United States Senate Intelligence Committee will conduct hearings on the use of cover to protect the identities of intelligence operatives. The use of cover to protect the identities of intelligence operatives has come under scrutiny during the investigation of the disclosure of Central Intelligence Agency operative Valerie Wilson. A special prosecutor is investigating who illegally leaked Valerie Wilson's status and lied to cover up the leak.
Valerie Wilson worked under cover for the Central Intelligence Agency for 18 years on weapons of mass destruction. Valerie Wilson was made public first and leaked in "Mission to Niger" by Robert Novak on Monday, July 14, 2003. Robert Novak used Valerie Wilson's maiden name, Valerie Plame, and attributed his information to two senior administration officials. Two senior administration officials, Karl Rove: President Political Adviser and Lewis Libby Jr.: Vice President Chief of Staff, have denied being the source of the leak.
Certain senior administration officials and others have minimized the significance of the leak of Central Intelligence Agency operative Valerie Wilson, noting her work at the Central Intelligence Agency and that she did not have an in depth cover. Valerie Wilson's purported employer, a shell company created by the Central Intelligence Agency, was little more than a post office box in Boston, Massachusetts. They have also questioned whether the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 applied to Valerie Wilson.
This leak and any leak has put lives at risk and jeopardized intelligence.
Saturday, July 23, 2005
Mission to Niger by Robert Novak
The CIA's decision to send retired diplomat Joseph C. Wilson to Africa in February 2002 to investigate possible Iraqi purchases of uranium was made routinely at a low level without Director George Tenet's knowledge. Remarkably, this produced a political firestorm that has not yet subsided.
Wilson's report that an Iraqi purchase of uranium yellowcake from Niger was highly unlikely was regarded by the CIA as less than definitive, and it is doubtful Tenet ever saw it. Certainly, President Bush did not, prior to his 2003 State of the Union address, when he attributed reports of attempted uranium purchases to the British government. That the British relied on forged documents made Wilson's mission, nearly a year earlier, the basis of furious Democratic accusations of burying intelligence though the report was forgotten by the time the president spoke.
Reluctance at the White House to admit a mistake has led Democrats ever closer to saying the president lied the country into war. Even after a belated admission of error last Monday, finger pointing between Bush administration agencies continued. Messages between Washington and the presidential entourage traveling in Africa hashed over the mission to Niger.
Wilson's mission was created after an early 2002 report by the Italian intelligence service about attempted uranium purchases from Niger, derived from forged documents prepared by what the CIA calls a "con man." This misinformation, peddled by Italian journalists, spread through the U.S. government. The White House, State Department and Pentagon, and not just Vice President Dick Cheney, asked the CIA to look into it.
That's where Joe Wilson came in. His first public notice had come in 1991 after 15 years as a Foreign Service officer when, as U.S. charge in Baghdad, he risked his life to shelter in the embassy some 800 Americans from Saddam Hussein's wrath. My partner Rowland Evans reported from the Iraqi capital in our column that Wilson showed "the stuff of heroism." President George H.W. Bush the next year named him ambassador to Gabon, and President Bill Clinton put him in charge of African affairs at the National Security Council until his retirement in 1998.
Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me Wilson's wife suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report. The CIA says its counter-proliferation officials selected Wilson and asked his wife to contact him. "I will not answer any question about my wife," Wilson told me.
After eight days in the Niger capital of Niamey (where he once served), Wilson made an oral report in Langley that an Iraqi uranium purchase was "highly unlikely," though he also mentioned in passing that a 1988 Iraqi delegation tried to establish commercial contacts. CIA officials did not regard Wilson's intelligence as definitive, being based primarily on what the Niger officials told him and probably would have claimed under any circumstances. The CIA report of Wilson's briefing remains classified.
All this was forgotten until reporter Walter Pincus revealed in the Washington Post June 12 that an unnamed retired diplomat had given the CIA a negative report. Not until Wilson went public on July 6, however, did his finding ignite the firestorm.
During the run up to the invasion of Iraq, Wilson had taken a measured public position viewing weapons of mass destruction as a danger but considering military action as a last resort. He has seemed much more critical of the administration since revealing his role in Niger. In the Washington Post July 6, he talked about the Bush team "misrepresenting the facts," asking: "What else are they lying about?"
