As India prepares a dossier on terror to share with Pakistan in an effort to take forward the Havana understanding, a top CIA team, headed by its Deputy Director of Intelligence Carmen Medina, is coming here next week to discuss the terror situation in India following the Mumbai train blasts as well as the the Pakistan linkage. Sources said both sides will also discuss the security situation in Afghanistan.
It’s learnt that Medina is being accompanied by Nancy Powell, who is the intelligence officer in-charge of South Asia in the National Intelligence Council that is responsible for co-ordinating information from across the US intelligence community. This visit comes within weeks of US Ambassador to India David Mulford saying Washington was in close contact with New Delhi on investigations in the Mumbai blasts where the police claimed that ISI was behind the plan.
Following this, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns is also slated to come on November 10-11 on what is being framed as a bilateral visit to meet new Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon. While his talks with Menon will focus on terror and security cooperation, Burns will hold separate talks with PM’s Special envoy Shyam Saran on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal.
While officials are tightlipped about the visit by CIA and other US intelligence officials, sources said that Medina and Powell will hold crucial meetings with senior diplomats and intelligence officials here. Meetings with National Security Advisor M K Narayanan and Menon are also being worked out. The official meetings, sources said, are being slotted Monday on.
Medina is among the top three officials of the CIA and heads the Directorate of Intelligence. Sources said she will also discuss Washington’s approach to the security situation in Afghanistan. India has serious concerns over the deal Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has struck in Waziristan.
Saturday, October 21, 2006
The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia by Lorenzo Vidino
The recent rounds of arrests in North America and in Europe highlight the changed face of jihadi terrorism in the West. The profile of the cells dismantled in Toronto and London this past summer confirms a trend that had become apparent after the November 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam and the 7/7 London bombings: the majority of terrorist activities inside the West come from independent, homegrown networks. Composed mostly of extremely young, second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in the West (with the notable addition of a growing number of converts), these spontaneous networks have only an ideological affiliation with al-Qaeda, while generally operating with virtually total autonomy. Although it is unlikely that these groups, given their relatively simple structures and often amateurish preparation, could carry out large operations, they are nevertheless dangerous. Their deep knowledge of Western cultures and languages, possession of Western passports and relative lack of overt ties to large terrorist organizations make their detection a difficult task for authorities. Their proven determination to strike their own countries, combined with the relatively easy access to explosive substances and weapons, makes them an immediate threat to the security of Western countries.
A region where this trend is particularly evident is Scandinavia. Denmark, Sweden and Norway have seen a limited presence of "traditional" organized terrorist groups since the beginning of the 1990s, with outfits such as the Algerian GSPC or the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya using the countries as convenient bases of logistical support for their activities in North Africa and the Middle East. While some of these groups are still operating today, the overwhelming majority of terrorist activities taking place in Scandinavia currently are carried out by homegrown networks.
In a security report released in September, PET, the Danish domestic intelligence agency, warned that the largest threat to Denmark, as in most European countries, comes from small, unsophisticated groups that are "inspired by al-Qaeda's global jihad ideology but can act autonomously and apparently without external control, support or planning" [1]. PET's findings are corroborated by recent arrests in Denmark. On September 6, Danish police arrested nine suspects in the city of Odense, Denmark's third largest. According to authorities, the men had acquired material "to build explosives in connection with the preparation of a terror act.'' Although PET has revealed very few details about the alleged plot, the suspects are believed to be mostly young second-generation Muslim immigrants of various ethnic origins living in Vollsmose, a poor neighborhood of Odense. One of the men arrested is a young Danish convert to Islam (Politiken, September 6).
The composition of the Vollsmose group appears to be similar to that of another alleged terrorist cell that Danish authorities had dismantled less than a year before in the suburbs of Copenhagen. On October 27, 2005, four young men between 16 and 20 years old were detained for involvement in terrorist activities. The arrests in the Copenhagen area were triggered by an operation carried out by Bosnian authorities. A week earlier, counter-terrorism officials in Sarajevo had arrested Mirsad Bektasevic and Abdulkadir Cesur, two young men with close links to Scandinavia [2]. Nineteen-year-old Bektasevic is a Swedish citizen of Bosnian descent who had left Goteborg in September to acquire explosives in Sarajevo. Cesur, a Danish-born 21-year-old of Turkish descent, joined him in the Bosnian capital a few days later. The two managed to purchase on the local market almost 20 kg of various explosive materials, which they had planned to fit in a suicide belt that they had already acquired. The men videotaped themselves while mixing the explosives and boasting about their plan to carry out attacks "against Europe, against those whose forces are in Iraq and in Afghanistan" [3]. Authorities have speculated that the British Embassy in Sarajevo was the men's most likely target, but they have been unable to determine so with certainty.
Monitoring Bektasevic's phone conversations, Bosnian authorities tipped off their Danish counterparts about the men's ties to the Copenhagen area cell. The four youth had been unknown to local authorities and have been described as average teenagers of Middle Eastern origin who had either been born in or had grown up in Denmark. While living a normal life in the suburbs, attending school and playing soccer, they had developed a sudden fascination with radical Islam and had begun to frequent jihadi chat rooms online. It was on the internet that they had met Bektasevic, who, in turn, was also part of a small network of technology-savvy Swedish militants. Further investigations have revealed that Bektasevic was one of the key players in an internet-based network of young cyber-jihadis that spanned from the United Kingdom to other European countries and beyond, to Canada and the United States. Bektasevic, who used the online nickname of Maximus, is also believed to have been recruiting European Muslims to fight in Iraq.
Other cases confirm the importance of the internet in the activities of young Scandinavian militants, from their radicalization to the development of operational networks. Last May, Swedish authorities arrested three young men in different parts of the country, charging them with planning an attack against the Livets Ord evangelical church in the university town of Uppsala. Nima Nikain Ganjin, a 22-year-old of Iranian descent, and Andreas Fahlen, a 25-year-old ethnic Swede, were arrested in the suburbs of Stockholm, while 19-year-old Albert Ramic was arrested in Trelleborg, in southern Sweden. According to authorities, the men had met online and had begun chatting on Mujahedon.net, an internet forum established by Ganjin. Swedish authorities, who had been keeping Ganjin under surveillance because of his involvement in a clumsy Molotov cocktail attack against an Iraqi polling place in Stockholm in 2005, monitored his communications with the other two. The youngsters expressed the intention of attacking the church, which is known for its pro-Israel stance, even though no specific plan was made (Dagens Nyheter, June 14). A court sentenced the three to prison, ranging from eight months to three-and-a-half years, but an appellate court significantly reduced the penalties in September.
What is striking about the members of the Mujahedon network, aside from their extremely young age and operational un-sophistication, is their unusual profile. All three seem to have backgrounds and interests that have little to do with those of an Islamic fundamentalist: they appear to be young men with a greater fascination for violence rather than for the ideology of committed jihadis. Ramic is a troubled teenager who lives with his parents and is a regular hashish consumer (Sydsvenskan, May 3). Ganjin is also known as a consumer and petty smuggler of soft drugs. Fahlen is the son of a wealthy Swedish family and, while acknowledging an interest in Islam, claims not to have converted. Despite these backgrounds, the three developed a sudden fascination with radical Islam and, almost immediately after, began to send threats online. Ramic posted a short clip on the internet in which he threatened Europe with attacks. Ganjin had sent a message to the media the day after the Iraqi polling station in Stockholm had been firebombed. He signed the message as Tanzim Qaeda't al-Jihad fi al-Soed, in a naïve attempt to portray his amateurish actions as those of a Swedish branch of al-Qaeda.
The profile of the members of the Mujahedon network differs from that of the average radical of 10 years ago. Their knowledge of Islam is virtually non-existent and their fascination with jihad seems to be dictated by their rebellious nature rather than a deep ideological conviction. Nevertheless, these "improvised jihadis" seem to be the norm in Scandinavia. In September, Norwegian authorities arrested four men who had fired shots at an Oslo synagogue and, according to local authorities, were planning attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies. Also in this case, the men were previously known to authorities as petty criminals or gang members, but had no known sympathy for fundamentalist ideologies. "This case is exceptional in that only the main perpetrator seems to have had some kind of Islamist motivation, and that developed at quite a late stage," commented a professor at Norway's Police Academy (Helsingin Sanomat, October 5).
While organized terrorist groups do operate in Scandinavia, as proved by the recent arrest in Italy of GSPC members with strong links to Norway, homegrown groups represent the most immediate threat. Radicalization is a phenomenon that worries authorities in all three countries. It takes place not only on the internet, but also in some mosques and as a result of the activities of groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is active throughout the region. Given these facts, Scandinavia seems to be no longer immune from a terrorist attack, a development that would have appeared very unlikely only five years ago. Danish authorities are particularly concerned due to the active presence of Danish troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan and as a result of the controversy over the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons in September 2005. Yet, security services in the other Scandinavian countries also consider the possibility of an attack on their territory. "It's only a matter of time before we have a terrorist attack in Scandinavia; in Norway, Denmark or Sweden," stated the head of PST, Norway's domestic intelligence service, less than a year ago (Aftenposten, December 14, 2005). Considering current trends, if such an attack is indeed to take place, its most likely perpetrators seem to be homegrown Scandinavian networks.
Notes
1. PET report 2004-2005.
2. Indictment of Bektasevic and others, Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 30, 2006.
3. Ibid.
A region where this trend is particularly evident is Scandinavia. Denmark, Sweden and Norway have seen a limited presence of "traditional" organized terrorist groups since the beginning of the 1990s, with outfits such as the Algerian GSPC or the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya using the countries as convenient bases of logistical support for their activities in North Africa and the Middle East. While some of these groups are still operating today, the overwhelming majority of terrorist activities taking place in Scandinavia currently are carried out by homegrown networks.
In a security report released in September, PET, the Danish domestic intelligence agency, warned that the largest threat to Denmark, as in most European countries, comes from small, unsophisticated groups that are "inspired by al-Qaeda's global jihad ideology but can act autonomously and apparently without external control, support or planning" [1]. PET's findings are corroborated by recent arrests in Denmark. On September 6, Danish police arrested nine suspects in the city of Odense, Denmark's third largest. According to authorities, the men had acquired material "to build explosives in connection with the preparation of a terror act.'' Although PET has revealed very few details about the alleged plot, the suspects are believed to be mostly young second-generation Muslim immigrants of various ethnic origins living in Vollsmose, a poor neighborhood of Odense. One of the men arrested is a young Danish convert to Islam (Politiken, September 6).
