Craig McCaw, the elusive wireless pioneer who patched together the country's first wide area network, is at it again. This time, the entrepreneur is launching a wireless broadband service using non-line-of-sight (NLOS) technology.
McCaw, who spoke at the Wireless Communications Association International conference in Washington, D.C., today, acknowledged there have been "a lot of failures" in trying to provide wireless broadband service but he is convinced there is a need for wireless broadband in the last mile.
McCaw's Clearwire is using NLOS technology for trials in Jacksonville, Fla., and St. Cloud, Minn., offering broadband services to compete with cable and wireline phone company services. "Cable and telephone industries have done a good job of putting new reptiles in the moats around their monopoly businesses," McCaw said, referring to regulatory objections those two industries historically have had to competitors trying to offer service in their markets.
McCaw serves as CEO and chairman of Clearwire, a culmination of more than two years of activity that included the acquisition of licensed spectrum in markets throughout the United States and the acquisition of NextNet, developer of non-line-of-sight gear. Clearwire says it will use the NextNet platform modified with its own proprietary technology to power its IP-based wireless network. Clearwire expects to offer commercial service in the initial two markets this summer and expand to other markets in the United States and internationally within the next year.
McCaw made a bundle selling McCaw Communications to AT&T Corp. in 1994 for $11.5 billion and went on to experiment with several companies.
Thursday, June 01, 2006
Wednesday, May 31, 2006
Iran's Military Plans for Invasion by U.S. by Iason Athanasiadis
Iran, apparently anticipating an American invasion, has quietly been restructuring its military and testing a new military doctrine that calls for a decentralized, Iraqi-style guerrilla campaign against an invading force. Iran's military planners are acutely aware that a military confrontation with technologically more advanced U.S. armed forces would be rapid and multifronted, unlike the static and slow-paced 1980-88 war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Therefore, a series of war games have been carried out since late last year to test the army's readiness. In December, more than 15,000 members of the regular armed forces participated in an exercise in northwestern Iran's strategically sensitive Azerbaijan border provinces that focused on irregular warfare carried out by highly mobile army units, according to the official MENA news agency. A second exercise was conducted in the majority-Arab province of Khuzestan in September, according to the Iranian press, aimed at quelling insurgencies in areas subject to ethnic unrest and prone to foreign influence. Involving a reported 100,000 troops, the exercise provided an example of how the Islamic Republic would respond to further disturbances in the strategic, oil-rich province that has been the scene of a year-old terrorist bombing campaign.
Iranian officials, including the interior and the intelligence ministers, as well as several religious leaders, have repeatedly blamed the disturbances on British forces occupying nearby southern Iraq.
At the same time, a European military attache in Tehran told The Washington Times that the Revolutionary Guard is moving away from a joint command with the ordinary army and taking a more prominent role in controlling Iran's often porous borders, even as it makes each of Iran's border provinces autonomous in the event of war.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said he was not aware of any improvement of Iran's military capabilities, but noted that if such developments are taking place, people in the U.S. government are watching.
Defense analysts said it makes sense for the Iranian regime to give the impression of upgrading and modernizing its military, but they questioned the need to prepare for guerrilla-type warfare because a full-blown U.S. invasion is not likely.
"It's probably a smart policy for the Iranian leadership to get this out in order to convince the U.S. military that they are ready for guerrilla resistance from the get-go," said Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution.
"They know they can't repulse our air strikes -- we can strike from a long distance making it hard to shoot us down -- so the only thing they can do in that case is move assets to secret locations," he said. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies dismissed the reports of the Iranian military acquiring new capabilities, saying it has been training in asymmetric tactics for years.
Iranian war planners expect that the first step taken by an invading force would be to occupy the oil-rich Khuzestan region, secure the sensitive Strait of Hormuz and cut off the Iranian military's oil supply.
Foreign diplomats who monitor Iran's army say that Iran's leadership has acknowledged it stands little chance of defeating U.S. armed forces with conventional military doctrine.
The shift in focus to guerrilla warfare against an occupying army in the aftermath of a successful invasion mirrors developments in Iraq, where a triumphant U.S. military campaign has been followed by three years of slow, indecisive struggle with insurgent and terrorist forces.
