Hezbollah...Fundraising or Security Threat in U.S. ? by Dennis Lormel

Do the escalating hostilities in the Middle East between the Israelis and Hezbollah cause additional security concerns within the United States (U.S.)? As increasing pressure is placed on Hezbollah in Lebanon, do Hezbollah operatives in the U.S. pose a greater risk of committing terrorist attacks in the U.S.? Hezbollah has a significant international presence with thousands of operatives located throughout the world, to include the U.S.

Since 9/11, Hezbollah has been listed along with Al-Qaeda and Hamas as posing the most serious threat to the U.S. However, unlike Al-Qaeda, who is intent on carrying out attacks in the U.S., Hezbollah and Hamas have been viewed as less likely to do so. The U.S. represents a significant source of fundraising for Hezbollah and Hamas. In that context, Hezbollah and Hamas have not wanted to risk diminishing or losing their fundraising capabilities by alienating their U.S. supporters by carrying out terrorist acts in the U.S. In keeping with that strategy, they did not want to draw the attention to their activities in the U.S. that a terrorist act would generate.

Law enforcement and intelligence services are well aware of the Hezbollah presence and fundraising initiatives in the U.S. Since early 2002, there have been numerous criminal cases successfully prosecuted in the U.S. involving Hezbollah operatives and sympathizers. An internet search under “Hezbollah fundraising” delineates a number of media reports of such cases. The compelling question for law enforcement and intelligence services today is…will the fundraising strategy or mindset give way to a retaliatory posture which thereby would escalate the threat level in the U.S. and make us more susceptible to a domestic attack by Hezbollah? I defer to my former law enforcement and intelligence colleagues to answer this vexing question.

As we well know, Hezbollah is a radical Shia group that was formed in Lebanon. It is dedicated to the creation of an Iranian style Islamic republic in Lebanon. Hezbollah is anti-West and anti-Israel. It is closely aligned to Iran. Iran provides Hezbollah with substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives political, diplomatic and organizational aid. Syria also provides Hezbollah with support. Somewhere between one fifth to one half of Hezbollah’s operating budget comes from Iran and Syria. Other sources of funding include charitable organizations, individual donations, legitimate business, and illegitimate businesses such as illegal arms dealers, cigarette smuggling, currency and product counterfeiting, credit card fraud, product theft, operating illegal telephone exchanges, and drug trafficking.

Hezbollah primarily generates funding in the U.S. through a variety of criminal activities. They operate in close knit cell structures that seem more identifiable with organized crime than terrorism. The front line cell members not only raise money for Hezbollah, but they keep large portions of their illicit gains and tend to live more elaborate life styles. These operatives are not consistent with the typical terrorist ideologists. That’s why these operatives tend to be more identifiable with organized crime than terrorism. A core group of Hezbollah members are identifiable as ideologists and are more consistent with jihadists. Hezbollah cells in the U.S. are proficient in operating small businesses and using these businesses to sell legitimate and counterfeit goods. They conduct a variety of business and credit card scams, and have made considerable profits perpetrating cigarette smuggling schemes. Hezbollah cells are adept at invoicing schemes, import/export schemes and money laundering through structured deposits.

One of the most noteworthy criminal cases involving a Hezbollah cell in the U.S. was known as “Operation Smokescreen”, a cigarette smuggling, bank fraud and money laundering case. This case originated in North Carolina. Ultimately, 25 individuals were convicted to include Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, the main subject and cell leader. Hammoud was convicted of charges to include providing material support to a terrorist organization (Hezbollah). As a consequence, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 155 years.

Law enforcement is currently assessing a business scheme involving Hezbollah cells in multiple jurisdictions in the U.S. The scheme may or may not involve criminal activity but invariably results in generating funds for Hezbollah. Schemes like this are reason for Hezbollah to continue its current track in the U.S. However, emerging developments in Lebanon concerning Hezbollah could trigger violent responses by Hezbollah operatives throughout the world, to include the U.S.