The composition of the Vollsmose group appears to be similar to that of another alleged terrorist cell that Danish authorities had dismantled less than a year before in the suburbs of Copenhagen. On October 27, 2005, four young men between 16 and 20 years old were detained for involvement in terrorist activities. The arrests in the Copenhagen area were triggered by an operation carried out by Bosnian authorities. A week earlier, counter-terrorism officials in Sarajevo had arrested Mirsad Bektasevic and Abdulkadir Cesur, two young men with close links to Scandinavia [2]. Nineteen-year-old Bektasevic is a Swedish citizen of Bosnian descent who had left Goteborg in September to acquire explosives in Sarajevo. Cesur, a Danish-born 21-year-old of Turkish descent, joined him in the Bosnian capital a few days later. The two managed to purchase on the local market almost 20 kg of various explosive materials, which they had planned to fit in a suicide belt that they had already acquired. The men videotaped themselves while mixing the explosives and boasting about their plan to carry out attacks "against Europe, against those whose forces are in Iraq and in Afghanistan" [3]. Authorities have speculated that the British Embassy in Sarajevo was the men's most likely target, but they have been unable to determine so with certainty.
Monitoring Bektasevic's phone conversations, Bosnian authorities tipped off their Danish counterparts about the men's ties to the Copenhagen area cell. The four youth had been unknown to local authorities and have been described as average teenagers of Middle Eastern origin who had either been born in or had grown up in Denmark. While living a normal life in the suburbs, attending school and playing soccer, they had developed a sudden fascination with radical Islam and had begun to frequent jihadi chat rooms online. It was on the internet that they had met Bektasevic, who, in turn, was also part of a small network of technology-savvy Swedish militants. Further investigations have revealed that Bektasevic was one of the key players in an internet-based network of young cyber-jihadis that spanned from the United Kingdom to other European countries and beyond, to Canada and the United States. Bektasevic, who used the online nickname of Maximus, is also believed to have been recruiting European Muslims to fight in Iraq.
Other cases confirm the importance of the internet in the activities of young Scandinavian militants, from their radicalization to the development of operational networks. Last May, Swedish authorities arrested three young men in different parts of the country, charging them with planning an attack against the Livets Ord evangelical church in the university town of Uppsala. Nima Nikain Ganjin, a 22-year-old of Iranian descent, and Andreas Fahlen, a 25-year-old ethnic Swede, were arrested in the suburbs of Stockholm, while 19-year-old Albert Ramic was arrested in Trelleborg, in southern Sweden. According to authorities, the men had met online and had begun chatting on Mujahedon.net, an internet forum established by Ganjin. Swedish authorities, who had been keeping Ganjin under surveillance because of his involvement in a clumsy Molotov cocktail attack against an Iraqi polling place in Stockholm in 2005, monitored his communications with the other two. The youngsters expressed the intention of attacking the church, which is known for its pro-Israel stance, even though no specific plan was made (Dagens Nyheter, June 14). A court sentenced the three to prison, ranging from eight months to three-and-a-half years, but an appellate court significantly reduced the penalties in September.
What is striking about the members of the Mujahedon network, aside from their extremely young age and operational un-sophistication, is their unusual profile. All three seem to have backgrounds and interests that have little to do with those of an Islamic fundamentalist: they appear to be young men with a greater fascination for violence rather than for the ideology of committed jihadis. Ramic is a troubled teenager who lives with his parents and is a regular hashish consumer (Sydsvenskan, May 3). Ganjin is also known as a consumer and petty smuggler of soft drugs. Fahlen is the son of a wealthy Swedish family and, while acknowledging an interest in Islam, claims not to have converted. Despite these backgrounds, the three developed a sudden fascination with radical Islam and, almost immediately after, began to send threats online. Ramic posted a short clip on the internet in which he threatened Europe with attacks. Ganjin had sent a message to the media the day after the Iraqi polling station in Stockholm had been firebombed. He signed the message as Tanzim Qaeda't al-Jihad fi al-Soed, in a naïve attempt to portray his amateurish actions as those of a Swedish branch of al-Qaeda.
The profile of the members of the Mujahedon network differs from that of the average radical of 10 years ago. Their knowledge of Islam is virtually non-existent and their fascination with jihad seems to be dictated by their rebellious nature rather than a deep ideological conviction. Nevertheless, these "improvised jihadis" seem to be the norm in Scandinavia. In September, Norwegian authorities arrested four men who had fired shots at an Oslo synagogue and, according to local authorities, were planning attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies. Also in this case, the men were previously known to authorities as petty criminals or gang members, but had no known sympathy for fundamentalist ideologies. "This case is exceptional in that only the main perpetrator seems to have had some kind of Islamist motivation, and that developed at quite a late stage," commented a professor at Norway's Police Academy (Helsingin Sanomat, October 5).
While organized terrorist groups do operate in Scandinavia, as proved by the recent arrest in Italy of GSPC members with strong links to Norway, homegrown groups represent the most immediate threat. Radicalization is a phenomenon that worries authorities in all three countries. It takes place not only on the internet, but also in some mosques and as a result of the activities of groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is active throughout the region. Given these facts, Scandinavia seems to be no longer immune from a terrorist attack, a development that would have appeared very unlikely only five years ago. Danish authorities are particularly concerned due to the active presence of Danish troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan and as a result of the controversy over the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons in September 2005. Yet, security services in the other Scandinavian countries also consider the possibility of an attack on their territory. "It's only a matter of time before we have a terrorist attack in Scandinavia; in Norway, Denmark or Sweden," stated the head of PST, Norway's domestic intelligence service, less than a year ago (Aftenposten, December 14, 2005). Considering current trends, if such an attack is indeed to take place, its most likely perpetrators seem to be homegrown Scandinavian networks.
Notes
1. PET report 2004-2005.
2. Indictment of Bektasevic and others, Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 30, 2006.
3. Ibid.
Friday, October 20, 2006
Hamas in the Palestinian Authority Seeks and Receives Assistance from Tehran and Damascus by David Schenker
Earlier this week, Israeli Defense Forces intelligence directorate chief BG Yossi Baidatz said that since the September 2005 Israeli withdrawal, Hamas had smuggled in millions of dollars worth of advanced weaponry to Gaza. Baidatz briefed the Israeli cabinet that anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons had entered Gaza, placing IDF helicopters and fixed wing aircraft at risk. Other Israeli sources suggest these weapons include the Russian-made Kornet anti-tank rocket employed so effectively by Hizballah against Israeli armor in August, as well as Soviet-era SAM-7s. Still other reports suggest that Hamas had managed to import over 20 tons of military explosives into Gaza.
No doubt these assessments inspired the current Israeli operation in Gaza, in which Israeli forces have returned to the Philadephia Corridor—the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—once occupied by the IDF to interdict weapons and personnel smuggling.
For Israel, the challenges posed by an increasingly well equipped Hamas go well beyond armaments. Hamas is also focused on improving the capabilities of its' personnel.
Indeed, two weeks ago, the Hamas PA Minister of the Interior, Said Siyam, traveled to Tehran and Damascus in search of technical assistance for his forces. Siyam’s meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene'i, President Ahmedinejad, and senior security officials—including reportedly with the Revolutionary Guard officials—were said to have gone quite well. So did Siyam’s meetings with the Syrian Interior Minister. News reports emerging from the trip suggest that Siyam received commitments from Tehran and Damascus to train (and fund) Palestinian (i.e., Hamas) police and intelligence cadres.
These developments are cause for concern for Israel. But they should also be of concern to Washington. Like Hizballah—which has long targeted the US—Hamas too has long espoused a virulently anti-US ideology. A marked improvement of technical capabilities could help Hamas to more effectively target US assets and personnel, should it find it in its interests to do so. Just recall the roadside bomb attack that killed 4 US diplomatic personnel in Gaza three years ago, on October 15, 2003. The investigation remains open, but it’s not difficult to imagine a Hamas role—either independently or via the Popular Resistance Committees—in the attack.
No doubt these assessments inspired the current Israeli operation in Gaza, in which Israeli forces have returned to the Philadephia Corridor—the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—once occupied by the IDF to interdict weapons and personnel smuggling.
For Israel, the challenges posed by an increasingly well equipped Hamas go well beyond armaments. Hamas is also focused on improving the capabilities of its' personnel.
Indeed, two weeks ago, the Hamas PA Minister of the Interior, Said Siyam, traveled to Tehran and Damascus in search of technical assistance for his forces. Siyam’s meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene'i, President Ahmedinejad, and senior security officials—including reportedly with the Revolutionary Guard officials—were said to have gone quite well. So did Siyam’s meetings with the Syrian Interior Minister. News reports emerging from the trip suggest that Siyam received commitments from Tehran and Damascus to train (and fund) Palestinian (i.e., Hamas) police and intelligence cadres.
These developments are cause for concern for Israel. But they should also be of concern to Washington. Like Hizballah—which has long targeted the US—Hamas too has long espoused a virulently anti-US ideology. A marked improvement of technical capabilities could help Hamas to more effectively target US assets and personnel, should it find it in its interests to do so. Just recall the roadside bomb attack that killed 4 US diplomatic personnel in Gaza three years ago, on October 15, 2003. The investigation remains open, but it’s not difficult to imagine a Hamas role—either independently or via the Popular Resistance Committees—in the attack.
Border Security & Venezuela by Aaron Mannes
US Representative Michael McCaul (TX - 10), Chairman of the Subcommittee for Investigations of the House Homeland Security Committee just released a major report A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border.
Among other things, the report deals with the history and future risk of terrorists entering the US along with the hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants entering this country along the US-Mexican border annually.
A particularly interesting note was the report's discussion of Venezuela's current policy of freely issuing identity documents. Thousands of cedulas (the Venezuelan equivalent of social security cards) have reportedly been issued to non-Venezuelans - including Cubans, Columbians, Middle Easterners, and Pakistanis. Combined with Hugo's belligerent rhetoric and close relationship with Iran this is extremely worrisome.
This issue has been discussed in intel circles for some time. FARC's foreign minister was living openly in Caracas and had even voted in Venezuela's election.
In fairness, even for Hugo, directly supporting terror attacks against the U.S. may be a bit much (although maybe not). This is more likely crime plus. That is - corruption and criminal activity - permitted by Hugo's regime as a revenue source with the added bonus of causing trouble for the United States.
Regardless it is presents a serious security problem.
The House report has made headlines in Venezuela and the US Ambassador there has called for more stringent controls on Venezuelan identity documents. This also plays into Venezuelan politics. Venezuela is holding elections in December and many Venezuelans are not pleased to see their country slowly slipping into international pariah status.