The Iranian preparations come as the United States refuses to rule out military action over Iran's suspect nuclear programs.
"Iran is a troublemaker in the international system, a central banker of terrorism. Security assurances are not on the table," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on "Fox News Sunday" last week.
Therefore, a series of war games have been carried out since late last year to test the army's readiness. In December, more than 15,000 members of the regular armed forces participated in an exercise in northwestern Iran's strategically sensitive Azerbaijan border provinces that focused on irregular warfare carried out by highly mobile army units, according to the official MENA news agency. A second exercise was conducted in the majority-Arab province of Khuzestan in September, according to the Iranian press, aimed at quelling insurgencies in areas subject to ethnic unrest and prone to foreign influence. Involving a reported 100,000 troops, the exercise provided an example of how the Islamic Republic would respond to further disturbances in the strategic, oil-rich province that has been the scene of a year-old terrorist bombing campaign.
Iranian officials, including the interior and the intelligence ministers, as well as several religious leaders, have repeatedly blamed the disturbances on British forces occupying nearby southern Iraq.
At the same time, a European military attache in Tehran told The Washington Times that the Revolutionary Guard is moving away from a joint command with the ordinary army and taking a more prominent role in controlling Iran's often porous borders, even as it makes each of Iran's border provinces autonomous in the event of war.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said he was not aware of any improvement of Iran's military capabilities, but noted that if such developments are taking place, people in the U.S. government are watching.
Defense analysts said it makes sense for the Iranian regime to give the impression of upgrading and modernizing its military, but they questioned the need to prepare for guerrilla-type warfare because a full-blown U.S. invasion is not likely.
"It's probably a smart policy for the Iranian leadership to get this out in order to convince the U.S. military that they are ready for guerrilla resistance from the get-go," said Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution.
"They know they can't repulse our air strikes -- we can strike from a long distance making it hard to shoot us down -- so the only thing they can do in that case is move assets to secret locations," he said. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies dismissed the reports of the Iranian military acquiring new capabilities, saying it has been training in asymmetric tactics for years.
Iranian war planners expect that the first step taken by an invading force would be to occupy the oil-rich Khuzestan region, secure the sensitive Strait of Hormuz and cut off the Iranian military's oil supply.
Foreign diplomats who monitor Iran's army say that Iran's leadership has acknowledged it stands little chance of defeating U.S. armed forces with conventional military doctrine.
The shift in focus to guerrilla warfare against an occupying army in the aftermath of a successful invasion mirrors developments in Iraq, where a triumphant U.S. military campaign has been followed by three years of slow, indecisive struggle with insurgent and terrorist forces.
The Iranian preparations come as the United States refuses to rule out military action over Iran's suspect nuclear programs.
"Iran is a troublemaker in the international system, a central banker of terrorism. Security assurances are not on the table," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on "Fox News Sunday" last week.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Testing Patent Protections by F. Scott Kieff and R. Polk Wagner
Patent cases like eBay and Blackberry triggered an outcry over "patent trolls" -- who supposedly ambush business with junk patents. The U.S. Supreme Court responded last week by speaking to the longstanding principle under patent law that a patentee may get a permanent injunction once patent validity and infringement have been adjudicated.
Unfortunately, besides flagging the two outer limits -- no "general rule" in favor of injunctions nor any "broad swath of cases" exempt from them -- the court said little other than the four-factor general test for injunctions should be applied. The effect of this watershed case on innovation turns on how close the courts avoid "writing on an entirely clean slate" by adhering to the status quo.
Negotiating against the backdrop of an injunction may seem like having a gun to one's head, especially when the patentee is not practicing the invention. But just imagine a rule that allowed me, anytime I notice you are not using your car as I like, to use it myself and pay whatever a court might later request, if you sue me and win.
Even when a patentee is not looking for a deal, the infringer can still offer him one too attractive to pass up. This presumably motivated the court to reject exceptions based on a patentee's "willingness to license" or "lack of commercial activity" and to affirm the century-old Continental Bag decision that a patentee need not practice the patented invention. As the court noted: "Some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves."