After the White House admitted error, Wilson declined all television and radio interviews. "The story was never me," he told me, "it was always the statement in (Bush's) speech." The story, actually, is whether the administration deliberately ignored Wilson's advice, and that requires scrutinizing the CIA summary of what their envoy reported. The Agency never before has declassified that kind of information, but the White House would like it to do just that now in its and in the public's interest.
Wilson's report that an Iraqi purchase of uranium yellowcake from Niger was highly unlikely was regarded by the CIA as less than definitive, and it is doubtful Tenet ever saw it. Certainly, President Bush did not, prior to his 2003 State of the Union address, when he attributed reports of attempted uranium purchases to the British government. That the British relied on forged documents made Wilson's mission, nearly a year earlier, the basis of furious Democratic accusations of burying intelligence though the report was forgotten by the time the president spoke.
Reluctance at the White House to admit a mistake has led Democrats ever closer to saying the president lied the country into war. Even after a belated admission of error last Monday, finger pointing between Bush administration agencies continued. Messages between Washington and the presidential entourage traveling in Africa hashed over the mission to Niger.
Wilson's mission was created after an early 2002 report by the Italian intelligence service about attempted uranium purchases from Niger, derived from forged documents prepared by what the CIA calls a "con man." This misinformation, peddled by Italian journalists, spread through the U.S. government. The White House, State Department and Pentagon, and not just Vice President Dick Cheney, asked the CIA to look into it.
That's where Joe Wilson came in. His first public notice had come in 1991 after 15 years as a Foreign Service officer when, as U.S. charge in Baghdad, he risked his life to shelter in the embassy some 800 Americans from Saddam Hussein's wrath. My partner Rowland Evans reported from the Iraqi capital in our column that Wilson showed "the stuff of heroism." President George H.W. Bush the next year named him ambassador to Gabon, and President Bill Clinton put him in charge of African affairs at the National Security Council until his retirement in 1998.
Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an Agency operative on weapons of mass destruction. Two senior administration officials told me Wilson's wife suggested sending him to Niger to investigate the Italian report. The CIA says its counter-proliferation officials selected Wilson and asked his wife to contact him. "I will not answer any question about my wife," Wilson told me.
After eight days in the Niger capital of Niamey (where he once served), Wilson made an oral report in Langley that an Iraqi uranium purchase was "highly unlikely," though he also mentioned in passing that a 1988 Iraqi delegation tried to establish commercial contacts. CIA officials did not regard Wilson's intelligence as definitive, being based primarily on what the Niger officials told him and probably would have claimed under any circumstances. The CIA report of Wilson's briefing remains classified.
All this was forgotten until reporter Walter Pincus revealed in the Washington Post June 12 that an unnamed retired diplomat had given the CIA a negative report. Not until Wilson went public on July 6, however, did his finding ignite the firestorm.
During the run up to the invasion of Iraq, Wilson had taken a measured public position viewing weapons of mass destruction as a danger but considering military action as a last resort. He has seemed much more critical of the administration since revealing his role in Niger. In the Washington Post July 6, he talked about the Bush team "misrepresenting the facts," asking: "What else are they lying about?"
After the White House admitted error, Wilson declined all television and radio interviews. "The story was never me," he told me, "it was always the statement in (Bush's) speech." The story, actually, is whether the administration deliberately ignored Wilson's advice, and that requires scrutinizing the CIA summary of what their envoy reported. The Agency never before has declassified that kind of information, but the White House would like it to do just that now in its and in the public's interest.
Intelligence VS. Politics (Those 16 Words)
Unless additional intelligence that Iraq made acquisitions and acquisitions were planned for uranium, such intelligence and similar intelligence should not have been made public. The Secret Intelligence Service and Intelligence and Security Services did confirm the acquisitions and that acquisitions were planned for uranium from Niger. At the same time, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and China were confirmed to have made acquisitions and planned acquisitions for uranium from Niger. Libya invested in Niger Uranium Industry and assisted in clandestine export operations. These clandestine export operations allowed countries with undeclared nuclear programs to build uranium stockpile. International Atomic Energy Agency found 2,600 tones of uranium in Libya. Even so, Niger was Libya supplier for uranium and only 1,500 tones is accounted for. The General Directorate for External Security has been uncharacteristically quiet. The uranium mines in Niger are run by the General Directorate for External Security and Areva, Niger is also a former French colony.