Among other things, the report deals with the history and future risk of terrorists entering the US along with the hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants entering this country along the US-Mexican border annually.
A particularly interesting note was the report's discussion of Venezuela's current policy of freely issuing identity documents. Thousands of cedulas (the Venezuelan equivalent of social security cards) have reportedly been issued to non-Venezuelans - including Cubans, Columbians, Middle Easterners, and Pakistanis. Combined with Hugo's belligerent rhetoric and close relationship with Iran this is extremely worrisome.
This issue has been discussed in intel circles for some time. FARC's foreign minister was living openly in Caracas and had even voted in Venezuela's election.
In fairness, even for Hugo, directly supporting terror attacks against the U.S. may be a bit much (although maybe not). This is more likely crime plus. That is - corruption and criminal activity - permitted by Hugo's regime as a revenue source with the added bonus of causing trouble for the United States.
Regardless it is presents a serious security problem.
The House report has made headlines in Venezuela and the US Ambassador there has called for more stringent controls on Venezuelan identity documents. This also plays into Venezuelan politics. Venezuela is holding elections in December and many Venezuelans are not pleased to see their country slowly slipping into international pariah status.
Thursday, October 19, 2006
Scientists Create ‘Cloak of Invisibility’ by A.P.
Scientists are boldly going where only fiction has gone before -- to develop a Cloak of Invisibility. It isn't quite ready to hide a Romulan space ship from Capt. James T. Kirk or to disguise Harry Potter, but it is a significant start and could show the way to more sophisticated designs.
In this first successful experiment, researchers from the United States and England were able to cloak a copper cylinder.
It's like a mirage, where heat causes the bending of light rays and cloaks the road ahead behind an image of the sky.
''We have built an artificial mirage that can hide something from would-be observers in any direction,'' said cloak designer David Schurig, a research associate in Duke University's electrical and computer engineering department.
For their first attempt, the researchers designed a cloak that prevents microwaves from detecting objects. Like light and radar waves, microwaves usually bounce off objects, making them visible to instruments and creating a shadow that can be detected.
Cloaking used special materials to deflect radar or light or other waves around an object, like water flowing around a smooth rock in a stream. It differs from stealth technology, which does not make an aircraft invisible but reduces the cross-section available to radar, making it hard to track.
The new work points the way for an improved version that could hide people and objects from visible light.
Conceptually, the chance of adapting the concept to visible light is good, Schurig said in a telephone interview. But, he added, ''From an engineering point of view it is very challenging.''
The cloaking of a cylinder from microwaves comes just five months after Schurig and colleagues published their theory that it should be possible. Their work is reported in a paper in Friday's issue of the journal Science.
''We did this work very quickly ... and that led to a cloak that is not optimal,'' said co-author David R. Smith, also of Duke. ''We know how to make a much better one.''
The first working cloak was in only two dimensions and did cast a small shadow, Smith said. The next step is to go for three dimensions and to eliminate any shadow.
Viewers can see things because objects scatter the light that strikes them, reflecting some of it back to the eye.
''The cloak reduces both an object's reflection and its shadow, either of which would enable its detection,'' Smith said.
The cloak is made of metamaterials, which are mixtures of metal and circuit board materials such as ceramic, Teflon or fiber composite.
In an ideal situation, the cloak and the item it is hiding would be invisible. An observer would see whatever is beyond them, with no evidence the cloaked item exists.
''Since we do not have a perfect cloak at this point, there is some reflection and some shadow, meaning that the background would still be visible just darkened somewhat. ... We now just need to improve the performance of cloaking structures.''
In a very speculative application, he added, ''one could imagine 'cloaking' acoustic waves, so as to shield a region from vibration or seismic activity.''
Natalia M. Litchinitser, a researcher at the University of Michigan department of electrical engineering and computer science who was not part of the research team, said the ideas raised by the work ''represent a first step toward the development of functional materials for a wide spectrum of civil and military applications.''
Joining Schurig and Smith in the project were researchers at Imperial College in London and SensorMetrix, a materials and technology company in San Diego.
The research was supported by the Intelligence Community Postdoctoral Research Fellowship Program and the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
In this first successful experiment, researchers from the United States and England were able to cloak a copper cylinder.
It's like a mirage, where heat causes the bending of light rays and cloaks the road ahead behind an image of the sky.
''We have built an artificial mirage that can hide something from would-be observers in any direction,'' said cloak designer David Schurig, a research associate in Duke University's electrical and computer engineering department.
For their first attempt, the researchers designed a cloak that prevents microwaves from detecting objects. Like light and radar waves, microwaves usually bounce off objects, making them visible to instruments and creating a shadow that can be detected.
Cloaking used special materials to deflect radar or light or other waves around an object, like water flowing around a smooth rock in a stream. It differs from stealth technology, which does not make an aircraft invisible but reduces the cross-section available to radar, making it hard to track.
The new work points the way for an improved version that could hide people and objects from visible light.
Conceptually, the chance of adapting the concept to visible light is good, Schurig said in a telephone interview. But, he added, ''From an engineering point of view it is very challenging.''
The cloaking of a cylinder from microwaves comes just five months after Schurig and colleagues published their theory that it should be possible. Their work is reported in a paper in Friday's issue of the journal Science.
''We did this work very quickly ... and that led to a cloak that is not optimal,'' said co-author David R. Smith, also of Duke. ''We know how to make a much better one.''
The first working cloak was in only two dimensions and did cast a small shadow, Smith said. The next step is to go for three dimensions and to eliminate any shadow.
Viewers can see things because objects scatter the light that strikes them, reflecting some of it back to the eye.
''The cloak reduces both an object's reflection and its shadow, either of which would enable its detection,'' Smith said.
The cloak is made of metamaterials, which are mixtures of metal and circuit board materials such as ceramic, Teflon or fiber composite.
In an ideal situation, the cloak and the item it is hiding would be invisible. An observer would see whatever is beyond them, with no evidence the cloaked item exists.
''Since we do not have a perfect cloak at this point, there is some reflection and some shadow, meaning that the background would still be visible just darkened somewhat. ... We now just need to improve the performance of cloaking structures.''
In a very speculative application, he added, ''one could imagine 'cloaking' acoustic waves, so as to shield a region from vibration or seismic activity.''
Natalia M. Litchinitser, a researcher at the University of Michigan department of electrical engineering and computer science who was not part of the research team, said the ideas raised by the work ''represent a first step toward the development of functional materials for a wide spectrum of civil and military applications.''
Joining Schurig and Smith in the project were researchers at Imperial College in London and SensorMetrix, a materials and technology company in San Diego.
The research was supported by the Intelligence Community Postdoctoral Research Fellowship Program and the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
Stevia is a Non-Toxic, Natural Sweetener by Daryl Kulak
You've seen all the knocks against sweeteners by now. Refined sugar is causing a diabetes epidemic. Aspartame is a toxic manmade chemical and people are finding it's better used as ant poison than as a sweetener. And Splenda is proving to be as problematic as other artificial sweeteners, because it contains chlorine.
So are we stuck? Must we go through our lives without anything sweet ever again? I certainly don't plan to.
I found a sweetener that is not only completely natural (comes from the leaf of a plant) but it also stabilizes blood sugar and acts as an antiviral agent, in that it can stop the onset of cold or flu. It's called stevia (pronounced STEE-vee-uh or STEH-vee-uh).
I think stevia is the best kept nutrition secret in America. Here is a replacement for sugar that is not a manmade chemical, it is not toxic and is actually healthy.
I say America, because in other countries, it's no secret. Stevia is the number one sweetener in Japan, with the majority of the market. Even Diet Coke is sweetened with stevia in Japan. It's used extensively in South America and other places as well.
Why is America behind in accepting this natural, non-toxic sweetener? You can thank our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for that. They made a decision to limit our access to stevia at exactly the time aspartame was being introduced. You can make your own decisions based on the story of aspartame and stevia in the early 1980s.
Stevia is possibly the most studied herb in the world. 900 studies have been done. Almost all of them have said that stevia is safe, but a handful of the studies hint at certain problems, which you can read about here.
Stevia has the ability to stabilize blood sugar. Whereas refined sugar causes spikes and drops in blood sugar, stevia can help regulate it. And stevia has strong anti-viral properties. That means you can use it to stave off a cold or flu, in concert with homeopathics and other remedies, of course.
You can buy it at most health food stores. Note that it is called a "dietary supplement," not a sweetener. That's the loophole that stevia makers must jump through to be able to sell it. Also, you won't see stevia added to any food products (soda, baked goods, etc.) in the U.S. because of the FDA rulings.
I use stevia everyday. I add a few drops of stevia liquid to water and drink several glasses each day. The liquid comes in various flavors - root beer is my favorite. I never drink soda anymore, my stevia water has been a satisfying replacement for that.
Stevia also comes in little packets, like sugar packets. These can be used to sweeten coffee or used in baking or anywhere else you might use sugar. Several stevia cookbooks are available. I've tried using the liquid stevia in cooking, with absolutely no success. I'm going to keep trying, though. The problem I've had is that I can't get the amounts right. Since the liquid is so concentrated, I always put in too little or too much stevia. Let me know if you've had any experience with this.
Another problem I have with stevia is the price. The 2 ounce bottles of liquid stevia are over $12. It seems really high, but it's good to remember that this stuff is very concentrated. I usually add 2 droppersful to a pint of water to drink. I'm guessing my pint of sweetened water costs about 70 cents or so. It's not bad when you think of it in those terms, but it's very frustrating to go to the store and have to pay so much for a tiny, tiny bottle. My guess is that stevia will become less and less expensive as more people start buying it. So buy, BUY!!
Oh, and if you don't want to pay big prices for stevia, you can grow it yourself. Stevia plants can grow pretty well in most parts of the country. The quality might not be as good (i.e. some bitter aftertaste) but it could be fun. Get stevia seeds here.
Overall, I'm so happy to have found stevia. I love my daily stevia-water drink - can't do without it. I wish I could get it to work in my baking, but that will just take experimentation.
So are we stuck? Must we go through our lives without anything sweet ever again? I certainly don't plan to.
I found a sweetener that is not only completely natural (comes from the leaf of a plant) but it also stabilizes blood sugar and acts as an antiviral agent, in that it can stop the onset of cold or flu. It's called stevia (pronounced STEE-vee-uh or STEH-vee-uh).
I think stevia is the best kept nutrition secret in America. Here is a replacement for sugar that is not a manmade chemical, it is not toxic and is actually healthy.
