure and social networks to force a change in the city's dynamic. Infrastructure attacks, particularly on power/fuel/water, negate the ability of the government to deliver political goods (for example, in September Baghdad only received 2.5 hours of electricity a day). This halts economic activity and forces the population to rely upon primary loyalties for daily survival (families, neighborhoods, religious organizations, gangs, etc.). It also damages the ability of the government to deliver political goods, which are the key to legitimacy. As a result, primary loyalties rise and nationalism falls. Next, attacks on the social fabric along fault lines (religious, ethnic, class, etc.), are then used to force these primary loyalty groups to arm themselves for security. Finally, as these manufactured groups naturally come into conflict (for access to resource, protection, or revenge), the city's intrinsic interconnectedness allows it to assume its own emergent dynamic, replete with feedback loops that accelerate conflict.
What this means
The extreme leverage afforded by this method means that Che's dream of a foco insurgency is finally possible. A small group can, if the targets are properly chosen, force a state into failure and keep it there. The key is to limit attacks on the government forces to only those necessary to fracture their moral cohesion, and focus the majority of effort on those activities that accelerate social and economic fragmentation. Unfortunately, once a global guerrilla effort ensconces itself in a major city, all hope of ejecting it within any relevant time period becomes moot. We are sure to see more of this activity in the future. Key insights include:
City collapse offers extreme economic rewards in the form of smuggling and black markets. The more it is deprived, the greater the reward. This creates a positive feedback loop as groups involved in the disruption gain from these activities. For example, insurgent and militia involvement in gasoline smuggling and black market power generation in Baghdad.
The collapse of a central city prevents any hope of countrywide economic recovery. Further, the chaos the city generates radiates outward through refugee flows. As this occurs, the social conflicts are exported, and other cities begin to fall into chaos like dominos.
The sheer complexity and size of modern mega-cities with populations in the millions defies remedy. Once destabilized, these cities will either continue in chaos until either they depopulate or the exhaust themselves. Of course, further impetus (attacks on systempunkts) towards instability can recharge the mechanism as needed.
Extreme mobility and interconnectedness (for example, high rates of automobile and cell phone ownership).
Complete reliance on high volume infrastructure networks.
Complex and heterogeneous social networks that are held together under pressure.
Blitzing the system
The key to unlocking the disruptive potential of cities within this new form of warfare, is to attack key points (systempunkts) within target infrastructure and social networks to force a change in the city's dynamic. Infrastructure attacks, particularly on power/fuel/water, negate the ability of the government to deliver political goods (for example, in September Baghdad only received 2.5 hours of electricity a day). This halts economic activity and forces the population to rely upon primary loyalties for daily survival (families, neighborhoods, religious organizations, gangs, etc.). It also damages the ability of the government to deliver political goods, which are the key to legitimacy. As a result, primary loyalties rise and nationalism falls. Next, attacks on the social fabric along fault lines (religious, ethnic, class, etc.), are then used to force these primary loyalty groups to arm themselves for security. Finally, as these manufactured groups naturally come into conflict (for access to resource, protection, or revenge), the city's intrinsic interconnectedness allows it to assume its own emergent dynamic, replete with feedback loops that accelerate conflict.
What this means
The extreme leverage afforded by this method means that Che's dream of a foco insurgency is finally possible. A small group can, if the targets are properly chosen, force a state into failure and keep it there. The key is to limit attacks on the government forces to only those necessary to fracture their moral cohesion, and focus the majority of effort on those activities that accelerate social and economic fragmentation. Unfortunately, once a global guerrilla effort ensconces itself in a major city, all hope of ejecting it within any relevant time period becomes moot. We are sure to see more of this activity in the future. Key insights include:
City collapse offers extreme economic rewards in the form of smuggling and black markets. The more it is deprived, the greater the reward. This creates a positive feedback loop as groups involved in the disruption gain from these activities. For example, insurgent and militia involvement in gasoline smuggling and black market power generation in Baghdad.
The collapse of a central city prevents any hope of countrywide economic recovery. Further, the chaos the city generates radiates outward through refugee flows. As this occurs, the social conflicts are exported, and other cities begin to fall into chaos like dominos.