General Directorate for External Security may be the source for the Secret Intelligence Service, but the Secret Intelligence Service is protecting those General Directorate for External Security sources because the information exchange was not authorized.
Second Post, First Posted on Monday, February 17, 2003.
General Directorate for External Security may be the source for the Secret Intelligence Service, but the Secret Intelligence Service is protecting those General Directorate for External Security sources because the information exchange was not authorized.
Second Post, First Posted on Monday, February 17, 2003.
Friday, July 22, 2005
U.N. General Assembly and Terrorism
U.N. General Assembly has been studying the adoption of The Comprehensive Convention On International Terrorism. Outcome remains in doubt due to the definition of terrorism. However, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan is urging that the U.N. General Assembly to “unite behind the clear definition of terrorism” proposed by U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. That panel called for a definition that would make it clear that “any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” This definition of terrorism is supported by the G-8 and other governments. However, this definition of terrorism is not supported by several Middle East governments and other governments that continue to support so called “freedom fighters” even though they continue to employ terrorism tactics.
U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee
U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee continues to languish from a lack of direction and qualified staff. U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee is a platform for mutual assistance and international cooperation in tracking down and prosecuting terrorists and charged with assisting member countries in drafting new laws and regulations to combat terrorism. U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee efforts were dissipated by an inability to engage countries in any meaningful dialogue concerning their counter-terrorism activities. The U.N. Security Council sought revitalization of U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee with a new mandate in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566. Even so, U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee continues to languish from a lack of direction and qualified staff.
U.N. Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee
Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee is charged with maintaining and disseminating a list al Qaeda and Taliban members, and associated individuals and entities. This list provides the basis for action against these individuals and entities which includes imposing and policing specific sanctions measures aimed at freezing their assets, curbing their mobility, and cutting off their access to weapons and explosives. A new draft has more precise criteria for designating these individuals and entities on this list. However, the new draft must not create such additional criteria that the list becomes more time consuming and more difficult to make. The new draft also requests that Interpol integrate the list into its own database. Absent from the new draft is any provisions that would expand and tighten the measures now applied to al Qaeda and Taliban members, associates, and entities. An earlier draft sought provisions to strengthen the role of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee monitoring team by charging it with identifying countries which failed to implement the measures. This provision was dropped in the face of political opposition. The result is that the new draft continues to retain close Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee control over the monitoring team and reducing any likelihood of an effective name and shame role. These control measures include requirements that the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee monitoring team submit a comprehensive program of work to the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee for its review, approval, consult with governments prior to traveling to their country, consult with such governments again following any trip and take into account their comments with regard to any references made concerning the report, and the monitoring teams final reports are subject to debate, review, and approval by the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee before issuance and release.
Thursday, July 21, 2005
The Comprehensive Convention On International Terrorism
New draft of The Comprehensive Convention On International Terrorism has a clear and unequivocal definition of terrorism. The Comprehensive Convention On International Terrorism also strengthens and reinvigorates the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee.
Sunday, July 17, 2005
United States Joint Operations and United States Navy
The United States Navy is going to create a United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion. The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will execute commando raid operations, maritime interdiction operations, and other combat operations. The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will also provide the United States Navy with a ground force for small scale and remote operations not large enough for the United States Marine Corps. The battalion would be made up of about 600 United States Navy Sailors and is to be operational by 2007. At the same time, the United States Navy is unclear as to who will train the United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion in combat tactics and how they would be manned.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion is one of many new capabilities the United States Navy will develop in a few years to contribute more to the War on Terrorism and increase the relevance of the United States Navy. The United States Navy has to fight more and more for money and influence during a period in which the United States Navy is supreme on the seas and the War on Terrorism does not require a great deal out of the United States Navy in relation to the needs and operations of the United States Army, United States Marine Corps, and United States Air Force.