I say America, because in other countries, it's no secret. Stevia is the number one sweetener in Japan, with the majority of the market. Even Diet Coke is sweetened with stevia in Japan. It's used extensively in South America and other places as well.
Why is America behind in accepting this natural, non-toxic sweetener? You can thank our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for that. They made a decision to limit our access to stevia at exactly the time aspartame was being introduced. You can make your own decisions based on the story of aspartame and stevia in the early 1980s.
Stevia is possibly the most studied herb in the world. 900 studies have been done. Almost all of them have said that stevia is safe, but a handful of the studies hint at certain problems, which you can read about here.
Stevia has the ability to stabilize blood sugar. Whereas refined sugar causes spikes and drops in blood sugar, stevia can help regulate it. And stevia has strong anti-viral properties. That means you can use it to stave off a cold or flu, in concert with homeopathics and other remedies, of course.
You can buy it at most health food stores. Note that it is called a "dietary supplement," not a sweetener. That's the loophole that stevia makers must jump through to be able to sell it. Also, you won't see stevia added to any food products (soda, baked goods, etc.) in the U.S. because of the FDA rulings.
I use stevia everyday. I add a few drops of stevia liquid to water and drink several glasses each day. The liquid comes in various flavors - root beer is my favorite. I never drink soda anymore, my stevia water has been a satisfying replacement for that.
Stevia also comes in little packets, like sugar packets. These can be used to sweeten coffee or used in baking or anywhere else you might use sugar. Several stevia cookbooks are available. I've tried using the liquid stevia in cooking, with absolutely no success. I'm going to keep trying, though. The problem I've had is that I can't get the amounts right. Since the liquid is so concentrated, I always put in too little or too much stevia. Let me know if you've had any experience with this.
Another problem I have with stevia is the price. The 2 ounce bottles of liquid stevia are over $12. It seems really high, but it's good to remember that this stuff is very concentrated. I usually add 2 droppersful to a pint of water to drink. I'm guessing my pint of sweetened water costs about 70 cents or so. It's not bad when you think of it in those terms, but it's very frustrating to go to the store and have to pay so much for a tiny, tiny bottle. My guess is that stevia will become less and less expensive as more people start buying it. So buy, BUY!!
Oh, and if you don't want to pay big prices for stevia, you can grow it yourself. Stevia plants can grow pretty well in most parts of the country. The quality might not be as good (i.e. some bitter aftertaste) but it could be fun. Get stevia seeds here.
Overall, I'm so happy to have found stevia. I love my daily stevia-water drink - can't do without it. I wish I could get it to work in my baking, but that will just take experimentation.
Physician, Fool Thyself: Why the healing power of placebos is making doctors think twice by Alun Anderson
Can believing in a cure make it work? That question has long bedeviled researchers, who labor to rule out the placebo effect when they test new drugs. Yet there may be real value - as well as new hope for the sick - in what has long been dismissed as snake oil.
The hope comes from mounting evidence that believing in a cure or trusting in the words of a doctor or therapist is not "merely psychological," but can bring about genuine physiological changes in people suffering from pain, depression, and even Parkinson's disease.
Two recent studies show the direction the new science of placebos is taking (placebo is Latin for "I shall please"). In one, Harvard Medical School researchers carried out the first clinical trial ever to compare the effectiveness of different placebos rather than that of different drugs. This "upside-down research," as lead author Ted Kaptchuk called it, is needed to start finding out what's important about medicine's bedside rituals. While rituals have little relevance in the treatment of, say, strep throat (you need antibiotics), in other conditions "rituals may be the critical component," he says.
His team looked at pain stemming from repetitive strain injury and compared two placebos: sugar pills and sham acupuncture, which uses a needle that does not really penetrate the skin but instead slides secretly back into the needle holder. Amazingly, both worked (sham acupuncture won). The dueling placebos even had side effects, with 15% of people who took the sugar pills reporting drowsiness and 20% feeling pain from the fake acupuncture.
Other studies show that there are actually drugs capable of boosting the power of belief. Fabrizio Benedetti of the University of Turin found that giving a drug called proglumide along with a placebo provided greater relief to patients suffering postoperative pain than a placebo alone. Proglumide works on the nervous system's opiate receptors, but unlike morphine, it is not a painkiller by itself: Secretly slipping the drug into the IV line of hospitalized patients has no effect at all. Instead, Benedetti found, proglumide boosts the brain's "expectation pathways," so the drug helps reduce pain if, and only if, it is associated with a placebo that creates an expectation of pain relief.
These studies come alongside a host of data from brain scanners showing that the placebo effect produces robust physiological changes. We now know that pain-relieving endorphins are released after sufferers take a placebo that is just saline solution. Placebos can even help people suffering from Parkinson's, boosting the level of dopamine, which is lacking in that condition.
And then there is placebos' power to combat depression. Back in 2002, a study re-analyzed FDA data for six top antidepressants and found that 80% of their effect was duplicated in placebo control groups. To the annoyance of drug companies, the authors suggested that the additional response to the drugs, on top of the powerful placebo effect, might be "clinically negligible."
Harnessing the placebo effect could spawn opportunities in both alternative and conventional medicine - but only with a shift in thinking. Alternative medicine could focus on finding ways to make the effect more powerful instead of pretending to offer the same benefits as conventional medicine. Yet publicizing the placebo effect has risks: If we stop believing in a medicine, it might work less well. So scientists who debunk alternative medical treatments should think again about whether it is ethical to destroy people's belief.
How far does placebo power extend? Doctors rightly agree that unlike pain and depression, infectious diseases and cancer are not going to be helped directly by placebos. But recovery even from serious illness that is being properly treated is another matter, as there is much anecdotal evidence that hope plus trust in your physician speeds convalescence.
Further in the future, we will learn how both active drugs and belief and rituals work inside the brain. The distinctions between mind and body will break down, and we'll have a new, improved, unified science of medicine that includes a healthy dose of snake oil.
The hope comes from mounting evidence that believing in a cure or trusting in the words of a doctor or therapist is not "merely psychological," but can bring about genuine physiological changes in people suffering from pain, depression, and even Parkinson's disease.
Two recent studies show the direction the new science of placebos is taking (placebo is Latin for "I shall please"). In one, Harvard Medical School researchers carried out the first clinical trial ever to compare the effectiveness of different placebos rather than that of different drugs. This "upside-down research," as lead author Ted Kaptchuk called it, is needed to start finding out what's important about medicine's bedside rituals. While rituals have little relevance in the treatment of, say, strep throat (you need antibiotics), in other conditions "rituals may be the critical component," he says.
His team looked at pain stemming from repetitive strain injury and compared two placebos: sugar pills and sham acupuncture, which uses a needle that does not really penetrate the skin but instead slides secretly back into the needle holder. Amazingly, both worked (sham acupuncture won). The dueling placebos even had side effects, with 15% of people who took the sugar pills reporting drowsiness and 20% feeling pain from the fake acupuncture.
Other studies show that there are actually drugs capable of boosting the power of belief. Fabrizio Benedetti of the University of Turin found that giving a drug called proglumide along with a placebo provided greater relief to patients suffering postoperative pain than a placebo alone. Proglumide works on the nervous system's opiate receptors, but unlike morphine, it is not a painkiller by itself: Secretly slipping the drug into the IV line of hospitalized patients has no effect at all. Instead, Benedetti found, proglumide boosts the brain's "expectation pathways," so the drug helps reduce pain if, and only if, it is associated with a placebo that creates an expectation of pain relief.
These studies come alongside a host of data from brain scanners showing that the placebo effect produces robust physiological changes. We now know that pain-relieving endorphins are released after sufferers take a placebo that is just saline solution. Placebos can even help people suffering from Parkinson's, boosting the level of dopamine, which is lacking in that condition.
And then there is placebos' power to combat depression. Back in 2002, a study re-analyzed FDA data for six top antidepressants and found that 80% of their effect was duplicated in placebo control groups. To the annoyance of drug companies, the authors suggested that the additional response to the drugs, on top of the powerful placebo effect, might be "clinically negligible."
Harnessing the placebo effect could spawn opportunities in both alternative and conventional medicine - but only with a shift in thinking. Alternative medicine could focus on finding ways to make the effect more powerful instead of pretending to offer the same benefits as conventional medicine. Yet publicizing the placebo effect has risks: If we stop believing in a medicine, it might work less well. So scientists who debunk alternative medical treatments should think again about whether it is ethical to destroy people's belief.
How far does placebo power extend? Doctors rightly agree that unlike pain and depression, infectious diseases and cancer are not going to be helped directly by placebos. But recovery even from serious illness that is being properly treated is another matter, as there is much anecdotal evidence that hope plus trust in your physician speeds convalescence.
Further in the future, we will learn how both active drugs and belief and rituals work inside the brain. The distinctions between mind and body will break down, and we'll have a new, improved, unified science of medicine that includes a healthy dose of snake oil.
Falcon Fills Blackbird's Shoes by David Axe
A decade after the final retirement of Lockheed Martin's Mach-3 SR-71 Blackbird spy plane, the Air Force is preparing to test a plane that flies more than three times as fast. Two Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicles, built by Lockheed Martin with input from NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), will take to the air in 2008. The $100-million program aims to field a Mach-10 unmanned aircraft that can spy on foreign powers, drop bombs or even lob satellites into orbit.
The Blackbird, which was first retired in 1990 then briefly resurrected between 1995 and 1997, reached its Mach-3 top speed by way of its hybrid Pratt & Whitney J-58 engines, which featured a conventional turbojet engine installed inside a ramjet optimized for supersonic flight. At low speeds, the turbojet did most of the work; at high speed the turbojet throttled back and the ramjet took over.
Engineers are improving on this so-called "combined cycle" to propel the Falcon, using a more powerful "scramjet" in place of the ramjet. "We need propulsion that transitions seamlessly from Mach 0 to Mach 9 or 10," says Lockheed Martin's Bob Baumgartner.
"For low speed, we're looking at turbine engines that can perform at speeds from Mach 0 to Mach 4, then a scramjet ... that takes over anywhere between Mach 2 and Mach 4 and goes up to higher Mach numbers -- depending on the fuel, up to Mach 10," says Steven Walker, a Darpa researcher. "For sure, we know how turbines work, but we don't have turbines that work at Mach 4."
"The scramjets are still at a low-technology readiness level," he adds. "Combining both flow-paths and looking at how you transition from one to the other and the transition back ... that's all new, break-through technology."
"Thermal protection ... is the next major enabling technology," Baumgartner says, referring to ways of coping with the high temperatures that Mach-10 flight generates. "We're looking at durable metallic thermal protection panels to withstand heat and keep it away from structure. We're also looking at ceramic panels."