While an injunction could shut down a business, it also drives parties to strike deals -- because shutting down the business is a loss for both sides. These patent deals are essential to innovation. While some bemoan the hefty $600 million Blackberry settlement, waiting to settle will prove costlier to the party that loses legal battles along the way. And high-profile, high-priced eleventh-hour settlements reveal little about the often overlooked and remarkably low royalty deals that could have been reached earlier. This presumably motivated Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to note in their concurrence a discomfort in letting an infringer unilaterally decide to use another's property simply by paying the owner a court-determined fee. The first two factors from the general test for injunctions -- irreparable harm and inadequacy of money damages -- are both met when a patent has been adjudicated to be both valid and infringed.
Concerns over the "true" importance of an invention to an infringer presumably motivated Justices Anthony Kennedy, John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Stephen Breyer to question a patentee's "undue leverage."
Yes, many patents are "trivial" to real business. But the decision by an infringer to spend millions on litigation -- and, increasingly, lobbying -- is plenty of evidence the invention is not trivial. And if truly trivial, the patented technologies should be cheap to omit or design around. Sure, in some cases, the value is due mostly to the hassle costs of litigation. But it would be better for infringers to put their ingenuity into striking deals or inventing around the patent, rather than trumping up novel legal arguments about how their case is "special" and not right for an injunction.
Denying an injunction would give infringers an option to take a court-determined price or later strike a deal with the patentee for less. Leaving the question of an injunction open to an all-things-considered analysis in each case would give even brazen infringers strong incentives to litigate in perpetuity rather than accept a reasonable settlement at an early stage. Both approaches would tip the balance of hardships against patentees, without offering benefits to innovation, which is the third factor from the general test for injunctions.
There are always irrational holdouts and other uncooperative behaviors. But it is perverse to let avoiding the injunction hinge on failure to strike a deal. A legal test that rewards a failure to cooperate would lead to a decrease in cooperation, not an increase -- all at expense of the public interest, the fourth factor from the general test for injunctions.
Believing a court could step in to set the "right" price in lieu of an injunction is unrealistic. First, doing so requires immense information that only the disputing parties have and that a court must obtain at great cost. Courts also err by setting prices either too low or too high, with seriously distorting effects in either case -- if too low, a rush to infringe ensues; if too high, the tremendous additional costs gain nothing over the injunction. Finally, not only are error and administrative costs far higher for the court than the market, but most technology deals are about more than price and courts are woefully inadequate compared to the market for determining and policing these other terms.
While many patents are held invalid -- on business methods or other methods and products -- present practice only allows permanent injunctions after the court has determined the patent is both valid and infringed. It would be ironic and harmful to let fears about the weakest patents prevent injunctions for those shown to be the strongest. If we think the possibility of invalid patents is so great that all seem tarnished, the culprit is the institutional problem of policing bad patents. And a direct attack on these problems is far likelier to yield gains. Why not weaken or abandon the judicial presumption of validity and publish patents soon after filing?
In the end, who won? It may be too soon to tell. To the extent we've entered a new uncertain domain ruled by an all-things-considered analysis in each case, the trial lawyers win. To the extent the present practice is an acceptable general tendency to issue injunctions -- though short of a "general rule" -- innovation wins.
Unfortunately, besides flagging the two outer limits -- no "general rule" in favor of injunctions nor any "broad swath of cases" exempt from them -- the court said little other than the four-factor general test for injunctions should be applied. The effect of this watershed case on innovation turns on how close the courts avoid "writing on an entirely clean slate" by adhering to the status quo.
Negotiating against the backdrop of an injunction may seem like having a gun to one's head, especially when the patentee is not practicing the invention. But just imagine a rule that allowed me, anytime I notice you are not using your car as I like, to use it myself and pay whatever a court might later request, if you sue me and win.
Even when a patentee is not looking for a deal, the infringer can still offer him one too attractive to pass up. This presumably motivated the court to reject exceptions based on a patentee's "willingness to license" or "lack of commercial activity" and to affirm the century-old Continental Bag decision that a patentee need not practice the patented invention. As the court noted: "Some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves."