The United States Navy also has deployed certain amphibious units without any United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Units, all United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Units have been fully deployed in Iraq. United States Navy also views the United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion as a way to ease the strain on the United States Marine Corps.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion, a civil affairs battalion attached to construction forces by 2006, a reserve civil affairs battalion by 2007, an active reserve integrated structure for two helicopter combat support special squadrons by 2005, and a team that would exploit intelligence gathered from maritime interdictions by 2007, such actions and proposals by the United States Navy has been and are still questioned by United States Security and Strategic professionals and academics.
Proposals that are not afraid to experiment and challenge conventional wisdom is a healthily part of any effective and productive organization. However, the proposals and actions must reflect the knowing and understanding of the direction of change and the challenges to come.
The United States Navy and the rest of the United States Armed Forces know and understand that the United States will be involved in a variety of small scale conflicts at any given time, given the nature and structure of the War on Terrorism. United States Special Operation is not able to and cannot produce enough persons given operational reasons and given operations. There must be a middle ground between United States Special Operation and United States Conventional Forces.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will not relieve the United States Marine Corps. However, United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will add increased capability and credibility to small scale forces elsewhere while the majority of the United States Armed Forces is tied down in Iraq. Even so, the precedent these proposals and actions set is a difficult one. One of the major elements in training, developing, and promoting the current generation of military officers is jointness. The War on Terrorism requires integrated operations. Institutional self interest might and will challenge this change in an attempt to keep as many assets and influences in house, will increase operational difficulties on the War on Terrorism by bloated and fraudulent equipment and support contracts, duplication of operations, counterproductive and differing doctrines and training structures, and operational security nightmares.
If the United States Navy wants to become more relevant on the War on Terrorism, improve abilities to hit high value targets on land from the sea, develop a viable theatre ballistic missile defense system that operates from the sea, and improve intelligence gathering and sharing capability from the sea.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion is one of many new capabilities the United States Navy will develop in a few years to contribute more to the War on Terrorism and increase the relevance of the United States Navy. The United States Navy has to fight more and more for money and influence during a period in which the United States Navy is supreme on the seas and the War on Terrorism does not require a great deal out of the United States Navy in relation to the needs and operations of the United States Army, United States Marine Corps, and United States Air Force.
The United States Navy also has deployed certain amphibious units without any United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Units, all United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Units have been fully deployed in Iraq. United States Navy also views the United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion as a way to ease the strain on the United States Marine Corps.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion, a civil affairs battalion attached to construction forces by 2006, a reserve civil affairs battalion by 2007, an active reserve integrated structure for two helicopter combat support special squadrons by 2005, and a team that would exploit intelligence gathered from maritime interdictions by 2007, such actions and proposals by the United States Navy has been and are still questioned by United States Security and Strategic professionals and academics.
Proposals that are not afraid to experiment and challenge conventional wisdom is a healthily part of any effective and productive organization. However, the proposals and actions must reflect the knowing and understanding of the direction of change and the challenges to come.
The United States Navy and the rest of the United States Armed Forces know and understand that the United States will be involved in a variety of small scale conflicts at any given time, given the nature and structure of the War on Terrorism. United States Special Operation is not able to and cannot produce enough persons given operational reasons and given operations. There must be a middle ground between United States Special Operation and United States Conventional Forces.
The United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will not relieve the United States Marine Corps. However, United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion will add increased capability and credibility to small scale forces elsewhere while the majority of the United States Armed Forces is tied down in Iraq. Even so, the precedent these proposals and actions set is a difficult one. One of the major elements in training, developing, and promoting the current generation of military officers is jointness. The War on Terrorism requires integrated operations. Institutional self interest might and will challenge this change in an attempt to keep as many assets and influences in house, will increase operational difficulties on the War on Terrorism by bloated and fraudulent equipment and support contracts, duplication of operations, counterproductive and differing doctrines and training structures, and operational security nightmares.
If the United States Navy wants to become more relevant on the War on Terrorism, improve abilities to hit high value targets on land from the sea, develop a viable theatre ballistic missile defense system that operates from the sea, and improve intelligence gathering and sharing capability from the sea.
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