Foil insulation is an option too, he continues. And for the engines, developers are looking at new ceramic or metal-alloy coatings that can withstand temperatures reaching thousands of degrees.
Lockheed Martin's Craig Johnston, who works on a hypersonic engine project, sees many applications for Falcon and similar vehicles. "I can easily envision this technology eventually making its way into advanced aircraft ... something like long-range strike aircraft, supersonic bombers or future fighters."
Darpa also foresees using Falcon to cheaply launch small satellites. "Falcon will develop a low cost, responsive Small Launch Vehicle that can be launched for $5 million or less," an agency statement reads. "The SLV will be capable of launching small satellites into sun-synchronous orbits and will provide the nation a new, small-payload access to space capability."
The Blackbird, which was first retired in 1990 then briefly resurrected between 1995 and 1997, reached its Mach-3 top speed by way of its hybrid Pratt & Whitney J-58 engines, which featured a conventional turbojet engine installed inside a ramjet optimized for supersonic flight. At low speeds, the turbojet did most of the work; at high speed the turbojet throttled back and the ramjet took over.
Engineers are improving on this so-called "combined cycle" to propel the Falcon, using a more powerful "scramjet" in place of the ramjet. "We need propulsion that transitions seamlessly from Mach 0 to Mach 9 or 10," says Lockheed Martin's Bob Baumgartner.
"For low speed, we're looking at turbine engines that can perform at speeds from Mach 0 to Mach 4, then a scramjet ... that takes over anywhere between Mach 2 and Mach 4 and goes up to higher Mach numbers -- depending on the fuel, up to Mach 10," says Steven Walker, a Darpa researcher. "For sure, we know how turbines work, but we don't have turbines that work at Mach 4."
"The scramjets are still at a low-technology readiness level," he adds. "Combining both flow-paths and looking at how you transition from one to the other and the transition back ... that's all new, break-through technology."
"Thermal protection ... is the next major enabling technology," Baumgartner says, referring to ways of coping with the high temperatures that Mach-10 flight generates. "We're looking at durable metallic thermal protection panels to withstand heat and keep it away from structure. We're also looking at ceramic panels."
Foil insulation is an option too, he continues. And for the engines, developers are looking at new ceramic or metal-alloy coatings that can withstand temperatures reaching thousands of degrees.
Lockheed Martin's Craig Johnston, who works on a hypersonic engine project, sees many applications for Falcon and similar vehicles. "I can easily envision this technology eventually making its way into advanced aircraft ... something like long-range strike aircraft, supersonic bombers or future fighters."
Darpa also foresees using Falcon to cheaply launch small satellites. "Falcon will develop a low cost, responsive Small Launch Vehicle that can be launched for $5 million or less," an agency statement reads. "The SLV will be capable of launching small satellites into sun-synchronous orbits and will provide the nation a new, small-payload access to space capability."
Max Boot: Bring Iraqi Forces Up to Speed by Max Boot
(If the U.S. won't send more troops to stabilize the country, it should assign more of its best officers to train Iraqis.)
Of the many failures that have bedeviled the American military effort in Iraq, few are as inexplicable and costly as the failure to commit more resources to the Iraqi security forces. The only way U.S. troops will be able to go home without having failed in their mission is if Iraqis are capable of establishing order on their own. Yet U.S. efforts to train and equip the Iraqis got off to a laughable start in 2003 and have only slightly improved since.
In the just - ended fiscal year, we spent $93.8 billion on U.S. troops in Iraq and just $3 billion on their indigenous counterparts. Most American troops live on giant bases complete with sprawling PXs and Internet cafes, and they go outside only in convoys of armored vehicles. Iraqi troops, by contrast, usually live in ramshackle quarters, often fail to receive enough ammunition or other essential supplies and have to travel in unarmored pickup trucks that make them easy prey for insurgents.
Many of these shortcomings, of course, are because of the Iraqis' own inadequacies, particularly in the higher echelons and at the Ministry of Defense. But part of the blame falls on us for not doing more to bring the Iraqis along faster.
It's not only a matter of money. We have more than 140,000 troops in Iraq, but fewer than 4,000 of them act as advisors. There are barely enough to go around for higher-level Iraqi headquarters; there are no "embeds" available to consistently operate at the company and platoon level, where most of the action occurs. The Iraqi police forces are even more neglected.
What's more, some of the best and brightest American officers are being steered away from Iraqi units. Everyone in the U.S. armed forces knows that the way to the top is to command American units, not to advise foreign units - even if the latter task is more difficult and more important.
One Army officer who has served in Iraq and would be well qualified for an advisory role told me recently that he was asked to become an ROTC instructor at home but not an advisor in Iraq. Those he sees being sent to help Iraqis tend to have "marginal career prospects." "No one is diverted from a school or command," he told me. "No one is sent after a successful command."
Another experienced Army officer with a Special Forces background - exactly the kind of advisor we should be sending - actually tried to volunteer. He recalls being told by a personnel officer: "Boy, I would hate to waste you with an assignment like that. With your background and file quality, there are so many other billets I could assign you to."
In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Brig. Gen. Terry Wolff, commander of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, defended the advisory program by pointing out that it has become better over time. A school has been established at Ft. Riley, Kansas, where advisory teams receive 60 days of training before being sent to Iraq. This is a big improvement over the days when so - called military training teams would be established on the spot with members who were strangers to one another and had received no specialized training.
But just because the program is better doesn't mean it's adequate. There is still a need for many more first - rate U.S. advisors to work with Iraqi army and police units down to the platoon level. T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel, believes that 20,000 to 30,000 advisors are needed and that we should be sending officers who have successfully led American battalions and brigades. "We're at least an order of magnitude off," Hammes told me. "If our main effort is advisory, why aren't our best people going to become advisors?"
Perhaps because this would force a shake - up in the U.S. armed forces, with officers having to be pulled out of plum staff billets and field assignments. That's a tough change to make, but it may be necessary. A country of 26 million can't be controlled by 140,000 troops. If we're not going to send a lot more soldiers, it might make sense to draw down to about 40,000 to 50,000 troops so that we could free up officers and NCOs for advisor duty. Iraq may be too far down the road to civil war for this step to make any difference, but we need to try something different to salvage a situation spinning out of control.
Of the many failures that have bedeviled the American military effort in Iraq, few are as inexplicable and costly as the failure to commit more resources to the Iraqi security forces. The only way U.S. troops will be able to go home without having failed in their mission is if Iraqis are capable of establishing order on their own. Yet U.S. efforts to train and equip the Iraqis got off to a laughable start in 2003 and have only slightly improved since.
In the just - ended fiscal year, we spent $93.8 billion on U.S. troops in Iraq and just $3 billion on their indigenous counterparts. Most American troops live on giant bases complete with sprawling PXs and Internet cafes, and they go outside only in convoys of armored vehicles. Iraqi troops, by contrast, usually live in ramshackle quarters, often fail to receive enough ammunition or other essential supplies and have to travel in unarmored pickup trucks that make them easy prey for insurgents.
Many of these shortcomings, of course, are because of the Iraqis' own inadequacies, particularly in the higher echelons and at the Ministry of Defense. But part of the blame falls on us for not doing more to bring the Iraqis along faster.
It's not only a matter of money. We have more than 140,000 troops in Iraq, but fewer than 4,000 of them act as advisors. There are barely enough to go around for higher-level Iraqi headquarters; there are no "embeds" available to consistently operate at the company and platoon level, where most of the action occurs. The Iraqi police forces are even more neglected.
What's more, some of the best and brightest American officers are being steered away from Iraqi units. Everyone in the U.S. armed forces knows that the way to the top is to command American units, not to advise foreign units - even if the latter task is more difficult and more important.
One Army officer who has served in Iraq and would be well qualified for an advisory role told me recently that he was asked to become an ROTC instructor at home but not an advisor in Iraq. Those he sees being sent to help Iraqis tend to have "marginal career prospects." "No one is diverted from a school or command," he told me. "No one is sent after a successful command."
Another experienced Army officer with a Special Forces background - exactly the kind of advisor we should be sending - actually tried to volunteer. He recalls being told by a personnel officer: "Boy, I would hate to waste you with an assignment like that. With your background and file quality, there are so many other billets I could assign you to."
In a telephone interview from Baghdad, Brig. Gen. Terry Wolff, commander of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, defended the advisory program by pointing out that it has become better over time. A school has been established at Ft. Riley, Kansas, where advisory teams receive 60 days of training before being sent to Iraq. This is a big improvement over the days when so - called military training teams would be established on the spot with members who were strangers to one another and had received no specialized training.
But just because the program is better doesn't mean it's adequate. There is still a need for many more first - rate U.S. advisors to work with Iraqi army and police units down to the platoon level. T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel, believes that 20,000 to 30,000 advisors are needed and that we should be sending officers who have successfully led American battalions and brigades. "We're at least an order of magnitude off," Hammes told me. "If our main effort is advisory, why aren't our best people going to become advisors?"
Perhaps because this would force a shake - up in the U.S. armed forces, with officers having to be pulled out of plum staff billets and field assignments. That's a tough change to make, but it may be necessary. A country of 26 million can't be controlled by 140,000 troops. If we're not going to send a lot more soldiers, it might make sense to draw down to about 40,000 to 50,000 troops so that we could free up officers and NCOs for advisor duty. Iraq may be too far down the road to civil war for this step to make any difference, but we need to try something different to salvage a situation spinning out of control.
Wednesday, October 18, 2006
War on the Middle Class by Lou Dobbs
Please watch "Lou Dobbs" of special reports about War on the Middle Class.
Congress, corporate elites, and special interest groups are destroying America's middle class.
Congress, corporate elites, and special interest groups are destroying America's middle class.
The Thin Green Line: What the Latest Violence Reveals about the Failed U.S. Strategy in Iraq by Phillip Carter
Sectarian violence exploded in Iraq this weekend, with Shiite and Sunni militants openly battling for control of Balad and Duluiyah, two cities north of Baghdad. The violence began with the kidnapping and beheading of 17 Shiite laborers; so far, nearly 100 Iraqis have perished in the fighting. U.S. forces initially held back, giving the Iraqi police and army the chance to pacify the cities. Once they recognized that this approach had failed, U.S. combat troops moved into Balad on Tuesday, conducting joint patrols in an effort to take back the streets. For now, the unrest seems to have simmered down.