The sheer complexity and size of modern mega-cities with populations in the millions defies remedy. Once destabilized, these cities will either continue in chaos until either they depopulate or the exhaust themselves. Of course, further impetus (attacks on systempunkts) towards instability can recharge the mechanism as needed.
Iran says Security Council Rulings Illegitimate by R.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Friday any decisions by the U.N. Security Council, which is considering imposing sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme, were illegitimate.
Iran’s file has been sent back to the council and it now faces possible sanctions after failing to meet a demand to halt uranium enrichment, a process the West believes Tehran is developing to build atomic bombs despite Tehran’s denials.
“The Security Council, in its current situation, lacks legitimacy. Its decisions are illegitimate. You (the Council) want to be the judge, the prosecutor and the executor at the same time? Those times are gone,” Ahmadinejad said.
The president, who says the council serves US and British political purposes, made his latest comments to worshippers at Friday prayers in speech broadcast on state radio.
Ahmadinejad is not the most powerful figure in Iran’s hierarchy of power, which gives the final word to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But like the president, Khamenei insists Iran will press ahead with its peaceful atomic plans.
Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations, Emyr Jones Parry, has said European nations hoped to circulate a draft text on sanctions against Iran to the full council early next week.
The draft text is expected to include curbs on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme, which observers concede will probably not impinge on its uranium enrichment activities.
Responding to the EU move, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement that “if its counterpart (the EU) chooses the path of pressure, sanctions and threats, (Iran) will not remain idle and will not allow its rights to be stamped on”.
He did not say what action Iran might take but added that Iran still wanted talks to resolve the nuclear standoff.
“Danger for the region”
Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani threatened retaliation on Wednesday, possibly by suspending international atomic inspections, if the United Nations imposed sanctions.
Influential former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said a move by the council against Iran would harm those who take the decision, the region, and the Islamic Republic.
“We advise them not to welcome such a danger for this region and this world,” Rafsanjani also told Friday prayers.
Iranian lawmakers say they are studying a bill that will oblige the government to halt inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which now carries out routine checks of Iranian facilities, if punitive steps are imposed.
Iran, the world’s fourth largest oil exporter, has shrugged off the sanctions threat. Western envoys say only a second or third round of penalties is likely to halt Tehran’s plans.
That will depend on whether the “P5+1” group made up of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, Britain, China, Russia and France, and Germany can remain united on Iran.
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Friday it would play a “constructive role” in resolving the nuclear standoff with Iran.
Iran’s file has been sent back to the council and it now faces possible sanctions after failing to meet a demand to halt uranium enrichment, a process the West believes Tehran is developing to build atomic bombs despite Tehran’s denials.
“The Security Council, in its current situation, lacks legitimacy. Its decisions are illegitimate. You (the Council) want to be the judge, the prosecutor and the executor at the same time? Those times are gone,” Ahmadinejad said.
The president, who says the council serves US and British political purposes, made his latest comments to worshippers at Friday prayers in speech broadcast on state radio.
Ahmadinejad is not the most powerful figure in Iran’s hierarchy of power, which gives the final word to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But like the president, Khamenei insists Iran will press ahead with its peaceful atomic plans.
Britain’s ambassador to the United Nations, Emyr Jones Parry, has said European nations hoped to circulate a draft text on sanctions against Iran to the full council early next week.
The draft text is expected to include curbs on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme, which observers concede will probably not impinge on its uranium enrichment activities.
Responding to the EU move, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement that “if its counterpart (the EU) chooses the path of pressure, sanctions and threats, (Iran) will not remain idle and will not allow its rights to be stamped on”.
He did not say what action Iran might take but added that Iran still wanted talks to resolve the nuclear standoff.
“Danger for the region”
Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani threatened retaliation on Wednesday, possibly by suspending international atomic inspections, if the United Nations imposed sanctions.
Influential former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said a move by the council against Iran would harm those who take the decision, the region, and the Islamic Republic.
“We advise them not to welcome such a danger for this region and this world,” Rafsanjani also told Friday prayers.
Iranian lawmakers say they are studying a bill that will oblige the government to halt inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which now carries out routine checks of Iranian facilities, if punitive steps are imposed.