While an injunction could shut down a business, it also drives parties to strike deals -- because shutting down the business is a loss for both sides. These patent deals are essential to innovation. While some bemoan the hefty $600 million Blackberry settlement, waiting to settle will prove costlier to the party that loses legal battles along the way. And high-profile, high-priced eleventh-hour settlements reveal little about the often overlooked and remarkably low royalty deals that could have been reached earlier. This presumably motivated Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to note in their concurrence a discomfort in letting an infringer unilaterally decide to use another's property simply by paying the owner a court-determined fee. The first two factors from the general test for injunctions -- irreparable harm and inadequacy of money damages -- are both met when a patent has been adjudicated to be both valid and infringed.
Concerns over the "true" importance of an invention to an infringer presumably motivated Justices Anthony Kennedy, John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Stephen Breyer to question a patentee's "undue leverage."
Yes, many patents are "trivial" to real business. But the decision by an infringer to spend millions on litigation -- and, increasingly, lobbying -- is plenty of evidence the invention is not trivial. And if truly trivial, the patented technologies should be cheap to omit or design around. Sure, in some cases, the value is due mostly to the hassle costs of litigation. But it would be better for infringers to put their ingenuity into striking deals or inventing around the patent, rather than trumping up novel legal arguments about how their case is "special" and not right for an injunction.
Denying an injunction would give infringers an option to take a court-determined price or later strike a deal with the patentee for less. Leaving the question of an injunction open to an all-things-considered analysis in each case would give even brazen infringers strong incentives to litigate in perpetuity rather than accept a reasonable settlement at an early stage. Both approaches would tip the balance of hardships against patentees, without offering benefits to innovation, which is the third factor from the general test for injunctions.
There are always irrational holdouts and other uncooperative behaviors. But it is perverse to let avoiding the injunction hinge on failure to strike a deal. A legal test that rewards a failure to cooperate would lead to a decrease in cooperation, not an increase -- all at expense of the public interest, the fourth factor from the general test for injunctions.
Believing a court could step in to set the "right" price in lieu of an injunction is unrealistic. First, doing so requires immense information that only the disputing parties have and that a court must obtain at great cost. Courts also err by setting prices either too low or too high, with seriously distorting effects in either case -- if too low, a rush to infringe ensues; if too high, the tremendous additional costs gain nothing over the injunction. Finally, not only are error and administrative costs far higher for the court than the market, but most technology deals are about more than price and courts are woefully inadequate compared to the market for determining and policing these other terms.
While many patents are held invalid -- on business methods or other methods and products -- present practice only allows permanent injunctions after the court has determined the patent is both valid and infringed. It would be ironic and harmful to let fears about the weakest patents prevent injunctions for those shown to be the strongest. If we think the possibility of invalid patents is so great that all seem tarnished, the culprit is the institutional problem of policing bad patents. And a direct attack on these problems is far likelier to yield gains. Why not weaken or abandon the judicial presumption of validity and publish patents soon after filing?
In the end, who won? It may be too soon to tell. To the extent we've entered a new uncertain domain ruled by an all-things-considered analysis in each case, the trial lawyers win. To the extent the present practice is an acceptable general tendency to issue injunctions -- though short of a "general rule" -- innovation wins.
Winning a Minimum of Public Support Vital in Iraq, Afghanistan by Douglas Farah
During the Central American wars, perhaps because of the nearness to the Vietnam experience, there as a broad understanding that, to neutralize a highly-motivated enemy it was vital to have the population in the enemy’s theater of operation at worst neutral and at best cooperative.
Civilian populations caught in conflict zones often make their calculations of who to support based on who they think can inflict the most pain if they do not cooperate. This is true up to a point, but when repression becomes unbearable, civilians will also join the side they believe will help eliminate the oppressor.
This lesson seems to be lost in much of what is going on in Iraq, looking at Anbar province, and Afghanistan, with the rioting in Kabul. The Washington Post has interesting articles quoting the Sunni leaders of Anbar province on their reality:
“We hope to get rid of al-Qaeda, which is a huge burden on the city. Unfortunately, Zarqawi’s fist is stronger than the Americans’,” said one Sunni sheik, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of insurgent retaliation. He was referring to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, an umbrella group for many of the foreign and local resistance fighters in Iraq. Local Sunni leaders often insist that the most violent insurgent attacks are by foreign fighters, not Iraqi Sunnis.