Despite having 140,000 troops in Iraq, our military is still forced to play a game of whack-a-mole with the insurgency and militias, because it cannot dominate the country enough to secure every city and hamlet. The U.S. military constitutes a thin green line capable of containing the insurgency when deployed, but it cannot be everywhere. The inability of Iraqi police and army units to retake Balad on their own demonstrates the continuing problem with the U.S. exit strategy of "standing up" Iraqi security forces so we can "stand down." Without a radical change of strategy, the mission in Iraq will fail.
The towns of Balad and Duluiyah sit in the lush, fertile Tigris River valley, a region of Iraq crisscrossed by irrigation canals, farms, palm groves, and highways and dotted with hundreds of rural towns and villages. Ethnically, the region is mixed; Sunni villages often coexist next to Shiite villages, and sometimes members of each sect live within the same block. The United States chose Balad as the site of its largest airbase in Iraq because of its central location and the existing long runways that Saddam Hussein's air force had used for years. Now dubbed "Life Support Area Anaconda," it is one of the largest American bases in the world and is home to more than 20,000 military personnel, contractors, and civilians. It boasts two base stores the size of small Wal-Marts, several massive dining facilities, two swimming pools, a bus service, and a quality of life better than anywhere else in Iraq. Although it functions primarily as a logistics and transportation hub, Anaconda is also home to several combat units, as is nearby Forward Operating Base Paliwoda, which sits just on the outskirts of Balad.
Although the United States has nearly 30,000 troops near Balad, it does not have any troops in the city on a full-time basis. During the last two years, the U.S. presence in Iraq has consolidated in massive superfortresses like Anaconda and shut down dozens of smaller bases and outposts across the country. This operational withdrawal was meant to make the U.S. presence more efficient and to reduce the risk of having small units deployed on small bases where they might be vulnerable to insurgent attack; it also forced the Iraqis to become more self-sufficient in securing their own cities. Unfortunately, this has come at a price. When a massive flare-up happens in places like Balad, Tikrit, or Kirkuk, all cities without a permanent U.S. presence, our military must respond from afar, its effectiveness and responsiveness limited by distance.
Of course, this presumes that U.S. forces are able to respond at a moment's notice. Nothing could be further from the truth. The American battalion responsible for Balad is stretched over hundreds of square miles and is responsible for partnering with Iraqi forces, engaging local government officials, overseeing reconstruction projects, securing its bases, and providing security throughout the area. Covering all these missions presents a difficult tactical problem, one that forces commanders to spread their troops thinly. A medium-sized city like Balad, with 100,000 residents, might be patrolled only by a company—100 to 150 men—at any given time.
This violent weekend proves that America needs to radically change its course in Iraq, while some form of victory still lies within our grasp. First, the U.S. military must reverse its trend of consolidation and redeploy its forces into Iraq's cities. Efficiency and force protection cannot define our military footprint in Iraq; if those are our goals, we may as well bring our troops home today. Instead, we must assume risk by pushing U.S. forces out into small patrol bases in the middle of Iraq's cities where they are able to work closely with Iraqi leaders and own the streets. Counterinsurgency requires engagement. The most effective U.S. efforts thus far in Iraq have been those that followed this maxim, like the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, which established numerous bases within the city and attacked the insurgency from within with a mix of political, economic, and military action.
Second, the United States needs to reinforce the most successful part of its strategy so far—embedding advisers ($) with Iraqi units. Our embedded advisers achieve more bang for the buck than any other troops in Iraq; one good 12-man adviser team, living and working with an Iraqi unit, can bolster an entire Iraqi battalion. Without these advisers, Iraqi army and police units remain ineffective—or worse, they go rogue. However, these advisers are drawn primarily from the reserves and the staff ranks, not from America's military elite, so they represent the B Team of today's military talent. The military needs to invest its best people in the job. If necessary, it should shatter existing units to cull the best officers and sergeants—those selected for command positions—for this critical duty. And the United States cannot afford to lavish advisers on the Iraqi army alone, as it has largely done since 2003. It must extend the embedding program to the police and the Iraqi government, down to the province and city level, to bring critical services like security, electricity, and governance to the Iraqi people.
At the same time, we must recognize the limitations of our strategy to raise the Iraqi forces—it is a blueprint for withdrawal, not for victory. At best, it will enable us to substitute Iraqi soldiers and cops for American men and women. But simply replacing American soldiers with Iraqi soldiers and cops will not end the insurgency; it will merely transform it into a civil war where the state-equipped army and police battle with Sunni and Shiite militias, with Iraqi civilians frequently caught in the crossfire.
To combat the insurgency, America must adopt a more holistic approach than simply building up the country's security forces. We have the seeds of this in Iraq today—the State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I worked closely with the PRT in Diyala to advise the Iraqi courts, jails, and police, and I saw their tremendous potential. However, having been hamstrung by bureaucratic infighting between the State and Defense departments, these teams now lack the authority, personnel, and resources to run the reconstruction effort effectively. America should reach back to one of its positive lessons from Vietnam, the "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support" program. There, the United States created a unified organization to manage all military and civilian pacification programs, recognizing that only a unified effort could bring the right mix of political, economic, and military solutions to bear on problems.
Although we copied some parts of the CORDS model in Afghanistan and Iraq when we created the PRTs, we did not go nearly far enough. It has become cliché to say that the insurgency requires a political solution; in practical terms, that means subordinating military force to political considerations and authority. Today's PRT chiefs need to have command authority over everything in their provinces, much as ambassadors have traditionally exercised command over all military activity in their countries. We must also empower the PRTs to actually do something besides diplomacy—that means money. Like battlefield commanders, PRT chiefs need deep pockets of petty cash (what the military calls the Commander's Emergency Response Program fund) to start small reconstruction projects and local initiatives that will have an immediate and tangible impact.
The Iraq Study Group led by James Baker will reportedly propose many significant adjustments to our diplomatic strategy and our relationship with the nascent Iraqi government. Failing that, the panel will recommend a strategic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. I believe that there is still time to secure Iraq and stave off what some believe is an inevitable civil war. Bolstering Iraq's security forces and our own reconstruction efforts may not be enough, but these practical fixes represent our best hope for pulling Iraq back from the precipice. We must act quickly, though, before more cities explode like Balad and Duluiyah.
Despite having 140,000 troops in Iraq, our military is still forced to play a game of whack-a-mole with the insurgency and militias, because it cannot dominate the country enough to secure every city and hamlet. The U.S. military constitutes a thin green line capable of containing the insurgency when deployed, but it cannot be everywhere. The inability of Iraqi police and army units to retake Balad on their own demonstrates the continuing problem with the U.S. exit strategy of "standing up" Iraqi security forces so we can "stand down." Without a radical change of strategy, the mission in Iraq will fail.
The towns of Balad and Duluiyah sit in the lush, fertile Tigris River valley, a region of Iraq crisscrossed by irrigation canals, farms, palm groves, and highways and dotted with hundreds of rural towns and villages. Ethnically, the region is mixed; Sunni villages often coexist next to Shiite villages, and sometimes members of each sect live within the same block. The United States chose Balad as the site of its largest airbase in Iraq because of its central location and the existing long runways that Saddam Hussein's air force had used for years. Now dubbed "Life Support Area Anaconda," it is one of the largest American bases in the world and is home to more than 20,000 military personnel, contractors, and civilians. It boasts two base stores the size of small Wal-Marts, several massive dining facilities, two swimming pools, a bus service, and a quality of life better than anywhere else in Iraq. Although it functions primarily as a logistics and transportation hub, Anaconda is also home to several combat units, as is nearby Forward Operating Base Paliwoda, which sits just on the outskirts of Balad.
Although the United States has nearly 30,000 troops near Balad, it does not have any troops in the city on a full-time basis. During the last two years, the U.S. presence in Iraq has consolidated in massive superfortresses like Anaconda and shut down dozens of smaller bases and outposts across the country. This operational withdrawal was meant to make the U.S. presence more efficient and to reduce the risk of having small units deployed on small bases where they might be vulnerable to insurgent attack; it also forced the Iraqis to become more self-sufficient in securing their own cities. Unfortunately, this has come at a price. When a massive flare-up happens in places like Balad, Tikrit, or Kirkuk, all cities without a permanent U.S. presence, our military must respond from afar, its effectiveness and responsiveness limited by distance.
Of course, this presumes that U.S. forces are able to respond at a moment's notice. Nothing could be further from the truth. The American battalion responsible for Balad is stretched over hundreds of square miles and is responsible for partnering with Iraqi forces, engaging local government officials, overseeing reconstruction projects, securing its bases, and providing security throughout the area. Covering all these missions presents a difficult tactical problem, one that forces commanders to spread their troops thinly. A medium-sized city like Balad, with 100,000 residents, might be patrolled only by a company—100 to 150 men—at any given time.
This violent weekend proves that America needs to radically change its course in Iraq, while some form of victory still lies within our grasp. First, the U.S. military must reverse its trend of consolidation and redeploy its forces into Iraq's cities. Efficiency and force protection cannot define our military footprint in Iraq; if those are our goals, we may as well bring our troops home today. Instead, we must assume risk by pushing U.S. forces out into small patrol bases in the middle of Iraq's cities where they are able to work closely with Iraqi leaders and own the streets. Counterinsurgency requires engagement. The most effective U.S. efforts thus far in Iraq have been those that followed this maxim, like the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, which established numerous bases within the city and attacked the insurgency from within with a mix of political, economic, and military action.
Second, the United States needs to reinforce the most successful part of its strategy so far—embedding advisers ($) with Iraqi units. Our embedded advisers achieve more bang for the buck than any other troops in Iraq; one good 12-man adviser team, living and working with an Iraqi unit, can bolster an entire Iraqi battalion. Without these advisers, Iraqi army and police units remain ineffective—or worse, they go rogue. However, these advisers are drawn primarily from the reserves and the staff ranks, not from America's military elite, so they represent the B Team of today's military talent. The military needs to invest its best people in the job. If necessary, it should shatter existing units to cull the best officers and sergeants—those selected for command positions—for this critical duty. And the United States cannot afford to lavish advisers on the Iraqi army alone, as it has largely done since 2003. It must extend the embedding program to the police and the Iraqi government, down to the province and city level, to bring critical services like security, electricity, and governance to the Iraqi people.
At the same time, we must recognize the limitations of our strategy to raise the Iraqi forces—it is a blueprint for withdrawal, not for victory. At best, it will enable us to substitute Iraqi soldiers and cops for American men and women. But simply replacing American soldiers with Iraqi soldiers and cops will not end the insurgency; it will merely transform it into a civil war where the state-equipped army and police battle with Sunni and Shiite militias, with Iraqi civilians frequently caught in the crossfire.