Iran, the world’s fourth largest oil exporter, has shrugged off the sanctions threat. Western envoys say only a second or third round of penalties is likely to halt Tehran’s plans.
That will depend on whether the “P5+1” group made up of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, Britain, China, Russia and France, and Germany can remain united on Iran.
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Friday it would play a “constructive role” in resolving the nuclear standoff with Iran.
An Islamic TV Channel Expands Its U.S. Audience by Steven Stalinsky
Bridges TV, an American-Islamic TV channel "seeking to improve the image of Muslims in the United States" and to "offer a unique perspective on the Middle East and the war on terrorism," has extended its availability into six states, creating a potential audience of nearly 2 million.
The network's programming includes a mix of entertainment, sports, news, documentaries, and advertisements from companies like Ford, with an emphasis on religious programs.
The channel says it has been endorsed by "top American [Islamic] scholars and community leaders," whose representatives appear on many of its programs, including one called "Prominent Scholars."
Some speakers openly criticize Islamic extremists. An imam from Los Angeles, Sheik Tajuddin Bin Shuaib, appeared on the channel on October 8 and denounced Osama bin Laden and the September 11, 2001, hijackers.
Some guests, however, are extremists. One religious figure who appeared October 3 said Muslims have a duty to change America and to increase their numbers to 50% of the population from 2%. He recommended that Shariah, or Islamic law, be implemented in American courts.
During a roundtable discussion on the Arab-Israeli conflict on October 5, one participant offered a solution: "For the Jews to leave and return to Europe."
Bridges TV aired a speech by the influential Muslim scholar Jamal Badawi on October 4. Mr. Badawi, who teaches Islam throughout North America, gave an interview to the Saudi Gazette on June 24, 2005, in which he raised questions about who was behind the September 11 attacks and suggested that Americans could be behind the car bombings of Iraqi markets.
Every night, Bridges TV shows a news program, "Talking Points." Its guest on October 4 was Imam Mohammad Alo Elahi, whom it described as a leading "interfaith figure." According to his Web site, Imam Elahi was a spiritual leader in Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian navy and also is the leader of "one of the largest mosques in the U.S.," in Dearborn, Mich.
The web site describes his meetings with world leaders and shows photographs of him with the spiritual adviser of Hezbollah, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah; Ayatollah Khomeini; Presidents Khatemi and Rafsanjani of Iran; Secretary-General Annan of the United Nations; and Minister Louis Farrakhan.
Throughout the day, Bridges TV airs segments of Koranic verses, quite a few of which denounce "unbelievers." One notable verse that aired October 9 praised martyrdom.
Since the Islamic holy month of Ramadan began, the channel has been showing official, Saudi government-controlled Wahhabi sermons from Mecca's holiest mosque, Al-Haram. The sermons stream live via Saudi TV Channel one every day at 4 p.m., and Bridges TV adds its own English subtitles.
An anti-Jewish, anti-Christian sermon from October 5 included the call, "May God destroy them!"
Bridges TV's Web site, bridgestv.com, features a weekly poll. Notable questions and results include 59% calling for Hezbollah to continue as a military force in Lebanon, 73% in agreement with the American policy of withholding funds to the Hamas-led Palestinian Arab government, and 63% believing that the Iranian government's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
One of the stars of Bridges TV is a cofounder and vice chairman of the international health care company CBay Inc., Donald "Skip" Conover, who hosts and produces a show called "Words Matter." He was the subject of a gushing article in the Saudi Daily Arab News on September 27.
In the article, Mr. Conover expressed "his disgust" at what he called inflammatory statements about Arabs and Muslims in the press.
He also discussed the power of the "Jewish lobby" and called on all Muslims to vote for the Democratic Party. "Every American politician is in lockstep with Israel. … If they vote against, then the Jewish lobby will put a lot of money behind the candidate against them in their districts in the future. I have news for the Muslim community. All American politicians are in the pocket of the Jewish lobby today because they control a lot of money, and they spend a lot of money in politics."