In Ramadi, “Zarqawi is the one who is in control,” the sheik said, speaking to a Washington Post special correspondent in Ramadi. “He kills anyone who goes in and out of the U.S. base. We have stopped meetings with the Americans, because, frankly speaking, we have lost confidence in the U.S. side, as they can’t protect us.”
The balance of power tipped toward U.S.-backed forces in El Salvador when people who were caught in the middle felt the military would be there to protect them, and, at the same time, would not abuse them. As human rights improved and the army became more disciplined, people returned to their homes, even under army control, because they were able to.
This was a key element in keeping the FMLN from successfully broadening their areas of control after the mid-1980s. I spent countless nights with peasants on both sides of the conflict who were trying to figure out how to survive, and their loyalty was to anyone who could provide them safety. Of course there are committed cadres on both sides, as there are here. But they cannot survive without the broad ability to at least count on the neutrality of the bulk of the population.
If people perceive their options as supporting Zarqawi or being killed, they will support Zarqawi for survival. Such support is not deep, but it can be broad. The only way to confront it is to offer civilians security first. With security will come more cooperation, especially if the enemy is a brutal as Zarqawi has shown himself to be.
But if the areas are not secured to the degree that people feel they can talk to someone without it being 1) reporeted and 2) avenged, then you face a hostile, scared population that will give you nothing but blank stares, bad information and intense hatred for disrupting their chances of survival.
Civilian populations caught in conflict zones often make their calculations of who to support based on who they think can inflict the most pain if they do not cooperate. This is true up to a point, but when repression becomes unbearable, civilians will also join the side they believe will help eliminate the oppressor.
This lesson seems to be lost in much of what is going on in Iraq, looking at Anbar province, and Afghanistan, with the rioting in Kabul. The Washington Post has interesting articles quoting the Sunni leaders of Anbar province on their reality:
“We hope to get rid of al-Qaeda, which is a huge burden on the city. Unfortunately, Zarqawi’s fist is stronger than the Americans’,” said one Sunni sheik, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of insurgent retaliation. He was referring to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, an umbrella group for many of the foreign and local resistance fighters in Iraq. Local Sunni leaders often insist that the most violent insurgent attacks are by foreign fighters, not Iraqi Sunnis.
In Ramadi, “Zarqawi is the one who is in control,” the sheik said, speaking to a Washington Post special correspondent in Ramadi. “He kills anyone who goes in and out of the U.S. base. We have stopped meetings with the Americans, because, frankly speaking, we have lost confidence in the U.S. side, as they can’t protect us.”
The balance of power tipped toward U.S.-backed forces in El Salvador when people who were caught in the middle felt the military would be there to protect them, and, at the same time, would not abuse them. As human rights improved and the army became more disciplined, people returned to their homes, even under army control, because they were able to.
This was a key element in keeping the FMLN from successfully broadening their areas of control after the mid-1980s. I spent countless nights with peasants on both sides of the conflict who were trying to figure out how to survive, and their loyalty was to anyone who could provide them safety. Of course there are committed cadres on both sides, as there are here. But they cannot survive without the broad ability to at least count on the neutrality of the bulk of the population.
If people perceive their options as supporting Zarqawi or being killed, they will support Zarqawi for survival. Such support is not deep, but it can be broad. The only way to confront it is to offer civilians security first. With security will come more cooperation, especially if the enemy is a brutal as Zarqawi has shown himself to be.
But if the areas are not secured to the degree that people feel they can talk to someone without it being 1) reporeted and 2) avenged, then you face a hostile, scared population that will give you nothing but blank stares, bad information and intense hatred for disrupting their chances of survival.
Monday, May 29, 2006
Memorial Day 2006
Please take the time to honor the millions of fallen true patriots. Generations of American Soldiers, American Sailors, American Airmen, American Marines, and American Coastguardsmen, who served with honor from 1776 to this day. True patriots that stood and fell by their oath in defense of our United States of America Constitution and United States of America Bill of Rights. They fight hard under very difficult circumstances and at great personal risks and hardships. Please remember to pause at 1500 your local time on Memorial Day to offer remembrance and prayer for these true patriots.
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