To combat the insurgency, America must adopt a more holistic approach than simply building up the country's security forces. We have the seeds of this in Iraq today—the State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I worked closely with the PRT in Diyala to advise the Iraqi courts, jails, and police, and I saw their tremendous potential. However, having been hamstrung by bureaucratic infighting between the State and Defense departments, these teams now lack the authority, personnel, and resources to run the reconstruction effort effectively. America should reach back to one of its positive lessons from Vietnam, the "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support" program. There, the United States created a unified organization to manage all military and civilian pacification programs, recognizing that only a unified effort could bring the right mix of political, economic, and military solutions to bear on problems.
Although we copied some parts of the CORDS model in Afghanistan and Iraq when we created the PRTs, we did not go nearly far enough. It has become cliché to say that the insurgency requires a political solution; in practical terms, that means subordinating military force to political considerations and authority. Today's PRT chiefs need to have command authority over everything in their provinces, much as ambassadors have traditionally exercised command over all military activity in their countries. We must also empower the PRTs to actually do something besides diplomacy—that means money. Like battlefield commanders, PRT chiefs need deep pockets of petty cash (what the military calls the Commander's Emergency Response Program fund) to start small reconstruction projects and local initiatives that will have an immediate and tangible impact.
The Iraq Study Group led by James Baker will reportedly propose many significant adjustments to our diplomatic strategy and our relationship with the nascent Iraqi government. Failing that, the panel will recommend a strategic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. I believe that there is still time to secure Iraq and stave off what some believe is an inevitable civil war. Bolstering Iraq's security forces and our own reconstruction efforts may not be enough, but these practical fixes represent our best hope for pulling Iraq back from the precipice. We must act quickly, though, before more cities explode like Balad and Duluiyah.
The Changing Face of War: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) by John Robb
In 1989, as the Berlin wall was being torn down, Bill Lind (with Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson) wrote "The Changing Face War: Into the Fourth Generation" for the Marine Corps Gazette. This seminal article made the case that while large scale interstate warfare was going the way of the dodo, low intensity guerrilla warfare and terrorism would thrive in its stead. They were right.
To make their point, Lind and his collaborators divided warfare over the last two centuries into four generations, where each previous generation was defeated by a successive generation of warfare. While, the first three generations deal with interstate warfare (although I make the point in my upcoming book "Brave New War" that the real fourth generation, missing from the framework, is nuclear warfare -- extreme mobility via ICBMs and SLBMs with extreme firepower via nukes), Lind's Fourth generation was between states and non-states. On the surface, many of the elements described as core to the fourth generation are not new and reflect guerrilla wars we have seen in the past:
* The emphasis on extreme dispersion.
* Decentralized logistics. An ability to live off of the land.
* Psychological warfare aimed collapsing the moral cohesion of the enemy (internal collapse).
* Extreme emphasis on maneuver at the expense of firepower.
However, Lind argued that the use of these methods of warfare on a global scale, with new technology, and through new methods of employment in combination with the decline of the West would radically increase the threat posed by fourth generation opponents. This has proven out as these opponents use our strength against us (judo moves) and our rear areas are increasingly targeted (rather than our military forces).
Into 5GW
Lind: Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.
Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war. What we see is jarring:
* Open source warfare. An ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new development and coordination methodologies. This new structure doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability. This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New York.
* Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).
* Virtual states (ala Philip Bobbitt). Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of the 4GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast (a GDP of trillions per year), and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states. This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.
NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th generation, it just doesn't matter. Whichever way you cut it, things are developing quickly and in the wrong direction.
To make their point, Lind and his collaborators divided warfare over the last two centuries into four generations, where each previous generation was defeated by a successive generation of warfare. While, the first three generations deal with interstate warfare (although I make the point in my upcoming book "Brave New War" that the real fourth generation, missing from the framework, is nuclear warfare -- extreme mobility via ICBMs and SLBMs with extreme firepower via nukes), Lind's Fourth generation was between states and non-states. On the surface, many of the elements described as core to the fourth generation are not new and reflect guerrilla wars we have seen in the past:
* The emphasis on extreme dispersion.
* Decentralized logistics. An ability to live off of the land.
* Psychological warfare aimed collapsing the moral cohesion of the enemy (internal collapse).
* Extreme emphasis on maneuver at the expense of firepower.
However, Lind argued that the use of these methods of warfare on a global scale, with new technology, and through new methods of employment in combination with the decline of the West would radically increase the threat posed by fourth generation opponents. This has proven out as these opponents use our strength against us (judo moves) and our rear areas are increasingly targeted (rather than our military forces).
Into 5GW
Lind: Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.
Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war. What we see is jarring:
* Open source warfare. An ability to decentralize beyond the limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new development and coordination methodologies. This new structure doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability. This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New York.
* Systems disruption. A method of sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses network dynamics (a new form of leveraged maneuver) to undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments favorable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).
* Virtual states (ala Philip Bobbitt). Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of the 4GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast (a GDP of trillions per year), and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states. This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.
NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th generation, it just doesn't matter. Whichever way you cut it, things are developing quickly and in the wrong direction.
For Iran, Soft-Kill Authoritarianism by Thomas Barnett
POST: Iran Limits ADSL Bandwidth
ARTICLE: Iran Bans Fast Internet to Cut West's Influence, Robert Tait, The Guardian, October 18, 2006
Simple equation: the more we pursue policies that strengthen hard - liners, the more they will disconnect the masses from the outside world and thus the less our influence over Iran's evolution.
The rule: soft - kill authoritarianism with connectivity, but hard-kill totalitarianism with regime change - however achieved.
Thanks to Terry Collier and Jacob Heim for sending this in.
ARTICLE: Iran Bans Fast Internet to Cut West's Influence, Robert Tait, The Guardian, October 18, 2006
Simple equation: the more we pursue policies that strengthen hard - liners, the more they will disconnect the masses from the outside world and thus the less our influence over Iran's evolution.
The rule: soft - kill authoritarianism with connectivity, but hard-kill totalitarianism with regime change - however achieved.
Thanks to Terry Collier and Jacob Heim for sending this in.
Tuesday, October 17, 2006
M.E.M.R.I. Special Dispatch Series - No. 1326
On October 17, 2006, an Islamist website posted a message titled "You Can Spy on the Enemies' Airports Directly by Controlling the Cameras' Direction." The message contains a link to a screen showing what it claims to be a live view of various areas within Anchorage International Airport via several cameras (http://209.193.48.89/view/index.shtml). The message gives directions for how to control the cameras and promises to provide links in the future for other airports as well.
Monday, October 16, 2006
Firefox 3.X/ Firefox Feature Brainstorming
We are currently in the early development stage for Firefox 3.X/ Firefox Feature Brainstorming, and would like to collect all the ideas for feature enhancements in a single place. Our goal is to create a single index that lists what sorts of things we're thinking of doing, with links to more detailed ideas about implementation specifics or concerns, and targets for inclusion in the project.
Vista Will Double Apple’s Market Share by Chris Pirillo
(Chris Pirillo has been a Windows fanatic for over a decade. Lockergnome.com sprang to life in 1996 with the intent of connecting other passionate PC users with helpful information. His personal blog, at Chris.Pirillo.com, has been a bit more platform agnostic. He composed this article in an Outlook 2000 plain text message window, and scribbled this byline in a Microsoft Word 2003 document. The content could easily have been written in any application with a text field. So, why then is he still using Windows? Legacy, we think—he’s not quite ready to switch over to a different evil.)
For one reason or another, Microsoft abandoned development of Internet Explorer a few years back, falling victim to the assumption that the world didn’t need anything more from a Web browser. This turned out to not be the case. The Firefox Project provided enough of an alternative to convince users and influencers to switch—with a true cross-platform allure too enticing to ignore. Microsoft executives ultimately decided to begin development on IE7, but its release will likely drive even more people to Firefox. Why? Because it’s too little, too late.
I loved Internet Explorer—loved it. Microsoft even sent me a T-shirt for participating in Midnight Madness with the final release of an earlier IE build some years ago when the world was largely stuck on dial-up. I loved using MSN Search. There were few decent alternatives even when Microsoft started serving pop-up advertisements with my search results. Eventually, I grew tired of these annoyances and turned my attention to Google, which, at the time, looked like an inferior product. But, Google made “search” work better than ever before. Windows Live attempts to reinvigorate Microsoft’s online brand, but few people have bothered to pay attention. Why? Because it’s too little, too late.
The industry hasn’t seen a new desktop OS come from Redmond since Windows XP. We’ve all been waiting with bated breath for Vista to revolutionize the way we . . . what the hell is this?! RC1 feels and looks more like an early beta than it does a final product, and they want me to fork over how much for it?
Off the shelf, Windows Vista Ultimate will cost the user $399 per copy, with subsequent licenses weighing in at $359 each. Upgrade prices for Ultimate are slightly less exorbitant ($259 for the initial upgrade and $233 for additional copies). If you’re planning on upgrading your home network of five machines, you’re going to spend $1,191 for five Ultimate upgrades. Conservatively, if you’re upgrading the same network to Home Basic, you’re going to spend $460. This time? It’s too much, too late.
My mom loads her start page and types “Google” into the search box. My fiancée pulls up iTunes to download the latest Bob Dylan album. My dad asks how he can download Firefox because friends told him it was safer to use, but only after asking how to install the latest spyware definitions, copy photos from his camera, back up all his important files, delete the programs he doesn’t want on his desktop, etc.
I’m a nanometer away from switching my family over to OS X when Apple releases Leopard in Q1 of 2007. It looks clean and elegant. It comes with all the software and services the average user could ever want. It runs on the same hardware. A system will be able to dual-boot between OS X and Windows, and pricing is no longer astronomical. But most importantly? With its UI inconsistencies, Vista feels completely schizophrenic, and that’s enough of a reason for anybody to leave Windows in the dust—just like they left MSN Search and IE.
Yesterday’s arguments don’t really hold water in today’s marketplace, and as a serious technologist, you need to recognize that. Forget the whole “Windows has more software” debate because that’s absolute bunk. More and more, we’re moving our lives online, spending our day in an email client and/or a Web browser (if, indeed, they’re not one in the same). We demand easier, better solutions than those that we currently have.
Remember how you felt when you saw “The Phantom Menace” for the first time? I was overwhelmingly disappointed. That’s exactly how Windows Vista RC1 makes me feel, and that’s not very likely to change between now and when the OS goes gold. Before now, there wasn’t a viable “Google” or “Firefox” for the Windows platform. Between Apple’s Boot Camp and Parallels (www.parallels.com), you’re going to have to make a strong argument to keep people from finally making the switch. And you wanna know the worst part of this entire situation?