Inside Hizballah’s Decision Making by Magnus Ranstorp

Hizballah’s decision to kidnap the two IDF soldiers was taken by Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah and the other six members of the Shura Karar, its supreme decision-making body. Additionally there are two Iranian representatives (from the Iranian embassy in Beirut/Damascus) that provide a direct link on matters that require strategic guidance or Iranian assistance or arbitration. The file for handling special operations of this kind is usually left to Imad Mughniyeh, the elusive terrorist mastermind for Hizballah, who stands with one foot within Hizballah (reporting to Nasserallah directly) and with one foot in Iran inside the architectures of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the al-Qods unit within the Iranian Pasdaran. Mughniyeh is strictly reserved for special occasions (like the Buenos Aires bombing in 1992 to avenge the Israeli assassination of the previous leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi) and his primary mission over the last decade has been to forge qualitative ‘military’ guidance to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives inside Gaza and the West Bank.

Hizballah’s overall guidance and support to the Palestinian militants has been strengthened on multiple levels. Firstly the presence of Osama Hamdan, Hamas’ representative to Lebanon, makes a qualitative difference. Hamdan is an important conduit for the Hizballah-Hamas-Iran axis as he was the Hamas representative to Iran for many years. Hamdan resides in dahiyya (southern suburbs) of Beirut amidst Hizballah’s own offices and supporters. Alongside with the Hamas exile leadership in Syria (most notably Imad Alami, Khalid Mishal and others), this presence has strengthened Hamas-Hizballah consultations on all strategic and military affairs, especially influencing the decision by Hamas to recently kidnap the IDF soldier. Undoubtedly Hizballah influenced this decision.

Secondly, Hizballah provides continuous qualitative technical advice to Hamas in improving the Qassem rocket series through blueprints via e-mail and advice on advanced tactical guerrilla and other fighting techniques. This has even extended towards smuggling weaponry through Jordan as was evident by the 2001 arrest of one of Imad Mughniyeh’s assistants. Some of this technical expertise has been diverted towards Iraq where Hizballah has provided some technical expertise to local Shia factions to attack coalition forces.

Thirdly, Hizballah has accelerated its efforts to recruit and use foreign nationals (usually EU-passport holders) as low-level reconnaissance operatives inside Israel (see article) providing a potential second internal front for future missions. This has been complimented by a drive to recruit Druze officers inside the IDF.

Fourthly, al-Manar (Hizballah’s TV-station) is the second most watched station in Gaza providing support and direction to the Palestinian factions. In 2001 al-Manar and its high-tech studios moved to underground locations as it feared Israeli military strikes. Al-Manar is a critical vehicle for the Hizballah to amplify its threats and psychological warfare against Israel. In essence Israel will continue to prioritise disruption of media services that will debilitate Hizballah’s manoeuvrability somewhat in political influence terms.

Lastly, the Hamas-Hizballah-Iran axis is strengthened by the guidance of Ali Akhbar Mohtashemi, the former Iranian ambassador to Syria and a key founder of Hizballah in 1982, who is the Secretary-General of the International Islamic Support for the Palestinian Resistance Conference hosted in Teheran. It was Mohtashemi alongside the old Hizballah leader Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli that were the principal architects of the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which killed 243 US Marines. If Hizballah should make a break with its darker past (terrorism) these two individuals could constitute an expendable price for rehabilitation of the organisation.

Hizballah’s kidnapping operation was sophisticated and complex. Sheikh Nasserallah continuously calls for negotiations behind the scenes and for further prisoner exchange. This file is handled by Wafic Safa, who personally reports to Sheikh Nasserallah, and there will be no shortage of diplomatic efforts by third parties to intercede to try to resolve this issue. The German intelligence service, who brokered the last deal in 2004, are probably already making overtures to their contacts in Beirut. It is, however, likely to take considerable months, if not years, to resolve as Israel is unlikely to part with Sheikh Obeid or any other high value prisoners they continue to hold. It is also likely that Israeli intelligence will target a senior Hizballah official for abduction or retaliation against Iranian operatives in Lebanon.

Both Hizballah and Hamas have succeeded in manufacturing a crisis to give them manoeuvrability – for Hizballah to avoid disarmament under UN Res 1559 and for Hamas to garner international sympathy and aid. It is critical now for Wasington to assist in breaking the potential for regional escalation and to accelerate the international efforts to disarm Hizballah.