"If the Muslims of America believe that they don't want Bush to have a free hand for the next two years, then the Muslims of America need to get organized and make sure they get out to vote for Democrats for both the House and the Senate," Mr. Conover added. "Every Muslim in the Middle East who has a relative in the U.S. should get the message across to their relatives. They need to make sure that all their friends vote against Bush."
Bridges TV claims that its "major purpose" is "to build bridges between American Muslims and other Americans." After viewing the channel, I find this highly unlikely.
The network's programming includes a mix of entertainment, sports, news, documentaries, and advertisements from companies like Ford, with an emphasis on religious programs.
The channel says it has been endorsed by "top American [Islamic] scholars and community leaders," whose representatives appear on many of its programs, including one called "Prominent Scholars."
Some speakers openly criticize Islamic extremists. An imam from Los Angeles, Sheik Tajuddin Bin Shuaib, appeared on the channel on October 8 and denounced Osama bin Laden and the September 11, 2001, hijackers.
Some guests, however, are extremists. One religious figure who appeared October 3 said Muslims have a duty to change America and to increase their numbers to 50% of the population from 2%. He recommended that Shariah, or Islamic law, be implemented in American courts.
During a roundtable discussion on the Arab-Israeli conflict on October 5, one participant offered a solution: "For the Jews to leave and return to Europe."
Bridges TV aired a speech by the influential Muslim scholar Jamal Badawi on October 4. Mr. Badawi, who teaches Islam throughout North America, gave an interview to the Saudi Gazette on June 24, 2005, in which he raised questions about who was behind the September 11 attacks and suggested that Americans could be behind the car bombings of Iraqi markets.
Every night, Bridges TV shows a news program, "Talking Points." Its guest on October 4 was Imam Mohammad Alo Elahi, whom it described as a leading "interfaith figure." According to his Web site, Imam Elahi was a spiritual leader in Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian navy and also is the leader of "one of the largest mosques in the U.S.," in Dearborn, Mich.
The web site describes his meetings with world leaders and shows photographs of him with the spiritual adviser of Hezbollah, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah; Ayatollah Khomeini; Presidents Khatemi and Rafsanjani of Iran; Secretary-General Annan of the United Nations; and Minister Louis Farrakhan.
Throughout the day, Bridges TV airs segments of Koranic verses, quite a few of which denounce "unbelievers." One notable verse that aired October 9 praised martyrdom.
Since the Islamic holy month of Ramadan began, the channel has been showing official, Saudi government-controlled Wahhabi sermons from Mecca's holiest mosque, Al-Haram. The sermons stream live via Saudi TV Channel one every day at 4 p.m., and Bridges TV adds its own English subtitles.
An anti-Jewish, anti-Christian sermon from October 5 included the call, "May God destroy them!"
Bridges TV's Web site, bridgestv.com, features a weekly poll. Notable questions and results include 59% calling for Hezbollah to continue as a military force in Lebanon, 73% in agreement with the American policy of withholding funds to the Hamas-led Palestinian Arab government, and 63% believing that the Iranian government's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
One of the stars of Bridges TV is a cofounder and vice chairman of the international health care company CBay Inc., Donald "Skip" Conover, who hosts and produces a show called "Words Matter." He was the subject of a gushing article in the Saudi Daily Arab News on September 27.
In the article, Mr. Conover expressed "his disgust" at what he called inflammatory statements about Arabs and Muslims in the press.
He also discussed the power of the "Jewish lobby" and called on all Muslims to vote for the Democratic Party. "Every American politician is in lockstep with Israel. … If they vote against, then the Jewish lobby will put a lot of money behind the candidate against them in their districts in the future. I have news for the Muslim community. All American politicians are in the pocket of the Jewish lobby today because they control a lot of money, and they spend a lot of money in politics."
"If the Muslims of America believe that they don't want Bush to have a free hand for the next two years, then the Muslims of America need to get organized and make sure they get out to vote for Democrats for both the House and the Senate," Mr. Conover added. "Every Muslim in the Middle East who has a relative in the U.S. should get the message across to their relatives. They need to make sure that all their friends vote against Bush."
Bridges TV claims that its "major purpose" is "to build bridges between American Muslims and other Americans." After viewing the channel, I find this highly unlikely.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)