Microsoft, in each and every instance, has been its own worst enemy.
For one reason or another, Microsoft abandoned development of Internet Explorer a few years back, falling victim to the assumption that the world didn’t need anything more from a Web browser. This turned out to not be the case. The Firefox Project provided enough of an alternative to convince users and influencers to switch—with a true cross-platform allure too enticing to ignore. Microsoft executives ultimately decided to begin development on IE7, but its release will likely drive even more people to Firefox. Why? Because it’s too little, too late.
I loved Internet Explorer—loved it. Microsoft even sent me a T-shirt for participating in Midnight Madness with the final release of an earlier IE build some years ago when the world was largely stuck on dial-up. I loved using MSN Search. There were few decent alternatives even when Microsoft started serving pop-up advertisements with my search results. Eventually, I grew tired of these annoyances and turned my attention to Google, which, at the time, looked like an inferior product. But, Google made “search” work better than ever before. Windows Live attempts to reinvigorate Microsoft’s online brand, but few people have bothered to pay attention. Why? Because it’s too little, too late.
The industry hasn’t seen a new desktop OS come from Redmond since Windows XP. We’ve all been waiting with bated breath for Vista to revolutionize the way we . . . what the hell is this?! RC1 feels and looks more like an early beta than it does a final product, and they want me to fork over how much for it?
Off the shelf, Windows Vista Ultimate will cost the user $399 per copy, with subsequent licenses weighing in at $359 each. Upgrade prices for Ultimate are slightly less exorbitant ($259 for the initial upgrade and $233 for additional copies). If you’re planning on upgrading your home network of five machines, you’re going to spend $1,191 for five Ultimate upgrades. Conservatively, if you’re upgrading the same network to Home Basic, you’re going to spend $460. This time? It’s too much, too late.
My mom loads her start page and types “Google” into the search box. My fiancée pulls up iTunes to download the latest Bob Dylan album. My dad asks how he can download Firefox because friends told him it was safer to use, but only after asking how to install the latest spyware definitions, copy photos from his camera, back up all his important files, delete the programs he doesn’t want on his desktop, etc.
I’m a nanometer away from switching my family over to OS X when Apple releases Leopard in Q1 of 2007. It looks clean and elegant. It comes with all the software and services the average user could ever want. It runs on the same hardware. A system will be able to dual-boot between OS X and Windows, and pricing is no longer astronomical. But most importantly? With its UI inconsistencies, Vista feels completely schizophrenic, and that’s enough of a reason for anybody to leave Windows in the dust—just like they left MSN Search and IE.
Yesterday’s arguments don’t really hold water in today’s marketplace, and as a serious technologist, you need to recognize that. Forget the whole “Windows has more software” debate because that’s absolute bunk. More and more, we’re moving our lives online, spending our day in an email client and/or a Web browser (if, indeed, they’re not one in the same). We demand easier, better solutions than those that we currently have.
Remember how you felt when you saw “The Phantom Menace” for the first time? I was overwhelmingly disappointed. That’s exactly how Windows Vista RC1 makes me feel, and that’s not very likely to change between now and when the OS goes gold. Before now, there wasn’t a viable “Google” or “Firefox” for the Windows platform. Between Apple’s Boot Camp and Parallels (www.parallels.com), you’re going to have to make a strong argument to keep people from finally making the switch. And you wanna know the worst part of this entire situation?
Microsoft, in each and every instance, has been its own worst enemy.
Sunday, October 15, 2006
M.E.M.R.I. Special Dispatch Series - No. 1321
Iranian Daily Close to Supreme Leader Khamenei: 'If Any Country Such as North Korea, Concludes, for Political or Security Reasons, That It Must Have Nuclear Weapons, It Will Ultimately Succeed... Even if the Whole World Is Opposed...'
On October 12, 2006, the Iranian daily Kayhan, which is identified with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, published an editorial titled "Lessons from North Korea."
The following are excerpts from the editorial: [1]
"North Korea Has Built A Nuclear Bomb Before the American's Eyes... Despite the Great Pressure it Was Under, And [Despite] Years of Harsh International Sanctions - And No One Has Managed to Do Anything [Against it]"
"How does a particular country go nuclear? This is an important question. But what is more important is the question of what happens [to it], and to the attitude towards it on the part of the international community, and to what extent the attitude towards it and towards its place in the international arena changes when it goes nuclear.
"There is, of course, another question: Do countries which, up until now, have had a monopoly on nuclear weapons want to preserve this monopoly, or will they permit new players to appear? In other words, if any country expresses interest in producing nuclear weapons, is there a safe way to prevent it? North Korea's nuclear test on Sunday [October 8, 2006] helps us give direct answers.
"North Korea's [acquisition of] nuclear [capability] is the product of persistence. Korea was not seeking to prove its regional power, nor to renew the advantages [to be found] in renewing the ancient empire that it had lost, so as to restore its national pride. What led Korea to this point was nothing but persistence in the face of the U.S., which would not agree to talk [with it] face to face and to assure it that it would not act to topple the North Korean government.
"The Koreans said many times before that if America would stop its operations to topple their government, and at the same time would go back to implementing the agreements that it had signed [with them] in the past in the framework of nuclear cooperation, and which it had then violated unilaterally, [then] North Korea would have no problem whatsoever with the inspection of their efforts to produce nuclear weapons. But the Americans, with their usual defective mindset that they have always had... persisted, and now it's all over.
"As the Russians said on Monday [October 9, 2006], in a first response to North Korea's nuclear test: 'It is the American stubbornness that has led to this situation. Had Washington agreed to be a little more flexible and to sit around the table with Pyongyang, the issue would have been resolved long ago, more simply, and at a lower cost.
"[North] Korea has built a [nuclear] bomb before the American's eyes, despite the great pressure it was under, and [despite] years of harsh international sanctions - and no one has managed to do anything [against it].
"If Any Country, Such as North Korea, Concludes, For Political or Security Reasons, That it Must Have Nuclear Weapons, it Will Ultimately Succeed... Even If the Whole World is Opposed"
"What this means precisely is that if any country, such as North Korea, concludes, for political or security reasons, that it must have nuclear weapons, it will ultimately succeed in implementing its wish - even if the whole world doesn't want it to. The superpowers may manage to slow down [its] path [in going] nuclear, or may apply economic and psychological pressures on it and on its citizens - but in the end the wish that arises from among the people is what prevails and determines the policy.
"If the Americans were truly concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons in the international arena, they should first be concerned about their [own] behavior and policy; [it is there that] they will find the root of the evil. The only way for countries to stop producing nuclear weapons is by giving a logical answer to their security problems. Otherwise, when the Americans still seek to vent their rage in the international arena, and threaten insecurity to this or that [government], it cannot but be expected that these countries will aspire to improve their defensive capabilities in various ways.
"As long as the superpowers - like America - are connected to the aspiration to monopoly and to aggression, it can be concluded that North Korea's attaining of nuclear weapons means absolute defeat for the policy of 'apply pressure and threats in order to change the model of countries' behavior.' The Americans must realize - even if it is difficult for them - that pressure and threats are not a suitable way to negotiate with the world..."
[1] Kayhan, October 12, 2006.
On October 12, 2006, the Iranian daily Kayhan, which is identified with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, published an editorial titled "Lessons from North Korea."
The following are excerpts from the editorial: [1]
"North Korea Has Built A Nuclear Bomb Before the American's Eyes... Despite the Great Pressure it Was Under, And [Despite] Years of Harsh International Sanctions - And No One Has Managed to Do Anything [Against it]"
"How does a particular country go nuclear? This is an important question. But what is more important is the question of what happens [to it], and to the attitude towards it on the part of the international community, and to what extent the attitude towards it and towards its place in the international arena changes when it goes nuclear.
"There is, of course, another question: Do countries which, up until now, have had a monopoly on nuclear weapons want to preserve this monopoly, or will they permit new players to appear? In other words, if any country expresses interest in producing nuclear weapons, is there a safe way to prevent it? North Korea's nuclear test on Sunday [October 8, 2006] helps us give direct answers.
"North Korea's [acquisition of] nuclear [capability] is the product of persistence. Korea was not seeking to prove its regional power, nor to renew the advantages [to be found] in renewing the ancient empire that it had lost, so as to restore its national pride. What led Korea to this point was nothing but persistence in the face of the U.S., which would not agree to talk [with it] face to face and to assure it that it would not act to topple the North Korean government.
"The Koreans said many times before that if America would stop its operations to topple their government, and at the same time would go back to implementing the agreements that it had signed [with them] in the past in the framework of nuclear cooperation, and which it had then violated unilaterally, [then] North Korea would have no problem whatsoever with the inspection of their efforts to produce nuclear weapons. But the Americans, with their usual defective mindset that they have always had... persisted, and now it's all over.
"As the Russians said on Monday [October 9, 2006], in a first response to North Korea's nuclear test: 'It is the American stubbornness that has led to this situation. Had Washington agreed to be a little more flexible and to sit around the table with Pyongyang, the issue would have been resolved long ago, more simply, and at a lower cost.
"[North] Korea has built a [nuclear] bomb before the American's eyes, despite the great pressure it was under, and [despite] years of harsh international sanctions - and no one has managed to do anything [against it].
"If Any Country, Such as North Korea, Concludes, For Political or Security Reasons, That it Must Have Nuclear Weapons, it Will Ultimately Succeed... Even If the Whole World is Opposed"
"What this means precisely is that if any country, such as North Korea, concludes, for political or security reasons, that it must have nuclear weapons, it will ultimately succeed in implementing its wish - even if the whole world doesn't want it to. The superpowers may manage to slow down [its] path [in going] nuclear, or may apply economic and psychological pressures on it and on its citizens - but in the end the wish that arises from among the people is what prevails and determines the policy.
"If the Americans were truly concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons in the international arena, they should first be concerned about their [own] behavior and policy; [it is there that] they will find the root of the evil. The only way for countries to stop producing nuclear weapons is by giving a logical answer to their security problems. Otherwise, when the Americans still seek to vent their rage in the international arena, and threaten insecurity to this or that [government], it cannot but be expected that these countries will aspire to improve their defensive capabilities in various ways.
"As long as the superpowers - like America - are connected to the aspiration to monopoly and to aggression, it can be concluded that North Korea's attaining of nuclear weapons means absolute defeat for the policy of 'apply pressure and threats in order to change the model of countries' behavior.' The Americans must realize - even if it is difficult for them - that pressure and threats are not a suitable way to negotiate with the world..."
[1] Kayhan, October 12, 2006.
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